Haagenson v. State , 376 Mont. 239 ( 2014 )

August 19 2014
DA 13-0755
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2014 MT 223
JAYDEE HAAGENSON,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. DDV-12-0475
Honorable Katherine M. Bidegaray, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
JayDee Haagenson, self-represented, Shelby, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, C. Mark Fowler, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
John Parker, Cascade County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 23, 2014
Decided: August 19, 2014
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Patricia Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 JayDee Haagenson appeals from an order of the Eighth Judicial District Court,
Cascade County, denying his petition for postconviction relief. We affirm.
¶2 A restatement of the issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in denying
Haagenson’s petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 In May 2009, the State filed an information in Cascade County charging Haagenson
with deliberate homicide, a felony, in violation of § 45-5-102, MCA. The charge was based
upon eyewitness testimony. An autopsy report indicated that the victim died of asphyxia due
to neck compression. Haagenson and the State entered into a plea agreement on May 17,
2010, pursuant to which Haagenson agreed to plead no contest to the felony offense of
mitigated deliberate homicide in violation of § 45-5-103, MCA.
¶4 The court conducted a hearing to allow Haagenson to change his plea. After
Haagenson agreed that there was a sufficient factual basis for his no contest plea, the trial
court heard testimony from the primary lead investigator for the case. The court then
accepted Haagenson’s no contest plea. On July 15, 2010, the court sentenced Haagenson to
40 years imprisonment with no eligibility for parole, supervised release, or other conditional
release. Haagenson filed a motion to withdraw his no contest plea, which the court denied.
Haagenson appealed from the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, but later waived his
appeal to pursue an action for postconviction relief.
¶5 On June 21, 2012, Haagenson, acting as a self-represented litigant, filed a petition for
postconviction relief under § 46-21-101, MCA. Haagenson claimed ineffective assistance of
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counsel (IAC) against his trial and appellate counsel. Haagenson argued, inter alia, that his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to give him a copy of a report by a forensic
pathologist containing potentially exculpatory opinions. According to Haagenson, he would
not have pleaded no contest had he known of the report. He also argued that his appellate
counsel was ineffective for filing an Anders brief. The District Court ordered, and the State
filed, a response to Haagenson’s petition for postconviction relief. The State maintained that
Haagenson had notice of the contents of the report, and that he signed a statement waiving
his right to an appeal after discussion with his appellate counsel.
¶6 The District Court considered affidavits from Haagenson’s former counsel, including
an affidavit of Haagenson’s trial counsel in which she acknowledged that she could find “no
trace notation, letter, date stamp or other indication that Mr. Haagenson was provided a
physical copy of Dr. [Thomas L.] Bennett’s April 16, 2010 report.” In the report, which
pre-dated Haagenson’s change of plea, Dr. Bennett wrote:
Based upon the information available at the time of this report, it is my
opinion that there is no forensic basis in this autopsy report to opine that death
is a result of “asphyxia due to neck compression.” Further, there is nothing in
this autopsy report that indicates a deliberate attempt to cause this death.
Rather, I would offer that, with no anatomic cause of death found at the
autopsy, and with no autopsy findings that would support the prolonged
application of pressure over the vessels of the neck as the cause of injury or
death, that either the cause of death is best left as “undetermined,” or the
mechanism of reflex cardiac arrest be invoked.
¶7 The District Court found no evidence in the record suggesting that trial counsel ever
delivered a copy of the report to Haagenson. The court “[found] it troubling, to say the least,
that the Managing Attorney for the Great Falls Office of the State Public Defender System
signed a statement conceding her failure to provide her client with a copy of an expert report
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developed for a homicide case,” especially “considering the fact that Dr. Bennett’s report
states that it was commissioned by [trial counsel], herself.” However, the court found that
Dr. Bennett extensively discussed the potentially exonerative information in open court in
Haagenson’s presence at an April 8, 2010 hearing, and that “Haagenson was, at the very
least, impliedly notified of the potentially-exonerative contents of Dr. Bennett’s report prior
to his change of plea hearing.” The court also found that Haagenson had voluntarily signed
the motion to dismiss his appeal filed by his appellate counsel, and that his reliance on
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967), was therefore misplaced. The
District Court accordingly denied Haagenson’s petition. Haagenson timely appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8 We review a district court’s denial of a petition for postconviction relief to determine
whether the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its conclusions of law
are correct. McGarvey v. State, 2014 MT 189, ¶ 14, __ Mont. __, __ P.3d __ (citation
omitted). We review de novo the mixed questions of law and fact presented by claims of
IAC. McGarvey, ¶ 14 (citation omitted). A petitioner seeking to reverse a district court
order denying postconviction relief based on IAC bears a heavy burden. McGarvey, ¶ 14
(citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶9 Did the District Court err in denying Haagenson’s petition for postconviction relief?
