Lewis Clark County County Commmis , 2000 MT 258 ( 2000 )


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    No. 99-255
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    
    2000 MT 258
    301 Mont. 496
    10 P.3d 805
    BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF
    LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    MONTANA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
    LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY; HONORABLE
    THOMAS C. HONZEL; HONORABLE DOROTHY
    McCARTER; AND HONORABLE JEFFREY M. SHERLOCK,
    Respondents.
    ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Petitioner:
    James H. Goetz and Brian M. Morris, Goetz, Gallik, Baldwin
    and Dolan, Bozeman, Montana
    For Respondents:
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    Alexander Blewett III, Hoyt and Blewett, Great Falls, Montana
    For Amici Curiae:
    David J. Patterson, Missoula, Montana
    Leo Berry and Steven T. Wade, Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry and
    Hoven, Helena, Montana
    Argued and Submitted: June 22, 2000
    Decided: September 26, 2000
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1 On July 13, 1999, we accepted original jurisdiction over this dispute between the Lewis
    and Clark County Commissioners and the Judges of Montana's First Judicial District
    Court. The dispute concerns the county employee status, supervision, and control of the
    three court reporters for the First Judicial District Court.
    ¶2 We address the following issues:
    ¶3 1. Are the First Judicial District's Court Reporters subject to the § 7-5-2108, MCA,
    requirement that full-time salaried county employees must work a minimum of 40 hours
    per week, and, if so, what record keeping is required to document hours worked by the
    Court Reporters, including overtime, annual leave, and sick leave?
    ¶4 2. Are the Court Reporters subject to the requirement that Lewis and Clark County
    employees must spend their work week at their "workstation," and, if so, what is the Court
    Reporters' "workstation"?
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    ¶5 3. Are the District Judges subject to county budgeting deadlines in setting the salaries
    of their Court Reporters?
    ¶6 The First Judicial District Court is a state district court of general jurisdiction, the
    boundaries of which include Lewis and Clark and Broadwater Counties. Honorable
    Thomas C. Honzel, Honorable Dorothy McCarter, and Honorable Jeffrey M. Sherlock are
    the duly-elected District Judges of the First Judicial District. All three Judges have offices
    in Lewis and Clark County; Judges Sherlock and McCarter also alternate every other year
    in handling Broadwater County's smaller caseload.
    ¶7 Three court reporters serve the First Judicial District. Each court reporter has been
    appointed by one of the Judges of the District as allowed by statute.
    The judge of a district court may appoint a reporter for such court who is an officer
    of the court and holds his office during the pleasure of the judge appointing him. He
    must subscribe the constitutional oath of office and file the same with the clerk of
    the court. In districts where there are two or more judges, each judge may appoint a
    reporter.
    Section 3-5-601, MCA.
    ¶8 Between 1991 and 1997, Lewis and Clark County Commissioners became concerned
    that the reporting of work hours, sick leave, and annual leave by the First Judicial
    District's Court Reporters was insufficient. On several occasions, Commissioners and the
    District Judges discussed this subject, but no permanent resolution was reached.
    ¶9 In April of 1997, the Montana Legislature amended § 3-5-602, MCA, to increase the
    amount of salary allowed for district court reporters. The statute, which became effective
    on October 1, 1997, provides in relevant part:
    (1) Each reporter is entitled to receive a base annual salary of not less than $28,000
    or more than $35,000 and no other compensation except as provided in 3-5-604,
    unless the judge decides to solicit bids for the work performed by the reporter, in
    which case the salary must be for the amount specified in the bid accepted by the
    judge. The salary must be set by the judge for whom the reporter works. The salary
    is payable in monthly installments out of the general funds of the counties
    composing the district for which the reporter is appointed and out of an
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    appropriation made to the supreme court administrator as provided in subsection (2).
    Section 3-5-602(1), MCA.
    ¶10 During the 1997 county budgeting process, the Commissioners offered the Judges the
    choice of either having their Court Reporters classified as county employees subject to the
    same benefits, regulations, policies, and procedures as other county employees, or having
    them classified as independent contractors responsible for payment of their own workers'
    compensation and unemployment insurance. The Judges did not agree to either option. In
    August of 1997, the County Commissioners adopted a 1997-98 county budget setting the
    salaries for the three Court Reporters between the newly-adopted statutory limits of
    $28,000 and $35,000, based upon seniority.
    ¶11 Between September 18 and 30, 1997, each of the District Judges informed the County
    Commission that his or her respective Court Reporter's salary for the 1997-98 budget year
    would be the maximum allowed by statute, $35,000. Accordingly, the budget adopted for
    1997-98 by the Commissioners did not include sufficient money to pay the Court
    Reporters.
