Bd. of Trustees Clinton Elementar ( 1986 )

No. 8 5 - 6 3 5
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1986
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, CLINTON
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT #32,
MISSOULA COUNTY,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, BONNER
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT # 1 4 ,
et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula,
The Honorable James B. Wheelis, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Garnaas, Hall & Pinsoneault; H. J. Pinsoneault,
Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Robert L. Deschamps, 111, County Attorney, Missoula,
Montana
19ichael W. Sehestedt, Deputy County Attorney, Missoula
Submitted on Briefs: April 10, 1 9 8 6
Decided: May 29, 1986
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Mont. 375, 639 P.2d 498.
Plaintiffs contend that defendants' actions were not in
compliance with § 20-6-213, which provides in pertinent part
as follows:
20-6-213. Transfer of territory from one
elementary district to another. (1) A majority of
the electors of any elementary district who are
qualified to vote under the provisions of 20-20-301
and who reside in territory which is a part of an
elementary district may petition the county
superintendent to transfer such territory to
another elementary district when:
(a) such territory is contiguous to the district
to which it is to be attached;
(b) such territory is not located within 3 miles,
over the shortest practical route, of an operating
school of the district from which it is to be
detached;
(c) the transfer of such territory will not reduce
the taxable value of the district to less than
$100,000 unless the remaining territory of the
district will contain not less than 50,000 acres of
nontaxable Indian land; and
(d) the board of trustees of the school district
that would receive the territory has approved the
transfer.
(2) The petition shall be addressed to the county
superintendent and shall:
(a) describe the territory that is requested to be
transferred and to what district it is to be
transferred;
(b) state the reasons why such transfer is
requested; and
(c) state the number of elementary school-age
children residing in such territory.
(4) The county superintendent shall conduct the
hearing as scheduled, and any resident or taxpayer
of the affected districts shall be heard. If the
county superintendent considers it advisable and in
the best interests of the residents of such
territory, he shall grant the petitioned request
and order the change of district boundaries to
coincide with the boundary description in the
petition. Otherwise, he shall, by order, deny the
request. Either of the orders shall be final 30
days after its date unless it is appealed to the
board of county commissioners by a resident or
taxpayer of either district affected by the
territory transfer. The decision of the board of
county commissioners, after a hearing on such
matter and consideration of the material presented
at the county superintendent's hearing, shall be
final 30 days after its date unless a petition to
submit the question to a vote of the people in the
district from which the land is to be transferred,
which h.as been signed by a majority of the electors
of the district who reside in the territory to be
transferred and who are qualified to vote in
elections for that district under 20-20-301, is
presented prior to that time ...
The order issued by the County Superintendent did not
contain a finding that the four elements of a valid petition
listed under § 20-6-213(1), MCA, were met, nor did the order
contain findings supporting the conclusion that a transfer
was in the best interests of the residents of the affected
territory. The Board of County Commissioners affirmed the
order without making any findings. Plaintiffs assert the
lack of findings in the record was error and makes court
review of the transfer decision impossible. The District
Court ruled against plaintiffs on this matter, holding that
plaintiffs had waived the issue of findings by submitting to
it an agreed statement of facts, and that plaintiffs' failure
to request findings at an earlier stage in the proceedings
barred reversal for lack of findings under $ 2-4-704 (2)(g),
MCA .
Section 2-4-623(1), MCA, requires that a final decision
in a contested case shall include findings of facts.
Although the County Superintendent did not comply with this
provision, there is substantial evidence in the record
supporting his decision to grant the transfer. Testimony
given at each hearing reflects that Sunwood Acres residents
were unanimous in their support of the transfer proposal,
while opposition testimony was minimal. Plaintiffs do not
contend that any of requisite facts for transfer under
S 20-6-213, MCA, have not been met, nor do they contend the
transfer was not in the best interests of the residents of
such territory.
Our standard of review under S 2-4-704, MCA, is limited.
Section 2-4-704 (2)(g), MCA provides: "The court may reverse
or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant
have been prejudiced because findings of fact, upon issues
essential to the decision, were not made although requested."
Plaintiff did not request findings of fact from either the
County Superintendent or the Board of County Commissioners.
Pursuant to S 2-4-704 (2)(g), MCA, such failure bars court
reversal for lack of fact findings. We find substantial
credible evidence in the record supporting the order of the
County Superintendent granting the transfer. Plaintiffs have
failed to make any showing that such order was an abuse of
discretion; therefore we affirm the decision of the County
Superintendent.
The second issue raised by plaintiffs involves
interpretation of § 20-6-213(1), MCA. The disputed provision
reads: "A majority of the electors of any elementary
district who are qualified under the provisions of 20-20-301
and who reside in territory which is part of an elementary
district may petition the county superintendent to transfer
such territory . . ." Plaintiffs contend the petition must
be signed by a majority of the electors of the district who
live in the area to be transferred. The District Court held
that the provision requires the petition to be signed only by
a majority of the electors residing in the territory to be
transferred and need not be signed by a majority of the
electors in the district from which the territory is to be
transferred.
We agree with the interpretation of the District Court.
Under plaintiffs' interpretation, residents of a small
territory within a district, such as in the present case,
could never file a valid petition because a majority of the
electors do not reside within such territory. Our
statutorily mandated duty under §S 1-3-232, and 1-3-233, MCA,
is to favor the interpretation which is reasonable and gives
effect t o the s t a t u t e i n question. We reject p l a i n t i f f s '
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a s it would r e n d e r t h e s t a t u t e u s e l e s s .
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e
W e concur: