Webster v. Geico Ins. Co. , 2000 MT 174N ( 2000 )

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No. 99-498
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2000 MT 174NGLEN WEBSTER,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,
v.
GEICO INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant/ Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Cascade,
The Honorable Kenneth R. Neill, Judge presiding.
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COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Glen Webster, Monarch, Montana, pro se
For Respondent:
Jeffrey T. McAllister, Conklin, Nybo, LeVeque & Lanning, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: October 7, 1999
Decided: July 6, 2000
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
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Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. delivered the Opinion of the Court.
1. ¶Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent but shall be
filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be
reported by case title, Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter
Publishing Company and to West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases
issued by this Court.
2. ¶The Plaintiff, Glen Webster (Webster) brought this action pro se in the Eighth
Judicial District Court, Cascade County, to recover damages from the Defendant,
Geico Insurance Company (Geico) for alleged fraud, breach of contract, libel/
slander (defamation), bad faith/unfair claims settlement practices, negligence, and
infliction of emotional distress. The District Court held that the statute of limitations
barred Webster's claims and granted Geico's motion for summary judgment.
Webster appeals from the order granting summary judgment in favor of Geico. We
affirm.
3. ¶The dispositive issue on appeal is that Webster's alleged claims against Geico are
now barred by the statutes of limitations.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. ¶On March 16, 1991, Webster purchased a 1986 jeep pickup (jeep). Webster
financed his jeep through First Security Bank of Idaho (First Security). By the terms
of the financing agreement, Webster was required to carry property insurance on the
jeep payable to First Security in the event the jeep was damaged or destroyed.
Various policies were instituted with insurance companies Colonial Penn, Geico,
Farmer's Insurance Company, and First Security's blanket insurer, Balboa. Policies
were canceled for non-payment of premiums, by Webster's allowing one policy to
lapse after applying to another insurer for coverage, and by denial of coverage.
2. ¶The policy purchased through Geico was purchased on or about July 3, 1991.
Although Geico shortly thereafter informed Webster it was denying his application
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and refunded him a portion of his premium, Webster had a policy in effect with
Geico from July 3, 1991 until September 2, 1991. Disagreement exists, however,
between Webster and Geico over whether the policy was comprehensive or liability
only.
3. ¶On July 10, 1991 Webster's jeep was stolen from his residence and driven over a
steep embankment. The jeep sustained severe damage. It was unclear which insurer,
if any, would cover the loss, as it was unclear whether any of the various insurance
policies were in effect when the jeep was stolen.
4. ¶Prior to liability on the part of any or all of the insurance companies being
determined, Webster stopped payment on the check written to First Security for the
July, 1991 payment. After that, Webster made no further payments on his obligation.
5. ¶In August of 1991, First Security contacted Webster stating they would retrieve the
jeep and sell it as parts. Webster was notified by a letter dated August 28, 1991, that
the jeep, "which has been repossessed," would be sold at private sale unless he
redeemed within ten days. Webster was notified by a letter dated September 19,
1991, that First Security has applied for "repossession title" on the jeep. The jeep
was not redeemed, but was sold at private sale with the proceeds of the sale being
applied to the loan obligation with First Security. A balance remained on the loan.
6. ¶First Security's blanket insurer, Balboa, eventually paid a portion of the loss of the
jeep based on its value to First Security. In October of 1992, having determined that
its coverage was in effect when the jeep was stolen, Colonial Penn Insurance
tendered payment to First Security for the balance owing on the account. The
balance owing on the account, however, was misquoted by First Security. The
quoted balance was actually $298.07 less than the actual balance. Therefore,
following payoff by Colonial Penn, a balance remained on the account. This balance
was internally charged off by First Security as uncollectible. First Security did not
notify Webster of the deficiency in the payoff or attempt to further collect on the
balance from him.
7. ¶On October 31, 1991, the charged off repossession of the jeep was reported to
credit services via credit reporting tape. In December of 1991, Webster was denied
credit due to his credit report. The credit denial listed the reasons for denial
including repossession, collection action, and unfavorable or derogatory credit
history.
