Matter of M.L.Y. ( 1982 )

I N THE SURPEME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
I N THE MATTER O M. L. Y .
F AND M. Y . ,
Youth i n n e e d o f c a r e .
I N Rl2 THE I.WRRIAGE OF
MARVIN LEO YOTTER,
P e t i t i o n e r and Respondent,
THERESA NEIL YOTTEK PIILLIAMSON,
Respondent a n d A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f Y e l l o w s t o n e , The H o n o r a b l e
Diane G. B a r z , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellant:
J o n e s , J o n e s & Work; B l a i r J o n e s , E i l l i n g s , ,
F o r Respondent :
Nye Law Firm; J e r r o l d L. Nye, B i l l i n g s , Montana
H a r o l d Eianser , County A t t o r n e y , B i l l i n g s , Montana
O l s e n , C h r i s t e n s e n & G a n n e t t ; Damon L. G a n n e t t ,
B i l l i n g s , Montana
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : O c t o b e r 7 , 1982
Cecided: December 1 6 , 1982
Filed: !!KC 1 6 1982
M. J u s t i c e J o h n
r Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
T h i s a p p e a l was t a k e n f r o m a judgment o f the District Court
of the Thirteenth Judicial District declaring the c u s t o d y of
M.L.Y. and M.Y. Due to procedural e r r o r we m u s t vacate the
judgment of t h e District C o u r t .
The underlying consolidated actions were the latest of a
series of disputes between the husband and wife since their
d i v o r c e i n 1978. A t t h e t i m e of d i v o r c e t h e p a r t i e s e n t e r e d into
a c u s t o d y and s u p p o r t a g r e e m e n t . T h i s a g r e e m e n t was i n c o r p o r a t e d
i n t h e d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n . T h e r e s a was t o be t h e c u s t o d i a l
p a r e n t of t h e two c h i l d r e n . A l t h o u g h t h e d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n
g r a n t e d r e a s o n a b l e v i s i t a t i o n , it appears t h a t Theresa "continued
t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h and b l o c k v i s i t a t i o n a t t e m p t s made by M a r v i n
I n August 1979 , Marvin t r a v e l e d to S o u t h Dakota, t h e resi-
d e n c e o f T h e r e s a and t h e c h i l d r e n , and f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r c h a n g e
of custody. A hearing was h e l d and a v i s i t a t i o n a g r e e m e n t was
entered into ; unfortunately, t h e p a r t i e s c o n t i n u e d to f i g h t o v e r
visitation rights. In early 1980, Theresa moved to Arizona
without in£orming Marvin of her whereabouts. Marvin later
located h i s ex-wife and c h i l d r e n and w e n t to A r i z o n a . On May
27, 1980, he entered into another visitation agreement with
T h e r e s a ; h e would t a k e t h e c h i l d r e n t o Montana f o r t h e summer and
would allow t h e c h i l d r e n t o r e t u r n t o A r i z o n a o n o r a b o u t A u g u s t
15. Marvin returned t o Montana w i t h t h e c h i l d r e n and filed a
motion for change of c u s t o d y i n D i s t r i c t C o u r t of Yellowstone
C o u n t y on J u l y 8 . An amended m o t i o n f o r c h a n g e of c u s t o d y was
f i l e d on A u g u s t 5 . On A u g u s t 2 8 , D i s t r i c t J u d g e C h a r l e s Luedke
d e n i e d M a r v i n ' s amended m o t i o n w i t h o u t h e a r i n g . Marvin d i s p u t e d
Judge Luedke's o r d e r denying h i s motion and filed a n o t i c e of
a p p e a l on S e p t e m b e r 9 . However, o n S e p t e m b e r 2 6 , M a r v i n f i l e d a
document e n t i t l e d "Withdrawal of Appeal. "
During t h i s t i m e period, T h e r e s a came t o Montana t o r e g a i n
custody of M.L.Y. and M.Y. T h e r e s a was n o t able to find the
children. Marvin, intending to frustrate Theresa's e f f o r t s to
regain custody, had s e n t t h e c h i l d r e n to U t a h w i t h h i s p r e s e n t
wife. Twice d u r i n g t h e month of September Marvin w a s a r r e s t e d
f o r custodial interference. On S e p t e m b e r 3 0 , t h e S t a t e became
involved by filing a petition for temporary investigative
authority and protective services. The District Court then
o r d e r e d t h e c h i l d r e n p l a c e d i n f o s t e r care p e n d i n g f i n a l d i s p o s i -
tion.
