Ryan v. State ( 2002 )


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  •                                            No. 02-360
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    2002 MT 244N
    DOUGLAS E. RYAN,
    Petitioner and Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF MONTANA,
    Respondent and Respondent.
    APPEAL FROM:         District Court of the Second Judicial District,
    In and for the County of Silver Bow,
    The Honorable John W. Whelan, Judge presiding.
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Douglas E. Ryan, Pro Se, Shelby, Montana
    For Respondent:
    Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Jennifer Anders,
    Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
    Robert McCarthy, Silver Bow County Attorney, Butte, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: October 10, 2002
    Decided: November 7, 2002
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1    Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court
    1996 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be
    cited as precedent but shall be filed as a public document with the
    Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title,
    Supreme    Court    cause     number    and    result    to   the   State   Reporter
    Publishing Company and to West Group in the quarterly table of
    noncitable cases issued by this Court.
    ¶2    Douglas E. Ryan (Ryan) appeals from the order entered by the
    Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County, denying his
    motion for transcripts and the production of documents relating to
    his underlying convictions.            We affirm.
    ¶3    The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred
    in denying Ryan’s motion.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶4    In August of 1999, the State of Montana (State) filed two
    informations against Ryan, the first alleging he had committed the
    felony offense of theft and the second alleging he had committed
    the felony offenses of theft and criminal endangerment.                        Ryan
    subsequently pleaded guilty to all three offenses.                  On January 13,
    2000, the District Court sentenced Ryan to 10-year commitments to
    the Department of Corrections on each count, with the sentences to
    run concurrently.          On April 21, 2000, the court amended Ryan’s
    sentences to three concurrent 10-year terms, with five years
    suspended on each, and entered judgment on the convictions and
    sentences.      Ryan did not appeal.
    2
    ¶5     In April of 2002, Ryan filed a motion with the District Court
    requesting copies of transcripts and documents relating to his
    underlying convictions.        In his motion, Ryan asserted he had made
    numerous unsuccessful attempts to get the documents from both his
    attorney and the Silver Bow County Attorney’s office.                   He further
    contended the documents were necessary in order for him to prepare
    a petition for postconviction relief alleging his convictions were
    invalid on the bases that there was no evidence of the crimes
    charged,    his   guilty     pleas    were   involuntary,       his    counsel   was
    ineffective and the State withheld exculpatory evidence.                         The
    District Court, noting that Ryan’s motion essentially challenged
    the constitutional validity of his convictions, deemed the motion
    to be a petition for postconviction relief and denied it as
    untimely filed.      Ryan appeals.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶6     We   review   a    district    court’s     denial   of   a     petition   for
    postconviction relief to determine whether the court’s findings of
    fact are clearly erroneous and its conclusions of law correct.
    State v. Wright, 
    2001 MT 282
    , ¶ 9, 
    307 Mont. 349
    , ¶ 9, 
    42 P.3d 753
    ,
    ¶ 9.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶7     Did the District Court err in denying Ryan’s motion?
    ¶8     As stated above, the District Court deemed Ryan’s motion to be
    one for postconviction relief and denied it on the basis it was
    untimely filed.          In that regard, a petition for postconviction
    relief must be filed within one year of the date a conviction
    3
    becomes final.    Section 46-21-102(1), MCA.    A conviction becomes
    final when, among other things, the time for appeal to this Court
    expires.    Section 46-21-102(1)(a), MCA.    An appeal in a criminal
    case must be filed within 60 days after entry of the judgment
    appealed from.    Rule 5(b), M.R.App.P.   Here, the amended judgments
    were filed on April 21, 2000, and Ryan’s convictions therefore
    became final on June 20, 2000.    Ryan did not file his motion until
    April of 2002, long after the one-year period in which to file a
    petition for postconviction relief had run.
    ¶9     Ryan concedes that he did not file a postconviction relief
    petition within the one-year period as required by § 46-21-102(1),
    MCA.   He contends, however, that at all times during that period he
    had been making diligent efforts to acquire the transcripts and
    documents related to the underlying proceedings which he contends
    were necessary before he could prepare and file such a petition.
    He further contends it is only because the State, his attorney and
    the District Court did not comply with his requests for the
    documents that he was unable to file a petition within the one-year
    period.    Essentially, Ryan argues that the statutory time limit on
    filing a petition for postconviction relief should be equitably
    tolled until he is able to acquire the information he asserts he
    needs.
    ¶10    The one-year time period in which to file a postconviction
    relief petition set forth in § 46-21-102, MCA, is a jurisdictional
    limitation on litigation and may only be waived where the failure
    to do so would result in a clear miscarriage of justice.    State v.
    4
    Abe, 
    2001 MT 260
    , ¶ 15, 
    307 Mont. 233
    , ¶ 15, 
    37 P.3d 77
    , ¶ 15;
    State v. Wells, 
    2001 MT 55
    , ¶ 10, 
    304 Mont. 329
    , ¶ 10, 
    21 P.3d 610
    ,
    ¶ 10 (overruled on other grounds in State v. Whitehorn, 
    2002 MT 54
    ,
    ¶ 42, 
    309 Mont. 63
    , ¶ 42, 
    43 P.3d 922
    , ¶ 42).         This miscarriage of
    justice   exception   is    very   narrow,   and   applies   only   where   a
    defendant alleges the existence of newly discovered evidence which
    establishes that he or she did not commit the underlying offense.
    Abe, ¶ 15; Wells, ¶ 10.      Ryan does not allege the existence of any
    evidence showing he is innocent of the offenses for which he was
    convicted.   Consequently, the miscarriage of justice exception does
    not apply here.
    ¶11   We conclude Ryan’s petition for postconviction relief is
    barred by the § 46-21-102(1), MCA, one-year limitation period.              We
    hold, therefore, that the District Court did not err in denying
    Ryan’s motion on that basis.
    ¶12   Affirmed.
    /S/ KARLA M. GRAY
    We concur:
    /S/   JAMES C. NELSON
    /S/   TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
    /S/   PATRICIA COTTER
    /S/   JIM RICE
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-360

Filed Date: 11/7/2002

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016