8. ¶Webster contacted First Security June 2, 1997, regarding the balance on the
account. At that time, an employee of First Security stated that he was entering a
check in the amount of $298.07 as payment for the balance owing on the account.
Following entry of "payment" for the balance of the account, First Security notified
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the credit reporting agencies to delete the account data.
9. ¶In July of 1991, Webster filed a claim with Geico for the theft of and damage to the
jeep. Shortly thereafter, Geico denied that Webster had coverage and refused to pay
on Webster's claim. No facts exist of any continued dealings between Webster and
Geico regarding coverage for the theft of the jeep.
10. ¶On July 30, 1997, Webster filed this action against Geico in an attempt to recover
damages resulting from Geico's denial of insurance coverage and refusal to pay him
for his stolen jeep. The District Court granted Geico's motion for summary
judgment holding that the statute of limitations barred Webster's claims and entered
judgment for Geico.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. ¶Summary judgment is properly granted when no issues of material fact exist and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P.; O'Bagy
v. First Interstate Bank (1990), 241 Mont. 44, 46, 785 P.2d 190, 191. The movant
has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact.
O'Bagy, 241 Mont. at 46, 785 P.2d at 191. Once the movant has met its burden the
opposing party must show the existence of a genuine issue of fact without relying
upon mere speculation or conclusory statements. First Sec. Bank of Bozeman v.
Jones (1990), 243 Mont. 301, 303, 794 P.2d 679, 681.
2. ¶We review a district court's decision on summary judgment de novo and apply the
same Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., criteria used by that court. Swank v. Chrysler Ins. Corp.
(1997), 282 Mont. 376, 379, 938 P.2d 631, 633. Usually, we start our analysis with
whether the movant met its burden. Swank, 282 Mont. at 379, 938 P.2d at 633. In
this case, however, the material facts are undisputed. Therefore, we will confine our
review to the District Court's conclusions of law. We review a district court's
conclusions of law to determine whether they are correct. Swank, 282 Mont. at 379,
938 P.2d at 633.
DISCUSSION
1. ¶Did the District Court err in holding that Webster's alleged claims against Geico
are barred by the statutes of limitations?
2. ¶Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time that the cause of
action accrues. Section 27-2-102(2), MCA. Ignorance of a legal claim or its accrual
does not toll the beginning of the period of limitation unless there is either some
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affirmative concealment of the injury or the injury is by its nature self-concealing.
Section 27-2-102(2), MCA; Wisher v. Higgs (1993), 257 Mont. 132, 140, 849 P.2d
152, 157, overruled on other grounds by Blackburn v. Blue Mountain Women's
Clinic (1997), 286 Mont. 60, 75, 951 P.2d 1, 10. Further, we have held that neither
ignorance of the law nor the needs for time to present a pro se case constitutes an
adequate excuse to disregard a statute of limitations. Cf. In re Petition of Gray
(1995) 274 Mont. 1, 2, 908 P.2d 1352, 1352.
3. ¶The alleged injuries suffered by Webster occurred in 1991, but Webster failed to
file suit against Geico until July, 1997. The statute of limitations for bringing an
unfair claim settlement practices suit is two years from the date of the violation.
Section 33-18-242(7)(a), MCA. Unless otherwise provided for, the statute of
limitations for bringing a tort action is three years. Section 27-2-204, MCA. While
Webster slumbered upon his rights for six years, time expired on his claims.
4. ¶Webster presents no recognizable legal argument on appeal for why this Court
should disregard the applicable statutes of limitations. Webster offers no evidence of
neither active concealment by Geico nor that his injury was self-concealing. In fact,
Webster admits knowledge of his injury in 1991. Webster only requests that we
disregard the applicable statutes of limitations because he is a pro se litigant.
5. ¶The District Court was correct in granting Geico's motion of summary judgment.
Webster failed to bring this action before the expiration of the appropriate statutes of
limitations.
6. ¶The District Court is affirmed.
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
We Concur:
/S/ J. A. TURNAGE
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
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/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
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