State v. Robert C. Brown ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                                               January 17 2012
    DA 11-0214
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    2012 MT 5N
    STATE OF MONTANA,
    Plaintiff and Appellee,
    v.
    ROBERT CARL BROWN,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the Third Judicial District,
    In and For the County of Granite, Cause No. DC 10-08
    Honorable Ray Dayton, Presiding Judge
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Joslyn Hunt, Chief Appellate Defender; Lisa S. Korchinski, Assistant
    Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
    For Appellee:
    Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Tammy K Plubell, Assistant
    Attorney General, Helena, Montana
    Christopher Miller, Granite County Attorney, Philipsburg, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: December 21, 2011
    Decided: January 17, 2012
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
    Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
    serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
    Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
    Reports.
    ¶2     Robert Carl Brown appeals from the judgment and sentence entered by the Third
    Judicial District Court, Granite County, convicting Brown of the offense of misdemeanor
    criminal mischief, in violation of § 45-6-101(1)(a) and (3), MCA, upon his nolo
    contendere plea. Brown was charged for his role in damaging automobiles belonging to
    four persons, including cutting the tires on a vehicle belonging to Darell McDonald.
    Brown raises several issues regarding the restitution he was ordered to pay to McDonald
    by the District Court.
    ¶3     McDonald lives in Phillipsburg and had purchased four new tires for his truck
    from a tire dealer in Missoula shortly before the incident giving rise to the charge in this
    case. Due to medical problems necessitating out-of-town appointments for which he
    needed prompt repairs for his vehicle, and upon a deputy’s request that a damaged tire be
    taken apart by the Missoula tire dealer, McDonald made multiple trips to Missoula to
    coordinate replacement and repair of the tires. He requested restitution in the amount of
    $1,783.90, including tire damage and repair, travel costs, and $50 for a gratuitous reward
    he had paid to the citizen who called police upon observing Brown’s actions, leading to
    2
    Brown’s arrest.     McDonald received reimbursement from his insurance company,
    Allstate, in the amount of $1,041.90. The District Court concluded that, after crediting
    McDonald with the insurance reimbursement, he was entitled to further restitution in the
    amount of $547.50, including reimbursement of the $50 reward, which the District Court
    characterized as “iffy.”
    ¶4     Brown argues that McDonald was made whole by his insurance payment and that
    his request for additional restitution is an effort to collect twice for his damages. He
    argues that McDonald’s trips to Missoula were excessive, McDonald failed to mitigate
    his damages, the District Court misapprehended the number of tires that needed to be
    replaced, and that the $50 reward was voluntary and not caused by the accident, citing
    State v. Coluccio, 
    2009 MT 273
    , 
    352 Mont. 122
    , 
    214 P.3d 1282
    .
    ¶5     “The appropriate measure of restitution is a question of law, which we review for
    correctness.” State v. Johnson, 
    2011 MT 116
    , ¶ 13, 
    360 Mont. 443
    , 
    254 P.3d 578
    (citation omitted). “In reviewing a district court’s findings of fact as to the amount of
    restitution, our standard of review is whether those findings are clearly erroneous.”
    Johnson, ¶ 13 (citation omitted).
    ¶6     We agree with Brown that because the $50 reward was made gratuitously after
    Brown had been arrested, it was not caused by Brown’s criminal behavior and was
    improperly included in the restitution amount.       As to the remainder of Brown’s
    arguments, we have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)
    of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for noncitable memorandum opinions.
    3
    Having reviewed the briefs and the record on appeal, we conclude that the District
    Court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and the legal issues are
    controlled by settled Montana law, which the District Court correctly interpreted.
    ¶7    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of an amended
    judgment striking the $50 reward from the restitution obligation.
    /S/ JIM RICE
    We concur:
    /S/ MIKE McGRATH
    /S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
    /S/ PATRICIA COTTER
    /S/ JAMES C. NELSON
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-0214

Filed Date: 1/17/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014