Aiking-Taylor v. Serang ( 2023 )

03/07/2023
DA 22-0393
Case Number: DA 22-0393
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2023 MT 41NANNELIES AIKING-TAYLOR,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
OLIVER SERANG,
Defendants and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV-19-1076
Honorable John W. Larson, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Annelies Aiking-Taylor, Self-represented, Missoula, Montana
For Appellee:
Louis C. Villemez, ASUM Legal Services, University of Montana,
Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 8, 2023
Decided: March 7, 2023
Filed:
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__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited and does not serve
as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s
quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Annelies Aiking-Taylor appeals from the Amended Judgment and Orders entered
by the District Court upon remand of this landlord-tenant matter, following this Court’s
Opinion in the first appeal. Aiking-Taylor v. Serang, 2021 MT 118N, 404 Mont. 554, 485
P.3d 746. There, this Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment in favor of tenant Oliver
Serang “in all respects,” including an award of $27,946.25 in attorney fees and $45 in costs,
“except for the $1,000 in statutory damages awarded to Serang for Aiking-Taylor’s two
MCPA [Montana Consumer Protection Act] violations,” which damages were reversed.
Aiking-Taylor, ¶¶ 16, 18. We reversed the MCPA damages because Serang had already
recovered the damages by withholding his last month’s rent payment. Aiking-Taylor, ¶ 16.
We did not reverse the judgment that Aiking-Taylor had twice violated the MCPA. In
affirming the attorney fee award, the Court cited the provisions of the MCPA and
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, as well as the written agreement between
Aiking-Taylor and Serang, which granted reasonable attorney fees and costs to the
prevailing party in litigation, and concluded that Serang was the prevailing party in this
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matter. Aiking-Taylor, ¶ 17.1 The case was remanded to the District Court for entry of an
amended judgment to that effect. Aiking-Taylor, ¶ 18.
¶3 On March 31, 2022, after remand, the District Court entered an Amended Judgment,
which stated that, pursuant to this Court’s Opinion in the first appeal, “[j]udgment in this
matter is amended to state that the District Court’s award of $1,000 in statutory damages
to Defendant Oliver Serang is withdrawn.” On April 28, 2022, Aiking-Taylor filed a
Motion to Amend the Amended Judgment, arguing that because the Amended Judgment
“awards no damages” to Serang, and Aiking-Taylor had been awarded $55.59 for an unpaid
utility bill, Aiking-Taylor was now the prevailing party and was entitled to her reasonable
attorney fees and costs, rather than Serang. On May 18, 2022, the District Court entered
an Order denying Aiking-Taylor’s motion to amend the judgment, reasoning that this Court
had upheld its judgment denying Aiking-Taylor’s damages claims.
¶4 On June 15, 2022, Aiking-Taylor filed a second motion to amend the Amended
Judgment, again arguing that Aiking-Taylor should be deemed the prevailing party as the
only party to be awarded damages, that being the $55.59 utility bill, and disagreeing with
a statement in the original Judgment that Serang had “agreed at all times to pay” the bill.
Aiking-Taylor also made extensive arguments about other issues previously decided in the
case. On June 22, 2022, the District Court entered an Order and Judgment denying the
second motion to amend the judgment, concluding Aiking-Taylor was engaging in
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We also noted that Aiking-Taylor had not challenged the reasonableness of the fees awarded by
the District Court. Aiking-Taylor, ¶ 17.
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frivolous efforts to challenge matters previously ruled upon by the District Court and this
Court, which had caused the court and counsel to expend time unnecessarily and to incur
additional fees. The District Court declared Aiking-Taylor to be a vexatious litigant and,
in consequence, granted Serang $1,260 in attorney fees for having to respond to
Aiking-Taylor’s filings, which Serang had requested, and ordered that the Clerk of the
District Court “shall not accept any further pleadings from [Aiking-Taylor] without first
Court approval.”
¶5 Aiking-Taylor now appeals, arguing primarily that the District Court erred by
denying her requests to be declared the prevailing party in the litigation, but the arguments
are unavailing. In the first appeal, this Court reversed the $1,000 in MCPA damages
awarded to Serang only because Serang had already effectively recovered them by
withholding his final rent payment to Aiking-Taylor. We thus reversed to avoid a double
payment of damages to Serang, and did not reverse the determination that Aiking-Taylor
had committed violations of the MCPA for which Serang was entitled to damages. Thus,
on that issue, Serang was, and continued to be, the prevailing party. Further, with the
exception of a $55.59 utility bill, Serang prevailed on all other issues and, therefore, was
clearly the prevailing party in the litigation entitled to an award of attorney fees under the
governing statutes and the parties’ written agreement. Indeed, this Court so held in the first
appeal, which is the law of the case. See Aiking-Taylor, ¶ 17 (“Serang is the prevailing
party.”). Aiking-Taylor’s continuing myopic focus on a statement made in the original
judgment about the $55.59 utility bill is ill-advised, and the continued litigation on this
point, requiring expenditure of additional time and expense for the parties and the courts,
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was held to be frivolous by the District Court. Clinging to the above-described arguments,
Aiking-Taylor argues on appeal the District Court erred by so concluding, but we affirm
the declaration and penalty.
¶6 Serang is entitled to attorney fees incurred in this appeal.
¶7 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents
no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent
or modify existing precedent. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question
controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.
Further, the District Court did not abuse its discretion.
¶8 Affirmed, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment granting Serang his
attorney fees on appeal.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
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