Schreckendgust v. Florence Baptist ( 1997 )

No. 96-325
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1997
CLYDE SCHRECKENDGUST, JR.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
FLORENCE BAPTIST CHURCH, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Ravalli,
The Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Dirk A. Williams; Church, Harris, Johnson &
Williams, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
David Rodli; David Rodli Law Offices, Missoula,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 16, 1997
Decided: January 30, 1997
Filed:
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3 (c), Montana Supreme Court
1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be
cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public
document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its
result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing
Company.
Clyde Schreckendgust, Jr. (Clyde) appeals from the judgment
entered by the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli
County, on its order granting the motion for summary judgment filed
by Florence Baptist Church, Inc. (Church). We reverse and remand.
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the District Court
erred in determining that the Church met its initial burden of
establishing that no genuine issue of material fact existed with
regard to its compliance with the use restriction in the 1977
warranty deed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1975, Ken Cox founded the Church known then as the Florence
Bible Church, and held worship services in the basement of his
home. In April of that year, Clyde conveyed a one-acre parcel of
land (Parcel A) in the Florence Orchard Homes subdivision, Ravalli
County, to the Church via a special warranty deed which limited the
use of Parcel A to noncommercial church purposes. One year later,
Clyde conveyed another one-acre parcel of land (Parcel B) in the
same subdivision to the Church via a warranty deed devoid of
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limitation. The Church opened a school, known as the Florence
Christian Academy, and began holding academic classes in 1976. The
Church subsequently built a sanctuary and school building on
Parcels A and B. The ownership and use of Parcels A and B under
the deeds to those parcels are not at issue in this case.
In 1977, the Church offered to purchase thirteen acres of land
(the 13-acre parcel) adjacent to Parcels A and B from Clyde. At
that time, the Church was conducting a five-day per week, Christian
school with approximately 140 students from kindergarten through
twelfth grade (K-12) on Parcels A and B. The Church wanted to
build a larger church sanctuary and an athletic field on the 13-
acre parcel and convert its existing church facility into an
extension of the school building on Parcels A and B.
Clyde declined the Church's offer to purchase the land.
Later, however, he conveyed the 13-acre parcel to the Church and
the Florence Christian Academy via a warranty deed (1977 warranty
deed) which described the real property as follows:
Lots Thi .rty (30), Thirty-one (31) and Thirty-two (32),
Florence Orchard Homes, a platted subdivision of Ravalli
County, Montana, LESS Parcel A and Parcel B located in
said Lot 30, Certificate of Survey No. 836 which were
previously conveyed; so long as said lands are used for
school and Christian church pUrpOSeS, that is
Fundamental, Bible believing, meeting the adademic [sic]
requirements of Christian Education; grades K-12 and
beyond, [sic] If this discontinues the property conveyed
shall revert back to original owner or assigners [sic].
[Emphasis added.]
As noted above, Parcels A and B had already been conveyed to the
Church. The first portion of the quoted limitation in the 1977
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warranty deed is referred to below as the use restriction; the
second portion as the reversionary clause.
The Church held academic classes at its school located on
Parcels A and B through the 1985-1986 school year. Enrollment was
l:.mited, however, in large part because many parents could not pay
the tuition being charged. During the 1987-1988 and 1988-89
academic years, only kindergarten and first grade students were
enrolled at the Church's school on Parcels A and B. During the
1989-1990 academic year, only kindergarten through third grade
students were enrolled at the school.
After the 1989-1990 school year, the Church continued to offer
a four-day per week, kindergarten class taught by a state-certified
elementary teacher at its school on Parcels A and B. In 1991,
C:.yde met with Gary Randall (Randall), the Church's pastor at the
time, to discuss the language of the 1977 warranty deed and the
Church's intentions regarding its school. Randall stated in his
a:ifidavit that he "expressed the church's continuing intent to have
a school in operation on the property." In August of 1991, the
Church began the Florence Baptist Bible Institute, a post-secondary
education program, which--with the exception of one semester in
1!>94--has been conducting classes since that time.
