Young Motor Co. v. Division of Workers' Compensation , 219 Mont. 1 ( 1985 )

No. 8 5 - 1 3 8
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1985
YOUNG MOTOR. COMPANY I
Employer,
and
FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Insurer,
Petitioners and Respondents,
DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION,
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondents and Appellants.
APPEAL FR.OM: Workers' Compensa.tion Court, The Honorable Timothy
Reardon, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Steven J. Shapiro, Chief Legal Counsel, Workers' Comp.
Division, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
TI
I M-
,
Robert Carlson, Butte, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: Sept. 12, 1 9 8 5
Decided: December 5, 1985
- 5 %9@5
Filed:
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
This is an appeal from an order of the Montana Workersf
Compei~sation Court relieving the insurer of liability to
Rebecca Campbell Holmberg for the sum necessary to bring the
total amount to which she is entitled to the sum she would
have received without the reduction of benefits granted by
the Social Security Act, and orderina the Workers'
Compensation Division to assume liability for the benefjts
which no longer belong to the insurer. We affirm.
Raymond Campbell injured his back January 8, 1974,
whi1.e working for his employer, Young Motor Company, in
Anaconda, Montana. Surgery and physical therapy did not
relieve the pain. He became depressed and drank alcohol for
pain relief. In 1976 he worked for another employer.
January 10, 1979, he committed suicide after his wife and
children left him. The Workers' Compensation Court awarded
benefits to the widow, Rebecca Campbell, now Rebecca
Holmberg, finding a causal connection between Ra.ymondls
industrial injury in 1974 and his death in 1979. This Court
affirmed in Campbell v. Young Motor Company and Federated
Mutual Insurance (Mont. 1984), 684 P.2d 1101, 41 St.Rep.
1218. Following this decision, Federa.ted Mutual Insurance
advised the Division of Workers ' compensation (Division) of
its position that the Division wa.s liable to the
beneficiaries for all past due and future benefits pursuant
to 5 92-704.2, R.C.M. (1947). The Division denied liability
for these benefits. The insurer began paying past and
present benefits September 25, 1984, and subsequently filed a
petition for declaratory judgment seeking indemnification
against the Division. The Division filed a motion to dismiss
and the insurer then filed a motion for summary judgment.
The motion to dismiss was denied, summary judgment was
granted, and the order above was issued. The Division
appeals.
The Division raises three issues:
(1) Whether the Workers' Compensation Court erred in
granting the insurer's motion for summary judgment?
(2) Whether the Workers' Compensation Court erred in
finding the Division of Workers' Compensation liable for
benefits to Rebecca Campbell Holmberg under § 92-704.2,
R.C.M.?
(3) Whether the i-nsurer's claim against the
respondents should be dismissed as a violation of due
process?
Summary judgment is granted when there are no issues of
material fact to be decided in the case. Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P.
and Hollinger v. McMichael I1978), 177 Mont. 144, 580 P.2d
927. The facts of this case have not changed sirice it was
heard by the Court in Campbell v. Young Motor Company, supra.
Because there is no issue of material fact, summary judgment
properly was granted.
The outcome of the case turns on the construction of
statutes and their applicability to the facts. The legal
issue is whether S 92-704.2, R.C.M. (1947) (Chapter 20, Laws
of 1974) applies in this case and requires the Division to
indemnify the insurer for the benefits it paid to Raymond
Campbell's beneficiaries. The Division argues this Court has
held repeatedly it is not bound by the lower court's
determination on legal issues, citing Solheim v. Tom Davis
Ranch (Mont. 1984), 677 P.2d 1034, 41 St.Rep. 326; Carlson v.
Cain (Mont. 1983), 664 P.2d 913, 40 St.Rep. 865; Sharp v.
Hoerner Waldorf Co. (1978), 178 Mont. 419, 584 P.2d 1298. We
agree. Our interpretation of the statutes and their
application to the facts of this case is that of the Worlters'
Compensation Court. The statutes in effect on the date of
the injury are controlling. Iverson v. Argonaut Insurance
3
CO. (1982), 198 Mont. 340, 645 P.2d 1366. The controlling
statutes are 5 92-704.2, R.C.M. (1947) and 5 39-71-721 (I),
MCA .
