Von Petersdorff v. Kenyon Noble Lumber Co. , 325 Mont. 94 ( 2004 )

No. 03-691
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2004 MT 382MIKE C. VON PETERSDORFF,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
KENYON NOBLE LUMBER COMPANY d/b/a
KENYON NOBLE LUMBER and HARDWARE,
a Montana Corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DV 2001-480
The Honorable Mike Salvagni, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Geoffrey C. Angel, Attorney at Law, Bozeman, Montana
For Respondent:
Bill Hanson, Attorney at Law, Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 3, 2004
Decided: December 28, 2004
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Patricia O. Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Mike C. Von Petersdorff brought an action in the Montana Eighteenth Judicial
District Court in and for the County of Gallatin to recover wages alleged due him after his
employment with Defendant Kenyon Noble Lumber Company (“Kenyon Noble”)
terminated. The District Court granted Kenyon Noble’s motion for summary judgment on
the grounds that Von Petersdorff had invoked his administrative remedy and did not exhaust
his administrative appeals before filing suit in the District Court. From this Order, Von
Petersdorff appeals. We affirm.
ISSUE
¶2 We restate the appealed issue as follows:
¶3 Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Kenyon Noble on the
grounds that Von Petersdorff was precluded from pursuing a district court action for his
wage loss after first instituting and then abandoning the same claim in the administrative
process?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶4 Von Petersdorff was employed by Kenyon Noble for a period of slightly more than
two years. Von Petersdorff alleged that as a benefit of employment he was entitled to
receive ten days of vacation after being employed by Kenyon Noble for twenty-four months.
¶5 Von Petersdorff was terminated and filed a wage claim with the Montana Department
of Labor and Industry Wage and Hour Unit (“the Department”) to collect vacation pay. The
Compliance Specialist overseeing Von Petersdorff’s claim found that he failed to meet the
2
burden of proof that he was owed such compensation and dismissed Von Petersdorff’s claim.
Von Petersdorff did not pursue the claim further within the administrative process. Instead,
he filed an action in the Gallatin County Justice Court. The Justice Court dismissed Von
Petersdorff’s claim with prejudice due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Von
Petersdorff then appealed to the District Court.
¶6 Kenyon Noble moved for summary judgment, claiming that Von Petersdorff chose
his remedy at the administrative level, lost on the merits, failed to exhaust that remedy, and
should therefore be precluded from resurrecting his claim in a new forum. Von Petersdorff
responded that remedies under Hours and Wage Protection Act are cumulative, pursuant to
§ 39-3-408, MCA, and that he is thus allowed to seek remedy within both the administrative
process and the District Court.
¶7 No material facts being in dispute, the District Court determined that summary
judgment was appropriate, and concluded that Kenyon Noble’s interpretation of the
applicable law was correct. From this Decision and Order, Von Petersdorff timely appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
evaluation under Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., as the district court. Glacier Tennis Club at the
Summit, LLC v. Treweek Constr. Co., Inc., 2004 MT 70, ¶ 21, 320 Mont. 351, ¶ 21, 87 P.3d
431, ¶ 21 (citations omitted). In other words, the party moving for summary judgment has
the initial burden of proving that there are no genuine issues of material fact that would
permit a non-moving party to succeed on the merits of the case, and if the moving party
3
meets that burden, then the non-moving party must provide substantial evidence that raises
a genuine issue of material fact in order to avoid summary judgment in favor of the moving
party. Glacier, ¶ 21 (citations omitted). Once it is established that no genuine issues of
material fact exist, the district court must then determine whether the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, and this Court reviews that determination to determine
whether the district court erred. Glacier, ¶ 21 (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶9 Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Kenyon Noble on the
grounds that Von Petersdorff was precluded from pursuing a district court action for his
wage loss after first instituting and then abandoning the same claim in the administrative
process?
