Marriage of Dauenhauer ( 2004 )

No. 02-749
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2004 MT 95N
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
STANLEY MICHAEL DAUENHAUER,
Petitioner and Respondent,
and
PATRICIA L. BERNHARDT
f/k/a PATRICIA L. DAUENHAUER,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DR-00-1052
Honorable Susan P. Watters, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Linda Harris; Harris Law Firm, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
James R. Graves, Ingrid Gustafson; Graves, Toennis & Gustafson,
Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 2, 2003
Decided: April 16, 2004
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent. It shall be filed as
a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title,
Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter Publishing Company and to
West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.
¶2 The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, dissolved the parties'
marriage and distributed their marital property. Patricia L. Bernhardt appeals. We affirm.
¶3 The issue is whether the District Court failed to value and, therefore, failed to
equitably distribute the marital estate.
¶4 Our standard of review of a district court's division of marital property is whether the
district court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether the court correctly applied
the law. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, if the
district court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if our review of the record
convinces us the district court made a mistake. Where substantial credible evidence supports
the court's findings and judgment, we will not alter the district court's decision unless there
is an abuse of discretion. The test for abuse of discretion in a dissolution proceeding is
whether the district court acted arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment
or exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. In re Marriage of
Herrera, 2004 MT 40, ¶ 18, 320 Mont. 71, ¶ 18, 85 P.3d 781, ¶ 18 (citation omitted).
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¶5 Patricia cites four cases for the principle that there can be no equitable distribution
of a marital estate until there is a determination of the value of the marital estate. See In re
Marriage of Dirnberger (1989), 237 Mont. 398, 773 P.2d 330; Cook v. Cook (1980), 188
Mont. 472, 614 P.2d 511; Schultz v. Schultz (1980), 188 Mont. 363, 613 P.2d 1022;
Hamilton v. Hamilton (1980), 186 Mont. 282, 607 P.2d 102. She points out that the District
Court did not set a net value of the marital estate, and contends the court thereby acted
arbitrarily.
¶6 An exact net worth finding is not required when the court considers and adequately
sets forth the relevant factors for division of property under § 40-4-202, MCA. In re
Marriage of Nordberg (1994), 265 Mont. 352, 360, 877 P.2d 987, 992 (citations omitted).
Here, the District Court carefully identified the parties' marital and pre-marital assets and
debts and then distributed the marital assets and debts between them. The marital estate is
essentially limited to personal property and credit card and other unsecured debt incurred by
the parties individually. Our review of the record convinces us the court divided the property
and debt equitably, apportioning the debt to give each party responsibility for debts he or she
incurred.
¶7 Affirmed.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
We concur:
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/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
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