In 1973, the Montana Legislature enacted Chapter 202,
Laws of 1973, which provided for 100% offset of social
security benefits against Workers' Compensation benefits to
the beneficiaries of deceased workers. Chapter 202 provided
in pertinent part:
In cases where it is determined that
periodic benefits granted by the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 (1935), are
payable because of the injury, the weekly
benefits payable under this section shall
be reduced by the amount of the federal
periodic benefits for such week.
The offset was eliminated by the legislature in 1974, Chapter
270, Laws of 1974, and S 92-704.2, R.C.M., (1947) was
enacted:
The provisions of this act apply
prospectively only. However, the
division shall pay to any widow, widower
or beneficiary who did or shall become
eligible for compensa.tion for injury
causing death after June 30, 1973, and
before July 1, 1974, such sum or sums
necessary to bring the total amount of
compensation paid or to be paid as long
as such person has, or remains eligible
for compensation, to the amount such
person would have received without the
reduction for benefits granted by the
Social Security Act. The division shall
pay such sums in a lump sum as to
compensation periods past and bi-weekly
as to compensation to become due and from
a special fund appropriated for this
purpose.
Although this statute was not recodified in the change over
from the Revised Codes of Montana to the Montana Code
Annotated, it was not repealed. In this case it must be read
with S 39-71-721 (I), MCA:
Compensation for injury causing
death. (1) If an injured employee dies
and the injury was the proximate cause
of such death, then the beneficiary of
the deceased, as the case may be, is
entitled to the same compensation as
though the death occurred immediately
following the injury, but the period
during which the death benefit is paid
shall be reduced by the period during or
for which compensation was paid for the
injury.
Section 92-704.2, R.C.M., (1947), includes the
provision that a beneficiary becomes eligible for
compensation if an injury causing death occurred between June
30, 1973, and July 1, 1974. The question facing the Court is
whether the statute applies to benefits paid the
beneficiaries of workers who died between June 30, 1973, and
July 1, 1974, as the Division argues, or whether it applies
to workers whose injury in that time frame is the proximate
cause of their subsequent death.
The Division argues the statute applies to benefits for
beneficiaries and not for the workers themselves. Because the
worker, Mr. Campbell, was alive during this period there were
no eligible beneficiaries. This argument is unsound.
Eligibility and entitlement are not the same. The
legislature has fixed the date of injury as the point in time
when compensation benefits and beneficiaries are determined.
A beneficiary becomes eligible for benefits when an injury
causing death occurs between June 30, 1973, and July 1, 1974,
pursuant to $ 92-704.2 R.C.M. (1947). When this section is
read with § 39-71-721(1), MCA, the beneficiary becomes
entitled to the benefits for which she is eligible as though
the death occurred immediately following the injury, because
the injury was the proximate cause of the death. This
section entitles the beneficiaries to benefits at the time of
the injury.
Mrs. Holmberg became eligible for compensation on the
date of her husband's injury, January 8, 1974, because the
injury was within the time frame in S 92-704.2, R.C.M.,
(1947) . She likewise would have been eligible had the death
occurred then. Because Mr. Campbell's injury was the
proximate cause of his death, she is entitled to compensation
as though the death occurred immediately following the injury
5
pursuant to S 39-71-721, MCA. Clearly, had the injury not
occurred within the statutory time frame, $ 92-704.2 R.C.M.
(1947) would not apply. Any industrial injury occurring
between June 30, 1973, and July 1, 1974, which is the
proximate cause of death is covered by S 92-704.2, R.C.M.,
(1947) .
The Division's lack of due process argument is without
merit. The rules of the Workers' Compensation Court provide
that the Division is served with a copy of the petition for
hearing. The Division had notice of the beneficiary's claim
in October, 1979. Further, it is responsible for enforcing
the Workers' Compensation laws of this state and clearly knew
or should have known of the possible effects of $ 92-704.2,
R.C.M., (1947). It had adequate opportunity to be heard on
this question and has not suffered deprivation of any liberty
or property right.
The order of the Workers' Compensation Court is
a£firmed.
We concur: JQ"
Justices