State v. Quesnel , 353 Mont. 317 ( 2009 )

November 17 2009
DA 09-0197
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2009 MT 388STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
KODIAK QUESNEL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DC 02-148
Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Edmund F. Sheehy, Jr., Regional Deputy Public Defender; Missoula,
Montana
For Appellee:
Hon. Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Sheri K. Sprigg,
Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana
George Corn, Ravalli County Attorney; T. Geoffrey Mahar, Deputy
County Attorney; Hamilton, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: October 14, 2009
Decided: November 17, 2009
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Kodiak Quesnel (Quesnel) appeals the order of the District Court of the Twenty-
First Judicial District, Ravalli County, revoking his suspended sentence, committing him
to the custody of the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC) for fifteen years, and
conditioning his parole eligibility on completion of sex offender treatment. We affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand to the District Court.
¶2 We consider the following issues on appeal:
¶3 1. Whether the District Court exceeded its authority in sentencing Quesnel to a
fifteen-year commitment to DOC.
¶4 2. Whether the District Court exceeded its authority in conditioning Quesnel’s
eligibility for parole on completion of sex offender treatment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶5 In September 2002 the State moved for leave to file an information in the District
Court charging Quesnel with one count of sexual intercourse without consent and one
count of sexual assault, alleging that on one occasion, upon Quesnel’s insistence, Quesnel
and an eleven-year-old boy engaged in mutual masturbation. The State also alleged that
on other occasions Quesnel forced the boy to perform oral sex on him and that Quesnel
performed oral sex on the boy. Though Quesnel was fifteen years old at the time of the
alleged events, the State sought to charge him as an adult pursuant to § 41-5-206(1),
MCA. The District Court granted the State leave to file the charges against Quesnel, as
an adult. Quesnel initially pled not guilty to both charges.
2
¶6 Both Quesnel and the State then moved on multiple occasions to continue
Quesnel’s transfer hearing, required by § 41-5-206(3), MCA. First, on October 21, 2002,
Quesnel, through appointed counsel, moved to continue his transfer hearing in the case to
November 27, 2002. The District Court granted the continuance. Then in November the
State moved, without objection from Quesnel, to continue the transfer hearing. Again the
District Court granted the continuance. Quesnel then moved once more to continue the
transfer hearing, and the District Court again granted the continuance. Subsequently, in
January 2003, Quesnel moved to continue the transfer hearing “without date.” The
District Court then continued the transfer hearing to April 2004. In March 2004 Quesnel
changed his plea to guilty to both charges pursuant to a plea agreement in which the State
recommended six-year deferred sentences for each count, to run concurrently. At the
change of plea hearing, Quesnel waived the transfer hearing on the record.
¶7 The District Court accepted Quesnel’s guilty pleas and in August 2004 sentenced
him to a six-year deferred imposition of sentence for each count, to run concurrently,
subject to numerous conditions. In its judgment, the District Court recognized that
Quesnel, himself, had been a victim of sexual abuse, had been orphaned, and had been
diagnosed with mental illness—post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive
disorder. The District Court further remarked that the deferred sentence was appropriate
to allow for rehabilitation and eventual expungement or, if probation were to fail, to
allow for maximum public security.
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¶8 Following Quesnel’s sentencing, the State petitioned five times to revoke the
deferred sentence. The District Court’s ruling on the State’s fifth revocation petition is
now at issue. The State filed its fifth petition in October 2008, alleging that Quesnel had
violated five conditions of his suspended sentence by not notifying his probation officer
(PO) of his residence, traveling outside his assigned district without permission, failing to
maintain regular employment, failing to attend appointments with a counselor for sex
offender treatment, and having contact with people under age eighteen by being in the
residence of the woman who had young children. The State later amended its petition to
include an additional alleged violation by Quesnel for using methamphetamine. Quesnel
admitted to all violations. The District Court sentenced Quesnel to a fifteen-year
commitment to DOC, recommending placement at the Montana State Prison. The
District Court further ordered Quesnel’s eligibility for parole to be conditioned on his
completion of sex offender treatment. Quesnel appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 We review a sentence in a criminal case for legality, to determine if the sentence is
within statutory confines. State v. Burch, 2008 MT 118, ¶ 12, 342 Mont. 499, 182 P.3d
66. Because a district court’s sentencing authority is defined by statute, a sentence that
strays beyond the bounds of statutory authority is illegal. Burch, ¶ 12.
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DISCUSSION
¶10 Issue 1: Whether the District Court had authority to sentence Quesnel to a
fifteen-year commitment to DOC.