After his 1991 meeting with Randall, Clyde apparently did not
contact the Church until July 5, 1994, when he advised Randall that
he would begin "foreclosure" proceedings on the 13-acre parcel
unless the Church was operating a traditional on-premises K-12
school by the end of August, 1994. The Church did not comply with
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Clyde's demand by the deadline. It did, however, found the
Florence Christian Academy Home School Association (FCABSA),
apparently in 1994, and applied for membership in the Accelerated
Christian Education program in late July of 1994; its membership
application was approved in January of 1995. The Church
administers the FCABSA, supervising families who belong to the
FCABSA and who "home school" their children. It also provides
those families with access to the school building and numerous
resources, materials, curricula, guidance and certification. At
the conclusion of each academic quarter, an award ceremony is held
at the school for FCAHSA students; graduates of the FCAHSA receive
a diploma from the Florence Christian Academy. Since its
inception, the Church has held traditional worship services, Sunday
school classes, adult Bible studies and teen group activities.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Clyde filed an action against the Church on November 1, 1994,
seeking to quiet title to the 13-acre parcel in his name on the
basis that the Church failed to comply with the use restriction
contained in the 1977 warranty deed. He also sought to have the
Church ejected from the 13-acre parcel based on its refusal to
comply with his demand to vacate.
The Church responded that, although it did not "currently
regularly conduct on-premises private elementary and secondary
school classes during weekdays," it was in compliance with the use
restriction contained in the 1977 warranty deed. In addition,
while the Church admitted that it had refused Clyde's demand to
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vacate the 13-acre parcel, it alleged that its refusal was proper.
Finally, the Church pled the affirmative defenses of accord and
satisfaction, estoppel, and the statute of limitations.
The Church subsequently moved for summary judgment on the
basis that no genuine issues of material fact existed regarding its
compliance with the clear and unambiguous restriction requiring use
for "school and Christian church purposes" which was contained in
the 1977 warranty deed. The Church also contended that the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibited the District
Court from interpreting church doctrine and religious terminology
in order to resolve any ambiguity regarding additional terms in the
use restriction. In addition, the Church argued that the 1977
warranty deed was orally modified in 1991 when Clyde gave the
Church five years in which to be operating an on-premises K-12
school. Finally, the Church maintained that Clyde's attempt to
quiet title to the 13-acre parcel via exercise of the reversionary
clause was barred by lathes.
Clyde filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, contending
that his quiet title action was purely a contract action without
First Amendment implications. He asserted entitlement to judgment
as a matter of law on the basis that the plain language of the use
restriction contained in the 1977 warranty deed required the Church
to maintain an on-premises K-12 academic school and that no genuine
issue of material fact existed regarding the Church's failure to
comply. Alternatively, he maintained that the parties' intent,
custom and usage for at least fourteen years was that the Church
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must ttoperatel' an on-premises K-12 academic school in order to
comply with the use restriction.
The District Court granted the Church's motion for summary
judgment and denied Clyde's cross-motion. Among other things, it
determined that the Church had established the absence of any
genuine issues of material fact regarding its compliance with the
use restriction contained in the 1977 warranty deed and that Clyde
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact in that regard.
The District Court subsequently entered judgment in favor of the
Church.
Thereafter, Clyde filed a motion to alter or amend judgment
which was deemed denied by operation of law. Clyde appealed.
DISCUSSION
Did the District Court err in determining that the Church
met its initial burden of establishing that no genuine
issue of material fact existed with regard to its
compliance with the use restriction in the 1977 warranty
deed?
Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issues of materia
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. We review a district court's grant
or denial of a motion for summary judgment de nova, applying the
same Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., criteria used by that court. Carelli
v. Hall (Mont. 1996), 926 P.2d 756, 759, 53 St.Rep. 1116, 1117
(citation omitted). The moving party has the initial burden of
establishing the absence of genuine issues of material fact and
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Carelli, 926 P.2d at
759 (citation omitted). Only where the moving party satisfies its
initial burden does the burden shift to the party opposing summary
judgment to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material
fact. Carelli, 926 P.2d at 759-60 (citation omitted).
