Walton v. Pankratz ( 1996 )

No. 95-573
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1996
EDMUND WALTON, LORETTA WALTON, PATRICK E. WALTON, PATTI
WALTON, STEPHEN WALTON, CONNIE WALTON, AND T. ED WALTON,
Petitioners and Appellants,
v.
WESLEY PANKRATZ, PORCUPINE GRAZING ASSOCIATION, INC.,
a Montana Corporation, MATTHEW W. KNIERIM, LAURA
CHRISTOFFERSEN, NICK PANKRATZ, and JOHN DOES l-10,
Respondents and Respondents,
and
WESLEY PANKRATZ and PORCUPINE GRAZING ASSOCIATION,
EDMUND WALTON, LORETTA WALTON, PATRICK E. WALTON, PATTI
WALTON, STEPHEN WALTON, CONNIE WALTON, and T. ED WALTON,
Defendants, Cross-Defendants, and Respondents,
and
EDMUND WALTON, LORETTA WALTON, PATRICK E. WALTON, PATTI
WALTON, STEPHEN WALTON, CONNIE WALTON, and T. ED WALTON,
Cross-Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
PORCUPINE GRAZING ASSOCIATION, INC., a Montana Corporation,
NICK PANKRATZ, PETER A. NYQUIST, NORTH BENCH RANCH, INC.,
a Montana Corporation, EAST FORK RANCH, INC., a Montana
Corporation, and WESLEY PANKRATZ, Individually and d/b/a
PORCUPINE LAND and LIVESTOCK,
Cross-Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial
District, In and for the County of Valley,
The Honorable John C. McKeon, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Arnie A. Hove, Attorney at Law,
Circle, Montana
For Respondents:
Robert Hurly, Attorney at Law,
Glasgow, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 8, 1996
Decided: October 8, 1996
Filed:
Cletk
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court
1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be
cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public
document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its
result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing
Company.
The appellants, Edmund Walton, et. al. (Waltons), filed a
petition for enforcement of a tribal court judgment and an
application for a preliminary injunction in the District Court of
the Seventeenth Judicial District in Valley County. The
respondents, Wesley Pankratz, et. al. (PPN) , challenged the
jurisdiction of the tribal court and asserted, as a counterclaim,
an ongoing agister's lien against Waltons' livestock. The parties
reached a settlement of the issues raised by Waltons' request for
injunctive relief. Waltons then (1) consented to a final
adjudication on the merits, (2) withdrew their efforts to enforce
the tribal court order, and (3) requested a trial in the District
Court of the issues raised by PPN's counterclaim. After a nonjury
trial, the District Court entered a judgment for PPN in the amount
of $92,614.18. Waltons appeal the judgment of the District Court.
We affirm the District Court.
The issues on appeal are:
1. Was there sufficient evidence to support the judgment of
the District Court?
2. Did the District Court err when it refused to admit a
videotape offered into evidence by Waltons, or when it granted
PPN's motion to quash a subpoena?
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In November 1993, the parties made an agreement pursuant to
which Waltons would transfer possession of a number of their
livestock to PPN to keep on pastures belonging to or under the
control of PPN. The agreement included the following provisions:
1. A lease of PPN's deeded lands for grazing by WALTONS
of their livestock at an agreed lease price of $10.00 per
animal unit month for adult animals, and 6/lOths thereof
for calves;
2. A provision that, upon reaching feeding arrangements,
PPN be paid going rates for feeder services;
3. A provision that PPN is to be paid on the 15th of
every month for services to date, and that they may be
paid in cattle of value equal to money owed, provided
said cattle are free and clear of prior liens.
On November 15, 1993, Waltons placed approximately 199 head of
livestock on PPN's grazing ranges. The livestock remained on PPN
ranges until January 18, 1994. Waltons were billed $3,980.00,
which they paid in full. However, after this initial successful
transaction, the parties' business relationship deteriorated and
resulted in this litigation.
On June 8, 1995, Waltons filed a petition for enforcement of
a tribal court judgment and an application for a preliminary
injunction in the District Court. They demanded the immediate
return of possession of their livestock. PPN filed an answer in
which it challenged the tribal court's jurisdiction, and asserted
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an agister's lien as a counterclaim. Prior to the conclusion of
the injunction hearing, the parties reached a settlement on the
issues raised by the request for an injunction.
Pursuant to that settlement, Waltons consented to a final
adjudication on the merits in the District Court and withdrew their
efforts to enforce the tribal court order. Further, they
stipulated on the record that, although the amount was disputed,
PPN had a valid agister's lien. The parties also stipulated that,
in addition to the witnesses and evidence that would be presented
at the trial, the District Court should admit and consider all of
the witness testimony given at the preliminary injunction hearing.
A nonjury trial was held on November 27-28, 1995. Both sides
presented a considerable amount of evidence and number of
witnesses. Waltons asserted that, despite their previous
stipulation on the record, PPN did not have a valid agister's lien
after May 2, 1995. They disputed whether PPN had, in fact, leased
bulls to service their livestock, and objected to PPN's
calculations of their monthly bills. They also contended that PPN
did not take proper care of their livestock, and that high numbers
of their livestock had been killed and stolen. The parties also
disagreed on the actual number of Waltons' livestock for which PPN
provided grazing and wintering services.
After the trial, the District Court entered its findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and order of judgment, from which Waltons
now appeal. The District Court determined that PPN had (1) leased
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bulls to service W&tons' cows; (2) kept, pastured, herded, and fed
WaltoIls ' livestock during various periods of time between
January 24, 1994, and September 13, 1995; and (3) provided services
for seven of Waltons' horses. Based on its findings, the District
Court entered a judgment for PPN in the amount of $92,614.18. The
District Court also issued the following orders: PPN has a valid
agister's lien; PPN is entitled to the immediate return of 292
cows, 48 heifers, and 213 calves based on their agister's lien; and
that the judgment is to be enforced by sale, as set forth in the
statutory provisions regarding agister's liens.
