Montana Department of Administration v. Ekanger , 54 State Rptr. 821 ( 1997 )


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  • 96-488
    No. 96-488
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    1997
    MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION,
    Petitioner and Respondent,
    v.
    LAURIE EKANGER, Commissioner of Labor and
    Industry, Montana Department of Labor and Industry;
    THE LABORERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
    NORTH AMERICA-MONTANA DISTRICT COUNCIL
    OF LABORERS; INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
    OPERATING ENGINEERS; UNITED BROTHERHOOD
    OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA;
    EDSALL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; and
    BERNARD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
    Respondents and Appellants.
    APPEAL FROM:                  District Court of the First Judicial District,
    In and for the County of Lewis & Clark,
    The Honorable Dorothy McCarter, Judge presiding.
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellants:
    Daniel B. McGregor, Department of Labor and Industry, Helena, Montana
    Karl J. Englund, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana
    For Respondent:
    Kelly A. Jenkins, Department of Administration, Helena, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: March 27, 1997
    Decided:               August 7, 1997
    Filed:
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    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    Laurie Ekanger (Ekanger), Commissioner of Labor and Industry of the State of
    Montana, appeals from the First Judicial District Courtþs order which reversed the
    Department of Laborþs order awarding þheavyþ and þhighwayþ pay rates to workers
    constructing underground tunnels at Montana State University (MSU). We reverse the
    decision of the District Court and remand for determination of appropriate
    compensation
    consistent with þheavyþ and þhighwayþ rates under the Little Davis-Bacon Act,      18-
    2-
    401 et seq., MCA.
    We address the following issue on appeal:
    Are the Edsall and Barnard tunnels "heavy" construction projects under
    Montana's Little Davis-Bacon Act,    18-2-401(5), MCA ?
    BACKGROUND
    Montana law divides prevailing wage classifications for laborers into three
    categories: heavy construction, highway construction and other types of construction
    (i.e., building). Wages for heavy and highway workers are set at one rate in Montana
    and wages for "other" (building) workers are set at a second rate. Sections 18-2-401
    (5)
    and (7), MCA, provide:
    (5) "Heavy and highway construction wage rates" means wage rates,
    including fringe benefits for health and welfare and pension contributions,
    that meet the requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
    of 1974 and other bona fide programs approved by the United States
    department of labor and travel allowance that are determined and
    established statewide for heavy and highway construction projects, such as
    alteration or repair of roads, streets, highways, alleys, runways, trails,
    parking areas, or utility rights-of-way.
    . . . .
    (7) (a)
    "Standard prevailing rate of wages" or "standard prevailing
    wage" means:
    (i) the heavy and highway construction wage rates applicable to
    heavy and highway construction projects; or
    (ii) those wages, other than heavy and highway construction wages,
    including fringe benefits for health and welfare and pension contributions,
    that meet the requirements of the Employee Retirement Security Act of
    1974 and other bona fide programs approved by the United States
    department of labor and travel allowance that are paid in the district by
    other contractors for work of a similar character performed in that district
    by each craft, classification, or type of worker needed to complete a
    contract under this part. In each district, the standard prevailing rate of
    wages is a weighted average wage rate based on all of the hours worked on
    work of a similar character performed in the district.
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    The instant case involves the appropriate prevailing wage for laborers working
    on
    two separate construction projects at MSU. Specifically, this case involves a
    dispute as
    to whether construction workers should receive the þheavyþ construction wage which is
    generally $3.00 to $4.00 per hour greater than the building construction wage rate.
    The
    first of these projects was formally known as þUnderground Utility Phase II, Montana
    State University.þ For purposes of brevity, this project will be referred to as the
    þBarnard Tunnelþ as it was eventually constructed by Barnard Construction. The
    second
    project was officially known as the þEngineering/Physical Sciences Building, Utility
    Tunnel.þ This project will be referred to as the þEdsall Tunnelþ as Edsall
    Construction
    Company contracted to build this second tunnel.
    At MSU, many of the buildings are heated with steam from a central heating
    plant.
    Steam is carried in underground pipelines to buildings connected to the plant. Both
    the
    Edsall and Barnard Tunnels were constructed to house steam and condensate pipes in
    order to protect them from degradation and make them more accessible for maintenance
    and repair. The Edsall and Barnard Tunnels are of similar design and are entirely
    underground. Inside both tunnels are metal frames used to support the steam and
    condensate pipelines and electrical overhead lights. Neither tunnel has a heating or
    cooling system, windows, flooring or internal finished walls or any plumbing,
    plumbing
    system or bathrooms.
    While the Edsall and Barnard Tunnels were being constructed, the Labor Standards
    Bureau of the Montana Department of Labor and Industry (Department) received an
    inquiry from Laborersþ International Union of North America, Montana District Council