¶10 Von Petersdorff claims that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment
to Kenyon Noble in that it incorrectly interpreted § 39-3-408, MCA, and misapprehended
our holding in Stanley v. Holms (1994), 267 Mont. 316, 322, 883 P.2d 837, 840. In Stanley,
we reversed a district court’s dismissal of an action to collect lost wages, concluding that the
district court had erred in holding that a claimant could not file a lost wages action in the
district court without first filing a claim with the Commissioner of Labor and Industry.
¶11 Von Petersdorff asserts that pursuant to § 39-3-408, MCA, a plaintiff may choose to
pursue either an administrative remedy or a civil action, or both, because the provisions are
cumulative. He claims the District Court erroneously interpreted “cumulative” to mean
“either one or the other but not both.” Von Petersdorff explains that he first filed a wage
4
claim before the Department, and that the Department found that he was entitled to only
$9.50 of the $760.00 he had requested. Instead of appealing the Department’s decision, he
chose to file a civil action seeking the remaining unpaid wages.
¶12 Kenyon Noble concedes that Von Petersdorff’s remedies were cumulative, but
contends that “cumulative” means that he had the choice of two distinct remedies--he could
either pursue his claim through the administrative procedures with the Department, or he
could file an original action in the District Court. Kenyon Noble maintains that the District
Court correctly determined that, once Von Petersdorff commenced an administrative
proceeding, he was foreclosed from commencing a duplicate original action in the District
Court.
¶13 Von Petersdorff replies, drawing our attention to Stanley and Boegli v. Glacier
Mountain Cheese Company (1989), 238 Mont. 426, 777 P.2d 1303. He claims that in
Boegli, we held that under § 39-3-408, MCA, a claimant need not exhaust administrative
remedies before filing a claim in the district court. Boegli, 238 Mont. at 429, 777 P.2d at
1306. In Boegli, the claimant filed an original action in the district court without ever
requesting an administrative remedy. Boegli, 238 Mont. at 427, 777 P.2d at 1304. Boegli
is thus readily distinguishable from the case at hand; there, the claimant sought a remedy in
one venue--the district court--and not both, as Von Petersdorff seeks to do here.
¶14 In Stanley, the claimant likewise filed a complaint to recover wages in the district
court without first seeking a remedy at the administrative level. Stanley, 267 Mont. at 317,
883 P.2d at 837. We reversed the court’s dismissal of his complaint, holding that, “a wage
5
claimant . . . may either seek administrative remedies through the Department of Labor and
Industry or file his or her claim directly in district court.” Stanley, 267 Mont. at 322, 883
P.2d at 840. (Emphasis added.) While Von Petersdorff maintains that the District Court
misinterpreted Stanley when it concluded that Stanley supports two mutually exclusive
options for a claimant--either filing a civil action, or filing an administrative claim, but not
both--we do not see how the language of Stanley supports this claim.
¶15 In its Decision and Order, the District Court explained,
Plaintiff had two options to get his case to the District Court; first, he could
have filed his complaint against Defendant at the District Court originally, or
second, by filing with [the Department] he could have proceeded through
administrative remedies and then appealed to the District Court under § 2-4-
702, M.C.A.
Stanley clearly provides that a claimant under the Act has the option of seeking
redress in either administrative proceedings or in the District Court. Plaintiff
was entitled to seek redress in either venue, not both. The provisions of § 39-
3-408, M.C.A., allow claimants to choose among the remedies available to
them without restriction to a single manner of redress. However, a claimant
must choose one remedy and follow it to conclusion. A claimant cannot open
multiple cases for the same injury. Plaintiff is not entitled to resurrect his
cause of action in the District Court after failing to conclude it in the
administrative process.
(Emphasis in original.)
¶16 We agree. Based upon our review of the record, the statutes, and the applicable case
law, we see no reason to disturb the District Court’s conclusion that summary judgment was
appropriate in this case.
CONCLUSION
¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.
6
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
We Concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ JIM RICE
7