Montanans Against Assisted Suicide v. Board of Medical Examiners ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                             April 28 2015
    DA 14-0090
    Case Number: DA 14-0090
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    
    2015 MT 112
    MONTANANS AGAINST ASSISTED SUICIDE (MAAS),
    a Montana Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation,
    Petitioner and Appellant,
    v.
    BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS,
    MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUSTRY,
    Respondent and Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the First Judicial District,
    In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. ADV-2012-1057
    Honorable Mike Menahan, Presiding Judge
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Craig D. Charlton, Charlton Law Firm, PLLC; Helena, Montana
    Margaret K. Dore, Law Offices of Margaret K. Dore, PS; Seattle,
    Washington
    For Appellee:
    Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Michael L. Fanning, Special
    Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: March 25, 2015
    Decided: April 28, 2015
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Justice Michael E Wheat delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1      Montanans Against Assisted Suicide (MAAS) appeals from the order of the
    Montana First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, dismissing as moot
    MAAS’s petition for declaratory judgment and equitable relief. We affirm.
    ISSUE
    ¶2      We review the following issue: Did the District Court err when it dismissed
    MAAS’s petition as moot?
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶3      On December 31, 2009, we issued our opinion in Baxter v. State, 
    2009 MT 449
    ,
    
    354 Mont. 234
    , 
    224 P.3d 1211
    . We held “that under § 45-2-211, MCA, a terminally ill
    patient’s consent to physician aid in dying constitutes a statutory defense to a charge of
    homicide against the aiding physician when no other consent exceptions apply.” Baxter,
    ¶ 50.
    ¶4      The Board of Medical Examiners (Board) is the occupation and licensing board
    for healthcare professionals within the Montana Department of Labor and Industry. At
    the request of two medical doctors, the Board drafted a “position statement” explaining
    the effect of our decision in Baxter on its discipline policy for physicians participating in
    “aid-in-dying.” On January 12, 2012, a committee of the Board gave notice to interested
    persons of a final position statement draft. The Board adopted an amended version of
    that draft on January 20, 2012, and it posted the final version, which it titled “Position
    Statement No. 20” (Position Statement), on its website.
    2
    ¶5     MAAS is a Montana nonprofit public benefit corporation. Its core purpose is to
    oppose assisted suicide and euthanasia. On March 12, 2012, MAAS asked the Board to
    vacate the Position Statement and to remove it from the Board’s website. The Board
    revised the Position Statement on March 16, 2012, but it did not comply with MAAS’s
    request.   MAAS repeated its request on July 6, 2012.          The request was again
    unsuccessful, and on September 27, 2012, MAAS filed a petition with the Board. In the
    petition, MAAS sought a declaratory ruling that the Position Statement was invalid. On
    November 16, 2012, the Board held a hearing on the petition. It denied the petition
    shortly thereafter.
    ¶6     On December 17, 2012, MAAS filed a petition in the District Court for judicial
    review of the Board’s decision. MAAS claimed that the Board exceeded its authority by
    adopting the Position Statement. It asked the District Court for declaratory judgment to
    that effect and for an order requiring the Board to vacate the Position Statement. On
    September 20, 2013, while this matter was pending before the District Court, the Board
    adopted a motion to rescind all of its position statements, including Position Statement
    No. 20, and it removed the statements from its website. The Board then filed a motion in
    the District Court asking the court to dismiss the case. The Board argued that once it
    rescinded the Position Statement the case was rendered moot. The District Court agreed,
    and dismissed MAAS’s petition on December 13, 2013. MAAS appeals this order.
    3
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶7     Mootness, as an issue of justiciability, presents a question of law. We review
    questions of law de novo. Reichert v. State, 
    2012 MT 111
    , ¶ 20, 
    365 Mont. 92
    , 278 P.3d.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8     Did the District Court err when it dismissed MAAS’s petition as moot?
    ¶9     MAAS argues that its case was not rendered moot when the Board withdrew the
    Position Statement, and, regardless, that the case should be allowed to go forward based
    on exceptions to our mootness rules. In response, the Board argues that the case has been
    rendered moot and that any decision on the merits of the case would result in an
    unacceptable advisory opinion. It argues that the District Court was correct to dismiss
    the case for this reason. We agree.
