State v. D. Eystad , 386 Mont. 291 ( 2017 )

02/21/2017
DA 15-0550
Case Number: DA 15-0550
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2017 MT 29
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
DEVIN J. EYSTAD,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DC-12-335 (D)
Honorable David M. Ortley, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, James Reavis, Assistant
Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Micheal S. Wellenstein,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Ed Corrigan, Flathead County Attorney, Stacy Boman, Deputy County
Attorney, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: December 14, 2016
Decided: February 21, 2017
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Devin Eystad appeals from the District Court’s Opinion and Order of July 24,
2015, which affirmed the Order of the Flathead County Justice Court dated August 1,
2012. The Justice Court’s order denied Eystad’s motion to dismiss the criminal charges
against him based upon denial of a speedy trial. We affirm.
¶2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:
Did the Justice Court properly deny Eystad’s motion to dismiss the criminal
charges against him based upon violation of his right to a speedy trial?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 On February 13, 2009, the State charged Eystad with motor vehicle offenses
(driving with a suspended license, driving without a license plate) and served him with a
complaint and notice to appear. The complaint required him to appear before the
Flathead County Justice Court on or before February 27, 2009, for an initial appearance
and arraignment. Eystad failed to appear and the Justice Court sent him a notice
requiring him to appear on March 27, 2009, for an initial appearance and arraignment.
That notice also warned him that failure to appear would result in suspension of his
driver’s license. Eystad again failed to appear. On April 13, 2009, the Justice Court
suspended his license, and on May 21, 2009, it issued a warrant for Eystad’s arrest for
failing to appear.
¶4 On April 13, 2012, Eystad was arrested on the warrant from May 2009. He made
an initial appearance in Justice Court on April 16, 2012, and pled not guilty. The Justice
Court set trial for August 23, 2012. At the June 12, 2012 omnibus hearing in Justice
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Court, Eystad moved to dismiss the charges against him for lack of a speedy trial. The
Justice Court held a hearing on the motion on July 30, 2012, and Eystad testified.
¶5 The Justice Court’s post-hearing order concluded that “Eystad acquiesced in the
great majority of the delay period” between the original charges in 2009 and his arrest in
2012. The Justice Court found that Eystad ignored all notices and orders requiring him to
appear, and that his appearance in April 2012 was “involuntary,” resulting from arrest.
The Justice Court found that the record demonstrated that Eystad “placed a very low
value and priority on obtaining a speedy trial in this matter.” In addition, Eystad was
subjected to “virtually no pretrial incarceration” and the subject traffic offenses “are not
particularly complex in nature.”
¶6 The Justice Court found that Eystad presented no evidence that the delay in
bringing him to trial disrupted his life in any way. To the contrary, “it appears that
Eystad has been largely able to go about his life since February 2009 with only the
minimal intrusion of his arrest in 2012 to be brought before the Court for arraignment.”
The Justice Court found that Eystad presented no evidence of community scorn or of
damage to his reputation; no evidence of economic hardship; and no evidence of an
adverse impact upon his ability to defend against the original charges.
¶7 The Justice Court concluded that while there was a lengthy delay (1288 days)
between the initial charges and the trial date, the reasons for the delay “do not weigh
heavily against the State, nor do they work to the substantial prejudice of Eystad.” The
Justice Court found that there was no evidence of bad faith by the State to gain a tactical
advantage, and that Eystad “shares responsibility with the State” for ninety percent of the
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delay period. The Justice Court concluded that Eystad’s ability to defend against the
charges had not been prejudiced; there was no oppressive pretrial incarceration; his life
was not disrupted; and his standing in the community was not affected. Based upon this
record, the Justice Court concluded that Eystad’s constitutional right to a speedy trial had
not been violated.
¶8 Eystad then entered a plea agreement in which he pled guilty to driving with a
suspended license, the other charge was dismissed, and he reserved the right to appeal to
District Court. The Justice Court sentenced Eystad to six months in jail with all but two
days suspended, giving him credit for two days served after the arrest in 2012.
¶9 On August 17, 2012, Eystad appealed to District Court. In an ironically-belated
ruling in July 2015, the District Court upheld the Justice Court’s determination that
Eystad was not denied his right to a speedy trial. Eystad appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 A justice court is a court of record, and an appeal to the district court is an appeal
on the record in which the district court functions as an intermediate appellate court.
