Rule v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. , 325 Mont. 329 ( 2005 )

No. 04-145
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2005 MT 6
LLOYD E. RULE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND
SANTA FE RAILWAY CO.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. BDV 2003-975
Honorable Julie Macek, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Alexander (Zander) Blewett, III, Kurt M. Jackson; Hoyt &
Blewett, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Jon M. Moyers; Hedger Moyers, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 25, 2004
Decided: January 25, 2005
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 In this Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) action, the Eighth Judicial District
Court, Cascade County, granted the motion of Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway
Company (BNSF) for a change of venue. Lloyd E. Rule appeals. We affirm.
¶2 The issue is whether the District Court erred in granting BNSF's motion to change
venue pursuant to §§ 25-2-122(2) and -201(1), MCA.
BACKGROUND
¶3 Rule filed this action in Cascade County District Court, seeking damages from BNSF
for personal injury arising out of his railroad employment in Dawson County, where he
resides. After Rule served BNSF through its registered agent in Yellowstone County, BNSF
timely moved to change venue from Cascade County to either Yellowstone County or
Dawson County, pursuant to §§ 25-2-122(2) and -201(1), MCA.
¶4 Relying on the referenced statutes, the District Court granted BNSF's motion to
change venue and ordered the case transferred to either Dawson or Yellowstone County, at
Rule's option. Rule appeals.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶5 Proper venue is a question of law involving the application of venue statutes to
pleaded facts. Our review of a district court's venue ruling is plenary; we simply determine
whether the district court's ruling was legally correct. Sprinkle v. Burton (1996), 280 Mont.
358, 361, 935 P.2d 1094, 1096 (citations omitted).
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¶6 Similarly, we review a conclusion that a statute is constitutional for correctness. See
Powell v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 2000 MT 321, ¶ 13, 302 Mont. 518, ¶ 13, 15 P.3d
877, ¶ 13 (citations omitted). The constitutionality of a legislative enactment is presumed,
and the party challenging a statute bears the burden of proving it unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt. Powell, ¶ 13 (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶7 Did the District Court err in granting BNSF's motion to change venue pursuant to §§
25-2-122(2) and -201(1), MCA?
¶8 Venue issues relate to determining the proper place for trial of a legal action. The
venue statutes at issue in the present case are § 25-2-122(2), MCA, and § 25-2-201(1), MCA.
Subsections (a), (b) and (c), respectively, of § 25-2-122(2), MCA, provide that the proper
place of trial for a tort action against a corporation incorporated in a state other than Montana
is the county in which the tort was committed, the county in which the plaintiff resides or
the county in which the corporation's resident agent is located. Section 25-2-201(1), MCA,
provides that, upon motion and when the county designated in the complaint is not the proper
county, a district court must change the place of trial.
¶9 In granting BNSF's motion, the District Court determined that venue was proper in
either Dawson County or Yellowstone County. The apparent basis for that determination
is that the alleged tort was committed--and Rule resided--in Dawson County, and BNSF's
resident agent is located in Yellowstone County. The District Court implicitly concluded
that, because Cascade County was not a proper venue under the plain meaning of § 25-2-
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122(2), MCA, § 25-2-201(1), MCA, required it to change the place of trial to a proper
county.
¶10 Rule sets forth three arguments in support of his overall contention that the District
Court erred in applying the terms of Montana's general tort venue statutes to his FELA
action: (1) that the Legislature did not intend § 25-2-122(2), MCA, to apply to FELA cases;
(2) that § 25-2-122(2), MCA, cannot coexist with the liberal forum selection policy under
FELA; and (3) that § 25-2-122(2), MCA, is unconstitutional because it constitutes an
arbitrary and capricious limitation on FELA venue practice in Montana. We address each
argument in turn.
¶11 Rule contends the Montana Legislature did not intend § 25-2-122(2), MCA, to apply
to FELA cases. In this regard, he relies on Senator Bruce Crippen's comments during
legislative hearings on the 1995 and the 1997 amendments to § 25-2-122, MCA.
Specifically, he cites Crippen's remarks in response to criticism of the bill by railroad worker
and union opponents. Crippen stated that "the provisions of this bill would not restrict their
[FELA claimants'] options at all" and "[t]his has nothing to do with FELA. They can still
file under the federal forum if they choose." See Hearing on Senate Bill 63 before the House
Judiciary Committee, 1995 Montana Legislature, March 10, 1995, p. 2; Hearing on Senate
Bill 314 before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1997 Montana Legislature, February 13,
1997, p. 12.
¶12 Senator Crippen's comments at the referenced hearings appear to address the rights
of FELA plaintiffs to sue in federal court. In any event, Senator Crippen's remarks do not
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necessarily reflect the law. When a statute is plain and unambiguous on its face, we do not
employ other means of interpretation in determining legislative intent. See Connery v.
Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. (1996), 280 Mont. 115, 119, 929 P.2d 222, 225 (citation
omitted).
¶13 Pursuant to § 25-2-122(1), MCA, the general rule is that the proper place of trial for
a tort action is the county in which the defendant resides or the tort was committed. Section
25-2-122(2), MCA, provides that the proper place of trial for a tort action in which the
defendant is a corporation incorporated in a state other than Montana is the county in which
the tort was committed, the county in which the plaintiff resides or the county in which the
corporation's resident agent is located. Section 25-2-122(3), MCA, provides that if the
defendant is a resident of a state other than Montana, the proper place of trial for a tort action
is the county in which the tort was committed or the plaintiff resides.
¶14 A FELA action is a negligence action against a common carrier by railroad under
federal law. See 45 U.S.C. § 51. Negligence is a type of tort. Section 25-2-122(1), MCA,
plainly states that--except as provided in subsections (2) and (3)--it applies to tort actions,
and subsection (2) applies to tort actions against defendant corporations incorporated in a
state other than Montana. BNSF is a defendant out-of-state corporation. The Legislature did
not create an exception from the provisions of § 25-2-122(2), MCA, for FELA claims.
Because § 25-2-122, MCA, does not expressly exclude FELA claims, we conclude the
statute applies to FELA claims.
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¶15 Next, Rule contends § 25-2-122(2), MCA, cannot coexist with "the liberal forum
selection policy under the FELA to which injured railroad workers are entitled under
Montana law." He advances both federal and state cases in support of this proposition.
¶16 There can be no dispute that both federal law and courts, and this Court, are protective
of broad venue rights for FELA plaintiffs. Pursuant to federal statute, a federal district court
has jurisdiction of a FELA action, concurrent with the jurisdiction of state courts, if the
defendant resides in or does business in that federal court's district or if the cause of action
arose in that district. See 45 U.S.C. § 56. Venue choices for FELA actions filed in federal
court are broader than the choices allowed under the general federal venue provisions, which
"worked injustices to employees." Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Kepner (1941), 314 U.S. 44,
53, 62 S. Ct. 6, 10, 86 L. Ed. 28, 33. The United States Supreme Court has stated "[t]he right
to select the forum granted in [45 U.S.C. § 56] is a substantial right." Boyd v. Grand Trunk
Western R. Co. (1949), 338 U.S. 263, 266, 70 S. Ct. 26, 28, 94 L. Ed. 55, 58.
¶17 The Supreme Court also has recognized that "the venue of state court [FELA] suits
was left to the practice of the forum . . . [provided,] [b]y virtue of the Constitution, [that] the
courts of the several states must remain open to [FELA] litigants on the same basis that they
are open to litigants with causes of action springing from a different source." See Miles v.
Illinois Cent. R. Co. (1942), 315 U.S. 698, 703, 62 S. Ct. 827, 830, 86 L. Ed. 1129, 1134.
Here, Rule does not dispute that the Montana venue statutes provide FELA litigants with
access to Montana courts on the same basis as litigants with tort causes of action against
nonresident corporations springing from different sources.
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¶18 Rule relies on a series of Montana cases, decided over the last quarter-century, for the
proposition that this Court does not recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens in FELA
actions. See State ex rel. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. District Court (1995), 270 Mont.
146, 154, 891 P.2d 493, 498; State ex rel. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. District Court
(1987), 229 Mont. 325, 329, 746 P.2d 1077, 1080; Labella v. Burlington Northern, Inc.
(1979), 182 Mont. 202, 595 P.2d 1184. He is correct.
¶19 Whether a change of venue may be allowed on the basis of forum non conveniens
differs, however, from the question presented here, which is whether Rule filed his FELA
action in a proper venue, in the first instance, under the applicable venue statute. Venue
must be changed if the county designated in the complaint is not a proper county. Section
25-2-201(1), MCA. Forum non conveniens, which is codified in Montana at § 25-2-201(2)
and (3), MCA, allows a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is
authorized under the venue statutes, when an impartial trial cannot be had in the county
designated in the complaint or the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would
be promoted by the change. In the present case, the District Court did not grant BNSF's
change of venue motion pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, but instead
pursuant to § 25-2-201(1), MCA, on the basis that Cascade County was not a proper county
for Rule's FELA action given the plain language of § 25-2-122(2), MCA.
¶20 Rule next quotes from several Montana cases involving issues other than forum non
conveniens, in which we have made statements relating to venue in FELA cases. For
example, we stated in Ford v. Burlington Northern R. Co. (1991), 250 Mont. 188, 193, 819
7
P.2d 169, 173, aff’d sub nom. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Ford (1992), 504 U.S. 648 112
S. Ct. 2184, 119 L. Ed. 2d 432, that FELA was "designed to provide injured railroad workers
with as many options as possible when choosing the venue within which to file their com-
plaint." Similarly, we stated in Haug v. Burlington Northern R. Co. (1989), 236 Mont. 368,
374, 770 P.2d 517, 520, that "the FELA is to be given a liberal construction in favor of
injured railroad employees." While Rule is correct that, under our cases, a FELA plaintiff
may not be afforded fewer venue options than general tort plaintiffs, a FELA plaintiff's
options are not necessarily unlimited, under any case law he has cited.
