State v. Roll , 2014 MT 177N ( 2014 )

July 8 2014
DA 13-0065
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2014 MT 177N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY ALEX ROLL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC 2011-48
Honorable Susan P. Watters, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Wade Zolynski, Chief Appellate Defender; Lisa S. Korchinski, Assistant
Appellate Defender; Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General; Pamela P. Collins, Assistant
Attorney General; Helena, Montana
Scott Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney; David Carter, Deputy County
Attorney; Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 11, 2014
Decided: July 8, 2014
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Anthony Roll (Roll) appeals from the judgment of the Thirteenth Judicial District
Court, Yellowstone County, sentencing him to two five-year terms of commitment with
the Department of Corrections (DOC), plus fines and restitution, for two counts of
Deceptive Practices. The District Court ordered the two terms to run concurrently with
each other, but consecutively to an unrelated federal sentence Roll had already received.
Roll appeals from the order making the state sentences run consecutively with his federal
sentence.
¶3 In January 2011, Roll was charged by information with two felony counts of
Deceptive Practices exceeding $1,500 in violation of § 45-6-317(1)(d)(i), MCA. The
State gave notice of its intent to have Roll designated a persistent felony offender (PFO).
On August 26, 2011, an Acknowledgement of Waiver of Rights and Plea Agreement was
filed with the District Court. Under the agreement, Roll agreed to plead guilty to both
counts as a PFO, and the State agreed to recommend a sentence of five years to the DOC
with a $3,000 fine, plus restitution, on each count. The State also agreed to recommend
that the two sentences run concurrently to each other.
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¶4 On October 3, 2011, Roll withdrew his pleas of not guilty and entered guilty pleas
on both counts. Roll twice requested a continuance of the sentencing on the basis of a
pending federal case. He noted that “[i]t is in the interests of justice that Defendant’s
federal sentencing be completed prior to the State matter due to its impact on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.” The State did not object, and the court continued the sentencing
hearing as requested.
¶5 Sentencing was ultimately held on November 1, 2012. The State recommended
the sentence provided in the plea agreement, but added a recommendation that the
sentence be consecutive to the fourteen and one-half year federal sentence Roll had
recently received. The State based the request on the fact that it would be “very, very
difficult for the Department of Corrections to collect any restitution for these victims.”
Roll acknowledged that he had recently received a “rather lengthy federal sentence,” and
argued that “the claim of restitution by the State is going to fall on pretty hollow
grounds.” Roll requested a sentence concurrent with the federal time, and noted that the
restitution obligation could be “enforced through whatever means the State may have in
regard to his Bureau of Prisons inmate responsibility programs.”
¶6 The court noted that Roll had a significant criminal history since he was a
juvenile, with “criminal convictions for [nearly] every year since 2000,” and despite all
the programs provided through his previous sentences he had never “changed [his]
behavior.” The court also explained to Roll that the charges to which he had pled guilty
involved
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real live victims, and they deserve to be made whole, and you deserve to be
punished for that conduct also; and if the Department of Corrections’
ability to collect restitution is hindered in some way, I think the Court needs
to impose a sentence that makes the collection of restitution from you easier
so that these victims can be made whole.
The court ultimately followed the State’s sentencing recommendation, and concluded that
between the Federal Board of Prisons, and then the Department of
Corrections, I certainly hope that there will be programs offered to you and
you will take advantage of them so that you are no longer involved in the
criminal justice system which you’ve basically been involved in all your
life since a very young age.
¶7 Roll appeals the court’s judgment, arguing that the court’s consideration of his
ability to pay restitution while serving his federal sentence resulted in a sentence
improperly “based upon his status as an indigent person.”
¶8 We review a sentence of more than one year for legality only. State v. Gunderson,
2010 MT 166, ¶ 38, 357 Mont. 142, 237 P.3d 74. This Court reviews de novo whether
the district court violated the defendant’s constitutional right to due process at sentencing.
State v. Jackson, 2007 MT 186, ¶ 5, 338 Mont. 344, 165 P.3d 321.
¶9 As a preliminary matter, the parties argue over whether Roll sufficiently preserved
the issue raised herein for appeal. The transcript reveals that Roll never raised a due
process argument or made any argument that his ability to pay restitution should not be
considered. After the State recommended a sentence consecutive to his federal sentence,
Roll simply requested a concurrent sentence and stated that the State would be able to
enforce the restitution obligation “through whatever means [it] may have in regard to his
Bureau of Prisons inmate responsibilities programs,” so “the restitution matter can be
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taken care of in that regard.” Thus, Roll did not raise the issue presently before this
Court in the District Court, and has failed to properly preserve the issue for appeal.
However, we undertake review of the issue pursuant to the Lenihan exception. See State
v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338, 343, 602 P.2d 997, 1000 (1979).
