Marriage of Ford , 2002 MT 340N ( 2002 )

No. 02-493
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2002 MT 340N
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
RENEE ROCHELLE FORD,
Petitioner and Respondent,
and
OREN JOE FORD,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Rosebud,
The Honorable Joe L. Hegel, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
George T. Radovich, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Stephen C. Mackey, Towe, Ball, Enright, Mackey & Sommerfeld, P.L.L.P.,
Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 21, 2002
Decided: December 23, 2002
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court
1996 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be
cited as precedent but shall be filed as a public document with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title,
Supreme Court cause number, and result to the State Reporter
Publishing Company and to West Group in the quarterly table of
noncitable cases issued by this Court.
¶2 Appellant Oren Joe Ford (“Joe”) appeals from the order of the
Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Rosebud County, which dissolved
his marriage to Respondent Renee Ford and distributed the marital
estate. We affirm.
¶3 The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused
its discretion when it distributed the marital estate.
BACKGROUND
¶4 Joe and Renee were married on December 31, 1987, in Conrad,
Montana. Two children were born of the marriage. In August of
1999, Joe voluntarily checked himself into an alcohol treatment
program. That same month Renee moved with the children to Medford,
Oregon.
¶5 On August 31, 1999, Renee petitioned the District Court to
dissolve the marriage. Following a non-jury trial, the District
Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
on June 19, 2002. Therein, the District Court dissolved the
marriage, adopted a parenting plan naming Renee as the primary
custodian, ordered Joe to pay $643.00 per month in child support,
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and distributed the marital estate. As for the property
distribution, Joe received assets valued at $112,772.87 and debts
valued at $114,283.14. Renee received assets valued at $19,150.00
and debts valued at $8,300.00.
¶6 On July 3, 2002, Joe filed a notice of appeal from the
District Court’s order. Joe’s appeal challenges the property
distribution only.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7 We review a district court’s findings of fact regarding the
division of marital property to determine whether they are clearly
erroneous. In re Marriage of Ortiz (1997), 282 Mont. 500, 503, 938
P.2d 1308, 1310. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is not
supported by substantial evidence, if the district court
misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if our review of the
record convinces us that the district court made a mistake.
Kovarik v. Kovarik, 1998 MT 33, ¶ 20, 287 Mont. 350, ¶ 20, 954 P.2d
1147, ¶ 20. If the findings are not clearly erroneous, we will
affirm the distribution of property unless the district court
abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Stufft (1996), 276 Mont.
454, 459, 916 P.2d 767, 770.
DISCUSSION
¶8 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it
distributed the marital estate?
¶9 Joe contends that “the trial court, in awarding approximately
116% of the marital estate to the Wife, has committed very serious
and reversible error . . . .” Joe maintains that the District
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Court entered the distribution in a “conclusory fashion” with no
indication that it considered the factors delineated in § 40-4-202,
MCA. Joe does not allege that the District Court erred in valuing
the marital assets or that the findings of fact are not supported
by substantial evidence. Further, Joe does not argue that the
District Court misinterpreted the law. Joe simply submits that the
property distribution is disproportionate and, therefore,
erroneous.
¶10 Section 40-4-202, MCA, requires that a court equitably
apportion the marital estate in a proceeding for dissolution of a
marriage. In apportioning the marital estate, the court shall:
consider the duration of the marriage and prior marriage
of either party; the age, health, station, occupation,
amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of
the parties; custodial provisions; whether the
apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to
maintenance; and the opportunity of each for future
acquisition of capital assets and income. The court
shall also consider the contribution or dissipation of
value of the respective estates and the contribution of a
spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit.
Section 40-4-202(1), MCA. A district court has broad discretion
pursuant to § 40-4-202, MCA, to distribute the marital estate in a
manner that is equitable to each party according to the
circumstances of the case. In re Marriage of Harkin, 2000 MT 105,
¶ 24, 299 Mont. 298, ¶ 24, 999 P.2d 969, ¶ 24. A court abuses its
discretion in a dissolution proceeding if it acts arbitrarily
without employment of conscientious judgment or it exceeds the
bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. Harkin, ¶ 24.
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¶11 The District Court entered findings regarding the duration of
the marriage, as well as the health, current occupation, earning
potential, custodial needs, and liabilities of the parties. The
District Court also entered findings about Joe’s substance abuse
problems and his current status in that regard. As for dissipation
of the marital estate, the District Court found that, during the
marriage, Joe “was losing $140-150 per month gambling, although at
times it may have been as much as $160 per week.” Finally, the
District Court itemized each marital asset and its respective
value.
¶12 The District Court tabulated the marital debt at $122,583.14
and apportioned $114,283.14 of the debt to Joe. However, most of
the debt was incurred in purchasing marital assets which the
District Court also awarded to Joe, i.e., the family home, other
real property, and a 1991 Nissan automobile. The District Court
valued the marital estate at $131,922.87 and awarded $112,772.87 in
assets to Joe. Therefore, while the District Court did burden Joe
with a substantial portion of the marital debt, it also awarded Joe
a majority of the marital assets. Further, both parties admit that
they individually incurred credit card debt following their
separation. Again, the District Court itemized each of these
liabilities and apportioned them to the party which incurred the
respective debt. The District Court awarded only $8,300.00 of the
marital debt to Renee. However, Renee received only $19,150.00 in
marital assets.
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¶13 As indicated above, Joe raises general allegations of error
only. He does not challenge the District Court’s findings of fact
or contend that the court misapplied or misinterpreted the law.
Joe simply maintains that the disproportionate award compels
reversal. However, in dividing a marital estate, a district court
must reach an equitable distribution, not necessarily an equal
distribution. In re Marriage of Walls (1996), 278 Mont. 413, 416,
925 P.2d 483, 485. Further, a district court’s decision is
presumed correct and it is the appellant who bears the burden of
establishing error by that court. Matter of M.J.W., 1998 MT 142, ¶
18, 289 Mont. 232, ¶ 18, 961 P.2d 105, ¶ 18. Joe simply has not
established that the District Court acted arbitrarily or exceeded
the bounds of reason when it distributed the parties’ marital
estate. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not abuse
its discretion when it distributed the marital assets as it did.
¶14 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM REGNIER
We Concur:
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
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