Stiffarm v. Furois ( 1985 )

No. 85-020
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1955
JOSEPH P. STIFFARM,
Petitioner and Appellant,
WILLIAM F. FUROIS, as Chief
of the State of Montana,
Department of Justice, l l t r
loo
Vehicle Division, et al.,
Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Hill,
The Honorable Chan Ettien, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Morrison, Barron & Young; Robert C. Melcher, Havre,
Montana
For Respondents:
Barbara Claassen, Assistant Attorney General, Helena,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 3, 1985
Decided: August 15, 1985
Clerk
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
Joseph Stiffarm appeals from an order of the District
Court affirming the one-year revocation of his driver ' s
license by the Montana Motor Vehicle Division of the
Department of Justice.
On February 5, 1984, appellant was arrested for the
offense of driving under the influence of a 1cohol. The
appellant refused to submit to a chemical test to determine
the alcohol concentration of his breath. Appellant had
previously refused the chemical test in March of 1982. The
Motor Vehicle Division invoked section 61-8-402, MCA which
requires the revocation of a driver's license for one year
upon a second or subsequent refusal to submit to a chemical
test within five years of a previous refusal.
On September 13, 1984, the appellant filed a petition
for writ of mandamus and claimed that the application of the
mandatory revocation provision of section 61-8-402, MCA was
improper because only one of the offenses upon which the
revocation of his license was based, occurred after the
effective date of the amendment. The District Court ordered
the State to either return the appellant's driver's license
or to appeal the determination. Following a hearing, the
District Court affirmed the Motor Vehicle Division's
application of section 61-8-402, MCA and the writ of mandamus
was vacated.
The dispositive issue before this Court is whether
section 61-8-402, MCA, which requires revocation of a
driver's license for one year upon a subsequent refusal to
submit to a chemical test within five years of a previous
refusal, was properly applied.
S e c t i o n 61-8-402, MCA p r o v i d e s :
" (1) Any p e r s o n who o p e r a t e s a motor
v e h i c l e upon ways o f t h i s s t a t e open t o
t h e p u b l i c s h a l l b e deemed t o h a v e g i v e n
consent, subject t o the provision of
61-8-401, t o a chemical test o f h i s
blood, b r e a t h , o r u r i n e f o r t h e purpose
o f determining t h e a l c o h o l i c content of
h i s b l o o d i f a r r e s t e d by a p e a c e o f f i c e r
for driving o r i n actual physical control
of a motor v e h i c l e w h i l e under t h e
influence of alcohol .
" ( 3 ) I f a r e s i d e n t d r i v e r under a r r e s t
r e f u s e s upon t h e r e q u e s t o f a p e a c e
o f f i c e r t o submit t o a chemical t e s t
d e s i g n a t e d by t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r a s
provided in subsection (1) o f this
s e c t i o n , none s h a l l b e g i v e n , b u t t h e
o f f i c e r s h a l l , on b e h a l f o f t h e d i v i s i o n ,
immediately s e i z e h i s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e .
The p e a c e o f f i c e r s h a l l forward t h e
license t o t h e division, along with a
sworn r e p o r t t h a t h e had reasonable
grounds t o b e l i e v e t h e a r r e s t e d person
had been driving o r was in actual
p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l o f a m o t o r v e h i c l e upon
ways o f t h i s s t a t e open t o t h e p u b l i c ,
w h i l e u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l and
t h a t t h e p e r s o n had r e f u s e d t o s u b m i t t o
t h e t e s t upon t h e r e q u e s t of t h e p e a c e
officer. Upon r e c e i p t o f t h e r e p o r t , t h e
d i v i s i o n s h a l l suspend t h e l i c e n s e f o r
t h e period provided i n subsection ( 5 ) .