On November 20 , M a r v i n was s u c c e s s f u l i n p e r s u a d i n g t h e c o u r t
t o o r d e r t h e c h i l d r e n removed from f o s t e r care and p l a c e d i n h i s
custody. On t h e same d a y , Marvin f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r c h a n g e of
c u s t o d y and a m o t i o n t o c o n s o l i d a t e t h e d e p e n d e n c y and neglect
proceedings with h i s custody action. On t h a t d a y J u d g e Luedke
ordered consolidation.
A lengthy trial ensued. A final order was entered on
November 9 , 1981. The D e p a r t m e n t of S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n
S e r v i c e s was granted legal c u s t o d y of the children until age
eighteen, and Marvin was granted guardianship and physical
custody until age eighteen. Theresa was granted reasonable
rights of visitation. On December 8, 1981, Theresa filed a
n o t i c e of appeal.
The appellant has raised several i s s u e s concerning various
a c t i o n s o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n r e l a t i o n t o j u r i s d i c t i o n and t h e
consolidation of the custody action and the dependency and
neglect action. First, a p p e l l a n t claims t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d
n o t have j u r i s d i c t i o n over the custody action since the father
had f i l e d a n o t i c e of appeal, thus transferring jurisdiction to
t h i s Court. Second, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l argument,
appellant contends it was e r r o r to c o n s o l i d a t e the two c a u s e s
b e c a u s e t o d o s o was p r e j u d i c i a l ; " [ t l h e c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t s h o u l d
n o t be r e q u i r e d t o d e f e n d a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e of Montana and the
n o n c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t s e e k i n g c u s t o d y i n o n e and t h e same a c t i o n ."
W e need o n l y a d d r e s s t h e f i r s t i s s u e .
A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t s i n c e a n o t i c e of a p p e a l was f i l e d b y
h e r husband from d i s m i s s a l of h i s amended m o t i o n f o r c h a n g e of
c u s t o d y , t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e p a r t i e s and t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r
had passed to this Court, leaving t h e District Court without
a u t h o r i t y to a s s e r t j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e s u b s e q u e n t p e t i t i o n f o r
change of custody. At t h i s time we must restate t h e chronology
o f v a r i o u s documents:
1. On August 28, 1980, the District Court denied the
f a t h e r ' s amended m o t i o n f o r c h a n g e of c u s t o d y .
2. On September 9, 1980, the father filed a notice of
appeal.
3. On S e p t e m b e r 2 6 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e f a t h e r f i l e d w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t a document e n t i t l e d ''Withdrawal of Appeal."
4. On November 20, 1980, the father filed a petition for
change of c u s t o d y and a m o t i o n to c o n s o l i d a t e h i s p e t i t i o n w i t h
t h e d e p e n d e n c y and n e g l e c t a c t i o n f i l e d by t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e C o u n t y
Attorney's Office. On t h e same d a y t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r e d
consolidation.
Initially, we note t h a t the husband's n o t i c e of appeal was
timely; i t was f i l e d w i t h i n t h i r t y d a y s of the District C o u r t ' s
denial of the motion for change of custody. See Rule 5,
M.R.App.Civ.P. Such a t i m e l y f i l i n g v e s t s t h i s C o u r t w i t h j u r i s -
diction. I n J u l i a n v. B u c k l e y ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - -- Mont . _ , 625
P.2d 5 2 6 , 5 2 8 , 38 S t . R e p . 1 2 8 , 130, we s t a t e d : " [ s j i n c e 1954 it
h a s been an e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e i n Montana t h a t when a n o t i c e of
appeal has been filed, jurisdiction over the parties to the
c o n t r o v e r s y and s u b j e c t m a t t e r p a s s e s from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and
v e s t s i n t h e Supreme C o u r t . "
I t i s a r g u e d t h a t t h e a p p e a l was n e v e r p e r f e c t e d b e c a u s e the
f e e was n o t p a i d n o r w a s t h e r e c o r d transferred, and as a con-
sequence, jurisdiction was never acquired by this Court.
