State Ex Rel. Department of Agriculture v. A.B.N. Ranch , 230 Mont. 449 ( 1988 )


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  •                                 No. 87-463
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    1988
    STATE OF MONTANA, acting by and through
    the DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    -vs-
    A.B.N.   RANCH, et al.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM:     The District Court of the First Judicial District,
    In and for the County of Lewis & Clark,
    The Honorable Thomas Honzel, Judge presiding.
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Lilly, Andriolo & Schraudner; Michael J. Lilly,
    Bozeman, Montana
    For Respondents:
    Timothy J. Meloy, Dept. of Agriculture, Helena,
    Montana
    Rae V. Kalbfleisch, Shelby, Montana
    Hugh Brown, Chester, Montana
    Thomas Budewitz, Townsend, Montana
    Kenneth Frazier, Billings, Montana
    Donald Hamilton, Great Falls, Montana
    R. W. Heineman, Wibaux, Montana
    Steve Johnson, Great Falls, Montana
    Dale Keil, Conrad, Montana
    Keith Maristuen, Havre, Montana
    Joseph Mudd, Bridger, Montana
    L.D. Nybo, Great Falls, Montana
    Rodney Peterson, Cut Bank, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: Jan. 14, 1988
    Decided: FEB 2 g 1988
    Filed:   FEB 2 9 1988
    Clerk
    Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the
    Court.
    This is an appeal of an order distributing bond
    proceeds made by the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and
    Clark County, Montana, in its memorandum and order of August
    6, 1987.    Originally, the State of Montana Department of
    Agriculture (State), filed an interpleader action after
    receiving bond proceeds from the surety of Coast Trading
    Company, Inc. (Coast) after Coast declared bankruptcy.
    The District Court determined that there were two
    categories of numerous defendants entitled to receive the
    proceeds.    One category is a group of independent grain
    dealers (Dealers) who contracted with Coast at its Portland,
    Oregon, office, through an agent located in Great Falls,
    Montana.   The other category is comprised of a number of
    farmers (Farmers) who dealt directly with twelve grain
    elevators located throughout the state of Montana. The court
    determined that the Farmers were secured under a $195,000
    grain dealer and public warehouseman bond and the Dealers
    were secured under a $20,000 grain merchandiser-track buyer
    bond. It is from this determination that the Dealers appeal.
    We affirm.
    The only issue we have before us is whether the
    District Court properly allocated the bond proceeds held by
    the State among the various defendants after granting summary
    judgment. Both parties agree that there is no material issue
    of fact and therefore this appeal is only to consider whether
    the District Court erred in adopting the distribution plan
    suggested by the State.
    In 1980, the State determined Coast was conducting two
    separate and independent grain purchasing businesses. Coast
    originally applied for two separate licenses in compliance
    with Montana law.
    In July, 1981, Coast renewed its grain purchasing
    licenses for the 1981-1982 grain year and it was required to
    execute two bonds.       One bond was entitled a grain
    merchandiser-track buyer bond in the amount of $20,000.   The
    other was entitled a grain dealer-public warehouseman bond in
    the amount of $195,000.
    The grain dealer-public warehouseman bond expressly
    stated that Coast operated twelve public local warehouses at
    Agawan, Bainville, Brady, Galata, Geraldine, Great Falls,
    Lothair, Missoula, Plains, Power, Square Butte, and Tiber,
    Montana.    Farmers sold grain to these twelve elevators
    pursuant to contracts entered into with Kenneth Branvold,
    manager for the Montana and North Dakota elevators of Coast.
    Each elevator manager purchased grain from the Farmers under
    a grain purchase agreement.    Generally, the Farmers would
    deliver the grain to one of the twelve grain elevators
    without any freight charge to Coast.      Occasionally, Coast
    would send a tractor-trailer unit to the Farmers to pick up
    the grain.   The local elevator manager would issue a grain
    sale ticket.    If stored at the local elevator a warehouse
    receipt would be exchanged for the ticket.
    Under the grain dealer-public warehouseman transaction,
    all grain purchased by the Coast elevators was paid for by
    the local elevator manager with a check drawn upon a Montana
    bank.   Branvold stated in his deposition that he purchased
    grain out of the Great Falls office under the grain
    dealer-public warehouseman license and did not purchase grain
    for the Portland office.    He further stated that the local
    manager was responsible for any lost or spoiled grain at any
