Marriage of Wilson ( 1995 )

No. 94-550
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1995
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
KEREN WALES WILSON,
Petitioner and Respondent,
-v-
GARY V. WILSON
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula,
The Honorable John W. Larson, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
James T. Ranney, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Paulette C. Ferguson, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 6, 1995
Decided: August 21, 1995
Filed:
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Appellant, Gary Wilson (Gary), appeals the Fourth Judicial
District Court's amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
decree entered July 25, 1994, distributing the marital assets of
Gary and Keren Wilson (Keren).
We affirm.
Gary raises the following issue on appeal: Did the District
court erroneously divide the marital estate by failing to follow §
40-4-202, MCA?
Background Facts
Gary and Keren were married in Las Vegas, Nevada on March 3,
1987. On March 26, 1991, Keren petitioned the District Court for
the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County to dissolve her
marriage with Gary. Following a trial on March 29, 1994, the
District Court entered its initial decree and opinion. The
District Court finalized its opinion and order in its amended
findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree on July 25,
1994.
At the time of the dissolution, Gary was 51 and self-employed
in a television satellite business; Keren was 32 and self-employed
in a used bookstore. They had one child, Samuel, born during their
marriage. The premarital real property included the bookstore,
purchased by Keren from her mother in December, 1982, and the
Flathead Lake property bought with proceeds from the sale of land
given to Keren by her father. The purchase price of the bookstore
was $11,500, the down payment was $500, and the quarterly payments
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are $304.77. A realtor estimated the value of the bookstore as
$33,000, but a carpenter estimated that it needed as much as
$30,000 in repair. The District Court divided between Gary and
Keren the $20,000 appreciation in the value of the Flathead Lake
property.
The District Court found that the marital assets totaled
$93,490 and included two parcels of real property, a right-of-way,
and various household items including cars, boats, guns, and
equipment. The District Court found that the marital debts totaled
$X4,595.15. Accordingly, Keren received the right-of-way, half of
the appreciation in value of the Flathead Lake property, guns, and
most of the cars. Her assets minus debts totaled $42,072. Gary
received the remaining two parcels of real property in addition to
the guns, boats, equipment, Columbia mobile home, and Winnebego
trailer. His assets minus debts totaled $32,084. Additionally,
the District Court provided that if necessary, Keren could satisfy
Gary's portion of the appreciation in value of the Flathead Lake
property by transferring to him at least one-half of the right-of-
way. The District court used the property division as an
alternative to maintenance arrangements. Gary appeals the District
Court's division of property as stated in the July 25, 1995 decree.
Discussion
Gary raises the following issue on appeal: Did the District
Court erroneously divide the marital estate by failing to follow 5
40-4-202, MCA?
Gary claims that the District Court failed to follow § 40-4-
202, MCA, because 1) it did not give Gary credit for his
3
contributions to the bookstore; 2) it did not make findings as to
the validity of Gary's debts; 3) it ignored Gary's request for
Keren to return items of personal property; and 4) it assigned
personal property owned by third parties.
We review a district court's division of marital property to
determine if the district court's findings of fact are clearly
erroneous. In re the Marriage of Zander (1993), 262 Mont. 215,
221, 864 P.2d 1225, 1229. Thus, when substantial credible evidence
supports the trial court's findings and judgment, this Court will
not alter the trial court's decision unless there has been an abuse
of discretion. In re the Marriage of Maedje (1994), 263 Mont. 262,
265-66, 868 P.2d 580, 583 (citing In re the Marriage of Scoffield
(1993), 258 Mont. 337, 852 P.2d 664).
Section 40-4-202, MCA, governs the distribution of the marital
estate. This statute vests the district court with the broad
discretion to adopt any reasonable valuation of marital property
which is supported by the record and to apportion the marital
property in a manner which is equitable to each party under the
circumstances. In re the Marriage of Rada (1994), 263 Mont. 402,
405, 869 P.2d 254, 255-56; Maedie, 868 P.2d at 582. "An equitable
distribution is not necessarily an equal distribution." w, 869
P.2d at 255-56. Section 40-4-202, MCA, provides in pertinent part:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage,
legal separation, or division of property . the court
. . . shall . finally equitably apportion between the
parties the property and assets belonging to either or
both, however and whenever acquired and whether the title
thereto is in the name of the husband or wife or both .
. . In dividing property acquired prior to the marriage
. . . the court shall consider the contributions of the
other spouse to the marriage, including:
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(a) the nonmonetary contribution of a homemaker;
(b) the extent to which such contributions have
facilitated the maintenance of this property; and
(c) whether or not the property division serves as an
alternative to maintenance arrangements.
Gary maintains that this statute is an "all property" rule
mandating that all property, whether prior acquired or not, must be
considered as marital property. However, we have held that the
district court must first consider the contributions of the other
spouse, and only then may consider prior acquired property as part
of the marital property. In re the Marriage of Jorgensen (1979),
180 Mont. 294, 299, 590 P.2d 606, 610. "We have also held that, if
the contributions of the non-owning spouse have not facilitated the
maintenance of property brought into the marriage by the other
spouse, the district court may properly exclude that property from
the marital estate." In re the Marriage of Simms (1994), 264 Mont.
317, 328, 871 P.2d 899, 905-06.
1n the instant case, after hearing conflicting testimony
regarding Gary's contributions to the maintenance of the bookstore,
the District Court found that Keren owned the bookstore prior to
her marriage with Gary and thus determined it to be premarital
property. The trial court is in the best position to judge the
credibility of the witnesses. "We will not substitute our judgment
for that of the District Court even where there is evidence in the
record to support contrary findings." In re the Matter of the
Estate of Alcorn (19941, 263 Mont. 353, 360, 868 P.2d 629, 633.
Our review of the record shows substantial evidence to support the
District Court's findings.
Moreover, the District Court considered the statutory factor
5
of Keren's nonmonetary contributions, heard extensive testimony on
Gary's contributions to the maintenance of the bookstore, and
stated that the property division serves as an alternative to
maintenance arrangements. We conclude that the District Court did
not abuse its discretion in finding the bookstore to be premarital
property.
Gary next contends that there are three additional reasons to
remand the District Court's division of property: 1) the District
Court did not make findings as to the validity of Gary's debts; 2)
the District Court ignored Gary's personal property; and 3) the
District Court assigned property that belonged to third parties.
Each of Gary's contentions hinges on the District Court's
interpretation of conflicting testimony. Again, we have held that
the District Court is in the best position to determine the
credibility of the testimony. See Alcorn, 868 P.2d at 633; In re
the Marriage of Gerhart (199(J), 245 Mont. 279, 282, 800 P.2d 698,
700. We have held that the district court need not articulate each
factor of § 40-4-202, MCA, and that item by item findings are not
required in property division cases, as long as the findings are
sufficient to allow nonspeculative review by this Court. Gerhart,
800 P.2d at 700-01 (concluding "[o]ur ultimate test for adequacy of
findings of fact is whether they . . . provide a basis for decision
and whether they are supported by the evidence presented"); Larson
v. Larson (1982), 200 Mont. 134, 139, 649 P.2d 1351, 1354.
The District Court entered extensive findings of fact,
describing the premarital assets, describing the marital assets and
marital debts, totalling the assets and debts, and equitably
6
dividing the assets and debts. In fact, the District Court's final
division of property was similar to the division Gary suggested
when the District Court questioned him. At that time, Gary stated
that he wanted the right-of-way, the two parcels of real property,
the 1964 mobile home, half of the appreciation in value of the lake
property, and agreed to assume all of his debts. He agreed that
Keren could have the bookstore and its inventory, the lake
property, and an easement for a sign advertising the bookstore.
There is ample evidence to support the District Court's
division of the marital estate. The District Court carefully
established the value of the estate and divided equitably. We
therefore hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion
in dividing Keren and Gary's property.
AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court
1988 Internal Operating Rules, this decision shall not be cited as
precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public document
with the Clerk of this Court and by a report of its result to the
West Publishing Company.
We Concur:
August 2 1995
,l,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the
following named:
JAMES T. RANNBY, ESQ
Attorney at Law
515 Savings Center Bldg.
110 E. Broadway
Missoula, MT 59802
PAULETTE C. FERGUSON
Attorney at Law
210 N. Higgins, Suite 302
Missoula, MT 59802
ED S1 AITH
CLER K OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MONTANA
- ,