¶11 Quesnel contends that the District Court lacked authority to sentence him to a
fifteen-year commitment with DOC with none suspended because § 46-18-201(3)(d)(i),
MCA (2001), requires all but the first five years of any commitment to DOC to be
suspended.1 The State submits that the District Court was authorized to sentence Quesnel
as it did, pursuant to § 46-18-201(3)(d)(ii), MCA (2001), which does not require
suspension of any portion of a commitment to DOC.2 Resolution of this dispute turns on
the interactions between subsection (3)(d)(i), subsection (3)(d)(ii), and § 41-5-206, MCA.
¶12 Subsection (3)(d)(i) authorizes a district court to impose a sentence that includes
“a commitment of . . . an offender not referred to in subsection (3)(d)(ii) to the
department of corrections, with a recommendation for placement in an appropriate
correctional facility or program; however, all but the first 5 years of the commitment to
the department of corrections must be suspended.” Subsection (3)(d)(ii), however,
authorizes a district court to impose a sentence that includes commitment of “a youth
transferred to district court under 41-5-206 and found guilty in the district court of an
offense enumerated in 41-5-206 to the department of corrections for a period determined
1
A district court must sentence a criminal defendant under the law in effect when the defendant
committed the crime. State v. Flanagan, 2003 MT 123, ¶ 31, 316 Mont. 1, 68 P.3d 796. Here,
Quesnel committed sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault in the late summer or
early autumn of 2001. Therefore, § 46-18-201, MCA (2001), governed the District Court’s
authority to sentence Quesnel.
2
For the sake of brevity, we will refer to § 46-18-201(3)(d)(i), MCA (2001), as “subsection
(3)(d)(i)” and to § 46-18-201(3)(d)(ii), MCA (2001), as “subsection (3)(d)(ii).”
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by the court for placement in an appropriate correctional facility or program.” The
exemption provided by subsection (3)(d)(ii) gives a district court the flexibility to
sentence a youth offender to a long term of supervision without necessarily incarcerating
the youth in a state prison. State v. Strong, 2009 MT 65, ¶¶ 22-24, 349 Mont. 417, 203
P.3d 848.
¶13 Section 41-5-206(1), MCA, provides a procedure for a county attorney to file
charges directly in district court against a youth alleged to have committed any of certain
enumerated crimes. Section 41-5-206(1)(a)(i), MCA, allows a county attorney to seek
leave to file an information in district court if “the youth charged was 12 years of age or
older at the time of the conduct alleged to be unlawful and the unlawful act would if it
had been committed by an adult constitute . . . sexual intercourse without consent as
defined in 45-5-503.” Section 41-5-206(5)(b), MCA, allows “[a]n offense not
enumerated in [§ 41-5-206(1), MCA] that arises during the commission of a crime
enumerated in [§ 41-5-206(1), MCA]” to be “transferred to district court with an offense
enumerated in [§ 41-5-206(1), MCA] upon motion of the county attorney and order of the
district court.”
¶14 Here, the State, in its motion for leave to file an information, declared its intention
to try Quesnel, a minor at the time, as an adult in District Court under § 41-5-206(1)(a),
MCA, for sexual intercourse without consent and, apparently, under § 41-5-206(5)(b),
MCA, for sexual assault. Quesnel eventually pled guilty to both charges, and the District
Court sentenced him to a fifteen-year commitment to DOC with no time suspended. The
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question before the Court is whether the District Court had authority to sentence Quesnel
under subsection (3)(d)(ii), or whether, as Quesnel contends, the District Court was
required to sentence him pursuant to subsection (3)(d)(i).
¶15 Quesnel maintains that subsection (3)(d)(i) should control (and thus that all but the
first five years of his commitment to DOC should have been suspended) because he was
not “transferred” to the District Court under § 41-5-206, MCA. Relying heavily on the
rule of statutory interpretation that a court must give effect to the plain language of a
statute, Quesnel correctly points out that subsection (3)(d)(ii) applies to “a youth
transferred to district court under 41-5-206.” “Transfer” denotes movement from one
location to another. Black’s Law Dictionary 1536 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed., West
2004). Here, however, the State filed the charges against Quesnel directly in the District
Court pursuant to § 41-5-206(1), (5)(b), MCA. Accordingly, Quesnel reasons, he was not
transferred (i.e., from youth court) to the District Court, so subsection (3)(d)(ii) does not
apply. Therefore, subsection (3)(d)(i) applies as the default provision, and the District
Court was required to suspend all save the first five years of Quesnel’s commitment to
DOC.
