Mensing v. State ( 2001 )


Menu:
  • file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-317%20Opinion.htm
    No. 01-317
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    2001 MT 263N
    ANDREW C. MENSING,
    Petitioner and Appellant,
    v..
    STATE OF MONTANA,
    Respondent and Respondent.
    APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District,
    In and for the County of Silver Bow,
    The Honorable John W. Whelan, Judge presiding.
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Andrew C. Mensing, Pro Se, Deer Lodge, Montana
    For Respondent:
    Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Pamela P. Collins,
    Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
    Robert M. McCarthy, Silver Bow County Attorney,
    Butte, Montana
    file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-317%20Opinion.htm (1 of 7)3/23/2007 4:02:15 PM
    file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-317%20Opinion.htm
    Submitted on Briefs: November 15, 2001
    Decided: December 13, 2001
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Chief Justice Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal Operating
    Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a public
    document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title,
    Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter Publishing Company and to
    West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.
    ¶2 Andrew C. Mensing, appearing pro se, appeals from the order of the Second Judicial
    District Court, Silver Bow County, dismissing his petition for postconviction relief. We
    affirm.
    ¶3 The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in dismissing Mensing's
    postconviction relief petition, which was based on ineffective assistance of trial and
    appellate counsel.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶4 The State of Montana charged Mensing with committing the offense of sexual
    intercourse without consent by allegedly having nonconsensual sexual intercourse with the
    victim on the evening of June 5, 1997, near the Speculator Mine in Butte, Montana. He
    was represented during the proceedings by appointed counsel Deirdre Caughlan and
    Michael Clague, and he testified during his jury trial that the sexual intercourse was
    consensual. The jury convicted Mensing, and the trial court subsequently sentenced him
    and entered judgment.
    ¶5 Mensing appealed to this Court and was represented on appeal by William F. Hooks,
    the Montana Appellate Defender. State v. Mensing, 
    1999 MT 303
    , 
    297 Mont. 172
    , 991
    file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-317%20Opinion.htm (2 of 7)3/23/2007 4:02:15 PM
    file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-317%20Opinion.htm
    P.2d 950. The only issue raised in that appeal was whether the trial court had committed
    reversible error in admitting testimony from law enforcement officers regarding prior
    inconsistent statements made by the victim. Mensing, ¶ 2. We concluded the trial court
    had abused its discretion in admitting the testimony, but that the error did not prejudice
    Mensing. As a result, the court's error was harmless and we affirmed. Mensing, ¶¶ 17, 21-
    22.
    ¶6 Thereafter, Mensing timely filed a petition for postconviction relief in the District
    Court based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel Caughlan and appellate counsel
    Hooks. No hearing was held on Mensing's petition and the District Court dismissed it by
    order on April 16, 2001. This appeal follows.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶7 Did the District Court err in dismissing Mensing's petition for postconviction relief,
    which was based on ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel?
    ¶8 We review the conclusions of law in a district court's denial or dismissal of a petition
    for postconviction relief to determine whether the conclusions are correct. See Dawson v.
    State, 
    2000 MT 219
    , ¶ 18, 
    301 Mont. 135
    , ¶ 18, 
    10 P.3d 49
    , ¶ 18 (citation omitted).
    ¶9 Mensing asserts trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to interview and
    call at trial defense witnesses to whom the victim allegedly admitted that the sexual
    intercourse with Mensing was consensual. He also asserts trial counsel failed to present
    allegedly exculpatory photographs showing an absence of bruises on the victim's thighs.
    Mensing contends appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise ineffective
    assistance of trial counsel as an issue on appeal.
    ¶10 In considering ineffective assistance of counsel claims on both direct appeal and in
    postconviction proceedings such as this one, we apply the two-part test established in
    Strickland v. Washington (1984), 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L.Ed.2d 674
    . The
    petitioner must establish that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient
    performance prejudiced his defense and deprived him of a fair trial. Dawson, ¶ 20 (citation
    omitted).
    ¶11 The underlying question in the deficient performance prong is "whether counsel acted
    within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." State v.
    file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-317%20Opinion.htm (3 of 7)3/23/2007 4:02:15 PM
    file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-317%20Opinion.htm
    Niederklopfer, 
    2000 MT 187
    , ¶ 19, 
    300 Mont. 397
    , ¶ 19, 
    6 P.3d 448
    , ¶ 19 (citation
    omitted). Counsel is entitled to a presumption that the challenged actions might be sound
    trial strategy, and counsel's trial tactics and strategic decisions cannot be the basis for an
    ineffective assistance determination. Niederklopfer, ¶ 19 (citation omitted).
    ¶12 The prejudice prong requires a demonstration that "there is a reasonable probability
    that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
    different." Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 694
    , 
    104 S.Ct. at 2068
    , 
    80 L.Ed.2d at 698
    . "A
    reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
    Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 694
    , 
    104 S.Ct. at 2068
    , 
    80 L.Ed.2d at 698
    .
    Allegations regarding trial counsel
    ¶13 Mensing first alleges that trial counsel failed to interview and call at trial defense
    witnesses who would have testified that the victim told them the sexual intercourse with
    him was consensual. Mensing did not provide an affidavit with his petition for
    postconviction relief which either identified these witnesses or stated how many of them
    there were; nor did he attach to his petition affidavits from any of these alleged witnesses.
    Section 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA, requires a postconviction petition to "identify all facts
    supporting the grounds for relief set forth . . . and have attached affidavits, records, or
    other evidence establishing the existence of those facts." Mensing totally failed to meet
    this statutory requirement with regard to the alleged defense witnesses and, as a result, the
