A.C. v. Montana Tenth Judicial District Court ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                                      May 16 2012
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    OP 12-0155
    
    2012 MT 110
    _________________
    A.C.,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                                     OPINION
    AND
    MONTANA TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,                          ORDER
    FERGUS COUNTY, HONORABLE E. WAYNE
    PHILLIPS, Presiding,
    Respondent.
    _________________
    ¶1       On March 9, 2012, Petitioner A.C., by counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of
    Supervisory Control seeking our exercise of control over Fergus County Cause Nos.
    DN 2012-1 and DN 2012-2.        A.C. challenges the District Court’s interpretation of
    § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, as it pertains to the timeliness of motions for substitution of
    district judges in child abuse and neglect proceedings (hereinafter DN cases). On March
    21, 2012, we issued an Order taking A.C.’s petition under advisement pending the
    outcome of another petition for supervisory control that raised a similar question. That
    matter having been resolved by way of an Opinion and Order, we now address the
    question presented here.
    ¶2       On May 15, 2012, we issued our Opinion and Order in D.H. v. Montana Fourth
    Jud. Dist. Ct., 
    2012 MT 106
    , ___ Mont. ___, ___ P.3d ___. In D.H., we were asked to
    1
    address the timeliness of a motion for substitution of a district judge in two distinct types
    of cases: youth court proceedings, and matters on appeal to district court from a justice
    court. For present purposes, we focus on the youth court proceedings aspect of our
    Opinion and Order in D.H.
    ¶3     D.H. and J.H. were alleged to be delinquent youths. Both were served with
    summonses and directed to appear for a detention hearing, which they did with assigned
    counsel. The detention hearings served to determine whether probable cause existed that
    the youths were delinquent. D.H., ¶ 17. If probable cause is determined, the youth court
    may grant leave to the State to file a petition charging the youth as delinquent. Section
    41-5-1401(1), MCA. This occurred in the cases of both D.H. and J.H. Thus, following
    the detention hearings, the State’s petitions and summonses were prepared and served on
    the youths, directing them to appear and answer the allegations of the petitions charging
    them as delinquent youths. In each case, the youths thereafter appeared in response to the
    petitions and summonses, and filed motions to substitute district judge pursuant to
    § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, within 10 days of their appearances. However, in both cases, the
    motions for substitution of judge were filed more than 10 days after the youths initially
    appeared in court for their respective detention hearings. The District Court concluded
    that the appearance of each youth for his detention hearing constituted his “initial
    appearance” for purposes of triggering the time period for substitution of district court
    judge and therefore the court denied both motions for substitution of judge as untimely.
    D.H and J.H. sought supervisory control.
    ¶4     Section 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, provides:
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    (b) In a criminal action; a child abuse and neglect proceeding under
    Title 41, chapter 3; a youth court act proceeding under Title 41, chapter 5;
    or a mental health commitment proceeding under Title 53, chapter 21, part
    1, a motion for substitution by the prosecution or the state must be filed
    within 10 calendar days after the district judge is assigned pursuant to
    subsection (2)(a). A motion for substitution by the defendant, parent,
    youth, or respondent must be filed within 10 calendar days after the
    defendant, parent, youth, or respondent makes an initial appearance in the
    district court.
    ¶5     In D.H., we concluded that the District Court’s determination that the detention
    hearing constituted the youth’s “initial appearance” for purposes of § 3-1-804(1)(b),
    MCA, was erroneous. Equating a detention hearing with a probable cause hearing, we
    stated that “[a] ‘probable cause’ hearing does not constitute a youth’s ‘initial appearance’
    in court within the meaning of § 3-1-804(b), MCA. This probable cause hearing instead
    simply establishes whether the State may charge the youth as delinquent.” D.H., ¶ 17.
    We determined that the youths’ “initial appearance” for purposes of the statute was the
    date each appeared in court to answer the allegations of the petitions alleging them to be
    delinquent youths. Therefore, we concluded that their motions for substitution of judge
    were timely.
    ¶6     In the matter before us, we are concerned with DN proceedings and not youth
    court proceedings.    However, given that both types of proceedings are specifically
    addressed in § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, and given the analogous nature of the respective
    proceedings, we conclude our decision in D.H. is controlling here.
    ¶7     The DN proceedings in this case commenced with the filing of a Petition for
    Emergency Protective Services, Adjudication as Youth in Need of Care and Temporary
    Legal Custody on January 27, 2012. An Order to Show Cause and Notice of Show Cause
    3
    Hearing was filed on January 30. The respondent parent, A.C., was served with the show
    cause order on February 5, 2012, and on February 7, the Office of Public Defender filed a
    notice of appearance on behalf of A.C. A settlement conference was held on February
    10, and the court then continued the show cause hearing until February 22. A.C. filed her
    motion to substitute judge on February 21, 2012. The District Court concluded that
    A.C.’s “initial appearance” under the statute was the date that counsel appeared, which
    was February 7, 2012, and that therefore the motion for substitution was untimely and
    must be denied. A.C. sought supervisory control.
    ¶8     Citing § 41-3-432(4), MCA, A.C. argues in her petition that the “initial
    appearance” in a DN case, as contemplated under § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, is the show
    cause hearing at which a parent is informed of the procedures to be followed in the case
    and of the various rights the parent has. These rights include the right of representation
    and notice regarding ICWA, if applicable. Importantly, § 41-3-432(4), MCA, further
    provides that the parent “must be given the opportunity to admit or deny the allegations
    contained in the petition at the show cause hearing.” Moreover, § 41-3-432(2), MCA,
    provides that “[t]he person filing the petition has the burden of presenting evidence
    establishing probable cause for the issuance of an order for temporary investigative
    authority after the show cause hearing . . . .”
    ¶9     We conclude that for both youth court and DN cases, it is the hearing at which the
    parties appear in court to answer the allegations of the petition in question that constitutes
    the “initial appearance” for purposes of § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA. In D.H., we determined
    that the youth’s “initial appearance” occurred on the date when the youth appeared
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    pursuant to summons “to answer the allegations of the petition.” D.H., ¶ 18. In the
    instant case, the “initial appearance” occurred when the parent appeared and was “given
    the opportunity to admit or deny the allegations contained in the petition[].” Section
    41-3-432(4), MCA. Thus, it is the date upon which a parent first appears in court to
    answer the allegations of a DN petition that constitutes her “initial appearance” for
    purposes of the substitution statute.
    ¶10    A.C. moved for substitution of judge one day before the continued show cause
    hearing was set to occur. Two days later, the District Court entered its order declaring
    the motion to substitute untimely. We do not know if the show cause hearing has yet
    occurred; however, based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the District Court erred in
    determining that it was the date of appearance of counsel that started the clock running
    for purposes of a motion for substitution of judge in a DN proceeding. Therefore,
    ¶11    IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that A.C.’s Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control is
    GRANTED.
    ¶12    IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is remanded to the District Court for
    further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order.
    ¶13    The Clerk of this Court is directed to provide a copy of this Opinion and Order to
    all counsel of record and to the Hon. E. Wayne Phillips, Tenth Judicial District Court.
    DATED this 16TH day of May, 2012.
    /S/ PATRICIA COTTER
    5
    We concur:
    /S/ MIKE McGRATH
    /S/ BETH BAKER
    /S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
    /S/ JAMES C. NELSON
    /S/ BRIAN MORRIS
    /S/ JIM RICE
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Document Info

Docket Number: OP 12-0155

Filed Date: 5/16/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/11/2024