Tocci v. City of Three Forks ( 1985 )


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  •                                                        No.     84-501
    I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O F MONTANA
    1985
    RAYMOND P. T O C C I , B E T T I J. T O C C I ,
    VICTOR SURDAHL and E L O I S E SURDAHL,
    P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s ,
    THE C I T Y OF THREE FORKS,                      a munici-
    p a l corporation,
    D e f e n d a n t and R e s p o n d e n t .
    APPEAL FROM:                  D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e E i g h t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
    I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of G a l l a t i n ,
    T h e H o n o r a b l e J o s e p h B. G a r y , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
    COUNSEL O F RECORD:
    For Appellants:
    M o r r o w , S e d i v y & B e n n e t t ; L y m a n H.       Bennett,     111,
    Bozeman, Montana
    For Respondent:
    Landoe,      Brown Law O f f i c e , Bozeman, M o n t a n a
    .
    -
    S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s :     March 7,       1985
    Decided:          May 2 3 , 1 9 8 5
    Filed:    ;y\;4,!   5:    j
    Clerk
    Mr. Chief Justice 3. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the
    Court.
    Landowners appeal a judgment of the Gallatin County
    District Court upholding special improvement district assess-
    ments by the City of Three Forks.     The assessments were made
    to recapture engineering and legal expenses in creating a SID
    for improvements which were never completed by the City.    The
    project was completed privately       after the municipal bond
    failed to sell.     Finding neither a statutory basis for the
    assessment nor a benefit to the property involved, we reverse
    the judgment of the District Court.
    Raymond Tocci on beha.lf of himself and other landowners
    petitioned the City of Three Forks in 1977 for the creation
    of several special. improvement districts.     Acting on these
    requests the City Council created four SIDs in 1978.        The
    purpose of the SIDs was to provide water and sewer services
    for parcels that Tocci wished to develop.
    The City proceeded to contract with the engineering
    firm of Thomas, Dean   &   Hoskins to design a water and sewer
    system and estimate its cost for purposes of letting a con-
    struction bid and drawing up a municipal bond.       This firm
    acted as the city engineer of Three Forks.      The City under-
    took this work under the assumption that the SIDs would
    result in a bond sale and. improvements.
    The costs of designing and, planning the project to-
    talled $7,831.19.   This amount represents engineering servic-
    es, publication, title search and legal services associated
    with creating the four SIDs.    The low bid for construction of
    the project was approximately $50,000.      The City was unsuc-
    cessful in its attempts to sell a bond for the SIDs.
    Subsequent      to       the   unsuccessfu~ sale    the   developer
    retained his own engineering firm to design the project and
    at his own cost improved the property with water and sewer
    facilities.
    The question then arose as to which party would pay the
    creation costs of the abandoned SIDs.           The City's engineering
    firm of Thomas, Dean       &   Hoskins filed suit against the City of
    Three Forks for $5,211.89 representing its consulting fee.
    The parties negotiated a settlement whereby the City paid
    $4,000 to the engineering firm.
    In October 1982 the City Council voted to assess Tocci
    and the other property owners the costs of creating the SIDs.
    Following    this    assessment, which       Tocci objected to, the
    plaintiffs in the present lawsuit under protest paid assess-
    ments of $7,121.94 in 1983.             Shortly thereafter, Tocci and
    Surdahl     filed the      present     lawsuit to   recover their    tax
    payments.
    Facts reflecting our discussion above were stipulated
    and a nonjury trial was held June 27, 1984.              The trial court
    concluded as a matter of law that the defenda.nt City was
    properly authorized to incur the creation costs of the SIDs
    and to assess the same against the plaintiffs.
    In a memorandum attached to the court's order of August
    15, 1984, the court noted that it was the developer that
    started the SID process by petitioning the City for the
    improvements.       The court stated that the developer was aware
    that the bond might not sell and that this party shou1.d
    assume the risk of nonsale.           Furthermore, the court found the
    property owners could have used the engineering (sewer and
    water) plans the City had contracted for, rather than those
    of the independent engineering firm with which Tocci had
    contracted:
    ". .
