Ronald Saxon v. Phyllis Saxon ( 2012 )

January 3 2012
DA 11-0434
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2012 MT 2N
RONALD SAXON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
PHYLLIS SAXON,
Defendant and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Madison, Cause No. DV 2010-0087
Honorable Blair Jones, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Ronald Saxon (self-represented litigant); Bozeman, Montana
For Appellee:
Victor N. Bunitsky, Attorney at Law; Virginia City, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: December 14, 2011
Decided: January 3, 2012
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court Internal
Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and
does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included
in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and
Montana Reports.
¶2 In May, 2010, Ronald Saxon filed an action against his sister Phyllis Saxon in
Justice Court in Madison County, Montana, alleging that she had sold him a truck “that
wasn’t hers.” After a hearing the Justice Court entered judgment for Phyllis and in
October, 2010, Ronald appealed to the Fifth Judicial District Court. Phyllis moved for
summary judgment, supplying affidavits that demonstrated that Sandra Iverson was the
owner of the truck; that Ronald had contracted with Iverson to buy the truck; and that at
all pertinent times Ronald knew that his contract to buy the truck was with Iverson and
not with Phyllis. The District Court found that Ronald “utterly failed to address these
facts” and failed to meet his burden to respond to the motion for summary judgment by
showing that there were genuine issues of material fact. The District Court therefore
concluded that Phyllis was entitled to summary judgment.
¶3 Upon Phyllis’ motion the District Court also struck Ronald’s document filed in
opposition to summary judgment because of its reliance upon “redundant, immaterial and
impertinent matters, and the fact that his comments regarding Phyllis’ sexual orientation
were wholly inappropriate.” Further, the District Court applied the standard of Foy v.
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Anderson, 176 Mont. 507, 580 P.2d 114 (1978), to determine that Phyllis was entitled to
attorney fees for having to hire counsel to defend a frivolous lawsuit.
¶4 It is clear from the record that Phyllis submitted affidavits demonstrating that she
had no contract with Ronald regarding the truck, and that any contract was with Iverson.
It is also clear from the record that Ronald failed to produce any affidavits or admissible
evidence to show that there was any genuine dispute on the essential fact of the identity
of the contracting parties.
¶5 Our de novo review of the record demonstrates that the District Court applied the
proper legal standard in M. R. Civ. P. 56 and properly granted summary judgment to
Phyllis. It is manifest from the record that the District Court applied the proper standard
and did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Phyllis. We find no reason in
fact or law to disturb the District Court’s order.
¶6 Affirmed.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
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