Hofmann v. George , 51 State Rptr. 1007 ( 1994 )


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  •                              No. 93-465
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    1994
    EDWARD L. HOFMANN, JR.,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    DAVID E. GEORGE and
    MARJORIE F. GEORGE,
    Defendants and Appellants.
    MARCH 3 , 1994)
    APPEAL FROM:   District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
    In and for the County of Yellowstone,
    The Honorable Robert W. Holmstrom, Judge presiding.
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellants:
    Leo Graybill, Jr., Graybill, Ostrem     &   Crotty,
    Great Falls, Montana
    For Respondent:
    Pierre L. Bacheller, Pierre L. Bacheller, Inc.,
    Billings, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs:    February 10, 1994
    Decided:   March 3, 1994
    Filed:
    Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    David E. George and Marjorie F. George (the Georges) appeal
    from a decision of the Thirteenth Judicial District Court,
    Yellowstone County.   The court ruled that a buy and sell contract,
    wherein the Georges agreed to sell land to Edward L. Hofmann, Jr.,
    was valid; the court further ordered specific performance of the
    contract.    We affirm.
    The dispositive issue on appeal is rephrased as whether the
    District Court erred in determining that the parties' buy and sell
    contract was specifically enforceable.
    During 1992, the Georges sought to sell a tract of land they
    owned which is located between Billings and Laurel, Montana.   The
    land was listed with area realtors, and realtor James Hoffman,
    located Edward L. Hofmann, Jr. (Hofmann), as an interested buyer in
    June 1992.
    Hofmann made the Georges an offer to purchase the land for
    $160,000, and the Georges rejected the offer.    Approximately one
    month later, however, the Georges approached Hofmann at Hofmannrs
    business address and asked if he was still interested in purchasing
    their land for $160,000. The Georges explained that their contract
    with the realtors had terminated, and they could now sell the land
    to Hofmann, avoiding $11,200 in realtor fees.
    Hofmann agreed to purchase the land under these conditions.
    Marjorie George picked up a buy and sell agreement at a local
    business, typed it out, and both parties signed it on July 29,
    2
    1992.   The agreement provided, in relevant part, that payment was
    due as follows:
    $1,000.00 earnest money to be applied at closing    . . .
    $159,000.00 balance of the purchase price will be paid as
    follows: proceeds from loan buyer is acquiring from
    First Federal Savings and Loan. Sale contingent upon
    buyer being able to obtain financing.
    The parties signed another, supplemental agreement on July 30,
    1992, which provided:
    DAVID D, and MARlORIE F, GEORGE (Sellers) agree to split
    with EDWARD L. HOFMANN, Jr. (buyer) any part of the
    $11,200 that is not paid to the realitors [sic] as
    commission at time of closing of the property at:
    4316 Christinson Rd., Billings, Montana 59101.
    /s/ Marjorie I?. George
    /s/ David D. George
    /s/ Edward L. Hofmann, Jr.
    Hofmann presented the Georges with a $1,000 personal check dated
    August 1, 1992.    He asked the Georges to notify him when they
    planned to cash it in order to ensure that sufficient funds would
    be in his personal checking account. The Georges attempted without
    success to reach Hofmann; they did not cash the check.
    Instead, after the Georges had learned that realtors had
    initiated court proceedings to recover the $11,200 fee, the Georges
    asserted that the buy and sell agreement was invalid because the
    check was not valid earnest money.      Additionally, the Georges
    asserted that the contract was not specifically enforceable because
    it was dependent upon Hofmann obtaining financing, and Hofmannls
    lending institution had yet to finalize the financing procedures.
    Hofmann asserted that the $1,000 check was valid earnest money
    and that the only reason financing had not been completed was
    because his lender's appraisal agent could not contact the Georges
    to make an appraisal appointment.      Hofmann asserted that the
    appraiser felt he was "being avoided" by the Georges. The District
    Court agreed with Hofmann and ordered specific performance of the
    contract.   The Georges appeal.
    Did the District Court err in determining that the partiest
    buy and sell contract was specifically enforceable?
    Reviewing this civil case tried by the court without a jury,
    we examine whether the court's findings of fact are clearly
    erroneous and whether its conclusions of law are correct.     Steer,
    Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue (1990), 
    245 Mont. 470
    , 474-75, 
    803 P.2d 601
    , 603.