    The Commissioners responded to the Judges' September 1997 letters with a letter
    stating that the Court Reporters' fringe benefits would be discontinued after October
    1, 1997. In response, on October 1, 1997, all three Judges signed an order requiring
    the Commissioners to continue paying their Court Reporters' fringe benefits. The
    Judges' order required the Commissioners to provide the Court Reporters the
    maximum salary increase authorized by the 1997 Legislature and "all County
    benefits they received prior to October 1, 1997, including, but not limited to, health
    insurance, PERS participation, and all other benefits said court reporters received
    prior to October 1, 1997." Since October 1, 1997, the Commissioners have complied
    with the Judges' order under protest.
    ¶12 The County Commissioners appealed the Judges' October 1, 1997 order to this Court.
    We dismissed the appeal on grounds that the appropriate remedy would be a petition for
    an extraordinary writ. In re District Court Budget Order Dated October 1, 1997, 
    1998 MT 4
    , 
    287 Mont. 137
    , 
    952 P.2d 427
    .
    ¶13 The Commissioners then filed this action requesting a writ of supervisory control or
    other appropriate writ. We accepted jurisdiction and appointed Honorable Thomas A.
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    Olson, District Judge for Montana's Eighteenth Judicial District, to hold a hearing and
    make findings of fact for the Court's use. The Montana Court Reporters Association was
    granted permission to intervene, and the Montana Association of Counties appeared as an
    amicus curiae.
    ¶14 Judge Olson held an evidentiary hearing in January 2000, after which he filed detailed
    findings of fact. The parties and the intervener rebriefed, and oral argument was heard in
    June 2000.
    Background--legal context
    ¶15 Our attention has been directed to previous decisions of this Court relating to
    supervision and control of state court employees, and to a Montana Attorney General
    Opinion on the subject. The first decision to which we have been cited concerned an
    attempt by the executive branch of state government to regulate a "court reporter" for the
    Montana Supreme Court. See State ex rel. Schneider v. Cunningham (1909), 
    39 Mont. 165
    , 
    101 P. 962
    . Relying on the constitutional provision providing for separation of
    powers among the three branches of government, this Court stated in Schneider that the
    power to select and appoint, set qualifications for, and fix compensation of court reporters
    for the Montana Supreme Court must necessarily be vested in the judiciary.
    [I]t is manifest that the power to select the proper employees could not with
    propriety be vested elsewhere than in the court itself; and it is equally manifest that
    the power to say whether it may or may not be necessary to have assistance, and
    what the qualifications of the assistants shall be, may not be vested elsewhere. If the
    power of appointment exists at all, it is a necessary power of the court, and, since
    the qualifications of the individual desired is determined in a measure by the amount
    of compensation paid his services, the power to fix the compensation is also a
    necessary power. In short, the court has the inherent power to select and appoint its
    own necessary assistants and make the compensation due for their services a charge
    against the state as a liquidated claim.
    Schneider, 39 Mont. at 171, 101 P. at 964.
    ¶16 Not long thereafter, the Court acknowledged that in spite of the separateness of the
    three branches of government, "[t]here is no such thing as absolute independence" of the
    branches. State ex rel. Hillis v. Sullivan (1913), 
    48 Mont. 320
    , 330, 
    137 P. 392
    , 395. In
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    Hillis, a court attendant who had been appointed by a district judge filed a claim with this
    Court for compensation for his services. This Court dismissed the claim on grounds that
    the court had made the appointment without a showing that it had been necessitated by the
    failure of the county sheriff to perform those duties, as prescribed by statute. In so doing,
    the Court stated:
    The protection of the judicial department from encroachment is not to be sought in
    extravagant pretensions to power, but rather in a firm maintenance of its own clear
    authority coupled with "a frank and cheerful concession of the rights of the co-
    ordinate departments." (People ex rel. Smith v. Judge, 
    17 Cal. 547
    .)
    Hillis, 48 Mont. at 330, 137 P. at 395.
    ¶17 While Schneider and Hillis were decided under Montana's 1889 Constitution, our
    present Constitution also includes a provision for separation of powers:
    Separation of powers. The power of the government of this state is divided into
    three distinct branches-legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons
    charged with the exercise of power properly belonging to one branch shall exercise
    any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution
    expressly directed or permitted.
    Art. III, Sec. 1, Mont. Const.
    ¶18 In Board of Com'rs of Flathead County v. Eleventh Judicial Dist. Court (1979), 
    182 Mont. 463
    , 
    597 P.2d 728
    , this Court was presented with an occasion to interpret the
    separation of powers clause of the present Montana Constitution. The case arose from a
    dispute between county commissioners and district judges regarding the funding of a
    position of director of family court services. The county commissioners brought the action
    to confirm their authority to refuse to fund the position after being ordered to do so by the
    district court. This Court determined that constitutional interpretation was not necessary
    because under the circumstances, the commissioners did not have authority to refuse to
    fund the position. The Court then stated:
    We admonish the District Courts to use the statutorily implied funding power we
    recognize here with judicious restraint. The constantly changing demands upon the
    judicial system must be worked out in a spirit of independent identity and balance
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    among legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government by reasonable
    interaction tempered with respect for the limitations of their power.
    Flathead County, 182 Mont. at 470-71, 597 P.2d at 732.
    ¶19 The County Commissioners also draw our attention to a 1981 opinion by the Montana
    Attorney General. In response to a series of questions about the county employee status of
    district court personnel, the Attorney General opined that a district court employee who is
    paid by the county and receives fringe benefits therefrom is a county employee; that an
    employee who receives a county payroll check must abide by the county's personnel
    policies; and that district court employees are subject to the statutory requirement that full-
    time salaried county employees work forty hours per week. The Attorney General further
    opined that requiring district court employees to abide by county policies and regulations
    is not an undue interference upon the judicial branch, but is necessary to the county for the
    effective administration of county business. The Attorney General tempered his opinion,
    however, with the following comments:
    Although I make this observation about the balance of interests between the court
    and the county, in regard to district court employees abiding by county rules and
    policies, I must conclude that to expressly define the scope of judicial authority in
    relation to that of the county is inappropriate for an Attorney General's opinion. That
    question would be more appropriately disposed of either by an understanding
    between the individual judge and the county commissioners, or by a judgment in a
    court of proper jurisdiction.
    39 Mont. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 38.
    ¶20 Finally, our attention is directed to Clark v. Dussault (1994), 
    265 Mont. 479
    , 
    878 P.2d 239
    . There, a justice of the peace (JP) objected to the holding of a grievance hearing
    before the local county commission concerning his disciplinary suspension of the justice
    court office manager. The district court ruled that the JP need not comply with the
    grievance procedures, based on the court's conclusion that those procedures would
    interfere with the JP's inherent authority to ensure the proper functioning of the justice
    court. This Court disagreed:
    The separation of the government into three great departments does not mean that
    there shall be "no common link of connection or dependence, the one upon the other
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    in the slightest degree" [citation omitted]; it means that the powers properly
    belonging to one department shall not be exercised by either of the others [citation
    omitted].
    Clark, 265 Mont. at 487, 878 P.2d at 243-44 (quoting Hillis, 48 Mont. at 330, 137 P. at 395).
    ¶21 Pointing out that the county commissioners had independently hired the office
    manager, the Court ruled that such a grievance hearing did not violate the separation of
    powers doctrine or constitute an exercise of authority belonging to the judicial branch.
    Clark, 265 Mont. at 487, 878 P.2d at 244.
    ¶22 Resolution of the issues here presented lies in the above context, at the core of our
    tripartite system of government.
    Issue 1
    ¶23 Are the First Judicial District's Court Reporters subject to the § 7-5-2108, MCA,
    requirement that full-time salaried county employees must work a minimum of 40 hours
    per week, and, if so, what record keeping is required to document hours worked by the
    Court Reporters, including overtime, annual leave, and sick leave?
    ¶24 Section 7-5-2108, MCA, provides: "All full-time salaried county employees shall
    work a minimum of 40 hours per week." Judge Olson found that "[b]y statute and by
    tradition, court reporters in Montana are county employees and thereby entitled to full
    fringe benefits." Although the record indicates that there are exceptions to that general rule
    (such as Judge Purcell's court reporter in Silver Bow County, who has been hired as an
    independent contractor), that finding has not been challenged. We conclude that where, as
    in the First Judicial District, court reporters are treated as full-time salaried county
    employees, they are subject to the statutory 40-hour workweek requirement.
    ¶25 The County Commissioners point out that an employer must record the hours worked
    by its employees. "If the employer fails to record the employee's hours, the employee's
    records may be used to determine the amount of time worked." Holbeck v. Stevi-West, Inc.
    (1989), 
    240 Mont. 121
    , 125-26, 
    783 P.2d 391
    , 394. The County Commissioners assert that
    the Court Reporters are therefore subject to the same record keeping requirements
    concerning their hours of work as are other county employees.