However, t h e p r o p o n e n t s o f t h i s a r g u m e n t o v e r l o o k a s t a t e m e n t i n
t h e comments t o R u l e 4 , M.R.App.Civ.P.: " [n]o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n
the filing of a notice of appeal in the District Court is
required f o r t h e p e r f e c t i n g of an appeal." Annotations to MCA,
540
Vol. 3, Title 25, p. 543. On S e p t e m b e r 9 , 1980, the date the
n o t i c e o f a p p e a l was f i l e d w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , t h i s Court's
j u r i s d i c t i o n w a s invoked.
On S e p t e m b e r 2 6 , 1980, t h e f a t h e r f i l e d a document w i t h t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n d i c a t i n g h i s i n t e n t i o n s to w i t h d r a w h i s a p p e a l .
The d o c u m e n t s i m p l y s a i d "NOW COMES t h e P e t i t i o n e r and w i t h d r a w s
his appeal herein. DATED this 26th day of September, 1980."
R u l e 3 6 , M.R.App.Civ.P. states t h a t " [ i ] f an appeal h a s not been
d o c k e t e d t h e a p p e a l may be d i s m i s s e d b y t h e c o u r t from w h i c h t h e
a p p e a l was t a k e n . . . upon m o t i o n and n o t i c e by t h e a p p e l l a n t . "
N o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s e i t h e r m o t i o n or n o t i c e . W e must
conclude that the father's document entitled "Withdrawal of
A p p e a l " was n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o d i v e s t t h i s C o u r t of its jurisdic-
tion. " W h e t h e r or n o t t h e a p p e l l a n t . . . w i l l be p e r m i t t e d t o
dismiss o r withdraw his appeal . . . i s a matter w i t h i n t h e
d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e c o u r t , and n o t a m a t t e r of r i g h t on t h e p a r t of
the appellant . . ." 5 Arn.Jur.2d - p p e a- . --- E r r o - S e c t i o n 9 2 0
A l and r
(1962).
The r u l e s o f a p p e l l a t e c i v i l p r o c e d u r e m u s t be f o l l o w e d , h e r e
t h e y were n o t . Consequently, when t h e father filed a petition
f o r change of c u s t o d y on November 20, 1980, the District Court
was w i t h o u t j u r i s d i c t i o n and i t was error to e n t e r a n o r d e r of
consolidation.
Montana law is clear, once a notice of appeal is filed,
jurisdiction over the subject matter v e s t s i n t h e Supreme C o u r t
and it "becomes t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s d u t y to m a i n t a i n t h e s t a t u s
quo of the parties until the controversy can be determined ."
-ulian,
J
- - - .- - Mont. a t - , 6 2 5 P.2d a t 5 2 8 , 38 S t . R e p . a t 130.
We vacate t h e o r d e r s of the D i s t r i c t Court dated August 24,
1 9 8 1 , and November 9 , 1 9 8 1 . I n t h e i n t e r e s t s of m i n i m i z i n g harm
to the children, we reinstate the order of the court dated
November 20, 1980, p l a c i n g t h e c h i l d r e n i n temporary c u s t o d y of
the natural father. If the state o r if the f a t h e r choose to
r e i n s t i t u t e proceedings, t h e y may d o s o w i t h i n t h i r t y d a y s from
the date this decision is handed down, without prejudice.
However, i f no p r o c e e d i n g s a r e i n i t i a t e d , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t m u s t
uphold the mother's custody rights by ordering the children
r e t u r n e d t o h e r care.
4
ustice
':Je concur: