Marriage of Erler ( 1994 )

NO. 93-087
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1993
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
KAREN PETERSON ERLER,
Petitioner/Respondent,
-v-
SCOTT ERLER,
Respondent/Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula,
The Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
P. Mars Scott, Mulroney, Delaney & Scott, Missoula,
Montana
For Respondent:
Darla Keck, Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Lind, Missoula,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 12, 1993
Decided: October 14, 1993
Filed:
Cl/erk
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a Fourth Judicial District Court,
Missoula County, opinion, determining that the court did not have
jurisdiction over the custody matters at issue. We affirm.
We restate the issues on appeal:
I . Did the District Court err in concluding that under the
Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) and the Montana
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (MUCCJA), it did not have
subject matter jurisdiction?
II. Did the District Court err by failing to conduct an
evidentiary hearing before it concluded that it did not have
subject matter jurisdiction?
III. Should this Court strike a provision in the April 26,
1985 order, stating that "visitation rights herein are subject to
the Respondent being concurrent in his child support obligations?"
BACKGROUND
The parties, Karen Peterson Erler (Karen) and Scott Erler
(Scott), were married on December 22, 1979. Two children, twin
sons, Thomas and Mark, were born of the marriage on October 5,
1981. The marriage was terminated in Missoula, Montana, on
September 7, 1984 with Karen granted sole custody of the children
and Scott ordered to pay $400 per month per child for child
support.
The parties have spent numerous days in court on a variety of
issues since their dissolution in 1984, notably for Scott's failure
to pay monthly child support, Karen's $6,500 share of the equity in
their home, and $4000 for Karen's attorney's fees. In an attempt
to persuade Scott to pay child support for Thomas and Mark, the
Court provided in its April 26, 1985 order that visitation would be
contingent upon Scott's payment of child support to Karen. This
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order also states that Scott consented to Karen's move to Seattle,
Washington with the two boys, to establish a permanent residence
there. A petition for modification of amended decree of
dissolution states that a major reason for moving was to avoid
encountering Scott.
In an order dated December 12, 1985, the paternal grandparents
were granted limited visitation with Thomas and Mark, with certain
restrictions. The District Court noted that "the request of the
grandparents is in part an attempt to circumvent the Court's
earlier Order regarding... the reintroduction of the children to
their father and the payment of support."
The latest matter to come before the trial court involved
Scott's motion to quash the writ of execution issued by the court
on his Keogh retirement plan for failure to pay on his dissolution
obligations. Also involved was Scott's motion for an order of
investigation and a report concerning custody arrangements, his
motion to modify custody and child support and finally, Karen's
motion to dismiss Scott's petition to modify custody due to lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
In its order, the trial court concluded that:
The Motion to Quash Writ of Execution is granted,
and
II.
The Motion to Dismiss Petition for Modification of
Custody for Lack of Jurisdiction is granted, and
III.
Having no jurisdiction to hear matters of custody,
the court takes no action on Respondent's Motion for
Investigation and Report Concerning Custody Arrangements
for the Children.
IV.
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Having no jurisdiction to hear matters of custody of
these children, the Court takes no action on Respondent's
Motion to Find Visitation Interference or Respondent's
Motion to Modify Child Support which was based on the
condition that he be granted custody.
The trial court stated that it did, however, retain
jurisdiction over child suvvort matters.
On December 18, 1992, the trial court denied Scott's combined
motion for a Rule 59(g) order to alter or amend, or in the
alternative, a Rule 60(b), order for relief of a judgment or order.
Scott's appeal of the court's denial brings this action before the
Montana Supreme Court.
Our standard of review is whether the lower court's
conclusions are correct. Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue
(1990) I 245 Mont. 470, 474, 803 P.2d 601, 603; In re Marriage of
Danelson (1992), 253 Mont. 310, 317, 833 P.2d 215, 220.
I. SUHJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court was
correct in concluding that it did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over child custody matters under the PKPA and/or the
MUCCJA. Scott argues that under the PKPA, "Montana must continue
as the jurisdictional forum to review all child care issues,
including custody," and that the PKPA supersedes the MUCCJA. Karen
counters that Scott is unable to meet the jurisdictional
requirements of the MUCCJA and also, the PKPA does not confer
subject matter jurisdiction in the instant case. We agree.
A. PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PROTECTION ACT (PKPA)
Scott argues that the PKPA supersedes the MUCCJA and "protects
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the rights of a custody state to exercise continuing jurisdiction
over child custody issues." However, Karen asserts that the PKPA
"was enacted by Congress so that there will be uniformity in
determining which states will have jurisdiction over child custody
proceedings when there is a conflict between two states attempting
to simultaneously assert jurisdiction." (Emphasis supplied.)
Since the PKPA has not previously been interpreted by this
Court, the entire statute is set forth at the end of this opinion.
' Additionally, we will briefly discuss the history and purposes
of the PKPA.
The PKPA was enacted by Congress in 1980 to address the
continuing problems of forum shopping and "child snatching." 28
USC 5 1738A; History: Ancillary Laws and Directives (a), page 228.
Because custody decisions were not thought to be final judgments,
State B would frequently fail to accord full faith and credit to a
decision from State A. Foster, Child Custody Jurisdiction: UCCJA
and PKPA, 27 NY L Sch L Rev 297, 297-298, (1981). This fact led to
a growing number of parents seizing their child or children, moving
to another jurisdiction, and bringing an action for custody in the
new jurisdiction to obtain a more favorable judgment. 27 NY L Sch
L Rev at 298. All too frequently, the end result was two
conflicting decisions from the two different jurisdictions.
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), which had
been adopted by most states to address interstate child custody
disputes, was found to be inadequate to address the problems of
forum shopping and "child snatching" because the UCCJA operated at
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the state level. Pettenati, The Effect of the Parental Kidnaping
Prevention Act of 1980 on Child Snatching, 17~2 New Eng 499, 506-
507, (1982). The individual states were unable to deal with
problems that were essentially interstate in nature. %7:2 New Eng
at 507. Additionally, the lack of perceived finality in child
custody issues continued to plague the state courts. 17~2 New Eng
at 506.
The PKPA established national standards under which
jurisdictions could determine whether they had jurisdiction and
what effect to give the decisions by courts of other jurisdictions.
The PKPA requires full faith and credit be accorded to decisions of
a jurisdiction if the court appropriately exercised jurisdiction
under the PKPA standards. 28 USC 5 1738A(a).
The statute's general purposes are to promote cooperation and
the exchange of information between state courts, facilitate the
enforcement of custody decisions of sister states and to discourage
continuing interstate controversies over child custody. 28 USC 5
1738A History; Ancillary Laws and Directives, page 228. These
purposes are achieved primarily through 28 USC § 1738A(d) which
provides as follows:
The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a
child custody determination consistently with the
provisions of this section continues as long as the
requirement of subsection (c)(l) of this section
continues to be met and such State remains the residence
of the child or of any contestant.
28 USC !j %738A(d) vests continuing jurisdiction in the
original state as long as the child or one of the contestants
continues to reside there. However, subsection (f) of 28 USC §
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173819 permits a court of a state to modify a determination of
custody of the same child or children made by another court if it
has jurisdiction to make such a custody decision and the court of
the other state no longer has jurisdiction or declines to exercise
its jurisdiction.
As to the issue of whether the PKPA confers subject matter
jurisdiction in the instant case, we conclude that it does not
because Montana is the only state involved in the custody issue at
this time. "The purpose of the PKPA is to prevent the issuance of
comnetinq decrees in sister states." Nielsen v. Nielsen (La.
1985), 472 So. 2d 133, 136. (Emphasis supplied.) See also:
Peterson v. Peterson (Me. 1983), 464 A.2d 202, 204. ("Both the
UCCJA and PKPA were enacted to prevent jurisdictional conflict and
competition over child custody....") (Emphasis added.) In the
instant case, there is no other state competing with Montana for
jurisdiction. Neither Karen nor Scott have sought to invoke the
jurisdictional powers of the Washington courts. Since the State of
Washington is not attempting to compete with the State of Montana
for jurisdiction in the matter of child custody, the PKPA is not
invoked. We conclude that the trial court correctly determined
that the PKPA does not apply in this case.
B. MONTANA UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT (MUCCJA)
Next, we must determine whether Montana has subject matter
jurisdiction over the child custody issues under the MUCCJA, which
is found at Chapter 7 of Title 40. Scott argues that "Section 40-
4-211, MCA, is also pertinent to this case." He contends that
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Montana was the home state of the children when the proceedings
were commenced and further, jurisdiction is established in Montana
because the petition for dissolution was filed in Missoula,
Montana. Karen states that Montana is unable to meet any of the
jurisdictional requirements of the MUCCJA and therefore, it does
not have jurisdiction in the instant case.
Section 40-7-104, MCA, states that "[t]he jurisdictional
provisions of 40-4-211 apply to this chapter." Section 40-4-211,
MCA, is the *'premier jurisdictional hurdle which must be overcome
before a district court may modify a child custody decree with
interstate implications." In re Marriage of Lance (1984), 213
Mont. 182, 188, 690 P.2d 979, 982, citing In re the Marriage of
Bolton (1984), 212 Mont. 212, 218, 690 P.Zd 401, 404. Section 40-
4-211, MCA, provides:
Child custo&y jurisdiction - commencement of proceedings.
(1) A court of this state competent to decide child
custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody
determination by initial or modification decree if:
(a) this state:
(i) is the home of the child at the time of
commencement of the proceedings: or
(ii) had been the child's home state within 6 months
before commencement of the proceeding and the child is
absent from this state because of his removal or
retention by a person claiming his custody or for other
reason and a parent or person acting as parent continues
to live in this state: or
(b) it is in the best interest of the child that a
court of this state assume jurisdiction because:
(i) the child and his parents or the child and at
least one contestant have a significant connection with
this state: and
(ii) there is available in this state substantial
evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships: or
(c) the child is physically present in this state
and:
(i) has been abandoned; or
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(ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect him
because he has been subjected to or threatened with
mistreatment or abuse or is neglected or dependent: or
Cd) (i.) no other state has jurisdiction under
prerequisites substantially in accordance with
subsections (l)(a), (l)(b), or (l)(c) of this section or
another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on
the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum
to determine custody of the child: and
(ii) it is in his best interest that the court
assume jurisdiction.
(2) Except under subsections (l)(c) and (l)(d) of
this section, physical presence in this state of the
child or of the child and one of the contestants is not
alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of
this state to make a child custody determination.
Section 40-4-211(1)(a), MCA, requires the trial court to
determine which state is the child's home state or his home state
within the past 6 months. "Home state" means "the state in which
the child, immediately preceding the time involved, lived with his
parents, [or] a parent... for at least 6 consecutive months...."
Section 40-7-103, MCA. In the instant case, Scott consented to
Karen's move to Washington with the boys in 1985. They have
consistently resided with her in the State of Washington since that
time with the exception of visitation with Scott and/or the
paternal grandparents. Washington is unquestionably the home
state, not Montana. Lance, 690 P.2d at 983. This determination
comports with one of the general purposes of the MUCCJA, which is
to:
(c) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a
child takes place ordinarily in the state with which the
child and his family have the closest connection and
where significant evidence concerning his care,
protection, training, and personal relationships is most
readily available and that courts of this state decline
the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his
family have a closer connection with another state....
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Section 40-7-102(1)(c), MCA. Section 40-4-211(1)(a), MCA, does not
apply to the instant case.
Under 5 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA, Montana has jurisdiction if the
child and his parents, or at least one contestant have a
significant connection with Montana a& substantial evidence is
available here concerning the children's present or future care,
training, and personal relationships. Mark and Tom have lived in
Washington for the greater majority of their lives. Scott has
significant connections with Montana but the boy's connection stems
from visitation with their father. Even if the boys had
significant connections with Montana, there must also be available
in the state substantial evidence concerning their "present or
future care, protection, training, and personal relationships.'*
Section 40-4-211(l)(b)(ii), MCA. In this case, Mark and Tom's
friends, classmates, teachers and physicians reside in Washington
where the boys have resided for the last 7 years. Again, under 5
40-7-102(1)(c), MCA, above, the requirements of subsection (l)(b)
of 5 40-4-211, MCA, simply cannot be met in this case.
Subsection (l)(c) of 5 40-4-211, MCA, requires that the child
be physically present in this state & have been abandoned or that
an emergency situation necessitates the child's protection under
subsection (l)(c). In this case, the children are not physically
present in Montana nor are there any allegations of abandonment,
mistreatment, abuse or neglect. Thus, the requirements of 5 40-4-
211 (1) (cl I MCA, cannot be met.