" (5) -
The following
~ - s u s.p e n s i o n and
- . -
r e v o c a t i o n p e r i o d s a r e a p p l i c a b l e upon
r e f u s a l - submit - - chemical test:
to to a
" ( a ) upon - f i r s t r e f u s a l , - s u s p e n s i o n
a a
of
- 9 0 d a y s -t h-no p r o v i s i o n - -
wi for a
r e s t r i c t e d probationary license;
" ( b ) upon a second o r s u b s e q u e n t
refusal withic 5 years 0 a 7 revious
r e f u s a l , a s d e t e r m i n e d -- r z c o r d o f
from th;
- d i v i s i o n , - r e v o c a t i o n -f-1 y e a r w i t h
the
no
a o
- provision -
for -
a restricted
probationary license. " (Emphasis
supplied.)
P r i o r t o O c t o b e r 1, 1 9 8 3 , Montana law p r o v i d e d for a
sixty-day suspension of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e f o r
failure to take a chemical test. Section 61-8-402, MCA
(1981). I n 1983, s e c t i o n 61-8-402, MCA was amended, c h a n g i n g
the sixty-day suspension period to ninety-days. Section
61-8-402 ( 5 ) ( a ) , MCA. In addition, the amended version
p r o v i d e d f o r mandatory r e v o c a t i o n o f t h e l i c e n s e o f a d r i v e r
who h a s r e f u s e d t h e c h e m i c a l t e s t a second t i m e w i t h i n f i v e
years of t h e previous r e f u s a l . S e c t i o n 61-8-402 ( 5 ) ( b ) , MCA.
The appellant argues that section 61-8-402(5), MCA,
s h o u l d n o t be a p p l i e d t o r e q u i r e a r e v o c a t i o n o f h i s l i c e n s e .
The appellant argues that he must be allowed a "final
refusal" under t h e amended v e r s i o n o f section 61-8-402 ( 5 ) ,
MCA b e f o r e h i s l i c e n s e can be revoked based on a second o r
s u b s e q u e n t r e f u s a 1. Moreover, t h e a p p e l l a n t m a i n t a i n s t h a t
s e c t i o n 1-2-109, MCA, which p r o v i d e s "no law c o n t a i n e d i n any
o f t h e s t a t u t e s i n Montana i s r e t r o a c t i v e u n l e s s e x p r e s s l y s o
declared," precludes r e t r o a c t i v e application.
We find that section 61-8-402, MCA, i s void of any
language which expresses an intent to have it applied
retroactively. However, we a l s o f i n d t h a t s e c t i o n 61-8-402,
MCA d o e s n o t f a l l w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f a r e t r o a c t i v e law.
N s a n c t i o n was imposed on t h e f i r s t r e f u s a l o c c u r r i n g
o
prior to the effective date. Rather, it served as a
condition for imposing the one-year revocation for the
subsequent refusal. The statute requires revocation of
a p p e l l a n t ' s l i c e n s e i n response t o h i s r e f u s a l i n February of
1984 b e c a u s e it was a repetitive refusal. In Sanchez v .
S t a t e Dept. of Rev. Motor Veh. (Colo.App. 1 9 8 3 ) , 667 P . 2 d
779, a most s i m i l a r sequence o c c u r r e d . The Colorado C o u r t o f
Appeals likewise upheld the mandatory revocation of a
driver's l i c e n s e upon a second c o n v i c t i o n o f driving while
a b i l i t y impaired a s a p p l y i n g t o a c a s e i n which t h e second
conviction occurred a f t e r t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e s t a t u t e ,
but the first offense occurred prior to the effective date of
the statute. "This mode of statutory operation is not
retroactive, nor does it constitute an ex post facto law in a
criminal setting." Sanchez, supra, 667 P.2d at 780; see also
Gryger v. Burke (1948), 334 U.S. 728, 68 S. Ct. 1256, 92 L. Ed.
1683. We are in accord with rulings from courts from other
jurisdictions that an amended statute which is applied to a
factual situation which occurred prior to the enactment of
the amendment is not viewed as retroactive in application.
See Nix v. Tice (Colo.App. 1980), 607 P.2d 399; McCartney v.
West Adams County Fire Protection District (Colo.App. 1978) ,
574 P.2d 516; Shoemaker v. Atchison (Ala.Civ.App. 1981), 406
So. 2d 986.
Accordingly, we hold that the one-year revocation of
the appellant's driver's license as mandated by section
61-8-402, MCA was proper. The judgment of the District Court
is affirmed.
We concur: /I
;