State v. W. Rossbach ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                                               08/09/2016
    DA 15-0393
    Case Number: DA 15-0393
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    
    2016 MT 189
    STATE OF MONTANA,
    Plaintiff and Appellee,
    v.
    WILLIAM GEORGE ROSSBACH,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM:            District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District,
    In and For the County of Lake, Cause No. DC-01-60
    Honorable James A. Manley, Presiding Judge
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, Alexander H. Pyle, Assistant
    Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
    For Appellee:
    Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss,
    Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
    Steven Eschenbacher, Lake County Attorney, Benjamin Anciaux, Deputy
    County Attorney, Polson, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: May 25, 2016
    Decided: August 9, 2016
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Chief Justice McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1     The Appellant, William George Rossbach (“Rossbach”), appeals from a 2015
    judgment and sentence in the District Court for the Twentieth Judicial District, Lake
    County. We affirm.
    ISSUE PRESENTED
    ¶2     Did the District Court err in denying Rossbach’s motion to dismiss the revocation
    of his sentence pursuant to § 46-23-1012(2), MCA?
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶3     Rossbach pled guilty to a robbery in 2001. The District Court sentenced Rossbach
    to fifteen years at the Montana State Prison with eleven years suspended, subject to
    conditions. Since 2001 the District Court has revoked Rossbach’s sentence three times.
    The latest revocation occurred in May 2015 and is the basis for this appeal.
    ¶4     Rossbach was discharged to probationary supervision from the Crossroads
    Correctional Center in April 2014. Probation Officer Amy Rehbein (“Rehbein”) was
    familiar with Rossbach and testified to Rossbach’s initial attempts to comply with the
    conditions of his release. However, after using methamphetamines, Rossbach became
    unpredictable and violated several conditions of his probation.      On March 4, 2015,
    Rehbein faxed an Authorization to Pick Up and Hold Probationer (also known as a “field
    warrant”) to the Lake County Detention Center. The field warrant included statements
    that detailed Rossbach’s probation violations and an authorization to arrest and hold him.
    Rossbach was arrested and placed in the Lake County Detention Center on March 6,
    approximately 36 hours after the field warrant was faxed to the detention center. The
    2
    Lake County attorney filed a formal petition to revoke in the District Court on March 12,
    2015.
    ¶5      Rossbach filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the State did
    not comply with the statutory procedure set forth in § 46-23-1012(2), MCA. The District
    Court denied the motion to dismiss at a hearing on May 6, revoked his probation and
    sentenced Rossbach to the Department of Corrections for four years with credit for time
    served.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶6      We review a district court’s interpretation and application of a statute de novo.
    State v. Triplett, 
    2008 MT 360
    , ¶ 13, 
    346 Mont. 383
    , 
    195 P.3d 819
    . Our review of a
    conclusion of law is plenary; thus, we determine on appeal whether a district court’s
    application of the law is correct. State v. Johnson, 
    2001 MT 277
    , ¶ 7, 
    307 Mont. 317
    , 
    37 P.3d 701
    .
    DISCUSSION
    ¶7      Did the District Court err in denying Rossbach’s motion to dismiss the revocation
    of his sentence pursuant to § 46-23-1012(2), MCA?
    ¶8      In interpreting a statute this Court looks to the plain meaning of the language
    included therein. State v. Strong, 
    2015 MT 251
    , ¶ 13, 
    380 Mont. 471
    , 
    356 P.3d 1078
    (citing Infinity Ins. Co. v. Dodson, 
    2000 MT 287
    , ¶ 46, 
    302 Mont. 209
    , 
    14 P.3d 487
    ). We
    also follow Montana’s maxims of jurisprudence, which oblige us to disregard trifles,
    interpret the law reasonably, and avoid requiring idle acts. See §§ 1-3-223, -224, -233,
    MCA.
    3
    ¶9     Individuals on probation have diminished liberty interests and are subject to stark
    sanctions for violations of conditions of probation. See State v. Macker, 
    2014 MT 3
    , ¶ 9,
    