¶16 The flaw in Quesnel’s argument is that while statutory interpretation necessarily
begins with the text of the statute, it does not necessarily end there. Our ultimate goal in
interpreting a statute is “to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent.” Shelby
Distributors, LLC v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 2009 MT 80, ¶ 18, 349 Mont. 489, 206
P.3d 899. To do so, we not only look to the text of the statute but also consider the
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statute in the context of the greater statutory scheme and construe the statute to advance
the purpose of that scheme, giving meaning to all its provisions. State v. Brendal, 2009
MT 236, ¶ 18, 351 Mont. 395, 213 P.3d 448; Gamble v. Sears, 2007 MT 131, ¶ 59, 337
Mont. 354, 160 P.3d 537. When unable to discern the legislature’s intent from the
statutory text, we may consider the statute’s legislative history. Gannett Satellite Info.
Network, Inc. v. State, 2009 MT 5, ¶ 20, 348 Mont. 333, 201 P.3d 132.
¶17 Here, viewed in the larger statutory context, the text of subsection (3)(d)(ii)—
specifically “transferred to district court under 41-5-206”—is unclear. Section 41-5-
206(1), MCA, the statute’s principal provision,3 describes a procedure, not for
transferring a youth to district court, but for filing charges against a youth directly in
district court. To be sure, one provision of § 41-5-206, MCA—subsection (5)—does
describe a procedure for transferring charges to district court. However, to interpret
subsection (3)(d)(ii) to refer solely to § 41-5-206(5), MCA, gives rise to additional
difficulties. First, the transfer procedure outlined in § 41-5-206(5), MCA, only involves
the transfer of lesser, unenumerated offenses that arise during the commission of any of
the serious, enumerated offenses for which charges may be filed directly in district court
pursuant to § 41-5-206(1), MCA. But given that subsection (3)(d)(ii) applies to a youth
“transferred to district court . . . and found guilty in the district court of an offense
enumerated in 41-5-206,” it would appear illogical for subsection (3)(d)(ii) to apply only
to § 41-5-206(5), MCA, which does not apply to enumerated offenses. Moreover, there
3
Section 41-5-206, MCA, is captioned, “Filing in district court prior to formal proceedings in
youth court.”
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is no apparent reason why the legislature would have intended to limit the benefit of
subsection (3)(d)(ii)—granting a district court flexibility to sentence a youth to a long
period of supervision without incarcerating the youth in a state prison—to only that
subgroup of youths who appear in district court pursuant to § 41-5-206(5), MCA. For
these reasons, we do not discern a clear legislative intent from the text of subsection
(3)(ii). We, therefore, turn to the legislative history of subsection (3)(d)(ii) to shed light
on this matter.
¶18 The legislative history indicates that the legislature intended subsection (3)(d)(ii)
to apply to a youth in district court pursuant to the procedure in 41-5-206(1), MCA. The
legislature enacted subsection (3)(d)(ii) in 1999. 1999 Mont. Laws ch. 505, sec. 1. The
original version of the bill that became subsection (3)(d)(ii) specifically referred to a
youth transferred to district court under § 41-5-201(1), MCA. Mont. H. 81, 56th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. 2 (Dec. 14, 1998).4 Although the legislature removed this specific reference
from the final version of the bill, the legislative debate surrounding the amendment
removing the reference indicated no intent to alter the operation of the provision. Mont.
H. Jud. Comm., Executive Action on HB 115, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Jan. 19, 1999)
(House recording tape no. 2, side B). Indeed, the debate confirmed that the provision was
intended to grant district courts flexibility in sentencing youth offenders. Mont. H. Jud.
Comm., Executive Action on HB 115, (House recording tape no. 2, side B, tape no. 3, side
4
The House Judiciary Committee subsequently merged House Bill 81 into House Bill 115.
Mont. H. 115.02, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. 3 (as reported by the House Judiciary Committee on Jan.
19, 1999).
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A). Thus, we conclude that the text of subsection (3)(d)(ii), as originally enacted, was
intended to apply to any youth transferred to district court under § 41-5-206(1), MCA.
This interpretation is consistent with the language of subsection (3)(d)(ii) that limits its
application to a youth “found guilty in the district court of an offense enumerated in 41-5-
206.” This interpretation also advances the purpose of subsection (3)(d)(ii), which is to
enable a district court to sentence a youth found guilty of a serious crime to a long period
of supervision without necessarily incarcerating the youth. Strong, ¶¶ 22-24.