    .     It would be inequitable and
    unjust to simply Leave those financial
    expenditures [SID creation costs] on the
    CITY'S back when it is the property
    owners and clearly not the CITY who
    benefit.
    ". . . Therefore, as a matter of equity,
    .   ..the Court holds that the assess-
    ments made by THE CITY OF THR.EE FORKS
    are valid as against the Plaintiffs."
    The property owners appeal and raise this issue:
    May a city levy SID assessments against property for
    creation costs of anticipated improvements when those im-
    provements are not constructed on the property by the city?
    The starting and. ending point for our discussion on
    this issue will be the plain language of the statutes that
    authorize   assessments   for   special   improvement districts.
    Section 7-12-4201, MCA, states that:      "All costs and expenses
    incurred in the construction of any improvements specified in
    part 41 in any improvement district shall be paid for by
    special improvement district bonds or warrants.       . ."   The
    appellants have emphasized the mandatory       language of this
    provision in their briefs before this Court.       It is obvious
    that the City of Three Forks did not comply with the letter
    of this law when they compelled the developers to pay for
    certain creation costs of improvements rather than completing
    a bond sa.le.
    The costs at issue here are clearly anticipated by the
    language of 5 7-12-4201, MCA.      That statute makes reference
    to costs specified in part 41 of title 7, chapter 12, MCA.
    Incidental expenses are defined in part 41 to be:
    .
    ". . the compensation of the city
    engineer for work done by him, the cost
    of printing and advertising as provided
    in this part and part 42, the compensa-
    tion of persons appointed by the city
    engineer to take charge of and superin-
    tend any of the work mentioned in this
    part, or the expenses of making the
    assessment for any work authorized by
    this part." Section 71-2-4101.(7), MCA.
    We note that the contracted firm of Thomas, Dean           &   Hoskins
    was acting as the city engineer of Three Forks at the time of
    this project.       The incidental, creation, or start-up costs
    are considered part of "the cost and expenses of making the
    improvements within such special improvement district" by the
    language of   $$   7-12-4169 (I), MCA.    Thus, the statutory scheme
    of part 41 and part 42 of chapter 12 clearly states that
    creation costs of an SID, incurred by the city engineer and
    the city generally, shall be payable by SID bonds.
    The statutory language being plain and unambi.guous, we
    refrain from reading into the language a second mode of
    payment for expenses other than a SID bond.         It is true that
    the contingency presented by           the facts before us is not
    addressed by statute.          Respondent City would have us judi-
    cially read into the statutes, language to the extent that:
    "if the SID bond does not sell, the incidental costs of the
    district shall be assessed against the petitioning property
    owners. "
    To make this construction we would have to act in
    derogation of the general principle that a City's power to
    levy is strictly construed.         Morse v. Kroger (1930), 
    87 Mont. 54
    , 
    285 P. 185
    .          What would be particularly offensive to our
    common law would be the enlargement of a City's assessment
    power without a statutory basis.          A municipality's power to
    tax and levy assessments warrants special consideration apart
    from our Constitution's general mandate that powers of incor-
    porated cities be liberally construed.             Art. XI, Section
    4 (2), 1972 Mont. Const.
    The respondent City urges this Court to accept the
    City's    judgment as conclusive, absent proof of           fraud or
    mistake.     See, Stevens v. City of Missoula (~ont.1983), 
    667 P.2d 440
    , 4 0 St.Rep.        1267.    We accept this guideline, but
    find that here there was a clear mistake made by the City of
    Three Forks.          The erroneous mistake was one of law when the
    municipality strayed outside its statutory power to assess
    property for improvement.            The standard to which a city is
    held in SID procedures has been stated:
    11   I   ...
    The statute having defined the
    measure of the power granted., and also
    the mode by which it is to be exercised,
    the validity of the action of the legis-
    lative body of the municipality must be
    determined by an answer to the inquiry
    whether it has departed. substantially
    from the mode prescribed..'"     Smith v.