    of Laborers (Laborers) concerning the appropriate wage rate for construction on the
    tunnels. In addition, the Department received a number of complaints from individual
    construction workers employed on these two projects. Following an investigation, the
    Department determined that these projects were not conventional buildings and,
    therefore,
    should have been classified as þheavyþ construction projects for purposes of
    determining
    the appropriate prevailing wage. The Department made the following finding:
    [A] review of the projectþs nature distinguishes it from a building. Few,
    if any, buildings in Montana are entirely underground, and in the case of
    the Barnard portion extend over approximately 600 yards through a major
    portion of the university campus. Few, if any buildings, lack windows, any
    type of conventional roofing, living or storage space, internal wood or steel
    framing (other than the utility support structures), doors, plumbing, and
    heating or cooling systems. Few, if any buildings, have an internal
    drainage system (gutters) in case of flooding through excess ground water
    or sump pump failure. Few, if any buildings, are constructed entirely of
    concrete and reinforcing steel. Indeed, few, if any buildings, are built
    entirely within the confines of a continuous trench running approximately
    600 yards in length, an estimated 60 feet in width at ground level . . . .
    This is not a building in any conventional sense of the word.
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    After coming to the above conclusion, the Department found the contracting agency,
    the
    Architecture and Engineering Division of the Montana Department of Administration
    (AEDMDA), was responsible for back pay and future pay resulting from the wage
    differences. AEDMDA filed an appeal of the Departmentþs determination and a
    contested
    case hearing was held before a Department hearing officer Joseph V. Maronick
    (Maronick). Maronick entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order which
    affirmed the Departmentþs determination and directed AEDMDA to compensate
    construction workers at the þheavy constructionþ wage rate. AEDMDA appealed this
    decision to the District Court.
    After each party briefed and orally argued this matter, the District Court
    issued
    an order reversing the Departmentþs determination. The District Court held that the
    Department had misapplied Montanaþs Little Davis-Bacon Act,     18-2-401(7), MCA, and
    that its decision to award þheavy constructionþ wages was erroneous. Ekanger, in her
    position as Commissioner of the Department of Labor and Industry, appeals from the
    District Courtþs order.
    DISCUSSION
    Are the Edsall and Barnard tunnels "heavy" construction projects under
    Montana's Little Davis-Bacon Act,   18-2-401(5), MCA?
    We are called upon to review the District Court's application of the Little
    Davis-
    Bacon Act to the undisputed facts of this case. The standard of review of a district
    courtþs
    conclusions of law is whether the courtþs interpretation of the law is correct.
    Carbon
    County v. Union Reserve Coal Co. (1995), 
    271 Mont. 459
    , 469, 
    898 P.2d 680
    , 686; see
    also Kreger v. Francis (1995), 
    271 Mont. 444
    , 
    898 P.2d 672
    ; Steer, Inc. v. Depþt of
    Revenue (1990), 
    245 Mont. 470
    , 474-75, 
    803 P.2d 601
    , 603-04.
    Montana's Little Davis-Bacon Act defines three categories of wage rates: heavy
    construction, highway construction and "other" types of construction. Sections 18-2-
    401(5) and (7), MCA. The District Court held that this statute was unambiguous and
    explained that the Barnard and Edsall tunnel projects did not qualify as "heavy or
    highway" construction under    18-2-401(5), MCA, which defines "heavy and highway
    construction wage rates" as applying to:
    projects, such as alteration or repair of roads, streets, highways, alleys,
    runways, trails, parking areas, or utility rights-of-way.
    In interpreting the above statute, the court reasoned that, with the exception
    of
    "utility rights-of-way," the examples given all relate to roads and highways. The
    projects
    in question were obviously not in the nature of a road or highway. The appellant,
    however, argues that the projects are "utility rights-of-way." In response to this
    argument, the court noted that, although the term "utility rights-of-way" is not
    defined
    in Title 18, it is defined in Title 60 as:
    "Right of way" is a general term denoting land, property, or any interest
    in land or property, usually in a strip, acquired for or devoted to highway
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    purposes.
    Section 60-1-103(23), MCA. The court also relied on the definition of "right of way"
    in Black's Law Dictionary 1326 (6th ed. 1990) as,
    a right belonging to a party to pass over land of another, but it is also used
    to describe that strip of land upon which railroad companies construct their
    road bed, and, when so used, the term refers to the land itself, not the right
    of passage over it.
    Based upon these definitions of "right of way," the court concluded: "Simply stated,
    a
    'right of way' is only an interest in the land or the use of the land, and does not
    include
    utilities or other projects located on it." Since the tunnel projects were not road
    related
    and were not "utility rights-of-way" (i.e. interests in land), the court concluded
    that the
    tunnels "do not fit within any of the enumerated examples" of heavy or highway
    construction. We determine that the District Court 's use of this definition of
    "utility
    rights-of-way" in the context of the Little Davis-Bacon Act is erroneous. It makes
    no
    sense to define "utility rights-of-way," as that term is used in        18-2-401(5), MCA,
    as