    373 Mont. 199
    , 
    317 P.3d 150
    .         Accordingly, § 46-23-1012(2), MCA, authorizes a
    probation officer to arrest a probationer without a warrant if the probationer has “in the
    judgment of the probation . . . officer, violated the conditions of probation.”
    Furthermore, “[a] written statement or oral authorization delivered with the probationer
    by the arresting officer to the official in charge of a detention center is sufficient warrant
    for the detention of the probationer if the probation and parole officer delivers the written
    statement within 12 hours of the probationer’s arrest.” Section 46-23-1012(2), MCA.
    ¶10    In this case, Rehbein faxed a written statement thirty-six hours before Rossbach
    was arrested and held in the Lake County Detention Center. Rossbach contends on
    appeal that the State did not follow the statutory procedure as stated in § 46-23-1012(2),
    MCA, because the written statement was not delivered to the detention center between
    the moment of his arrest and twelve hours later. He contends that the State did not
    comply with the plain meaning of the statute.
    ¶11    Implicit in Rossbach’s appeal is the suggestion that the District Court’s denial of
    his motion rises to the level of a Due Process violation. A revocation hearing is not a
    criminal trial, but a civil proceeding in which the “offender is not entitled to the full
    spectrum of rights and protections that exist in a criminal trial.” State v. Finley, 
    2003 MT 239
    , ¶ 31, 
    317 Mont. 268
    , 
    77 P.3d 193
    . Section 46-23-1012(2), MCA, is written so the
    “official in charge of a detention center” receives, no later than twelve hours after the
    arrest sufficient cause to hold the probationer. The statute does not require service of the
    4
    statement on the probationer. Section 46-23-1012(2), MCA. The purpose of the statute
    is to give the detention center timely written authority to hold the probationer, and does
    not impose an additional due process obligation upon the probation officer for the benefit
    of the defendant.1 The early delivery of the notice did not prejudice any of Rossbach’s
    rights.
    ¶12       While it is accurate that the specific language used in the statute requires delivery
    of the statement “within 12 hours of the probationer’s arrest,” nothing in the statute
    precludes the probation officer from filing an earlier notice. Section 46-23-1012(2),
    MCA. Considering the evident purpose of the statute, a reasonable construction of
    “within 12 hours” can accommodate the interpretation that the notice must be delivered
    no later than twelve hours after arrest.2 Statutory language should be interpreted so as to
    carry out its intended purpose. S.L.H. v. State Comp. Mut. Ins. Fund, 
    2000 MT 362
    , ¶ 16,
    
    303 Mont. 364
    , 
    15 P.3d 948
     (citing United States Nat’l Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am.,
    Inc., 
    508 U.S. 439
    , 455, 
    113 S. Ct. 2173
    , 2182 (1993)).
    ¶13       Rossbach’s analysis suggests that if Rehbein had delivered the same field warrant
    a second time twelve hours after his arrest rather than thirty-six hours before, the State
    would have complied with the statute. Such an interpretation of § 46-23-1012(2), MCA,
    1
    If the field warrant is not delivered within twelve hours following the arrest, the
    detention facility would be free to release the prisoner.
    2
    The word “within” serves to limit the length of time during which an action is
    allowable. The term is often used this way in statutes of limitations. See, e.g., Cobb v. Saltiel,
    
    2009 MT 171
    , ¶¶ 26-27, 
    350 Mont. 501
    , 
    210 P.3d 138
    ; Anderson v. BNSF Ry., 
    2015 MT 240
    ,
    ¶ 9, 
    380 Mont. 319
    , 
    354 P.3d 1248
    ; Johnston v. Centennial Log Homes & Furnishings, Inc.,
    
    2013 MT 179
    , ¶ 61, 
    370 Mont. 529
    , 
    305 P.3d 781
     (J. McKinnon dissenting). Such statutes
    require a complaint to be filed no later than the end date provided.
    5
    is unreasonable, serves no evident purpose, and would require an idle act which we will
    not read into to the statute. Sections 1-3-223, -224, -233, MCA.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶14   For the foregoing reasons, we cannot agree that the District Court erred in denying
    the motion to revoke the petition. The District Court’s Judgment of May 7, 2015, is
    affirmed.
    /S/ MIKE McGRATH
    We Concur:
    /S/ BETH BAKER
    /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
    /S/ LAURIE McKINNON
    /S/ JIM RICE
    6