Sections 3-5-303 and 3-10-115, MCA; Stanley v. Lamire, 2006 MT 304, ¶ 24, 334 Mont.
489, 148 P.3d 643. In an appeal from a justice court of record, the district court’s review
is confined to the record. The district court reviews the justice court’s findings of fact to
determine whether they meet the clearly erroneous standard, reviews discretionary
rulings for abuse of discretion, and reviews legal conclusions to determine whether they
are correct. Stanley, ¶ 25. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are not based
upon substantial evidence, if the court has misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or
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if our review convinces us that a mistake was made. State v. Warclub, 2005 MT 149, ¶
23, 327 Mont. 352, 114 P.3d 254. On appeal from the district court’s review of the
justice court decision, this Court examines the record independently to determine whether
the justice court’s findings of fact meet the clearly erroneous standard, whether its
discretionary rulings were an abuse of discretion, and whether its legal conclusions were
correct. Stanley, ¶ 26.
DISCUSSION
¶11 Issue: Did the Justice Court properly deny Eystad’s motion to dismiss the
criminal charges against him based upon violation of his right to a speedy trial?
¶12 Eystad contends that his right to a speedy trial was denied because of the lapse of
time—almost 1300 days—between being charged in February 2009 and the trial on the
charges set for August 2012.1
¶13 The defendant in a criminal case has a right to a speedy trial under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and under Article II, Section
24 of the Montana Constitution. State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204, ¶ 20, 338 Mont. 442,
167 P.3d 815. Determining whether the defendant has been afforded a speedy trial
depends upon weighing the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant, Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2191-92 (1972), so that evaluation of speedy
trial claims is necessarily relative and depends upon the circumstances of each case, State
v. Hodge, 2014 MT 308, ¶ 15, 377 Mont. 123, 338 P.3d 8. A speedy trial analysis is
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Section 46-13-401(2), MCA, provides for dismissal of a misdemeanor charge if it is not
“brought to trial” within six months after entry of a plea to the charge. Under the facts of this
case, Eystad’s plea was less than six months prior to the Justice Court trial, so that statute forms
no basis for relief to Eystad.
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structured around four factors: the length of the delay; the reasons for the delay; the
accused’s response to the delay; and the prejudice to the accused as a result of the delay.
Hodge, ¶ 15.
¶14 The first factor, length of the delay, warrants little discussion in this case. The
relevant period was over 1200 days between the time of the original criminal charges and
the time the case was set for trial. This is well beyond the 200-day “trigger date” that
allows a defendant to raise the speedy trial issue. State v. Valesquez, 2016 MT 216, ¶ 9,
384 Mont. 447, 377 P.3d 1235.
¶15 The second factor in the analysis is the reason for the delay, which usually
involves an allocation of days as between the State and the defendant based upon an
assessment of responsibility. In Hodge we considered a speedy trial issue under facts
similar to the present case. In May 2010 the State charged Hodge with several traffic
offenses and he appeared for arraignment several weeks later. After Hodge missed
several subsequent court appearances the justice court issued a warrant for his arrest.
Hodge was arrested on that warrant almost two years later and subsequently moved to
dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The justice court held a hearing on the motion to
dismiss and although Hodge’s attorney attended the hearing, Hodge did not. He did not
present any evidence in support of his motion. The justice court denied the motion to
dismiss and Hodge appealed.
¶16 This Court affirmed, agreeing with the justice court’s conclusion that most of the
delay in the case was not attributable to the State for failing to find and arrest Hodge. To
the contrary, most of the delay was attributable to Hodge’s decision to ignore the justice
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court’s initial orders to appear for court proceedings and his decision to “remain at large
for 22 months.” Therefore the lapse of time “weighs heavily against him.” Hodge, ¶ 21.
While the State has an obligation to timely bring a prosecution to trial, that duty does not
require local law enforcement to “babysit” a defendant to ensure his appearance in court.
“A defendant who chooses to keep himself deliberately ignorant of the proceedings, or
who has knowledge of the proceedings and is voluntarily absent, should expect that the
resulting delay in locating him and bringing him back to court may be attributed to him.”