    of the twelve elevators.
    As to the grain merchandiser-track buyer transaction,
    the grain merchandiser-track buyer bond stated that Coast.
    carried out the business of track buyer in Portland. Kirk
    Smith, agent and buyer for the Portland office of Coast, also
    operated out of the same Coast office as Branvold in Great
    Falls.   Smith, however, purchased grain in bulk quantities
    from commercial grain elevators, Dealers, under what Branvold
    stated was the track buyer's license. Smith never purchased
    grain from any of the Farmers.      He never used the grain
    purchase contracts, scale tickets, settlement sheets or
    checks drawn on the Montana bank.     The grain was delivered
    outside of Montana, either to Coast in Portland or to
    Lewiston, Idaho. Coast's Portland office paid the freight on
    this grain to out-of-state destinations and also took
    responsibility for any losses or spoilage. The contract and
    settlement sheets for Smith's purchases were all printed and
    prepared by the Portland office. The Dealers, additionally,
    received approximately 1      per bushel more than what the
    Farmers received. The Dealers were paid by checks drawn on a
    Portland bank. None of the Dealer's grain was stored in any
    of the twelve Montana warehouses.
    Between 1981-1982, Coast declared bankruptcy.       The
    State then brought an action against United Pacific Insurance
    Co., the surety, to recover on the bonds. In February 1985,
    the State settled the lawsuit for $180,000.      It was this
    money which was distributed pro-rata to the Farmers and
    Dealers. The Farmers received $163,225 plus accrued interest
    and the Dealers received $16,745 plus accrued interest.
    According   to   the    District   Court,   the   grain
    dealer-public warehouseman bond was issued in accordance with
    the Department of Agriculture's bond schedule for public
    warehouses. Schedule A, M0nt.Admin.R. 4.12.1009 (1980). The
    qrain merchandiser-track buyer bond was issued pursuant to
    the same regulation. The District Court further held that a
    contingency fund be established for a number of farmers
    involved in a separate lawsuit to recover under prior year
    bonds submitted by the surety companies. The attorneys were
    also awarded fees and costs to be paid out of the accrued
    interest.
    Dealers argue that the Department of Agriculture
    originally was in error in issuing the licenses because Coast
    could not be a "track buyer" under the statutes in place at
    the time.    They argue that the Department of Agriculture
    should not have treated Coast as a single entity operating in
    two separate capacities.    Dealers claim that the District
    Court therefore should have combined the entire recovery
    amount and not made a distinction between the Dealers and the
    Farmers.
    Dealers argue that the following definitions apply to
    this case and show that Coast should have only executed one
    bond.   Section 80-4-201, MCA (1981), provides the following
    definitions for "agent", "broker", "commission man", "grain
    dealer," and "track buyer":
    Unless the context requires otherwise, as
    used   in   this   part,  the   following
    definitions apply:
    (1) The terms "agent", "broker", and
    "commission man" include every person,
    association, firm, and corporation which
    engages in the business of negotiating
    sales or contracts for grain or of making
    sales or purchases for a commission.
    (4)  The term "grain dealer" includes
    every person, firm, association, and
    corporation  owning,   controlling,    or
    operating a truck, tractor-trailer unit,
    or c\rarehouse, other   than   a  pub1 ic
    warehouse, and engaged in the business of
    buying grain for shipment or milling.
    (8) The term "track buyer" includes
    every person, firm, association, and
    corporation which engages        in the
    business of buying grain for shipment or
    milling and which does not own, control,
    or   operate  a   warehouse  or   public
    warehouse.
    Further, Dealers argue that although "warehouseman" is
    not defined in the Montana Code Annotated, the State did
    promulgate a definition of public warehouse and public
    warehouseman in M0nt.Admin.R. 4.12.1008 (b), (1980):
    Public Warehouse: Includes any elevator,
    mill, warehouse, or structure in which
    grain is received from the public for
    storage, milling, shipment or handling.
    The term "Public Warehouseman" shall be
    held to mean and include every person,
    association, firm and corporation owning,
    controlling, or operating any public
    warehouse in which grain is stored or
    handled in such a manner that the grain
    of various owners is mixed together, and
    the identity of the different lots or
    parcels is not preserved . . .
    Dealers argue that S 80-4-201(4) and (8), MCA (1981),