    "only an interest in land." The relevant portion of       18-2-401(5), MCA, includes
    "utility
    rights-of-way" in its examples of "heavy and highway construction
    projects." (Emphasis
    added.) An "interest in land" cannot be considered as an example of a "project" in
    any
    sense of the word. An interest in land exists by virtue of law; it is not
    "constructed"
    through wage labor. As used in      18-2-401(5), MCA's list of projects, "utility
    rights-of-
    way" clearly denotes something that is built or constructed through labor.
    Furthermore,
    a utility right-of-way is something other than a road or a highway. The District
    Court
    erred in concluding that       18-2-401(5), MCA, has application only to matters related
    to
    roads or highways. It applies as well to projects in which "utility rights-of-way"
    are
    constructed through labor.
    In construing any statute, the goal is to ascertain and implement the
    legislatureþs
    intent. Burritt v. City of Butte (1973), 
    161 Mont. 530
    , 
    508 P.2d 563
    . Where the
    language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is nothing left for a court to
    construe. Keller v. Smith (1976), 
    170 Mont. 399
    , 
    553 P.2d 1002
    ; Dunphy v. Anaconda
    Co. (1968), 
    151 Mont. 76
    , 
    438 P.2d 660
    . Section 18-2-401(5), MCA, requires heavy
    and highway construction rates for projects:
    such as alteration or repair of roads, streets, highways, alleys, runways,
    trails, parking areas, or utility rights-of-way.
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    The use of the phrase þsuch asþ in listing projects requiring heavy construction wage
    rates reflects an intent that the list be inclusive rather than exclusive. Section
    18-2-
    401(5), MCA, is unambiguous in its inclusion of "utility rights-of-way" in the heavy
    and
    highway project classification.
    The Edsall and Barnard Tunnels are "utility rights-of-way" projects in which
    tunnels were constructed to house steam and condensate pipes in a protected
    underground
    corridor to provide heat to buildings on the MSU campus. As such, these projects are
    among the enumerated projects considered as "heavy construction" under     18-2-401(5),
    MCA.
    In summary, we hold that the Little Davis-Bacon Act heavy and highway
    construction wage rate clearly is not restricted to projects which are road or
    highway
    related. Rather, this wage rate has application to "heavy" projects involving
    utility rights-
    of-way such as the Edsall and Barnard Tunnels. The decision of the District Court is
    reversed and the matter is remanded for determination of appropriate back pay.
    /S/       W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
    We concur:
    /S/ JAMES C. NELSON
    /S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
    /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
    Justice Karla M. Gray, specially concurring.
    I concur in the result reached by the Court, namely, that the construction
    workers
    on the Edsall and Barnard Tunnel projects are entitled to be paid at heavy and
    highway
    construction wage rates. I do not agree with all that is said by the Court in
    reaching that
    result or with the Court's approach to the statutory definition of "heavy and highway
    construction wage rates."
    I do agree with the Court that the "such as" language in the    18-2-401(5), MCA,
    listing of projects requiring heavy and highway construction wage rates reflects a
    legislative intent that the list be inclusive rather than exclusive. Stated
    differently, the
    "such as" list is merely illustrative of the types of projects properly designated
    "heavy and
    highway construction" projects. That being the case, it is unnecessary for the
    Court to
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    "force feed" the Edsall and Barnard Tunnel projects into one of the actual categories
    listed in    18-2-401(5), MCA, and that approach results in a somewhat strained
    interpretation that these projects are "utility rights of way."
    Given the inclusive rather than exclusive listing contained in     18-2-401(5),
    MCA,
    all that is necessary to conclude that the workers in this case are entitled to
    heavy and
    highway construction wage rates is to establish that the projects are of the same
    type or
    nature as those listed in the statute. Here, that is a relatively easy task.
    The projects involved the demolition of existing, and construction of new,
    sidewalks and roads. Thus, in the language of the statute, they can be likened to
    heavy
    and highway construction projects involving "alteration or repair of roads,
    streets. . .[or]
    trails. . . ." More importantly, they involved underground tunnel work much more
    similar to utility pipeline and power line projects than to conventional building
    construction projects for which heavy and highway construction wage rates are not
    required. In addition, of course, the formal names of the Edsall and Barnard Tunnel
    projects--"Engineering/Physical Sciences Building, Utility Tunnel" and "Underground
    Utility Phase II, Montana State University," respectively--reflect that the projects
    were
    utility-type projects. That the projects were not located on utility rights of way
    does not
    change the nature of the projects.
    I would conclude that the Edsall and Barnard Tunnel projects are of the same
    type
    and nature as the projects listed in      18-2-401(5), MCA, for which heavy and highway
    construction wage rates are required. For that reason, I join the Court in
    reversing the
    District Court.
    /S/       KARLA M. GRAY
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Document Info

Docket Number: 96-488

Citation Numbers: 284 Mont. 151, 54 State Rptr. 821, 943 P.2d 994, 1997 Mont. LEXIS 165

Judges: Leaphart, Gray, Nelson, Hunt, Trieweiler

Filed Date: 8/7/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024