State v. Hough ( 1973 )

No. 12486
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
F F OTN
1973
THE STATE O MONTANA,
F
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
-vs -
JOANN G. HOUGH,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable Edward T. D u s s a u l t , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record :
For A p p e l l a n t :
Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y General, Helena,
Montana
J. C. Weingartner, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General, appeared,
Helena, Montana
Robert L. Deschamps 111, lhp&y County A t t o r n e y , Missoula,
Montana
Michael J. Milodragovich, Deputy County A t t o r n e y , argued,
Missoula , Montana
F o r Respondent :
Donald R. Matthews argued, Missoula, Montana
Submitted: September 11, 1973
Decided : OCT 2 4 1973
Filed: WT 2 4.1973
M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court.
Defendant was charged w i t h unlawful possession o f dangerous
drugs i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t o f Missoula County. She moved t o suppress
t h e evidence seized by t h e Missoula County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e . From t h e
order o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t suppressing t h e evidence, t h e s t a t e appeals.
B r i e f l y s t a t e d t h e f a c t s a r e as f o l l o w s : On January 20, 1973,
deputy s h e r i f f s F r o j e n and Churchwell o f Missoula County were p a t r o l l i n g
an area i n Missoula, Montana. The deputies, who work f o r t h e drug team,
were d r i v i n g an unmarked c a r and wearing p l a i n c l o t h e s . Defendant was
h i t c h h i k i n g on Brooks S t r e e t i n Missoula. The o f f i c e r s stopped and picked
her up. They i d e n t i f i e d themselves t o defendant as b i l l c o l l e c t o r s and
expressed t o her an i n t e r e s t i n buying some drugs. Defendant t o l d t h e
o f f i c e r s she had extensive involvement w i t h drugs, b u t she d i d n o t have
any w i t h h e r a t t h a t time and d i d n o t know where t h e o f f i c e r s c o u l d o b t a i n
any.
While d r i v i n g around f o r a p e r i o d o f time, t h e o f f i c e r s urged
defendant t o l e t them know where t h e y c o u l d g e t some n a r c o t i c s . Defend-
a n t t o l d t h e o f f i c e r s t h a t she r e a l l y d i d n ' t know many people i n Missoula.
The o f f i c e r s estimated defendant's age t o be 15 o r 16 because she
looked extremely young. Defendant s t a t e d her age was 19 years and t h a t her
f i r s t name was Ginnie. Suspecting defendant was a runaway j u v e n i l e t h e
o f f i c e r s i d e n t i f i e d themselves as deputy s h e r i f f s . Defendant t o l d them she
was 18 and n o t 19 years o f age and gave t h e o f f i c e r s a w e l f a r e card and a
check guarantee card f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . The w e l f a r e card i d e n t i f i e d t h e
s u b j e c t as JoAnn Hough.
The welfare card revealed the s u b j e c t had two c h i l d r e n . Defendant
was unable t o a c c u r a t e l y s t a t e t h e c h i l d r e n ' s b i r t h d a t e s upon being questioned
by t h e o f f i c e r s . She was asked i f she had graduated from h i g h school. She
s t a t e d she had graduated, b u t c o u l d n o t remember t h e year i n which she grad-
ila ted.
The o f f i c e r s brought defendant t o t h e s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e f o r t h e
purpose o f i d e n t i f y i n g her, t o c o n t a c t her parents and inform them t h a t
t h e i r daughter had been l o c a t e d . While a t t h e s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e O f f i c e r
Churchwell examined t h e contents o f defendant's purse. The o f f i c e r s c l a i m
t h a t defendant had no o b j e c t i o n t o them going through h e r purse. Officer
Churchwell t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant v o l u n t a r i l y handed him t h e purse, a1 -
though he d i d n o t e x p l a i n t o her t h a t she had any a l t e r n a t i v e . Defendant
claims she objected t o t h e i r going through her purse.
