Marriage of Martin ( 1985 )

No. 85-163
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1985
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
PEARL E. MARTIN,
Petitioner and Respondent,
and
ROBERT M. MARTIN,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Cascade,
The Honorable John M. McCarvel, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Baiz & Olson; Thomas A. Baiz, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Alexander & Baucus; Nancy P. Cory, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 25, 1985
Decided : September 10, 1985
Filed: SEP 1 0 1 8
95
M r . J u s t i c e F r a n k B. Morrison, Jr. d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f
t h e Court.
The marital estate of R o b e r t. ! ? i Martin and Pearl E.
M a r t i n was d i s t r i b u t e d i n t h e E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t
by decree dated January 31, 1985. Robert Martin a p p e a l s ,
alleging that the property division is inequitable and
results in substantial i n j u s t i c e t o him. F7e d i s a g r e e and
a f f i r m t h e decree of t h e District Court.
R o b e r t and P e a r l w e r e m a r r i e d on A u g u s t 1-2, 1972. She
i s p r e s e n t l y 53 y e a r s o f a g e . H e i s 60 y e a r s o f a g e . Though
both parties had children by prior marriages, no chi-Idren
w e r e b o r n of t h e i r m a r r i a g e .
P e a r l i s a 1-egal s e c r e t a r y . H e r g r o s s income i s $ 1 4 , 8 0 0
a y e a r , w i t h t a k e home p a y o f $844 p e r month. H e r expenses
t o t a l $ 1 , 4 3 0 p e r month. R o b e r t owns and o p e r a t e s G r e a t F a l l s
Cleaning Service. His n e t m o n t h l y income i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y
$1200, excluding t a x consequences from t h e d e p r e c i a t i o n of
h i s business. H i s personal expenses t o t a l $850 p e r month.
T h e p a r t i e s t e s t i f i e d and t h e t r i a l j u d g e found t h a t t h e
parties contributed their r e s p e c t i v e incomes t o t h e i r j o i n t
benefit and t h a t t h e p a r t i e s ' nonfinancial contributions t o
t h e marriage w e r e equal.
The t r i a l judge found t h e n e t m a r i t a l e s t a t e t o c o n s i s t
of t h e following:
REAL PROPERTY
F a m i l y r e s i d e n c e - 2 2 7 1 Beech D r i v e ,
G r e a t F a l l s , Montana. (Equity i n c r e a s e
since date of marriage). $21,600.00
R e n t a l P r o p e r t y - 8 0 7 and 809 6 t h
S t r e e t SW, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana 46,831.80
R e s i d e n c e - 1546 Meadowlark D r i v e ,
G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
PERSONAL PROPERTY
1978 Ford Van
1976 Ford LTD
1966 GMC Van
1983 Buick
Stocks and bonds
Furniture, etc.
Petitioner's IRA Acct.
Respondent's LC1 Acct.
Petitioner's Gov't. pension
Respondent's savings acct.
Respondent's checking account
Petitioner's checking account
Petitioner's savings account
Respondent's IRA account
Cash in safe (American)
(Canadian)
Husband's coin collection
Joint coin collection
Finding of Fact VII.
Notably, the trial judge omitted Robert's cleaning
business from the net marital estate, choosing instead to
permit Robert to retain it in its entirety. The business is
worth $81,000: $27,500 for the building; $8,500 for the
equipment; and $45,000 for its good will.
The trial judge divided the net marital. state between
the parties as follows:
PETITIONER
Residence -
1546 Meadowlark
Drive
Stocks and bonds
1983 Buick
Petitioner's IRA Account
Petitioner's Government Pension
Petitioner's Checking Account
Petitioner's Savings Account
Cash in safe (American)
(Canadian)
Coin collection
Cash (to be paid by the
Respondent within
sixty (60) days
RESPONDENT
Residence -
2211 Beech Drive
R e n t a l - 807 & 809 6 t h S t . S W
Personal property -
2211 Beech D r i v e
1978 Ford Van
1976 Ford LTD
1966 GMC Van
R e s p o n d e n t ' s LC1 Account
R e s p o n d e n t ' s S a v i n g s Account
R e s p o n d e n t ' s Checking Account
R e s p o n d e n t ' s I R A Account
R e s p o n d e n t ' s Coin c o l l e c t i o n
Finding of Fact V I I I .