¶10 To determine whether a defendant received IAC, we employ the two-part test set forth
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). McGarvey,
¶ 24 (citation omitted). “The petitioner must show that counsel’s performance fell short of
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the range of competence required of attorneys in criminal cases and that his counsel’s
deficient performance was prejudicial to his case.” Taylor v. State, 2014 MT 142, ¶ 12, __
Mont. __, __ P.3d __ (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Under Strickland’s
first prong, we examine whether counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness considering prevailing professional norms, and in the context of all
circumstances.” McGarvey, ¶ 25 (citation omitted). “We indulge a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Taylor,
¶ 12 (citation omitted). Under Strickland’s second prong, we examine whether there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Baca v. State, 2008 MT 371, ¶ 17, 346 Mont. 474,
197 P.3d 948 (citation omitted). To prevail on an IAC claim, the defendant must satisfy both
prongs of the Strickland test. A court need not address both components of the inquiry if the
defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. Stock v. State, 2014 MT 46, ¶ 12, 374
Mont. 80, 318 P.3d 1053 (citations omitted).
¶11 As noted, Haagenson entered into his plea agreement with the State on May 17, 2010.
This was approximately one month after the date that Dr. Bennett wrote the report in issue.
We agree with the District Court that it is “troubling” that trial counsel failed to provide her
client with this report before he entered into a plea agreement. We conclude that the failure
to provide a report of this significance to her client prior to his entry into a plea agreement
constitutes deficient performance, thus satisfying the first Strickland prong. We now turn to
the question of whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for this deficient
performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
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¶12 On April 8, 2010, the District Court convened a hearing on whether the State should
be held accountable for turning the victim’s body over to his family following the autopsy,
but before further examination of the body could be made. Haagenson had requested the
hearing, arguing that the State should be held accountable for failing to preserve exculpatory
evidence—i.e., the body. While he had not yet prepared his report of April 16, Dr. Bennett
was called to testify, and did so at length in the presence of Haagenson.
¶13 Much of the testimony offered by Dr. Bennett on direct and cross-examination was
technical in nature. Even though Haagenson was not trained in medical jargon, it should
nonetheless have been clear to him from listening to the testimony that Dr. Bennett disagreed
with the conclusion of the autopsy report that the victim had died as result of a homicide.
Dr. Bennett testified that the autopsy report findings did not support homicide as a manner of
death. When asked whether the witness statements supported the autopsy conclusions
regarding a homicide, he testified that “the body doesn’t lie,” and that the witness statements
were inconsistent with the autopsy findings on the body.
¶14 In addition to the extensive testimony offered by Dr. Bennett, there was significant
discussion during the hearing, including comments by the court, about the fact that Dr.
Bennett’s contrary opinions would be introduced at trial, and that his opinions would be
favorable to Haagenson. In sum, Haagenson should have been able to deduce from the
testimony and the discussions in court that Dr. Bennett’s opinions called into question
whether the victim died of a homicide, and that his opinions would be potentially favorable
to him at trial.
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¶15 Though we have determined that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide
the report to her client, we conclude that Haagenson has failed to establish that the outcome
of the proceedings would have been different had he been given a copy of the report. We
reach this conclusion because Dr. Bennett’s April 16, 2010 report summarized the very
findings to which he testified at length in Haagenson’s presence at the April 8 hearing; thus,
Haagenson already possessed the information that would be contained in the April 16 report.
Therefore, Haagenson has failed to satisfy Strickland’s second prong. Under the
circumstances here, there is no reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to
provide the written report to him, the results of the proceeding (the entry into a plea
agreement) would have been different. Baca, ¶ 17.
¶16 We next address Haagenson’s argument that his appellate counsel was ineffective
when he advised Haagenson to withdraw his direct appeal in order to file a petition for
postconviction relief. M. R. App. P. 16(4) provides as follows: “Except for an Anders
motion pursuant to section 46-8-103(2), a party’s motion to voluntarily dismiss that party’s
cause, appeal, or cross-appeal must be signed by both the moving party and that party’s
counsel.” The District Court concluded that because Haagenson signed the motion to
voluntarily dismiss, “he ultimately relieved [appellate counsel] of the burden of proof that
accompanies an Anders brief” and “negate[d] any claims . . . regarding [counsel’s]
ineffectiveness on appeal in failing to put at issue and argue the circumstances surrounding
Haagenson’s change of plea and ultimate sentencing.” In his affidavit to the court,
Haagenson’s appellate counsel stated that he had explained the differences between a direct
appeal and a postconviction proceeding to Haagenson, that Haagenson informed him he
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wanted to dismiss his appeal so he could raise his argument in a postconviction proceeding,
and that Haagenson signed and filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss his appeal. Nothing in
the record indicates that Haagenson filed the motion involuntarily. Thus, we conclude that
Haagenson failed to establish deficient performance on the part of his appellate counsel. The
District Court did not err in denying Haagenson’s petition for postconviction relief as to his
claim against his appellate counsel.
CONCLUSION
¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s denial of Haagenson’s
petition for postconviction relief.
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
We Concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
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