    The Georges make two attacks on the validity of the buy and
    sell agreement. First, they maintain that Hofmann's $1,000 earnest
    money check was insufficient because the check was not cashed,
    because Hofmann's personal checking account at times did not have
    sufficient funds to cover the check and because the check was not
    tendered at the time the parties signed the contract. Second, the
    Georges assert that the contract could not be           specifically
    performed because Hofmann's lending institution failed to finalize
    the financing process by not performing an appraisal of the
    property.   The Georgest arguments are without merit.
    4
    A personal check is valid consideration. See 5 28-2-801, MCA.
    Here, where the contract stated that "$1,000 earnest money" was due
    "to be applied at closing," Hofmann's check, rendered after the
    contract was signed, constituted valid consideration.
    The courts look to substance over form. Section 1-3-219, MCA.
    While normally the conditions of a contract which can be instantly
    performed are to be performed upon the signing of the contract
    unless otherwise specifically stated, see 3 28-3-601, MCA, here we
    conclude that the District Court did not err in determining that
    the parties intended to enter into a valid, binding contract at the
    time Hofmann tendered the $1,000 earnest money check to the
    Georges. See generally, Ragland v. Sheehan (1993), 
    256 Mont. 322
    ,
    326-27, 
    846 P.2d 1000
    , 1003; Keesun Partners v. Ferdig Oil Co.
    (1991), 
    249 Mont. 331
    , 
    816 P.2d 417
    . Whether the Georges actually
    cashed the check is irrelevant to our review of its adequacy.
    Concerning their second argument, the Georges essentially
    attack the validity of the contract itself by attacking the court's
    authority to order specific performance. There is no dispute that
    the equitable remedy of specific performance may be had on a valid
    contract for the purchase and sale of real property.    Section 27-1-
    411(2), MCA: see also Keaster v. Bozik (1981), 
    191 Mont. 293
    , 
    623 P.2d 1376
    .
    Hofmann asserts that he obtained adequate financing and the
    only remaining event to occur in order to finalize the financing
    process is an appraisal of the Georges' property.      The appraiser,
    5
    stated Hofmann, had tried to perform an appraisal with no success.
    In its findings of fact, the court noted that
    [alfter execution of the agreement to sell and purchase,
    [Hofmann] made application for a loan through First
    Federal Savings and Loan Association; as part of his loan
    application, he was requested to provide a profit and
    loss statement for his business; he employed an accoun-
    tant to prepare such a statement at the cost of Six
    Hundred and No/lOOths Dollars ($600.00); he understood
    that the only thing left to be done with his loan
    application was to obtain an appraisal of the property;
    the appraiser employed by the lending institution called
    him and asked that he help make an appointment to
    appraise the property because the appraiser was unable to
    make arrangements for an appointment with the [Georges]
    for purposes of the appraisal.
    After reviewing the record, we conclude that Hofmann was "able
    to obtain financingw as required by the buy and sell agreement. We
    therefore hold that the District Court did not err in determining
    that the contract was valid and specifically enforceable.        See
    Larson v. Undem (1990), 
    246 Mont. 336
    , 
    805 P.2d 1318
    .
    Affirmed.
    We concur:
    March 3, 1994
    CERTIFICATE O F SERVICE
    I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the
    following named:
    Leo Graybill, Jr.
    Graybill, Ostrem & Crotty
    #18 Sixth St. No., Ste. 200
    Great Falls. MT 59401
    Pierre L. Bacheller, Esq.
    Pierre L. Bacheller, Inc.
    P.O. Box 2078
    Billings, MT 59103-2078
    ED SMITH
    CLERK O F THE SUPREME COURT
    ST'4TE O F MONTANA
    October 20. 1994
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    1 hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the
    following named:
    Leo Graybill, Jr.                               K e n n e t h R. N e i l 1
    LARSEN & NEILL
    Graybill, Ostrem & Crotty
    Box 1692
    #18 Sixth St. No., Ste. 200                     Great Falls M 5 9 4 0 3 - 1 6 9 2
    T
    Great Falls, MT 59401
    Pierre L. Bacheller, Esq.
    Pierre L. Bacheller, Inc.
    P.O. Box 2078
    Billings, MT 59103-2078
    ED SMITH
    CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
    ST.4TE ! MONTANA
    X
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 93-465

Citation Numbers: 267 Mont. 292, 51 State Rptr. 1007, 883 P.2d 826, 1994 Mont. LEXIS 226

Judges: Harrison, Hunt, Nelson, Turnage, Weber

Filed Date: 10/20/1994

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024