Under § 40-4-211(1)(d), MCA, this state may assume
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jurisdiction if no other state has jurisdiction under guidelines
comparable to those of subsections (l)(a), (b) and (c) or another
state has declined jurisdiction because this state is a more
appropriate forum and it is in the children's best interest that
this court assume jurisdiction. Since there has been no contact
with the courts in the State of Washington, it cannot be said that
Washington, the boys' home state, would not have jurisdiction nor
that it would decline jurisdiction. Neither can it be said that it
is in the best interest of the children for child custody to be
adjudicated in Montana. As stated earlier, the boys do not have a
significant connection with Montana nor would substantial evidence
be found in Montana regarding their present and future care and
training. Finally, the boys do not live in Montana, have not lived
here in years and there is no threat or emergency to necessitate
Montana's claim to jurisdiction. In conclusion, Montana cannot
claim jurisdiction over child custody matters in this case and the
trial court correctly concluded that Montana does not have subject
matter jurisdiction in this case.
II. EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Scott argues that under Pierce v. Pierce (1982), 197 Mont. 16,
640 P.2d 899, "when dealing with the children's best interests, an
evidentiary hearing is the only means of determining those best
interests as they relate to jurisdiction." However, Karen counters
that this issue is being raised for the first time on appeal and
therefore, should not be addressed. Scott does not discuss this
assertion in his reply brief; his silence and a review of the
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record reveal that this is, indeed, the first time this issue has
been raised. It is a settled rule in Montana that we will not
review an issue raised for the first time on appeal. In re
Marriage of Starks (1993), 50 St. Rep. 719, 722, _ Mont. __, 855
P.2d 527, 532. Therefore, we decline to address this issue.
III. MOTION TO STRIKE
Scott's final issue on appeal concerns his request to strike
a provision in the April 26, 1985 order, stating that "visitation
rights herein are subject to the Respondent being concurrent in his
child support obligations." However, Karen argues that Scott
should have appealed this issue within 30 days of the 1985
judgment. Alternatively, if the issue is before the Court, she
contends that although the trial court erroneously used the word
V'concurrent'V instead of current, the trial court's intention was to
require child support payment before the exercise of visitation.
Given Scott's continuing, flagrant abuse of his support obligations
we will address this issue.
At the outset, we note that visitation and child support are
not interdependent. State ex rel. Dewyea v. Knapp (1984), 208
Mont. 19, 22-23, 674 P.2d 1104, 1105-1106; State ex rel. Blakeslee
v. Horton (1986), 222 Mont. 351, 355, 722 P.2d 1148, 1150.
However, in this case, a review of the record reveals a clear
intention by the trial court to ensure that child support would be
current before visitation could be exercised based on Karen's
continuing child support problems and the parties' stipulation on
the record to that provision.
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Karen had previously reported to the trial court that she was
not being paid child support. In her Petition for Modification of
Amended Decree of Dissolution, and affidavit, both signed on
January 31, 1985, she contended that Scott was in arrears in the
amount of $2,800.00. In her February 5, 1985 Motion for Temporary
Order, she again stated "[t]hat Respondent is in arrears for months
July, 1984, until January, 1985 in the amount of $2,800.00." These
documents indicate that Karen was concerned about the child support
arrearages, and that she made the court aware of Scott's non-
compliance.
A simple reading of Finding of Fact 10 from the trial court's
order of April 26, 1985, makes it evident that the trial court
intended to require that the child support be current before Scott
exercised visitation. It states "[t]hat the visitation rights
herein are subiect the Respondent being concurrent [sic] in his
child support." (Emphasis added.) The visitation rights are
"subject to" the condition that the child support obligations be
met. That condition is an indisputable mandate, that child support
payments were to be current. The trial court made this requirement
a condition of Scott's exercise of visitation.
The following portion of the February 21, 1985 transcript
further clarifies this issue and provides as follows:
(By Mr. MacDonald): The visitation rights as set forth
herein are by stipulation subject to the Respondent being
concurrent in the child support obligations at the time
of the commencement of his child support obligations. I
realize, your Honor, that this is an unusual stipulation,
as some of these proceedings are, but I would remind the
court we have been through this. This is now our third
appearance in Court. No child support has been paid to
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date, and this agreement is being made by stipulation of
the parties in view of those circumstances.