¶19 Nevertheless, this conclusion returns us to the incongruity of the term “transfer”
used in subsection (3)(d)(ii) and § 41-5-206(1), MCA, which does not allow for the
transfer of a youth to district court, but allows a county attorney to file charges against a
youth directly in district court. Were we to interpret “transfer” literally, it would
effectively nullify subsection (3)(d)(ii) given that § 41-5-206(1), MCA, does not create a
procedure for a youth to be transferred to district court. This we will not do if another
reasonable interpretation is available. State v. Letasky, 2007 MT 51, ¶ 11, 336 Mont.
178, 152 P.3d 1288. Here, the reasonable alternative interpretation is that the legislature
intended subsection (3)(d)(ii) to apply to any youth who appears in district court pursuant
to the procedures from § 41-5-206, MCA, and who is found guilty of an enumerated
offense. The apparent explanation for the term “transfer” is that the legislature’s use of
the term was an inadvertent reference to the prior version of § 41-5-206(1), MCA, which
did not allow a county attorney to file charges against a youth directly in district court,
but required the county attorney first to file charges in youth court and then move the
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district court to transfer the case to district court. Section 41-5-206(1), MCA (1995).
This earlier version of § 41-5-206(1), MCA, had been in effect since 1974. 1974 Mont.
Laws ch. 329, sec. 29. In 1997 the legislature amended this earlier version (which at the
time was captioned “Transfer to criminal”) to allow direct filing of charges in district
court. 1997 Mont. Laws, ch. 550, sec. 18. Though the original version of subsection
(3)(d)(ii) was enacted two years later in 1999, it appears that the legislature inadvertently
employed the term “transfer” from the pre-1997 version of § 41-5-206(1), MCA. We
rectify this apparent oversight in order to give effect to the legislative intent behind
subsection (3)(d)(ii), and accordingly we interpret this subsection to apply not only to a
youth “transferred” to district court, but to any youth who appears in district court
pursuant to the provisions of § 41-5-206, MCA.
¶20 Under this reading of the statute, there is no question that Quesnel appeared before
the District Court pursuant to § 41-5-206, MCA, and that he was found guilty of an
enumerated offense. Therefore, subsection (3)(d)(ii), rather than subsection (3)(d)(i),
governed the District Court’s sentence. Since subsection (3)(d)(ii) does not require a
district court to suspend all but the first five years of a commitment, the District Court did
not exceed its authority when it sentenced Quesnel to a commitment to DOC for fifteen
years with none suspended. Consequently, we affirm this portion of the District Court’s
sentence.
¶21 Quesnel remonstrates that he was not properly before the District Court for the
sake of subsection (3)(d)(ii) because the District Court failed to hold a hearing within
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thirty days after granting the State leave to file the information, as mandated by § 41-5-
206(3), MCA. This argument lacks merit.
¶22 Section 41-5-206(3), MCA, reads in relevant part:
The district court shall grant leave to file the information if it appears from
the affidavit or other evidence supplied by the county attorney that there is
probable cause to believe that the youth has committed the alleged offense.
Within 30 days after leave to file the information is granted, the district
court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the matter must be
transferred back to the youth court, unless the hearing is waived by the
youth or by the youth’s counsel in writing or on the record. The hearing
may be continued on request of either party for good cause.
Here, the District Court granted the State leave to file the information charging Quesnel
on September 25, 2002. The District Court never held a hearing to determine whether the
matter should be transferred to youth court, and on March 3, 2004—well beyond the
thirty days mentioned in the statute—Quesnel waived the hearing on the record. This,
however, does not mean that Quesnel was improperly before the District Court. Section
41-5-206(3), MCA, allows either party to continue the hearing. The reason the hearing
was not conducted within thirty days of the District Court’s granting leave to file the
information was that both parties, on multiple occasions, moved to continue the hearing.
At no point did Quesnel object to continuance of the hearing. Accordingly, we conclude
that Quesnel was not improperly before the District Court under § 41-5-206, MCA.
¶23 Issue 2: Whether the District Court had authority to condition Quesnel’s
eligibility for parole on completion of sex offender treatment.
¶24 Quesnel’s second argument on appeal is that the District Court lacked statutory
authority to impose a parole restriction—conditioning eligibility for parole on completion
12
of sex offender treatment—on his commitment to DOC. Quesnel contends that the
District Court’s authority to restrict an offender’s eligibility for parole in § 46-18-202(2),
MCA, is limited to when the District Court imposes a sentence of incarceration in a state
prison. The State concedes this issue. Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s
conditioning Quesnel’s eligibility for parole on completion of sex offender treatment, and
we remand the case to the District Court to delete this parole restriction.
¶25 We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remanded to the District Court.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
/S/ JIM RICE
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