The District Court subsequently issued a supplemental order.
Waltons filed a premature appeal, and this Court remanded the case
to the District Court for "the sole purpose of entering any further
orders and judgments as might be necessary to finally resolve all
issues in this cause." The District Court then issued its final
order and awarded PPN the costs of gathering and caring for
Waltons' livestock after the judgment.
ISSUE 1
Was there sufficient evidence to support the judgment of the
District Court?
When we review a district court's findings of fact, the
standard of review is whether those findings are clearly erroneous.
Inlersrale Prod Credit Ass’n v. DeSaye (1991) , 250 Mont. 320, 322, 820 P.2d
1285, 1287.
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on appeal, Waltons submitted a fifty-page brief, and no less
than forty of those pages are dedicated to a review of the facts.
Waltons point out alleged inconsistencies and contradictions in
PPN's evidence and testimony, and claim that the District Court
improperly relied on that evidence and testimony. They dispute
almost every finding of fact made by the District court.
Specifically, they dispute the District Court's findings with
regard to the following issues: the actual number of livestock for
which PPN provided services; the calculations of their monthly
bills; the level of care PPN exercised with regard to their
livestock; whether PPN, in fact, leased bulls to serve their
livestock; and the existence of PPN's agister's lien. They contend
that the District Court's judgment and findings are not supported
by "substantial largely uncontradicted evidence," and that the
District Court did not give their evidence and testimony the same
weight and credibility that it gave to PPN's.
Ultimately, Waltons' brief does nothing more than ask this
Court to review the facts of the case and decide that the District
Court erred in its resolution of the factual issues. That is not
our role. "It is axiomatic that it is the function of the district
court, and not of [the Supreme] Court to hear the testimony, to
resolve conflicts in the evidence, to judge the credibility of the
witnesses and to determine the facts." Warnack v. Coneen Family Trust
(1994), 266 Mont. 203, 208, 879 P.2d 715, 719. Furthermore, 'I [wle
will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court when
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the issue relates to the credibility of the witnesses or the weight
given to certain evidence." Wunderlich v. Lumbermens Mut. Cm. Co. ( 19 9s ) ,
270 Mont. 404, 408, 892 P.2d 563, 566. Nor will we substitute our
judgment for that of the District Court "even where there is
evidence in the record to support contrary findings." In re Alcorn
(1994), 263 Mont. 353, 360, 868 P.2d 629, 633.
Our review of the facts, therefore, is necessarily limited,
and we are, in this case, unwilling to substitute our judgment for
that of the District Court. This case was driven by its facts; the
District Court was forced to resolve a myriad of complicated
factual disputes, including, most notably, the actual number of
Waltons' livestock for which PPN provided services. Despite the
alleged inconsistencies and contradictions in PPN's testimony and
evidence, all of the District Court's findings of fact are
supported by the record. Even though evidence is controverted, its
weight is for the District Court to determine. After a review of
the record, we conclude that there was substantial and credible
evidence to support the District Court's findings, and that they
are not clearly erroneous.
ISSUE 2
Did the District Court err when it refused to admit a
videotape offered into evidence by Waltons, or when it granted
PPN's motion to quash a subpoena?
When we review a district court's evidentiary or discretionary
ruling, the standard of review is whether the district court abused
8
its discretion. Hislopv. Cody (1993), 261 Mont. 243, 247, 862 P.2d
388, 390; MontanaRailLinkv.Byard (1993), 260 Mont. 331, 337, 860 P.2d
121, 125. The test for abuse of discretion is "whether the trial
court acted arbitrarily without employment of conscientious
judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in substantial
injustice." Tanner V. Dream Island, Inc. (19961, 275 Mont. 414, 430, 913
P.2d 641, 651. Additionally, we note that questions relating to
the admissibility of evidence are "left to the sound discretion of
the trial court, subject to review only in the case of manifest
abuse." Masonv.Di~zel (1992), 255 Mont. 364, 370-71, 842 P.2d 707,
712.
Waltons claim that the District Court erred when it refused to
admit a videotape into evidence. The videotape, they allege, would
have provided the District Court with additional information
regarding the condition of their livestock.
The District Court refused to admit the videotape for the
following reasons: (1) the videotape was not offered in accordance
with the rules of evidence; and (2) Waltons had already exceeded
the stringent time deadline the District Court had established for
the presentation of evidence. We conclude that the District Court
did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the videotape offered
by Waltons.
Waltons also claim that the District Court erred when it
granted PPN's motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum served on the
Glasgow Stockyard Company. They allege that the subpoenaed witness
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and accompanying documents would have provided the District Court
with additional information regarding the actual number of
livestock for which PPN provided services, and would have supported
the allegations regarding theft of their livestock.
The District Court granted PPN's motion to quash the subpoena
for the following reasons: (1) compliance with the subpoena would
have required a considerable amount of time and effort, and Waltons
provided Glasgow Stockyard with only thirteen days notice; and
(2) the requirements of the subpoena were too broad for Glasgow
Stockyard to be able to effectively comply with its terms. We
conclude that, for the reasons set forth in the District Court's
order, it did not abuse its discretion when it quashed Waltons'
subpoena duces tecum.
Finally, we note that, in their appeal, Waltons raise four
issues in addition to the two we have already addressed. These
four issues were not raised in the District Court, and therefore,
will not be considered for the first time on appeal.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
ust c'e
We concur:
"Chief Justice
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Justices "' /
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