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    ¶26 But as the Judges point out, the job of a district court reporter is different from that of
    most other county employees in some fairly significant ways. The court reporters' job is in
    large part delineated by statute. And, under § 3-5-601, MCA, court reporters for district
    courts are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the district judge. Each Montana court
    of record has statutory rulemaking authority concerning "the government of its officers."
    Section 3-1-112, MCA. Court reporters are, without question, "officers" of the court.
    Further, although they are not elected county officials, district court reporters are required
    to subscribe the oath of office required of elected Montana officials. Section 3-5-601,
    MCA.
    ¶27 Section 3-5-603, MCA, provides that the court reporter will provide services under the
    direction of the judge. In that regard, Judge Olson found:
    Most judges indicate that their work schedule varies significantly, and that at times
    the court reporter is expected to work or travel well before and after regular office
    hours. Apparently, most reporters are expected to absorb this varying work schedule
    as part of being a salaried court employee. . . .
    ....
    The court reporters in Lewis and Clark County routinely work overtime, i.e., they
    work outside the normal 8:00 to 5:00 workday.
    In short, the evidence presented to Judge Olson establishes that a court reporter's schedule
    is subject to change and does not fit into any pre-ordained work schedule.
    ¶28 District court reporters in Montana are also required, as an outside-the-courtroom
    statutory duty, to furnish complete or partial printed transcripts of cases heard, upon
    request of a party to the case or of the district judge. See § 3-5-604, MCA. As Judge Olson
    found, charging for these transcripts is a matter controlled by statute. See § 3-5-604, MCA.
    ¶29 We here dispose of what we conclude is a red herring issue concerning overtime. The
    County Commissioners have raised the specter of their possible liability under the Fair
    Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for overtime pay to the Court Reporters for time spent on
    transcript preparation work in their homes. No allegation has been made, however, by the
    Court Reporters that they are entitled to any such overtime pay. We note, too, that the
    FLSA contains specific provisions relating to court reporters, exempting certain of their
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    time spent on transcript preparation from hours worked pursuant to the FLSA. See 29 U.S.
    C. 207(o).
    ¶30 After reviewing the above considerations in their legal context, we conclude that
    while full-time district court reporters must work forty hours per week and their employer
    must record their hours, any method used to fulfill those requirements must comport with
    the judges' authority to control their assistants. Allowing the County Commissioners to
    enforce county personnel policies upon the Court Reporters to which the Judges object
    would infringe upon the Judges' right to control their assistants. We hold that reasonable
    record keeping is required to document hours worked by the Court Reporters, including
    overtime, annual leave, and sick leave, and that such reasonable record keeping shall be as
    determined by the District Judges.
    Issue 2
    ¶31 Are the Court Reporters subject to the requirement that Lewis and Clark County
    employees must spend their work week at their "workstation," and, if so, what is the Court
    Reporters' "workstation"?
    ¶32 The parties are "at loggerheads" on the county's workstation policy. The County
    Commissioners seek to enforce the county's personnel policy that all county employees,
    including the Court Reporters, must work at the county-designated workstations, subject
    to each Judge's paramount authority to assign his or her Court Reporter to a different
    location for court business. The Court Reporters want to work at home when their
    presence is not required in the courtroom, and the Judges have acquiesced in that
    preference.
    ¶33 In considering the workstation issue, we must remain cognizant of the unique job
    requirements of a court reporter for a district court. As the Commissioners have conceded
    and Judge Olson found, numerous county personnel requirements cannot be applied to the
    Court Reporters because they would conflict with statutes specifically relating to district
    court reporters. For example, collective bargaining agreements, continuity of service
    provisions, provisions regarding probationary periods for new and promoted employees,
    and demotion and lay-off provisions are among county personnel requirements which the
    parties to this action agree are not applicable to the Court Reporters.
    ¶34 A further complication is presented by the fact that Montana's First Judicial District,
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    like many of the state's judicial districts, encompasses more than one county. If county
    personnel rules were to be applied, a question would arise as to which county's personnel
    rules would apply to court reporters in multi-county judicial districts such as the First
    Judicial District.
    ¶35 A district court reporter's statutory duty to take stenographic notes at proceedings of
    the court is arguably the reporter's principal duty.
    Each reporter must, under the direction of the judge, attend all sittings of the court
    and take full stenographic notes of the testimony and of all proceedings given or had
    thereat except when the judge dispenses with the reporter's services in a particular
    cause or with respect to a portion of the proceedings therein.
    Section 3-5-603, MCA. As part of this duty, district judge recusals and substitutions
    require judges, and, in many cases, their court reporters, to travel outside their judicial
    districts. Required presence at an in-county assigned workstation would, at those times,
    clearly conflict with the duty to attend court sittings under the direction of the judge.
