Hillabrand v. McDougal Trust , 2004 MT 83N ( 2004 )


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  •                                            No. 02-475
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    
    2004 MT 83N
    MARY HILLABRAND,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    McDOUGAL BOTANICAL TRUST,
    M. MARGARET NIGRELLE, Trustee,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM:         District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District,
    In and For the County of Lake Cause No. DV 99-94,
    Honorable C. B. McNeil, Presiding Judge
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Edward A. Murphy, Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Lind, P.C.,
    Missoula, Montana
    For Respondent:
    Matthew H. O’Neill and John A. Mercer, Turnage, O’Neill & Mercer,
    PLLP, Polson, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: March 6, 2003
    Decided: April 6, 2004
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
    Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent but shall be filed as
    a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title,
    Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter Publishing Company and to
    West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.
    ¶2     Mary Hillabrand (Hillabrand) brought an action in the Twentieth Judicial District
    Court, Lake County, seeking specific performance of a buy-sell agreement she entered into
    with the McDougal Botanical Trust (the Trust) regarding a small ranch located in Lake
    County. On April 21, 2000, the District Court awarded summary judgment in favor of
    Hillabrand, finding that the buy-sell agreement was a valid, enforceable contract, which had
    been breached by the Trust, and ordered specific performance of the agreement. The District
    Court further ordered the Trust, within 30 days of the entry of the judgment, to deliver to the
    title company the balance of the purchase price under the contract, together with the closing
    costs, less the earnest money already deposited, and Hillabrand to deliver to the title
    company a warranty deed transferring merchantable title for the property to the Trust. The
    court awarded Hillabrand her reasonable costs and attorney fees.
    ¶3     The Trust subsequently appealed from the District Court’s order granting summary
    judgment. We affirmed the court’s order in Hillabrand v. McDougal Botanical Trust, 
    2001 MT 125N
    . Following remittitur, the Trust failed to comply with the order of specific
    performance, causing Hillabrand to seek entry of a money judgment. On October 10, 2001,
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    the District Court granted Hillabrand’s motion to convert the order into a money judgment
    against the Trust and ordered the property to be sold at a sheriff’s sale.
    ¶4     Prior to the date set for auction, however, Hillabrand located a buyer who was willing
    to purchase the property for the full judgment amount, approximately $1.2 million. With the
    consent of the Trust and the District Court, the sheriff’s sale was cancelled and a buy-sell
    agreement with the new purchaser was authorized. Despite the willingness of all the parties
    to consummate the transaction, the sale fell through when the purchaser was unable to secure
    conventional financing. Although Hillabrand and the purchaser thereafter negotiated a new
    sale of the property for $995,000, with Hillabrand financing the transaction on a contract for
    deed, the Trust opposed the arrangement and the buyer eventually became unwilling to
    proceed with the sale.
    ¶5     In order to determine whether the Trust had sufficient assets to satisfy a deficiency
    judgment following a sheriff’s sale, Hillabrand attempted, without success, to schedule an
    examination of the debtor. On March 1, 2002, the District Court ordered Margaret Nigrelle
    (Nigrelle), Trustee, to appear and answer questions regarding the property and assets of the
    Trust. However, Nigrelle failed to appear for examination, and Hillabrand brought a motion
    to hold Nigrelle in contempt of court. In its response to Hillabrand’s motion for contempt,
    the Trust advised that “the proper procedure at this point . . . is to sell the property either
    privately or through a sheriff’s sale, establish the deficiency if there is one and then perfect
    the judgment in Texas where the trust is located and exercise its collection remedies.”
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    ¶6     Acting on this representation, Hillabrand sold the property at a private sale for
    $995,000, and brought a motion in District Court for a determination of the deficiency. On
    May 15, 2002, the District Court awarded Hillabrand a deficiency judgment against the Trust
    in the amount of $197,177.52, with interest accruing at the rate of 10 percent per annum until
    satisfied. From this judgment, the Trust appeals. We affirm.
    ¶7     The only issue on appeal is as follows:
    ¶8     Did the District Court err in awarding a deficiency judgment against the Trust?
    ¶9     The Trust maintains that a deficiency judgment is proper only when following a
    sheriff’s sale. By selling the property at a private sale, the Trust argues that Hillabrand
    effected a forfeiture, and thereby relinquished her right to obtain a deficiency judgment. In
    support of its assertion, the Trust relies upon Aveco Properties, Inc. v. Nicholson (1987), 
    229 Mont. 417
    , 
    747 P.2d 1358
    , and cases cited therein. In response, Hillabrand challenges the
    Trust’s characterization of this case as a forfeiture matter, and argues that the issue is one of
    damages.
    ¶10    We agree that the Trust misapprehends this case as a forfeiture matter. The Trust has
    not demonstrated that it held any equitable interest in the property at issue at the time of the
    sale. Nor is this a situation in which Hillabrand elected her remedies pursuant to contract.
    Rather, Hillabrand merely acted upon the suggestion of the Trust to sell the property in
    question, and establish the deficiency.
    ¶11    We also conclude that the Trust’s reliance upon Aveco for the proposition that a
    deficiency judgment may be entered only when following a sheriff’s sale is misplaced.
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    Aveco involved foreclosure of the debtor’s interest in real property following default under
    a contract for deed. Relying upon our holding in SAS Partnership, Etc. v. Schafer (1982),
    
    200 Mont. 478
    , 
    653 P.2d 834
    , we concluded that the district court did not err in ordering the
    property to be sold upon the defendant’s failure to pay the remaining balance. 
    Aveco, 229 Mont. at 424
    , 747 P.2d at 1362. We further concluded that Aveco was entitled to receive a
    deficiency judgment in the event the sale of the property yielded an insufficient amount to
    satisfy the judgment. 
    Aveco, 229 Mont. at 425
    , 747 P.2d at 1363. In so concluding, we
    turned to our holding in Glacier Campground v. Wild Rivers, Inc. (1979), 
    182 Mont. 389
    ,
    
    597 P.2d 689
    , wherein we held that there is nothing inequitable about awarding a deficiency
    judgment on any unsatisfied amount after the sale of the land in controversy. 
    Aveco, 229 Mont. at 425
    , 747 P.2d at 1362-63. We did not hold, as the Trust contends, that a deficiency
    judgment was proper only when following a sheriff’s sale. Rather, we simply recognized
    that a deficiency judgment cannot be computed until after the property has been sold. 
    Aveco, 229 Mont. at 423
    , 747 P.2d at 1361.
    ¶12    In this case, the property sold at a private sale for $995,000, which the District Court
    concluded was commercially reasonable.            Ordinarily, we review a district court’s
    conclusions of law to determine whether those conclusions are correct. Yellowstone II Dev.
    Gr. v. First Amer. Title Co., 
    2001 MT 41
    , ¶ 34, 
    304 Mont. 223
    , ¶ 34, 
    20 P.3d 755
    , ¶ 34.
    However, in this case, the Trust does not take issue with the court’s conclusion that $995,000
    was a commercially reasonable sale price, nor does it provide any other authority in support
    of its contention that a sheriff’s sale must precede a deficiency judgment. Given our
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    holdings in Aveco and Glacier Campground, wherein we held that it is not inequitable to
    grant a deficiency judgment when the property at issue sells for less than the obligation
    owed, we cannot conclude that the District Court erred in awarding a deficiency judgment
    under these circumstances.
    ¶13   Affirmed.
    /S/ JIM RICE
    We concur:
    /S/ KARLA M. GRAY
    /S/ JAMES C. NELSON
    /S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
    /S/ JIM REGNIER
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