    City of Bozeman (1965), 
    144 Mont. 528
    ,
    541, 
    398 P.2d 462
    , 469, quoting from
    Shapard v. City of Missoula (1914), 
    49 Mont. 269
    , 279, 1.41 P. 544, 547.
    Here there was a substantial departure from the assessment
    mandate of S 7-12-4201, MCA.            Lacking power to assess SID
    incidental expenses apart from a bond sale, the City proceed-
    ed irregardless.
    This Court is not blind to the equitable appeal of
    apportioning the expenses of this project to the party who
    initiated the process and had the most to gain from its
    successful completion.         However, the precedent of a-ffirming
    such a decision would create an unnecessary burden and risk
    on future petitioners for SIDs.          Municipalities that question
    the marketability of a SID bond sale have other means of:
    insuring their incidental expenses will be paid; there is no
    demonstrated need to judicially recognize an after-the-fact
    assessment when bonds do not sell.
    A second problem in the reasoning of the lower court
    concerns the finding of a benefit.     The theory upon which a
    municipality may levy assessments for special improvements is
    that the property will be benefited by the improvements to
    the extent of the burden imposed.     Smith v. City of Bozeman,
    
    144 Mont. 528
    , 
    398 P.2d 462
    .      It is fundamental to assess-
    ments for special improvements that the assessment be in
    proportion   to the benefits conferred by     the improvement.
    Schumacher v. City of Bozeman (1977), 
    174 Mont. 519
    , 571 P-2d
    1135.
    We are unable to discern from the record what benefit
    the property received in this case.    The trial court conclud-
    ed that the developer could have used the plans prepared by
    the City's engineering firm.     In fact the developer did not
    use them, but hired his own engineering firm to develop plans
    for construction.    The mere existence of a set of plans that
    were    suitable for use   does not   support a   finding of a
    benefit.
    There was testimony in the record that Mr. Tocci re-
    viewed the City's set of specifications and plans before
    drawing up his own plans.    Additionally, one engineer testi-
    fied that he felt the property was benefited by the City
    first completing an acceptable design plan.       However, the
    final plans used by Tocci were not carbon copies of the City
    design.    Different areas were serviced by the two designs and
    different pipe was used.    Testimony established other differ-
    ences as well.
    We have been unable to find any precedent in Montana or
    elsewhere for a finding of benefit based on the preparation
    of engineering plans, when those plans are not used in the
    construction of improvements.      The connection of these plans
    to the improvements is simply too tenuous to be affirmed as
    an assessable benefit.
    As a final matter the City argues that the plaintiffs
    are estopped from questioning the validity of the assessment
    because of their participation in the proceedings.       It cannot
    be seriously contend-ed that the mere act of petitioning for a
    SID   bars any subsequent challenge to the assessment process.
    The plaintiffs timely objected to the City's assessment once
    the City Council acted in 1 9 8 2 .     In any case, a property
    owner ord.inarily cannot waive or become estopped from chal-
    lenging the validity of an assessment which is void. by reason
    of an inherent defect such as lack of statutory power to
    assess.    See Smith v. City of Bozeman, 1 4 
    4 Mont. 5
     2 8 ,    398
    The cause is reversed and remanded.     The District Court
    sha1.l order the taxes previously paid under the assessment
    returned to the pla-intiffs with interest from July 28, 1 9 8 3 .
    The costs of the plaintiff's court proceedings shall be born
    by the City of Three Forks pursuant to 5 7 - 1 2 - 4 2 5 8 ,   MCA.
    We concur:
    f /
    hief Justice
    F
    (/
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 84-501

Filed Date: 5/23/1985

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014