State v. Clayton Hunter , 347 Mont. 155 ( 2008 )

November 25 2008
DA 07-0224
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 395STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
CLAYTON JAMES HUNTER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DC 06-437A
Honorable Ted O. Lympus, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Gregory Hood, Assistant Public Defender, Kalispell, Montana
For Appellee:
Hon. Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General; Mark W. Mattioli,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Ed Corrigan, Flathead County Attorney; Lori Adams, Deputy County
Attorney, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 5, 2008
Decided: November 25, 2008
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice John Warner delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 In a plea agreement with the State of Montana, Clayton James Hunter agreed to plead
guilty to fraudulently obtaining dangerous drugs, a felony, and the State agreed to
recommend a two-year deferred sentence. The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead
County, accepted the plea agreement and imposed the recommended sentence, subject to
several probation conditions. Hunter appeals two of his probation conditions.
¶2 The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion when it
imposed the alcohol-related conditions.
BACKGROUND
¶3 In October 2006, Hunter altered a Percocet prescription so he could “get more for the
pain [he] was in at the time.” He attempted to fill the prescription at the Costco pharmacy in
Kalispell. Suspecting the prescription was a fake, the pharmacist called the doctor’s office
and verified the prescription was a forgery. After the police were called, Hunter admitted he
forged the prescription.
¶4 Hunter entered into a plea agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty
in exchange for a recommended deferred sentence of two years. At the sentencing hearing,
the presentence investigation report (PSI) showed Hunter was cited in 2005 in Colorado for
driving with a .06 blood alcohol content and in 1997 in Washington for a “public
disturbance.” It recommended Hunter not possess or consume intoxicants--that is, drugs and
alcohol--and that he submit to chemical testing for drugs and alcohol. Hunter admits to
occasional past marijuana use, but states he has no history of alcohol abuse.
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¶5 Hunter’s counsel objected to the imposition of alcohol-related conditions. The
District Court imposed the PSI’s recommended conditions and entered judgment. Hunter
appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶6 We review probation conditions for both legality and reasonableness. State v. Ashby,
2008 MT 83, ¶ 9, 342 Mont. 187, ¶ 9, 179 P.3d 1164, ¶ 9. Generally, a probation condition
is legal if it falls within statutory parameters. State v. Herd, 2004 MT 85, ¶ 24, 320 Mont.
490, ¶ 24, 87 P.3d 1017, ¶ 24. If a condition is illegal, or exceeds statutory parameters, this
Court will review the sentence even if the defendant failed to object to the sentence in the
trial court. State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338, 343, 602 P.2d 997, 1000 (1979).
¶7 In addition to explicit statutory sentencing parameters, a district court is authorized to
impose on deferred or suspended sentences any reasonable condition necessary for
rehabilitation or the protection of the victim or society. Ashby, ¶ 9; § 46-18-201(4), MCA.
For a condition to be reasonable, it must have “a nexus to either the offense for which the
offender is being sentenced, or to the offender himself or herself.” Ashby, ¶ 15. If the
defendant contends that the nexus between the offender or offense and the condition is
inadequate, the challenge is that the condition is “objectionable” rather than illegal. State v.
Hameline, 2008 MT 241, ¶ 12, 344 Mont. 461, ¶ 12, 188 P.3d 1052, ¶ 12. Objectionable
conditions must be objected to in the trial court to qualify for appellate review. State v.
Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17, ¶ 21, 335 Mont. 344, ¶ 21, 151 P.3d 892, ¶ 21.
¶8 Here, as noted above, Hunter’s counsel objected to the alcohol-related conditions.
Thus, notwithstanding Hunter’s assertions that the conditions are illegal, the challenge is to
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objectionable conditions. We review the reasonableness of the probation conditions for an
abuse of discretion. Ashby, ¶ 9.
¶9 A sufficient offense-related nexus can exist when the offense is indirectly connected
to the condition. For example, in State v. Greensweight, 2008 MT 185, ¶¶ 19-21, 343 Mont.
474, ¶¶ 19-21, 187 P.3d 613, ¶¶ 19-21, a connection existed between the offense of theft and
chemical testing conditions because the defendant used the money he stole for rent and bills-
-money he lacked because of his drug habit. We also have held a sufficient nexus existed
between the offense of sexual assault and intoxicant-based conditions because the defendant
had been immersed in a drug environment during the time of the assault and his stated reason
for the assault was being excluded from doing drugs with his family. In re D.A.S., 2008 MT
168, ¶ 12, 343 Mont. 360, ¶ 12, 184 P.3d 349, ¶ 12.
¶10 Further, a nexus exists between drug-related offenses and conditions related to
alcohol, including chemical testing. We held the purposes of rehabilitating the defendant
and protecting society were served by the imposition of alcohol-related conditions on
defendants’ sentences for possessing methamphetamine and marijuana--both dangerous
drugs. State v. Winkel, 2008 MT 89, ¶¶ 14-16, 342 Mont. 267, ¶¶ 14-16, 182 P.3d 54, ¶¶ 14-
16; State v. DeSchazo, 2008 MT 131, ¶ 12, 343 Mont. 77, ¶ 12, 183 P.3d 47, ¶ 12. “The
drug-related nature of [the defendant]’s offense alone suffices as a sufficient nexus to this
condition.” Winkel, ¶ 14.
¶11 In the present case, Hunter’s offense was fraudulently obtaining dangerous drugs.
Forging a prescription to obtain a dangerous drug, rather than renewing a prescription
through legal channels, is indicative of dependency. Prohibiting and monitoring Hunter’s
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consumption of both alcohol and drugs will help prevent him from “‘repeat[ing] the same
criminal conduct that gave rise to the sentence.’” Ashby, ¶ 14 (quoting State v. Ommundson,
1999 MT 16, ¶ 11, 293 Mont. 133, ¶ 11, 974 P.2d 620, ¶ 11). Consequently, we conclude a
sufficient nexus exists between Hunter’s offense and the alcohol-related conditions.
CONCLUSION
¶12 We hold the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the alcohol-related
conditions.
¶13 Affirmed.
/S/ JOHN WARNER
We Concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
/S/ JIM RICE
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