St. Highway Commission v. Palin , 160 Mont. 486 ( 1972 )


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  •                                 No, 11741
    I N THE SUPREME C U T O T E STATE O MONTANA
    OR    F H         F
    1972
    THE STATE OF M N A A ACTING BY AND T R U H
    OTN,                 HOG
    THE STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION O T E STATE
    F H
    O MONTANA,
    F                   ,
    P l a i n t i f f and Appellant,
    -vs   -
    MELVIN D. PALIN e t a l .   ,
    Defendants and Respondents.
    Appeal from:     D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l District,
    Honorable S i d G. S t e w a r t , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
    Counsel of Record:
    F o r Appellant :
    Daniel J. S u l l i v a n and Donald A. Douglas argued,
    Highway Legal Dept., Helena, Montana,
    F o r Respondents :
    Knight, Dahood and Mackay, Anaconda, Montana.
    .
    Wade J Dahood argued, Anaconda, Montana.
    William F. Sheehan, P h i l i p s b u r g , Montana.
    Submitted:          September 21, 1972
    Decided     .-
    WV2 7 TO?.
    Mr. Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of
    the Court.
    This is an appeal by the Montana State Highway Commis-
    sion from a jury award of $48,600 to the defendant, Melvin
    Palin, in a condemnation suit.   The land was used as part of
    the interstate highway system.   Both parties agreed that the
    highest and best use of the land, located along the Clark Fork
    River in Granite County, was for grazing.   The Palins placed a
    value of $52,470 on their lands being taken.     The State's appraiser
    computed compensation at $9,850.   The Palin's expert witness,
    Melvin Beck, testified concerning the value of the land and as
    the basis of his opinion Beck used what he called the "capitali-
    zation of income method".   This testimony was objected to by the
    State Highway Commission as having no proper foundation.
    The controlling issue in this cause is whether this is
    an appropriate case for the use of the "capitalization of income
    method" to determine the value of the land.    We conclude that
    it was not.
    The argument made by Palin's counsel was that the opinion
    testimony given by Beck was supported by substantial evidence
    and therefore proper for the jury to consider.    The record on
    appeal does not support that argument.   The testimony of Beck
    was based upon hypothetical assumptions and not from any actual
    information gathered from Palin or anyone else concerning the
    amount of income that could be derived from the land in question.
    His testimony concerning the method by which he reached his valuy
    ation was:
    "Well I first have to determine how many animals
    can be grazed and fed on this area."
    On voir dire examination it was determined that this carrying
    capacity of the land was determined by "observation and study".
    In State v. Peterson, 
    134 Mont. 52
    , 63, 
    328 P.2d 617
    , this Court
    held that income or revenue from land was "admissible for the
    purpose of arriving at the market value of the property".     The
    only testimony in this record concerning income from the land is
    that of Palin's brother, who testified that he had cut hay on
    the land in 1959.    He did not testify that the hay had been sold
    or used in the ranch operation.    The end result of this is that
    Beck's testimony was inadmissible because his basic assumption
    was not based on income from the land.
    This result is not to say we disapprove of the use of
    the capitalization of income method in determining the value of
    land.   We have previously held that it is a proper method within
    certain limitations.    State Highway Comrn'n v. Heltborg, 
    140 Mont. 196
    , 
    369 P.2d 521
    ; State Highway Cornrn'n v. Bare, 
    141 Mont. 288
    ,
    301, 
    377 P.2d 357
    .       -
    In Bare we reached the same conclusion as in
    this case and for the same reason the conclusion reached by the
    expert witness was not based on tangible factors. We said:
    " * * * Mr. Working's application of the method
    * * * is not an appropriate application. Further,
    in this case, none of the figures, being based
    on one year only, and in part pure estimates,
    have such degree of certainty as to be a credible
    factor. "
    We then went on to point out the testimony from the experts in
    Heltborq was the result of a:
    " * * * very careful foundation for production
    figures, operation figures, and effect of the
    taking on those figures, were made before any
    effort was made to apply the capitalization of
    income method."
    This is the error that was committed in this case, the testimony
    of Beck was not supported by such a foundation.    On the question
    of what type of situation is the capitalization of income an
    appropriate method to value land, the Supreme Court of Virginia,
    in Appalachian Power Company v. Anderson, 
    212 Va. 705
    , 
    187 S.E.2d 148
    , 154, in a case involving unimproved land held:
    "The capitalization of income method of appraisal
    is used where income producing property is
    condemned and it becomes necessary to ascertain
    its value.    * * *
    "However, in the instant case we are not deal-
    ing with income producing property but unimproved
    acreage. * * *"
    That court went on to cite United States v. Whitehurst, 3 3 
    7 F.2d 7
     6 5 (4th Cir. 1964), where the court held:
    " * * * the capitalization of income method of
    determining the value of land should not be used
    where the determination is based upon pure specu-
    lation and is without objective evidential
    support."
    We therefore hold that the capitalization of income
    method of land valuation should be limited to income producing
    property where at all possible, recognizing that it may be neces-
    sary to use the method in cases where no comparable sales evi-
    dence is available.                                             -
    But, in those cases, the limitation in Bare
    should be strictly adhered to that:
    " * * * its use must be based on a foundation
    which minimizes to the extent possible conjecture
    and uncertainty."
    Therefore the district court was in error in overruling
    the Highway Commission's motion to strike Beck's testimony and a
    new trial must be granted.    Because the case must be retried
    there is no need to discuss further the other claimed errors
    because they should not again
    The judgment is revers&   '
    I
    and a )w
    e   til,re/.
    ra,odrd
    QI
    Associa e Justices
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11741

Citation Numbers: 160 Mont. 486, 503 P.2d 524, 1972 Mont. LEXIS 404

Judges: Harrison, Haswell, Daly', Castles

Filed Date: 11/27/1972

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/10/2024