    both disallow Coast from being classified as a grain dealer
    or track buyer because Coast owns and operates the twelve
    public warehouses in Montana.     Therefore, Dealers contend,
    had the Department of Agriculture acted correctly, all
    parties in this case would be claiming under the same bond in
    a pro-rata manner.   They cite Fidelity Deposit Co. v. State
    of Montana (9th Cir. 1937) , 
    92 F. 2d 693
    , for the proposition
    that the statutes of the state should be incorporated into
    the terms of the bond. By so doing, the Dealers claim, we
    should conclude that the bonds were issued erroneously and
    combine all proceeds to be issued pro-rata.
    Dealers claim this Court should ignore the labels
    placed on the bonds and follow Fidelity Deposit Co., supra,
    and conclude the bond proceeds were to "protect all
    individuals dealing with" Coast.
    Farmers argue, and we agree, that Coast was operating
    two distinct grain merchandising businesses at the time the
    licenses and bonds were issued.         We have previously
    recognized that the Department of Agriculture can require
    different bonds for the same legal entity.    Kohles v. St.
    Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. (1964), 
    144 Mont. 395
    , 
    396 P.2d 724
    .
    We recognize the general rule that     " [i]f a bond is
    executed in accordance with a statutory     requirement, then
    such a statute constitutes a part of        the bond as if
    incorporated in it, and the bond must        be construed in
    connection with the statute." Kohles, 144   Mont. at 398-399,
    396 P.2d   at    726; see also, General Electric Credit
    Corporation v.   Wolverine Insurance Co. (Mich. 1984) , 
    362 N.W.2d 595
    , 602; American Surety Co. of New York v. Butler
    (1930), 
    86 Mont. 584
    , 591, 
    284 P. 1011
    , 1014. However, this
    rule is not without exception.   The statement in subsection
    (4) and (8) of S 80-4-201, MCA (1981), that a grain dealer
    and track buyer may not own, control or operate a warehouse
    or public warehouse, should be read with consideration that
    this section begins "[ulnless the context requires otherwise
    Coast purchased the bonds on the same day, from the
    same agent, to be issued by the same surety.     It is clear
    that the intention of Coast and the Department of Agriculture
    was, as the District Court noted, to have the grain
    dealer-public warehouseman bond protect losses by farmers
    selling grain to one of the twelve public warehouses and have
    the grain merchandiser-track buyer bond cover losses suffered
    by commercial dealers selling grain to the Portland office of
    Coast.
    The agent issuing the license for the State may have
    failed to determine if Coast specifically fit into the
    definitions under the statute.    The bonds do not have an
    express specific reference to any statute.       However, the
    facts support the decision of the State to require Coast to
    have two separate surety bonds. By looking at the facts of
    how Coast was operating, it is clear that they had two
    separate grain businesses.
    We find therefore, under the facts of this case, that
    the District Court correctly interpreted these bonds under
    the ambiguous statutes governing grain merchandising and
    storage, S 80-4-201 et seq., MCA (1981), and accompanying
    regulations, by determining the intention of the parties when
    the bonds were purchased.    Those intentions were that the
    grain merchandiser-track buyer bond in the amount of $20,000
    was to cover losses of the Dealers, the grain dealer-public
    warehouseman bond in the amount of $195,000 was to cover
    losses of the Farmers.
    We further note that the statutes referred to by the
    Dealers were repealed by the Legislature in 1983.         The
    statement made by the Legislature is as follows:
    WHEREAS, the existing statutes regulating
    certain aspects of the agricultural
    industry have become antiquated, as well
    as being contradictory and illogical in
    their organization.
    THEREFORE, it is necessary to extensively
    revise those statutes and adopt them as
    new sections.
    The statutes were originally drafted in 1921 and
    amended numerous times thereafter.     They were indeed
    illogical and antiquated and as a result, this case has
    arisen.     Due to the technical nature of this confusing
    legislation we will not disregard the intentions of the
    parties who originally entered into the surety bond
    relationship.
    FJe affirm.
    We concur:
    &E-
    Justices
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 87-463

Citation Numbers: 230 Mont. 449, 750 P.2d 1079, 45 State Rptr. 343, 1988 Mont. LEXIS 42

Judges: Gulbrandson, Turnage, Weber, Sheehy, McDonough

Filed Date: 2/29/1988

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024