    ¶36 A court reporter's duties also include, as noted above, preparing transcripts of
    proceedings at the request of parties to the case or the judge. In that regard, Judge Olson
    found:
    The matter of the location of court reporters when they are not engaged in actual
    courtroom work . . . seems to be a matter of tradition and varies from jurisdiction to
    jurisdiction. It is difficult to discern whether there is a "majority rule" because not
    all judges submitting affidavits in this case directly addressed that issue. It appears,
    however, that the most significant number of judges, like those in Lewis and Clark
    County, do not require a reporter to keep regular hours when not doing courtroom
    work. The reporters are present at the courthouse when actively engaged in the
    reporting of a case; transcripts are usually completed at offices located within the
    reporter's home.
    ¶37 In consideration of all of the above, we conclude that any mandatory location of work
    for the Court Reporters set by anyone but the District Judges would interfere with the
    necessary flexibility of the District Judges. The loggerheads claimed by the parties are
    averted by acknowledging that the Judges have authority to assign the Court Reporters to
    multiple locations as their "workstations"-e.g., the Court Reporters' homes for
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    transcription work, if the Judges deem to so assign. We hold that the Court Reporters'
    "workstation" is wherever they are required to be to perform their duties for the Judges for
    whom they work. Issue 3
    ¶38 Are the District Judges subject to county budgeting deadlines in setting the salaries of
    their Court Reporters?
    ¶39 Counties are required to approve and adopt their final budgets "on or before the
    second Monday in August." Section 7-6-2317(2), MCA. Lewis and Clark County met this
    statutory deadline in 1997 when the County Commissioners set the salaries of the Court
    Reporters with a proposed phase-in, over a period of years, to the maximum amount
    statutorily allowed. The October 1, 1997 court order signed by the District Judges,
    however, did not comport with the statutory deadline.
    ¶40 Although courts have authority to direct funding under some circumstances, we have
    held that this inherent power is limited to emergency situations and where the normal
    processes of funding are of no avail. Butte-Silver Bow Local Gov't v. Olsen (1987), 
    228 Mont. 77
    , 80, 
    743 P.2d 564
    , 566. The flipside of that holding is that county budget
    deadlines, in general, apply to judges.
    ¶41 Therefore, only if an emergency situation was present were the District Judges within
    their authority when they issued their October 1, 1997 order imposing the maximum
    statutory salaries for the Court Reporters. The County Commissioners maintain that any
    "emergency" was a result of the Judges' failure to act to raise the Court Reporters' salaries
    in a timely manner. They maintain there is no evidence to support Judge Olson's finding
    that "clearly the Commissioners were on notice that the Judges expected their court
    reporters to be paid at the newly enacted statutory maximum of $35,000."
    ¶42 Regardless of the truth of that contention by the Commissioners, Judge Olson further
    found: "[I]t is obvious that a threat to remove fringe benefits, including health insurance
    coverage, from the court reporters created an emergency to which the Judges had to
    respond." That finding is not challenged, and the threat to remove fringe benefits was not a
    direct and unavoidable result of any action or failure to act by the Judges. In this age of
    high health care costs, it is understandable that the loss of employment benefits including
    health insurance coverage represents a serious matter, and even an emergency situation.
    Therefore, and based upon the above finding, we conclude that an emergency situation
    justified the Judges' October 1 order.
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    ¶43 Since 1997, the amount of the Court Reporters' salaries has not been an issue, because
    the maximum statutory amount has been budgeted for each Court Reporter each year.
    Therefore, for those subsequent years, no budgeting deadline issue is present.
    ¶44 Unwillingness of county commissioners to recognize the reality of a district court's
    function in fulfilling constitutional mandates leads to nothing but trouble. A prime
    example is the County Commissioners' "workstation" argument. Moreover, if the County
    Commissioners' logic on that argument were to be applied across the board, a county road
    supervisor would not be permitted to leave his "workstation" at an office desk to travel
    around the county and supervise crews performing road work. On the other hand, in
    matters such as budgeting, district court judges must recognize that they are part of a
    larger governmental structure. It is unfortunate that this dispute found its way through the
    court system all the way to this Court.
    /S/ J. A. TURNAGE
    We concur:
    /S/ JIM REGNIER
    /S/ JAMES C. NELSON
    /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
    /S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
    /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
    /S/ KARLA M. GRAY
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Document Info

Docket Number: 99-255

Citation Numbers: 2000 MT 258

Filed Date: 9/26/2000

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016