O f f i c e r Churchwell dumped t h e contents o f defendant's purse o u t
on t h e desk. He opened a zippered purse which was i n t h e l a r g e r purse and
t h e r e i n found t h e drugs. Defendant exclaimed, "Well, you have g o t me now,"
b u t t h e r e i s a c o n f l i c t as t o when t h i s statement was made.
The o f f i c e r discovered a q u a n t i t y o f hashish and marijuana. De-
fendant was then f o r m a l l y a r r e s t e d and advised o f her r i g h t s .
An e v i d e n t i a r y hearing was h e l d on defendant's motion t o suppress
t h e evidence. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t , t h e Hon. Edward T. Dussault p r e s i d i n g ,
suppressed t h e seized drugs on t h e grounds t h a t t h e search and s e i z u r e was
unreasonable.
The s i n g l e i s s u e presented on appeal i s whether t h e drugs were
p r o p e r l y seized by t h e deputy s h e r i f f s .
The 4 t h Amendment t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e United States and
A r t . 111, s 7, Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1889 ( A r t . 11, B 11, Montana Consti-
t u t i o n of 1972) p r o t e c t s c i t i z e n s from "unreasonable searches and seizures."
Section 95-701, R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s :
"A search o f a person, o b j e c t o r p l a c e may be made and
instruments, a r t i c l e s o r t h i n g s may be seized i n accord-
ance w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s chapter when t h e search
i s made:
"(a) As an i n c i d e n t t o a l a w f u l a r r e s t .
" ( b ) With t h e consent o f t h e accused o r o f any person
who i s l a w f u l l y i n possession o f t h e o b j e c t o r place t o
be searched, o r who i s believed upon reasonable cause t o
be i n such l a w f u l possession by t h e person making the
search.
"(c) By t h e a u t h o r i t y o f a v a l i d search warrant.
" ( d ) Under t h e a u t h o r i t y and w i t h i n t h e scope o f a
r i g h t of l a w f u l i n s p e c t i o n granted by t h e law."
The s t a t e presents t h r e e a l t e r n a t i v e s f o r f i n d i n g t h a t t h e
drugs were p r o p e r l y seized. F i r s t , t h e s t a t e argues t h e r e was no search
under t h e circumstances o f t h i s case as t h e term i s d e f i n e d i n i t s 4 t h
Amendment sense.
T h i s Court i n S t a t e v. Williams, 153 Mont. 262, 269, 455 P.2d
634, said:
" * * * we f i n d t h a t a 'search' has been h e l d t o i m p l y an
examination o f one's premises o r person w i t h a view t o
t h e d i s c o v e r y o f contraband o r evidence o f g u i l t t o be
used i n p r o s e c u t i o n o f a c r i m i n a l a c t i o n ; i t i m p l i e s an
e x p l o r a t o r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n o r quest. ( C i t i n g a u t h o r i t y . )
I n t h e aggregate,a ' s e a r c h ' i n i t s 4 t h Amendment sense
simply denotes (1 ) a quest by an o f f i c e r o f t h e l a w (Weeks
v . U n i t e d States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652)
(2) w i t h an i n t e n t i o n o f f i n d (United States v. Lodahl,
D.C.Mont. 264 F.Supp. 927), (3) which invades a c o n s t i -
t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d area ( H a r r i s v. U n i t e d States, 331
U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399); Weeks v. U n i t e d
States, supra)."
I n t h e i n s t a n t case t h e o f f i c e r s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e drugs were
discovered i n an attempt t o i d e n t i f y t h e defendant. There was no "examin-
a t i o n o f one's premises o r person w i t h a view t o t h e d i s c o v e r y o f contraband
o r evidence o f g u i l t t o be used i n prosecution o f a c r i m i n a l a c t i o n " . Under
t h e foregoing d e f i n i t i o n t h e r e was no "search" under t h e f a c t s o f t h i s
case. The question presented, however, i s whether t h e s e i z u r e was proper,
and t h e s t a t e argues t h a t i t was under t h e " p l a i n view" d o c t r i n e .