¶10 We have held that “[d]ue process requires only that indigency or poverty not be
used as the touchstone for imposing the maximum allowable punishment.” State v.
Farrell, 207 Mont. 483, 499, 676 P.2d 168, 177 (1984). This is true because under a due
process analysis, “it [is] arbitrary and unfair to subject a defendant to the maximum
sentence simply because he may not be able to pay restitution in less than that amount of
time.” State v. Pritchett, 2000 MT 261, ¶ 29, 302 Mont. 1, 11 P.3d 539.
¶11 Roll argues that the District Court’s consideration of his ability to pay restitution
in ordering his state sentence to run consecutively to his federal sentence was a violation
of his right to due process. He claims to be in the same position as the defendants in
Farrell, Pritchett, and State v. Haldane, 2013 MT 32, 368 Mont. 396, 300 P.3d 657. In
each of those cases the defendants were sentenced to the maximum allowable term in
order to give them the longest time possible to make payments on restitution. Farrell,
207 Mont. at 494, 676 P.2d at 174; Pritchett, ¶¶ 3, 26; Haldane, ¶¶ 12, 43. In each case,
we reversed and remanded for resentencing, concluding that sentencing a defendant to
the maximum term based solely on his inability to pay restitution was a violation of due
process. Farrell, 207 Mont. at 498-99, 676 P.2d at 176-77; Pritchett, ¶ 37; Haldane,
¶ 43.
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¶12 The State counters that this case is more in line with State v. Benoit, 2002 MT 166,
310 Mont. 449, 51 P.3d 495. In Benoit, ¶ 8, the defendant entered a plea of guilty
pursuant to a non-binding plea agreement whereby the State agreed to recommend a
two-year deferred imposition of sentence with various conditions, including the payment
of restitution. The district court determined the restitution owed to be $15,933.90, and
sentenced the defendant to a six-year deferred imposition of sentence in part based upon
the length of time it would take to pay this amount. The court also granted the defendant
the opportunity to withdraw her guilty plea after two years from the date of entry of
judgment if she satisfied all conditions within that time. Benoit, ¶ 17. Benoit argued that
by increasing the deferment period from two years to six years, the maximum allowable
period for a deferred imposition of sentence, to insure payment of restitution, the court
had violated her right to due process. Benoit, ¶ 33. We disagreed that the sentence was
the “maximum allowable punishment” because the crime to which she had pled guilty
carried a maximum sentence of ten years, and declined to apply our holdings from
Farrell and Pritchett due to that fact. Benoit, ¶¶ 34, 37.
¶13 We agree with the State that our holdings in Farrell, Pritchett, and Haldane do not
control here. As a PFO, Roll faced a penalty for each offense of “not less than 5 years or
more than 100 years.” Section 46-18-502(1), MCA. Roll agreed to plead guilty to both
counts in exchange for a recommendation by the State of two five-year terms to DOC, to
be concurrent with each other. The District Court followed this recommendation,
sentencing Roll to the statutory minimum term for his offenses and the sentence he had
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agreed to in the plea agreement. Though the relation of the state sentence with the
federal sentence was not a subject of the plea agreement, we note that Montana law
presumes that multiple sentences will run consecutively. State v. Auld, 2006 MT 189,
¶ 25, 333 Mont. 125, 142 P.3d 753 (“the public policy of Montana is to have sentences,
wherever imposed, run consecutively unless otherwise ordered by a court”) (citing
§ 46-18-401, MCA; overruled in part on other grounds in Whitlow v. State, 2008 MT 140,
¶ 18 n.4, 343 Mont. 90, 183 P.3d 861). Additionally, Roll requested a continuance of the
sentencing hearing in order to allow him the opportunity to be sentenced in his federal
case to a lesser sentence, without the inclusion of two additional felony convictions in the
federal sentencing guideline calculations. The District Court granted this request.
Accordingly, Roll cannot be said to have been sentenced to anywhere near the maximum
term as were the defendants in Farrell, Pritchett, and Haldane.
¶14 More importantly, we disagree with Roll’s depiction that the District Court’s only
consideration in determining whether or not to make the state sentence consecutive to his
federal sentence was his ability to pay restitution. Though the court explained that it
found the payment of restitution to be an important factor, it also explained that it
considered his criminal history, age, and other factors, and hoped to allow Roll access to
various programs in order to provide him the opportunity to end his involvement with the
criminal justice system. Had the sentence been made concurrent to the federal sentence,
the DOC commitment would have expired long before he would have been able to take
advantage of such programs.
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¶15 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for noncitable memorandum opinions. The
issues in this case are legal and are controlled by settled Montana law. Roll has not met
his burden to demonstrate reversible error. Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
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