¶21 Rule also quotes from Davis v. United Pacific R. Co. (1997), 282 Mont. 233, 245-46,
937 P.2d 27, 34, that "[o]ne area of FELA that this Court has liberally construed in order to
further the objectives of FELA is a plaintiff's selection of forum in actions brought under the
Act." This statement is as true today as it was in 1997. However, Davis must be placed in
an appropriate context.
¶22 Prior to 1995, Montana's general venue statute allowed a plaintiff to sue any
nonresident defendant, including an out-of-state corporation, in any county in the state. See
§ 25-2-118(2), MCA (1993). In 1995, the Montana Legislature adopted § 25-2-122(2), MCA
(1995), which restricted venue for a plaintiff bringing a tort action against a nonresident
corporate defendant to the county in which the tort was committed, the county in which the
plaintiff resided or the county in which the corporation's resident agent was located. The
general venue statute allowing actions against nonresident defendants to be brought in any
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county remained in effect as to noncorporate nonresident defendants. See § 25-2-118(2),
MCA (1995).
¶23 In Davis, we addressed the constitutionality of the manner in which these venue
statutes differentiated between cases in which the defendant was a nonresident corporation
and cases in which the defendant was a nonresident individual. We reviewed the statutes in
light of their practical application to an example of two motorists injured on a Montana
highway, one as a result of the negligence of an out-of-state individual and the other as the
result of the negligence of an out-of-state corporation. Based on the vastly different venue
options available to the two plaintiffs in our example, we held that § 25-2-122(2), MCA,
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Montana Constitution. Davis, 282 Mont. at 246,
937 P.2d at 34.
¶24 Following our decision in Davis, the 1997 Legislature again amended the venue
statutes, excepting from the general venue statutes all torts in which the defendant is a
nonresident. Under the 1997 venue statutes, which remain in effect, the proper place of trial
for a tort action against a nonresident defendant--corporate or otherwise--is the county in
which the tort was committed, the county in which the plaintiff resides or, in the case of a
corporate defendant, the county in which the corporation's resident agent is located. See §§
25-2-118(2) and 25-2-122(2) and (3), MCA.
¶25 We have reviewed all of the authorities cited by Rule in support of his second
contention. It is true that we have always supported broad FELA venue choices. However,
we have never required, nor do the federal statutes or case law, that state court venue for
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FELA actions must include every place the defendant railroad does business, regardless of
venue limits statutorily placed on other tort plaintiffs. We observe that, under § 25-2-122(2),
MCA, FELA plaintiffs have three proper venues for trial, as opposed to two venues available
to plaintiffs under the general tort statute or in a tort case in which the defendant is an out-of-
state individual. We conclude § 25-2-122(2), MCA, provides sufficient venue options for
FELA plaintiffs to meet the concerns expressed in the federal venue statute and cases and
our previous cases.
¶26 Rule's third argument is that § 25-2-122(2), MCA, constitutes an arbitrary and
capricious limitation on FELA venue practice in Montana and violates his right to substantive
due process of law. We disagree with Rule's notion that § 25-2-122(2), MCA, is arbitrary
and capricious vis-a-vis FELA venue practice. Under the statute, a FELA plaintiff has the
same, or greater, venue rights as any other tort plaintiff.
¶27 Rule claims venue in FELA cases is elevated to a substantive right and § 25-2-122(2),
MCA, is unconstitutional. He properly advances Hardy v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co.,
2003 MT 85, 315 Mont. 107, 67 P.3d 892, for the proposition that, in order to comply with
substantive due process requirements of the Montana Constitution, a statute must be
reasonably related to a permissible legislative objective. Rule contends prevention of forum
shopping in FELA cases is not a permissible statutory objective. The statute does not treat
FELA plaintiffs differently than other plaintiffs with tort actions, however, and Rule presents
no evidence that restricting forum shopping by a FELA plaintiff was the purpose of § 25-2-
122(2), MCA.
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¶28 The Montana Legislature has broad discretionary powers to enact laws governing
venue. See Davis, 282 Mont. at 242, 937 P.2d at 32. As a matter of federal law, FELA cases
filed in state courts are subject to the same venue provisions as other civil cases filed in state
courts. Miles, 315 U.S. at 703, 62 S.Ct. at 830, 86 L. Ed. at 1134. Because federal law
allows state legislatures to enact venue laws applicable to FELA actions, there is no legal
impediment to treating FELA plaintiffs exactly the same as other Montana plaintiffs with tort
actions against out-of-state corporate defendants.
¶29 Under § 25-2-122(2), MCA, the state courts of Montana remain open to FELA
plaintiffs on the same basis that they are open to tort litigants with causes of action springing
from a different source. Rule has established no reason why application of § 25-2-122(2),
MCA, to FELA cases exceeds legislative discretion in enacting venue statutes. As a result,
we conclude Rule has not met his burden of proving § 25-2-122(2), MCA, unconstitutional.
¶30 We hold the District Court properly applied the venue statutes, which Rule has not
proven unconstitutional. We affirm the District Court's order granting BNSF's motion for
change of venue.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
We concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ JIM RICE
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