I n t h e r e c e n t case o f S t a t e v . Gallagher, Mont . , 509
P.2d 852, 30 St.Rep. 467, 476, t h i s Court said:
"The r u l e i s : Where t h e r e i s p r i o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r
t h e p o l i c e t o search an area, and i n searching t h e
area, t h e y i n a d v e r t e n t l y f i n d i n c r i m i n a t i n g evidence
which t h e y had no reason t o a n t i c i p a t e , t h e y may law-
f u l l y s e i z e t h a t i n c r i m i n a t i n g evidence." ( C i t i n g
authority. )
I n Gallagher t h e s h e r i f f was searching t h e house f o r a p r o w l e r
when he entered t h e bedroom o f defendant and n o t i c e d t h e evidence. I n find-
i n g t h a t t h e s h e r i f f ' s reason f o r being i n d e f e n d a n t ' s bedroom was l a w f u l
ana t h a t t h e evidence seized c l e a r l y came w i t h i n t h e " p l a i n view" d o c t r i n e ,
w quoted extensively from the United States Supreme Court decision of
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Coolidge v . Nw Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L ed 2d 564, which
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thoroughly discusses the "plain view" doctrine, i t s rationale and appl i -
cation. In Coolidge a t 29 L ed 2d 564, 583, the Court said:
"The rationale for the 'plain view' exception i s evident
i f w keep in mind the two distinct constitutional
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protections served by the warrant requirement. F i r s t ,
the magistrate's scrutiny i s intended t o eliminate a l -
together searches not based on probable cause. The
premise here i s that a?y intrusion in the way of search
or seizure i s an e v i l , so that no intrusion a t a l l i s
justified without a careful prior determination of
necessity. (Citing authority.) The second, d i s t i n c t
objective i s that those searches deemed necessary should
be as limited as possible. Here, the specific evil i s
the 'general warrant' abhorred by the colonists, and the
problem i s not t h a t of intrusion per se, b u t of a gen-
eral , exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings.
(Citing authority.) * * *
"The 'plain view1-doctrine i s not in conflict with the
f i r s t objective because plain view does not occur until
a search i s in progress. In each case, t h i s i n i t i a l
intrusion i s justified by a warrant or by an exception
such as 'hot pursuit' or search incident t o a lawful
a r r e s t , or by an extraneous valid reason f o r the o f f i c e r ' s
presence. * * *"
The question in t h i s case becomes whether there was a "prior
justification" f o r the officer to be in defendant's purse. There was no
warrant f o r another object. Hot pursuit was not involved. Was there an
extraneous valid reason for the o f f i c e r ' s presence in the purse, or pur-
suant t o section 95-701 ( d ) , R.C.M. 1947, was the inspection under the
authority and within the scope of a right granted by law? Let us examine
the facts in more d e t a i l .
After the officers identified themselves, defendant showed the
officers her welfare card and told them t h a t she lived on Sussex s t r e e t where
she had a birth c e r t i f i c a t e . Before going t o the s h e r i f f ' s office the
t r i o drove w i t h i n a few blocks of the Sussex address. In response to
questions asked of Officer Churchwell concerning going t o the house on
Sussex, the officer gave the following answers:
"Q. And would i t have been much trouble to go to her
house t o check out the birth c e r t i f i c a t e part of i t ?
A. That's n o t usually how w operate.
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"Q. Well -- A. I w o u l d n ' t have done i t t h a t way, no.
"Q. You o b v i o u s l y d i d n ' t do i t t h a t way; b u t would i t
have been much t r o u b l e f o r you t o have done t h a t ? A.
I t c o u l d have been done.
"Q. F a i r l y easy, c o u l d i t n o t ? A. Yes."