THE COURT: I did't quite understand what you said about
visitation current in child support. You used --
MR. MacDONALD: Excuse me.
THE COURT: I would like you to repeat it.
MR. MacDONALD: All visitation rights of the Respondent
are conditioned upon his being current in the payment of
child support at the date he is exercising his
visitation. That is, if he is not current, through the
Clerk of Court, then the visitation will not take place.
. . .
MR. MacDONALD: Could the Court have both the parties
stipulate on the record that they find the agreement
acceptable?
THE COURT: Dr. Erler?
MR. ERLER: Acceptable.
THE COURT: And you?
MRS. ERLER: Yes.
It is apparent that Scott is using a minor mistake in an
otherwise clear order to avoid his child support obligations. His
position is untenable. A review of the record and a careful
reading of the trial court's order make it clear that child support
is not dependent upon the exercise of visitation, but that
visitation is conditioned upon child support payments being current
at the time of visitation. His argument, wholly unsupported by the
record, leads us to deny his request to strike that portion of the
trial court's order. In so doing, we stress, however, that the
facts and stipulation of the parties in this case are unique. This
case shall not hereafter be cited for the proposition that
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visitation is dependent upon child support being current: the two
are not interdependent.
AFFIRMED.
1. The PKPA provides as follows:
Full faith and credit given to child custody
determinations
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall
enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify
except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, any
child custody determination made consistently with the
provisions of this section by a court of another State.
(b) As used in this section, the term--
(1) sc:hild" means a person under the age of
eighteen:
(2) llcontestant" means a person, including a parent,
who claims a right to custody or visitation of a
child:
(3) "custody determination" means a judgment,
decree, or other order of a court providing for the
custody or visitation of a child, and includes
permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders
and modifications:
(4) "home State" means the State in which,
immediately preceding the time involved, the child
lived with his parents, a parent, or a person
acting as parent, for at least six consecutive
months, and in the case of a child less than six
months old, the State in which the child lived from
birth with any of such persons. Periods of
temporary absence of any of such persons are
counted as part of the six-month or other period:
(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody
determination which modifies, replaces, supersedes,
or otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior custody
determination concerning the same child, whether
made by the same court or not;
(6) "person acting as a parent" means a person,
other than a parent, who has physical custody of a
child and who has either been awarded custody by a
court or claims a right to custody:
(7) lqphysical custody" means actual possession and
control of a child: and
(8) "State" means a State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, or a territory or possession of the United
States.
(c) A child custody determination made by a court of a
State is consistent with the provisions of this section
15
only if--
(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of
such State: and
(2) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the
child on the date of the commencement of the
proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home
State within six months before the date of the
commencement of the proceeding and the child
is absent from such State because of his
removal or retention by a contestant or for
other reasons, and a contestant continues to
live in such State;
(B) (i) it appears that no other State would
have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A),
and (ii) it is in the best interest of
the child that a court of such State
assume jurisdiction because (I) the child
and his parents, or the child and at
least one contestant, have a significant
connection with such State other than
mere physical presence in such State, and
(II) there is available in such State
substantial evidence concerning the
child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal
relationships;
(C) the child is physically present in such
State and (i) the child has been abandoned, or
(ii) it is necessary in an emergency to
protect the child because he has been
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment
or abuse;
(U) (i) it appears that no other State would
have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A),
(W, CC), or (W, or another State has
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that the State whose jurisdiction
is in issue is the more appropriate forum
to determine the custody of the child,
and (ii) it is in the best interest of
the child that such court assume
jurisdiction: or
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction
pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.
(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made
a child custody determination consistently with the
provisions of this section continues as long as the
requirement of subsection (c)(l) of this section
continues to be met and such State remains the residence
of the child or of any contestant.
(e) Before a child custody determination is made,
reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be
given to the contestants, any parent whose parental
16
rights have not been previously terminated and any person
who has physical custody of a child.
(f) A court of a State may modify a determination of the
custody of the same child made by a court of another
State, if--
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child
custody determination: and
(2) the court of the other State no longer has
jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such
jurisdiction to modify such determination.
(g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in
any proceeding for a custody determination commenced
during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of another
State where such court of that other State is exercising
jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this
section to make a custody determination.
28 USA s 1738A.
We Concur:
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