R o b e r t o b j e c t s t o h i s $45,000 c a s h o b l i g a t i o n t o P e a r l ,
claiming that Pearl then receives 61% o f the net marital
e s t a t e w h i l e h e receives o n l y 39%. However, R o b e r t f a i l s t o
c o n s i d e r t h a t h e was a l l o w e d t o r e t a i n . h i s c l e a n i n g b u s i n e s s ,
despite Pearl's substantial contributions to its success.
The C o u r t n o t e s t h a t t h e P e t i t i o n e r s e t u p a
bookkeeping system for the business, prepared
income t a x r e t u r n s and answered phone c a l l s , f i l l e d
i n f o r t h e s e c r e t a r y ' s v a c a t i o n s f o r 11 y e a r s and
s a v e d some b u s i n e s s a c c o u n t s i n 1978. Petitioner
t e r m i n a t e d h e r employment w i t h t h e law f i r m of
A l e x a n d e r & Baucus i n 1978 t o accomodate [ s i c ] t h e
Respondent. As a r e s u l t she l o s t fringe benefits
and a Keogh P l a n i n t e r e s t , h a v i n g b e e n employed by
t h a t f i r m s i n c e 1961. The C o u r t n o t e s t h i s b e c a u s e
s h e i s n o t b e i n g awarded a n y i n t e r e s t i n t h a t
business.
Finding of Fact IX. This finding supports the $45,000
payment.
Robert a l s o complains that the trial judge failed to
p r o p e r l y c o n s i d e r t h e $11,000 i n p r o p e r t y h e b r o u g h t i n t o t h e
marriage and the $16,000 he inherited from his parents.
Again w e must d i s a g r e e . The $11,000 consists of t h e cash
v a l u e o f a n i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y on R o b e r t ' s l i f e and t h e p r o f i t
r e a l i z e d when R o b e r t s o l d r e n t a l p r o p e r t y h e b r o u g h t i n t o t h e
marriage. Robert t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t t h e s e proceeds w e r e
used t o p u r c h a s e t h e r e n t a l . p r o p e r t y owned by t h e p a r t i e s a t
t h e t i m e of t h e i r dissolution. T h a t p r o p e r t y was i n c l u d e d i n
Robert's portion of the marital estate.
There i s no s p e c i f i c r u l e c o n c e r n i n g how a n i n h e r i t e d
asset is to be treated when marital property i s divided.
"Each c a s e h a s t o b e d e c i d e d on i t s own f a c t s . " Vivian v.
Vivian (2978), 1.78 Mont. 341, 344, 583 P.2d 1072, 1074.
However, 5 40-4-202(1), MCA, does require consideration of
t h e " c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f t h e o t h e r spouse t o t h e marriage . . ."
P e a r l and R o b e r t t e s t i f i e d t h a t P e a r l a s s i s t e d i n t h e u p k e e p
of the home, the rental property and the business. She
willingly quit a long term job, forfeiting substantial
retirement security, in order to assist her husband in
improving his own life. Again, we find no abuse of
d i s c r e t i o n by t h e t r i a l . j u d g e .
I n determining whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused i t s
d i s c r e t i o n , t h e reviewing c o u r t does n o t s u b s t i t u t e
i t s judgment f o r t h a t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t . The
standard f o r review i s whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t
acted arbitrarily without employment of
c o n s c i e n t i o u s judgment o r e x c e e d e d t h e bounds o f
reason resulting in substantial injustice.
[ C i t a t i o n s ommitted.]
Creon v. Creon (1981), 1 9 5 Mont. 254, 257, 635 P.2d 1308,
1309. Not o n l y h a s t h e t r i a l j u d g e n o t a c t e d a r b i t r a r i l y n o r
exceeded the bounds of reason, he has achieved a
well-reasoned, exceedingly f a i r distribution of the marital
property.
Affirmed.
We c o n c u r :
.-'
h i e f Justice