Defendant t o l d t h e o f f i c e r s t h a t her s i s t e r l i v e d w i t h her a t
t h e Sussex address and t h a t her s i s t e r c o u l d prove defendant's i d e n t i f i -
cation. She a l s o t o l d them t h a t h e r parents l i v e d i n Warm Springs. Offi-
c e r Churchwell c o u l d n o t remember whether o r n o t he c a l l e d defendant's
parents. He t e s t i f i e d as f o l l o w s :
"Q. M r . Churchwell, i s i t usual f o r you t o phone t h e
parents when you b r i n g a j u v e n i l e i n ? A. I o f t e n do t h a t ,
yes.
"Q. Don't you do t h a t most o f t h e time, p r a c t i c a l l y every
time? A. Yes, s i r .
"Q. Did you phone JoAnn's parents? A. No I'm n o t --
sure whether I d i d o r not. I r e a l l y d o n ' t remember.
"Q. IfI t o l d you t h a t she t o l d me, and she found o u t
from her f o l k s t h a t you d i d not, would you be1 i e v e t h a t ?
A. Yes, s i r . "
O f f i c e r F r o j e n d i d n o t c a l l defendant's parents. Defendant's
s i s t e r was c a l l e d l a t e r i n t h e evening. The drugs were discovered b e f o r e
she a r r i v e d .
O f f i c e r F r o j e n was handed defendant's w a l l e t w h i l e r i d i n g i n t h e
car. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t i t was t h e type of b i l l f o l d t h a t would h o l d c r e d i t
cards, papers and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . He d i d not, however, a t t h a t t i m e ex-
amine t h e contents o f t h e w a l l e t . Deferldant t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e zippered
purse i n which t h e drugs were found was a make-up bag.
According t o O f f i c e r Churchwell, he asked f o r o t h e r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
from t h e defendant than what she had produced. Defendant informed him t h a t
what she had given t o t h e o f f i c e r was a l l t h a t she had w i t h her.
O f f i c e r Churchwell was asked what t h e normal procedure i s w i t h a
suspected runaway j u v e n i l e . He s a i d :
"A. Normally I take them t o t h e o f f i c e ; i n t h e case o f
run-away j u v e n i l e s , take them t o t h e o f f i c e , i n t e r v i e w
them b r i e f l y and then advise them t h a t I am going t o
call t h e i r parents. I obtain a phone number from them
and call the parents."
I t was the o f f i c e r s ' responsibility to identify the defendant
and notify the proper parties. W observe from the f a c t s , however, t h a t
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the officers had several opportunities by which they could obtain identi-
fication. Present in t h i s case i s an apparent deviation from the normal
procedure f o r identifying the defendant. This deviation cannot extend
into constitutionally protected areas and be j u s t i f i e d for the purpose of
proving identification. Noticeably, the available and more r e l i a b l e
alternatives were not pursued by the o f f i c e r s . There was no valid reason
for the o f f i c e r ' s presence in the defendant's purse, and the "plain view"
doctrine i s not applicable.
In addition, the s t a t e argues that the seizure can also be
justified on the basis that there was a search made incidental to an a r r e s t .
W do n o t overlook the f a c t that the officers had reasonable grounds t o
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be1 ieve the defendant was a runaway juvenile. Defendant, however, was
not arrested; she was simply taken into custody f o r the purpose of proving
her identification. W note, as did the d i s t r i c t court, that defendant was
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not told that even though she was suspected of being a juvenile that she
could call her parents, her s i s t e r , the address a t Sussex or an attorney.
She was n o t arrested until a f t e r the drugs were found.
There was no search incident to a lawful a r r e s t . Therefore, the
seizure was n o t proper on t h i s basis and i t cannot serve as a prior j u s t i f i -
cation f o r the "plain view" doctrine.
As a third alternative the s t a t e contends t h a t the seizure can be
sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States decision in Terry v .
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L ed 2d 889. In Terry the court j u s t i -
fied the "stop and f r i s k " procedures used by police officers. The doctrine
enunciated i n Terry has no application t o the f a c t s of t h i s case.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the d i s t r i c t court
suppressing the drugs i s hereby a
W concur:
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Justices --i
Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison dissenting:
I dissent.