The arguments made by Clyde and the Church to both the
District Court and this Court refer interchangeably, and often in
the aggregate, to Parcels A and B and the 13-acre parcel, often
simply referring to activities on "the property." They also
apparently assume that the Church's activities on Parcels A and B
constitute activities on the 13-acre parcel to which the use
restriction and reversionary clause at issue apply and that, if
such activities meet the use restriction, those activities would
defeat both Clyde's exercise of the reversionary right and his
attempt to quiet title to the 13-acre parcel. It is not clear why
the parties proceeded in this manner. In any event, however, the
District Court joined in this confusion by failing to carefully
describe whether certain activities are taking place on Parcels A
and B or on the 13-acre parcel; indeed, it appears that the court
followed the parties' lead in grouping all the property together
and assuming that any church activities anywhere on "the property"
related to the 13-acre parcel, the use restriction and the
reversionary clause.
The problem is that the record before us does not establish
any activity at all by the Church on the 13-acre parcel. Clyde
argues in his opening brief on appeal that, regardless of the
correct interpretation of the use restriction relating to school
purposes, the record does not support any church use of the 13-acre
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parcel for any--even tangential--school purpose. The Church
responds that Ken Cox's July 21, 1995, affidavit establishes that
the 13-acre parcel "is used--as it has been since 1977 when the
land was donated by Clyde--as an athletic field."
Ken Cox's affidavit states:
5) Upon the initial two acres [Parcels A and B] was
situated the church and school. It was the desire of the
church board to purchase from Mr. Schreckendgust the
adjacent 13 acres in order to build a larger church
sanctuary and an athletic field, converting the existing
church building on the initial two acres into an
extension of the already established school. The church
board desired nothing more than to expand the ministry
already started.
6) Approximately in May, 1977, the church elders of
Florence Bible Church, including Affiant, invited Mr.
Schreckendgust to the church to show him a three-
dimensional model of the proposed expansion project which
would include a large church sanctuary and an athletic
field for the 13 adjacent acres owned by Mr.
Schreckendgust. No other buildings or representations
were made on the three-dimensional model. No school
buildings were shown on the model or proposed verbally or
otherwise for the 13 acres.
While the affidavit reflects the Church's desires and intent
regarding use of the 13-acre parcel, it clearly does not establish
either the existence or the use of an athletic field on the 13-acre
parcel after Clyde deeded it to the Church.
Nor does any other affidavit or exhibit establish that the
Church ever made use of the 13-acre parcel. The affidavit of Mark
Davis, the Church's senior pastor from October of 1987 through
September of 1989, talks about a gentleman using "the bus barn and
parsonage" for his own personal use. However, the affidavit does
not state on which parcel the bus barn and parsonage were located.
The Church's brief supporting its summary judgment motion in the
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District Court discusses improvements, such as a septic system and
drain field, and renovations on "the property." Again, the brief
does not establish that the referenced improvements and renovations
were on the 13-acre parcel. In January of 1987, the Church's
attorney wrote a letter to Clyde, exploring the possibility of
purchasing the "unconditional conveyance of the lands in Lots 30,
31 and 32 which have previously been the subject of the conditional
conveyance." He refers, in that letter, to substantial
improvements placed on the land, but does not elaborate.
The Church contends that Clyde conceded, for summary judgment
purposes, that the Church and the full-time, on-premises K-12
school the Church earlier had been conducting were Christian,
"Fundamental and Bible believing" and that the school met the
academic requirements of Christian education. It also contends
that he conceded that the kindergarten and the home school
education classes offered by the Church are Christian, Fundamental,
Bible believing and meet the academic requirements of kindergarten
and home school education, respectively. While that may be true,
those concessions do not establish that the kindergarten classes,
the home school administration or the home school awards ceremonies
were conducted on the 13-acre parcel. Indeed, the record strongly
suggests that all of those activities take place in the Church
buildings located on Parcels A and B.
Before the Church can establish the absence of genuine issues
of material fact regarding its compliance with the use restriction
in the 1977 warranty deed, it must establish--at a minimum--that it
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makes use of the 13-acre parcel for church and school purposes. It
has not done so. We hold that the District Court erred in
determining otherwise and, for that reason, also erred in granting
summary judgment to the Church. The court having erred on this
threshold question, we do not address the legal analysis it
applied, or the conclusion it reached, with regard to whether the
use restriction in the 1977 warranty deed is ambiguous; those
portions of the District Court's opinion and order on summary
judgment are vacated pending further consideration, as may be
appropriate, on remand.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
We concur:
Justices /
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