Hodge, ¶ 20. Similarly, conduct by an accused that demonstrates a “desire to avoid trial”
weighs heavily against him in a speedy trial analysis. State v. Stops, 2013 MT 131, ¶ 40,
370 Mont. 226, 301 P.3d 811. If an accused avoids being brought to trial, some or all of
the resulting delay must be attributed to him. State v. Houghton, 2010 MT 145, ¶ 23, 357
Mont. 9, 234 P.3d 904. When an accused “avoids being brought to trial some or all of the
responsibility for the delay should be attributed to him.” State v. Lacey, 2010 MT 6,
¶ 18, 355 Mont. 31, 224 P.3d 1247.
¶17 We apply these same considerations to the present case. The record demonstrates
that Eystad received ample notice that he must attend the Justice Court proceedings, but
he chose to be “voluntarily absent” until he was arrested some years later. This situation,
like those in the cases discussed above, weighs heavily against Eystad in the speedy trial
analysis when evaluating the responsibility for the delay. In this case involving simple
misdemeanor traffic offenses, it is not appropriate to assign any significant responsibility
to the State to go out and find Eystad. See, e.g., Lacey, ¶¶ 6-9; State v. Longhorn, 2002
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MT 135, ¶¶ 12-14, 310 Mont. 172, 49 P.3d 48 (both cases describing law enforcement
efforts to apprehend suspects charged with felony offenses).
¶18 Factor three considers the defendant’s response to the delay. Factually, the only
evidence of Eystad’s response to the situation is his assertion that he has lived at the same
address for a number of years and that he was not actively trying to disguise his
whereabouts. The defendant in Hodge made a similar argument that the Justice Court
rejected, concluding that factor three should be weighed heavily against Hodge because
he “effectively absconded” from the court proceedings and thereby “demonstrated no
desire to be brought to trial at all, let alone brought to trial quickly.” Hodge, ¶ 22. We
agreed with this conclusion in that case and similarly apply it here. Eystad also
“effectively absconded” from the proceedings and showed no desire to resolve the
criminal charges. His apparent decision to continue driving for three years while his
license was suspended is overwhelming evidence that he had no desire to go to trial. We
conclude that factor three weighs heavily against him in the speedy trial analysis.
¶19 Factor four requires an analysis of the prejudice to the defendant resulting from
the delay in bringing the charges to trial. Interests considered in this regard are
preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing the anxiety and concern
resulting from unresolved criminal charges, and limiting impairment to the accused’s
ability to defend the charges. Ariegwe, ¶ 111. Eystad relies upon a presumption of
prejudice arising from the length of the delay, and this Court has recognized that
presumptive prejudice can play a part in the speedy trial analysis. Hodge, ¶ 24.
However, presumptive prejudice will not weigh heavily in favor of the defendant except
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in the “few and far between” cases involving government bad faith or other egregious
conduct. Hodge, ¶ 25.
¶20 Here there is no evidence of any actual disruption to Eystad’s life or to the other
interests addressed in factor four. The fact that his “hiatus from the proceedings” came to
an end with his eventual arrest is strong evidence of his disregard of the entire process.
The vague assertions in Eystad’s briefing—such as that he was prejudiced by driving
with a suspended license for several years—are directly attributable to Eystad’s own
decisions and are not supported by actual evidence.
¶21 In this case there is no evidence of actual prejudice to Eystad. Finding
presumptive prejudice that might arise solely from the length of time would be a
disservice to the cause of justice. Defendants who fail to appear for court proceedings or
who voluntarily absent themselves to avoid prosecution will not be heard on a claim of
presumed prejudice resulting from the self-induced delay.
¶22 In summary, in this case the time between the initial charges and the eventual trial
date is sufficient to trigger the speedy trial inquiry. We find that the delay resulted from
Eystad’s decision to voluntarily absent himself from the Justice Court’s proceedings and
that this factor weighs very heavily against Eystad. The record also shows that Eystad
evidenced no interest of any kind in a prompt resolution of the charges and that he
demonstrated no prejudice to his interests arising from his self-induced delay in the
proceedings. We conclude that under the facts of this case Eystad was not denied his
right to a speedy trial and that the courts below properly denied his motion to dismiss.
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CONCLUSION
¶23 The conviction is affirmed.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ JIM RICE
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