    District Court did not err in dismissing that portion of Mensing's petition for failure to
    state a claim upon which relief could be granted under § 46-21-101, MCA.
    ¶14 Mensing also contends that trial counsel failed to introduce allegedly exculpatory
    photographs of the victim's thighs which would have shown an absence of bruises, thereby
    contradicting the State's evidence--via testimony by the doctor who examined her at the
    hospital--that she had multiple scratches to her upper chest and shoulders, bruises on both
    of her inner thighs, and inflammation in the vaginal area, all of which were inconsistent
    with consensual sex. Mensing does not identify these photographs, which is sufficient to
    dismiss this portion of his petition under § 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA, as well.
    ¶15 Moreover, the only photographs mentioned in the record on appeal were those
    apparently taken by an employee of the Butte-Silver Bow law enforcement agency the day
    after the events in question; the State did not introduce the photographs at trial. It is clear,
    however, that Mensing's trial counsel knew of the existence of the allegedly exculpatory
    file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-317%20Opinion.htm (4 of 7)3/23/2007 4:02:15 PM
    file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-317%20Opinion.htm
    photographs. Indeed, counsel referenced the photographs in her closing argument to the
    jury, regarding her view that there had been a "fairly cursory and sloppy hospital
    exam . . . . We heard that there were some pictures, but apparently they must not have
    showed much because we certainly didn't see them here today or at any time during the
    trial." Thus, instead of introducing the photographs, which may or may not have shown
    bruises on the victim's thighs, trial counsel argued the photographs must not have
    supported the State's case.
    ¶16 Counsel is presumed to have rendered adequate assistance. Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 689
    , 
    104 S.Ct. at 2065
    , 
    80 L.Ed.2d at 694
    ; see Niederklopfer, ¶ 19. On this record, it
    appears trial counsel made a tactical decision regarding the photographs which was within
    the range of competence demanded of criminal defense attorneys.
    ¶17 Even assuming arguendo, however, that counsel's performance was deficient in this
    regard, Mensing establishes no prejudice as defined in Strickland. Here, the victim's
    testimony detailed the events surrounding the sexual intercourse without consent, the
    location of the events near the Speculator Mine, and her escape. The doctor's testimony
    fully supported the probability that nonconsensual intercourse had occurred. The victim's
    boyfriend testified she told him very shortly after the events--in a "pretty distraught" state,
    with dirt on her clothes--that Mensing had raped her "front and back," the location where
    the rape occurred and how she had escaped. Another witness who saw the victim in the
    same time frame testified to her statements that Mensing had raped her and where the
    event took place. Furthermore, while Mensing initially denied to law enforcement that he
    had any sexual contact with the victim on the night in question and stated he had driven
    her to the Cabaret Lounge, law enforcement personnel compared tire tracks near the mine
    to the tread on Mensing's tires and testified at trial they were consistent. Contrary to his
    earlier statements, Mensing testified at trial that he had sexual intercourse with the victim
    on the night in question, near the Speculator Mine, but that the sex was consensual.
    ¶18 Briefly stated, the evidence against Mensing was overwhelming. On this record, there
    is no reasonable probability that, but for any deficient performance by trial counsel with
    regard to the photographs, the result of the trial would have been different; that is, there is
    not a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of Mensing's trial. See
    Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 694
    , 
    104 S.Ct. at 2068
    , 
    80 L.Ed.2d at 698
    .
    ¶19 For these reasons, we hold the District Court did not err in dismissing Mensing's
    petition for postconviction relief with regard to his ineffective assistance claims against
    file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-317%20Opinion.htm (5 of 7)3/23/2007 4:02:15 PM
    file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-317%20Opinion.htm
    trial counsel.
    Allegation regarding appellate counsel
    ¶20 The Strickland test also applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
    with minor modifications. The prejudice prong can be met in this regard only by
    establishing a reasonable probability that the petitioner would have prevailed on appeal.
    See Dawson, ¶¶ 147, 155 (citation omitted).
    ¶21 Mensing contends his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance on appeal by
    failing to raise an issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. His contention requires
    only brief discussion.
    ¶22 With regard to the claim relating to trial counsel's failure to interview or present
    defense witnesses who would have contradicted the victim's story and supported his own
    trial testimony, Mensing presented no affidavits supporting the claim with his
    postconviction petition. As a result, we cannot ascertain that appellate counsel knew or
    should have known of it. More importantly, the claim is not based on the record. The
    record does not disclose the existence of such witnesses and, if they existed, the record
    does not indicate why trial counsel did not interview them or present their testimony at
    trial. Where allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be documented from
    the record, they must be raised by petition for postconviction relief rather than on appeal.
    State v. White, 
    2001 MT 149
    , ¶ 12, 
    306 Mont. 58
    , ¶ 12, 
    30 P.3d 340
    , ¶ 12 (citations
    omitted).
    ¶23 With regard to Mensing's ineffective assistance claim against trial counsel regarding
    the photographs, we concluded above that he failed to establish ineffective assistance. As
    a result, Mensing cannot establish a reasonable probability that, but for appellate counsel's
    failure to raise the issue, he would have prevailed on appeal.
    ¶24 We conclude, therefore, that appellate counsel did not render ineffective assistance to
    Mensing by failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. As a
    result, we hold the District Court did not err in failing to conclude otherwise.
    ¶25 Affirmed.
    /S/ KARLA M. GRAY
    file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-317%20Opinion.htm (6 of 7)3/23/2007 4:02:15 PM
    file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-317%20Opinion.htm
    We concur:
    /S/ JAMES C. NELSON
    /S/ PATRICIA COTTER
    /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
    /S/ JIM RICE
    file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-317%20Opinion.htm (7 of 7)3/23/2007 4:02:15 PM
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-317

Filed Date: 12/13/2001

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/28/2017