Matter of Drivers License of Anders , 54 State Rptr. 797 ( 1997 )

96-687
No. 96-687
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1997
IN RE THE MATTER OF THE
DRIVER'S LICENSE OF
CHRISTOPHER T. ANDERSON,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Respondent and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM:District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Honorable G. Todd Baugh, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Terry L. Seiffert, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General
Pamela P. Collins, Ass't Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney
Brent Brooks, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 8, 1997
Decided: August 1, 1997
Filed:
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__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Christopher T. Anderson (Anderson) appeals from the order of the Thirteenth
Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, which denied his petition challenging
the
declaration by the Montana Department of Justice (Department) that he is a habitual
traffic offender and the Department's revocation of his driver's license. We
reverse and
remand.
The sole issue before us is whether the District Court erred in denying Anderson's
petition.
On or about May 7, 1996, the Department notified Anderson that, according to its
records, he had accumulated 30 or more conviction points related to the use or
operation
of a motor vehicle within a 3-year period. The records reflected convictions for
driving
under the influence of alcohol (DUI) on September 20, 1995, November 27, 1995, and
April 11, 1996. Each DUI conviction was assigned 10 conviction points.
Under such a circumstance, the Department is required to declare the driver a
habitual traffic offender and to revoke the person's driver's license for 3 years.
The
notification so advised Anderson, and also advised that he could challenge the
declaration
and revocation by petitioning the district court in the county of his residence
within 30
days.
Anderson timely filed a petition in the District Court challenging the Department's
actions. He contended that the purported DUI conviction on April 11, 1996, was
erroneous because his conviction date for that DUI was November 14, 1991. As a
result,
Anderson argued that he had not accumulated 30 or more conviction points within a 3-
year period under 61-11-203(2), MCA, and the Department's habitual traffic offender
declaration and driver's license revocation were invalid.
The District Court ordered the parties to submit an agreed statement of facts and
memoranda of law. After the parties complied, the District Court entered its order
denying Anderson's petition. Anderson appeals.
Did the District Court err in denying Anderson's petition challenging the
Department's declaration that he is a habitual traffic offender and its
revocation of his driver's license?
In Montana, a habitual traffic offender is a person who, within a 3-year period,
accumulates 30 or more "conviction" points relating to the use or operation of a
motor
vehicle. Section 61-11-203(2), MCA. " 'Conviction' means a finding of guilt by duly
constituted judicial authority. . . ." Section 61-11-203(1), MCA. In the case
presently
before us, it is clear that if Anderson was convicted of DUI on November 14, 1991,
rather than on April 11, 1996, he did not accumulate sufficient conviction points
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within
a 3-year period to support the Department's declaration that he is a habitual traffic
offender and revocation of his driver's license. Thus, it is necessary to carefully
scrutinize the record before us to determine the correct conviction date.
According to the record, Anderson was arrested on the DUI charge at issue on
October 26, 1991, found guilty by the Billings City Court (City Court) on November
14,
1991, and sentenced on the same date. He appealed to the district court where, for
unknown reasons, the case languished. On April 11, 1996, the district court signed
an
order, based on a stipulation by the parties, dismissing the appeal and remanding to
the
City Court for final imposition of sentence. The abstract of record relating to
proceedings on remand in the City Court, signed by the Clerk of the City Court and
dated
April 30, 1996, is the only document before us relating to those proceedings. The
Clerk
wrote in "4-11-96" after "date of conviction" and checked boxes captioned "found
guilty" and "judge."
The Department's declaration that Anderson is a habitual traffic offender is based
on its contention that Anderson had an "April 11, 1996, conviction." That
contention is
premised entirely on the district court's April 11, 1996, order dismissing Anderson's
appeal and remanding for final imposition of sentence, and the abstract of record
from
the City Court containing an identical conviction date. The problem is that, on this
record, no "duly constituted judicial authority" found Anderson guilty of DUI on
that
date and, as a result, no conviction occurred at that time. See 61-11-203(1),
MCA.
First, it is important to recall that the City Court convicted Anderson of--and
sentenced him on--the DUI at issue on November 14, 1991. Anderson appealed for a
trial de novo, but the district court ultimately dismissed his appeal from that
conviction
pursuant to the parties' stipulation and remanded for final imposition of sentence.
The
district court did not find Anderson guilty of DUI and, thus, did not "convict" him
as
defined in 61-11-203(1), MCA, on April 11, 1996.
With regard to the abstract of record concerning the remand to the City Court, it
is clear that the abstract reflects a conviction date of April 11, 1996, and
indicates
"found guilty" and "judge." It is equally clear, however, that the City Court had no
statutory authority to find Anderson guilty again, at that time, of the offense for
which
it had already convicted and sentenced him in November of 1991. Nor does the
Department cite to any case law under which such authority would exist.
Moreover, the district court's dismissal of Anderson's appeal remanded to the City
Court only for imposition of sentence already pronounced. While we prohibited such a
remand in Rickett v. City of Billings (1993), 262 Mont. 339, 864 P.2d 793, that case
is
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inapplicable here.
In Rickett, the pro se defendant appealed a city court
conviction to the
district court and then failed to appear for a scheduled omnibus hearing. Based on
her
failure to appear, the district court determined that the defendant had waived her
appeal
and remanded to the city court for imposition and/or execution of that court's
sentence.
Rickett, 864 P.2d at 794. We determined that the district court's options in
response to
a failure to appear were limited to those set forth in 46-16-122(2), MCA, and, as a
result, we held that the district court exceeded its authority in remanding to the
city court
for imposition or execution of sentence. Rickett, 864 P.2d at 794-95. Here, the
parties
stipulated to the dismissal of Anderson's appeal to the district court and its
remand to the
City Court for final imposition of sentence. Nothing in Rickett precludes a remand
under
this factual scenario.We conclude that the records on which the Department relied
in declaring Anderson a habitual traffic offender and revoking his driver's license
incorrectly reflected an April 11, 1996, DUI conviction and, as a result, Anderson
did
not accumulate 30 conviction points within a 3-year period. On that basis, we
further
conclude that the Department improperly declared Anderson a habitual traffic offender
and revoked his driver's license.
The Department contends that Anderson is attempting to collaterally attack his
April 11, 1996, conviction in this proceeding challenging a habitual traffic offender
declaration and correctly cites to State ex rel. Majerus v. Carter (1984), 214 Mont.
272,
278-80, 693 P.2d 501, 504-505, as authority for the proposition that he cannot
collaterally attack a conviction at this time. The Department's position, however,
is
premised on its theory that a conviction occurred on April 11, 1996. As we concluded
above, that theory is incorrect.
Moreover, while Majerus prohibits efforts to refute underlying charges or dispute
the propriety of underlying convictions in a habitual traffic offender proceeding by
collaterally attacking those convictions (Majerus, 693 P.2d at 504-505), Anderson is
not
attempting to do so here. Rather, Anderson is disputing the accuracy of the records
regarding the alleged April 11, 1996, conviction on which the Department's
declaration
and revocation were based; that is, Anderson questions only whether the records on
which the Department relied correctly reflected a DUI conviction on April 11, 1996.
Section 61-11-210(3), MCA, and Majerus, 693 P.2d at 504-505, expressly authorize him
to do so.
We hold that the District Court erred in denying Anderson's petition
challenging
the Department's declaration that he is a habitual traffic offender and its
revocation of his
driver's license.
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Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
We concur:
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
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