    ¶10    The judicial power of Montana courts “is limited to justiciable controversies.”
    Plan Helena, Inc. v. Helena Reg’l Airport Auth. Bd., 
    2010 MT 26
    , ¶ 6, 
    355 Mont. 142
    ,
    
    226 P.3d 567
    . For this reasons, justiciability is a threshold issue. Clark v. Roosevelt
    Cnty., 
    2007 MT 44
    , ¶ 11, 
    336 Mont. 118
    , 
    154 P.3d 48
    . A justiciable controversy is “one
    upon which a court’s judgment will effectively operate, as distinguished from a dispute
    invoking a purely political, administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion.” Plan
    Helena, Inc., ¶ 8 (quoting Clark, ¶ 11) (internal quotation marks omitted).          The
    requirement serves to prevent Montana courts from rendering advisory opinions, which
    we have consistently held exceed the authority of Montana courts. See Plan Helena, Inc.,
    ¶ 9.
    4
    ¶11    Mootness is a category of justiciability. Plan Helena, Inc., ¶ 8. We have often
    described mootness as the “doctrine of standing set in a time frame,” stating that “[t]he
    requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation
    (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” E.g., Greater Missoula
    Area Fed’n of Early Childhood Educators v. Child Start, Inc., 
    2009 MT 362
    , ¶ 23, 
    353 Mont. 201
    , 
    219 P.3d 881
    ; Havre Daily News, LLC v. City of Havre, 
    2006 MT 215
    , ¶ 31,
    
    333 Mont. 331
    , 
    142 P.3d 864
    . A matter is moot when “a court’s judgment will not
    effectively operate to grant relief.”    Clark, ¶ 11.    “The fundamental question to be
    answered in any review of possible mootness is ‘whether it is possible to grant some form
    of effective relief to the appellant.’” Briese v. Mont. Pub. Employees’ Retirement Bd.,
    
    2012 MT 192
    , ¶ 14, 
    366 Mont. 148
    , 
    285 P.3d 550
     (quoting Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v.
    Stuivenga, 
    2012 MT 75
    , ¶ 37, 
    364 Mont. 390
    , 
    276 P.3d 867
    ).
    ¶12    The matter MAAS presented to the District Court was the validity of the Position
    Statement.   MAAS claimed that the Position Statement was a rule promulgated in
    violation of the Board’s authority, and MAAS asked the District Court to declare the rule
    invalid, to order the Board to vacate the Position Statement, and to order the Board to
    remove the statement from its website.        By rescinding the Position Statement and
    removing it from the Board’s website, the Board effectively granted MAAS the relief it
    sought, and it left the District Court with no effective relief to grant, rendering the matter
    moot. In Clark, we held that the case was moot after a government entity returned the
    property that the plaintiff claimed was illegally seized. We reasoned that “a judgment by
    this Court regarding the issue raised on appeal – i.e., whether the District Court erred in
    5
    determining that probable cause existed for the seizure . . . – would have no practical
    impact on the matter of [the petitioner’s] entitlement to have her property returned.”
    Clark, ¶ 12. Similarly, any judgment the District Court could have rendered in the
    present case would not have had any practical impact on the continued validity of the
    Position Statement after the Board rescinded the Position Statement. The Board would
    not have been required to take any additional remedial measures in the face of any
    judgment, since it had already rescinded the Position Statement and removed the Position
    Statement from its website. For these reasons, no judgment of the District Court would
    have effectively operated to grant relief and the matter was moot. Clark, ¶¶ 11-12.
    ¶13    We do not agree with MAAS’s argument that reconsidering and overruling our
    decision in Baxter would provide effective relief in this case. MAAS argues that the
    Position Statement was an interpretation of our decision in Baxter, and that overruling
    Baxter would be an effective remedy. But, our continued adherence to Baxter is not the
    issue in this case, nor would overturning that case grant relief – effective or otherwise –
    to the parties. To begin with, overruling our precedent is not an action other Montana
    courts can make. See State v. Whitehorn, 
    2002 MT 54
    , ¶ 14, 
    309 Mont. 63
    , 
    50 P.3d 121
    .
    The District Court, therefore, could not have granted relief by overruling Baxter. More
    importantly, overruling precedent is a collateral result of a decision on the merits of a
    subsequent case. It is merely a potential consequence of our analysis when considering
    whether to grant relief. Overruling precedent is not relief in and of itself. To hold
    otherwise would allow parties to seek, as MAAS does now, opinions concerning the
    meaning of our decisions by presenting little more than hypothetical grievances or
    6
    conceptual disagreement with a holding of this Court. Opinions rendered in such cases
    would be advisory opinions, which are beyond the power of this Court to render. Plan
    Helena, Inc., ¶¶ 9-11. As we do not reconsider our prior decisions outside of the context
    of a controversy and “live” request for relief, MAAS’s argument that overruling Baxter
    would provide effective relief is incorrect for the same reasons as discussed above. Plan
    Helena, Inc., ¶ 10.    Namely, the Position Statement has already been rescinded, no
    judgment of the District Court could grant effective relief, and there is no longer a “live”
    request for relief.
    ¶14    MAAS argues that, in spite of the foregoing, we should allow its case to proceed
    for either of two reasons. First, MAAS argues that we have considered otherwise moot
    matters where the issues are of special importance to the public interest. MAAS contends
    that “the issues regarding Baxter . . . have important implications for the public interest,”
    and that we should let this case proceed and render an opinion on the meaning of that
    case. As discussed above, such an opinion would be advisory. It would be an opinion on
    the merits of a decision without the benefit of concrete facts or adversarial development
    of arguments. We will not render such an advisory opinion. Plan Helena, Inc., ¶¶ 9-11.
    We have never held that any exception to mootness will allow us to reconsider in the
    abstract a decision of this Court.
    ¶15    Second, MAAS argues that the Board, despite voluntarily ceasing the action
    alleged to be wrongful in this case, may freely repeat the action in the absence of a
    judgment. It argues that we should allow the case to proceed for this reason. We have,
    as MAAS notes, recognized that cases may proceed where they would otherwise have
    7
    been rendered moot by a defendant’s voluntary cessation of the challenged action. E.g.,
    Havre Daily News, LLC, ¶¶ 38-40. We have stated that courts may “rule on non-extant
    controversies in order to provide guidance concerning the legality of expected future
    conduct.” Havre Daily News, LLC, ¶ 38. We have, however, allowed courts to do so
    only in the limited circumstances where the defendant has voluntarily ceased the alleged
    wrong; where it is “reasonable to expect the ‘same wrong’ to recur, such that a ruling on
    the merits would be of . . . discernible future benefit to the litigants or the interests of
    judicial economy”; and where the reasonableness of such recurrence is supported by
    evidence, rather than speculation or allegation alone. Havre Daily News, LLC, ¶¶ 38-40.
    ¶16    In this case, there is no evidence indicating that it is reasonable to expect the same
    wrong to occur. The alleged wrong in this case was the Board’s interpretation of an
    opinion of this Court in a document the Board promulgated in excess of its authority. See
    Havre Daily News, LLC, ¶ 38 n.9 (stating that a wrong is the same only if it presents a
    “substantially identical constellation of facts”). There is no indication that the Board will
    repeat such behavior in the future. MAAS has not provided any evidence that the Board
    has repeatedly issued rules interpreting decisions of this Court or that it otherwise
    regularly exceeds its authority.    MAAS does not allege any other past instances of
    improper rulemaking and it does not point to any reasons that the Board would continue
    to promulgate rules in excess of its authority. Meanwhile, the Board has rescinded all of
    its position statements, and there is no indication that the Board will continue to issue
    position statements of any kind or undertake to interpret Baxter. Faced with such a lack
    of “concrete evidence suggesting that [the defendant] will perpetrate a substantially
    8
    similar wrong,” we have refused to apply the voluntary cessation exception to mootness,
    Havre Daily News, LLC, ¶ 40, and we refuse to apply the exception today.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶17   For the foregoing reasons, the matter before the District Court was rendered moot
    when the Board rescinded the Position Statement. The District Court was correct to
    dismiss the case. We affirm.
    /S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
    We Concur:
    /S/ MIKE McGRATH
    /S/ BETH BAKER
    /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
    /S/ JIM RICE
    9