Severns v. Csed ( 1997 )

..,
No. 96-4~6 & 96-447
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1996
DAVID SEVERNS,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND
REHABILITATION SERVICES,
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
DIVISION,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula,
The Honorable John W. Larson, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
John M. McRae, Special Assistant Attorney General,
Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Christopher Daly, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 14, 1996
Decided: January 2, 1997
Filed:
C erk
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court
1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be
cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public
document with the Clerk of this Court and by a report of its result
to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing Company.
The Child Support Enforcement Division of the Montana
Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (CSED) appeals the
decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County,
requiring the CSED to comply with an earlier order of the District
Court which the CSED failed to appeal~
We affirm.
David Severns (Severns) is the father of two children born of
two separate relationships. The CSED calculated Severns' child
support obligation for each child, but Severns took issue with the
manner in which those obligations were calculated. In determining
Severns' support obligation for his second child, the CSED deducted
his existing support obligation for his first child from his
available monthly income. It then used his remaining available
monthly income as the basis for calculating the support due to his
second child.
Severns contended that this method of calculation in effect
penalized him for having two children by two different mothers. He
contended that the child support should have been calculated by
determining the obligation for two children, deducting that amount
from his available income, and then dividing the figure by two. He
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appealed the CSED's method of calculation because he claimed it
impermissibly resulted in a higher child support obligation than
would have resulted if the CSED had used the method he suggested.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) affirmed the CSED' s
determination and Severns appealed to the District Court.
By an order dated February 28,' 1995, the District Court
determined that the method employed by the CSED was in compliance
with the child support guidelines. Nevertheless, the District
Court concluded that application of this method of calculation in
this case was an error of law because it failed to take into
adequate consideration Severns' obligation to support two children
by two different mothers. It therefore concluded that the CSED's
method of calculation was "unreasonable and arbitrary" and remanded
the matter for recalculation of Severns' support obligation. The
CSED did not appeal this 1995 order of the District Court.
On remand, the CSED refused to use a different method of
calculation other than that which it felt was mandated by the child
support guidelines. It therefore re-figured Severns' support
obligation using the same method of calculation it had employed
before and, not surprisingly, reached the same result. Severns
again appealed; the ALJ again affirmed; and Severns again appealed
to the District Court. By an order dated April 29, 1996, the
District Court informed the CSED and the ALJ that this was not the
result mandated by the 1995 order, and remanded again with
instructions that the CSED fully comply with the 1995 order. The
CSED now appeals.
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On appeal, the CSED addresses the propriety of the 1995 order,
which it contends was erroneous and exceeded the District Court's
authority. In response, Severns points out that the 1995 order was
an appealable one, but that the CSED did not appeal it. In the
absence of an appeal, Severns contends that, correct or incorrect,
that order became the law of this case.
The doctrine of "the law of the case" refers to
the principle that if an appellate court has passed on a
legal question and remanded the cause to the court for
further proceedings, the legal question thus determined
by the appellate court will not be differently determined
on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts
remain the same.
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) 886-887 (citations omitted);
see also Fiscus v. Beartooth Electric Cooperative, Inc. (1979), 180
Mont. 434, 436, 591 P.2d 196, 197. The law of the case means that
once an issue has been finally decided, whether rightly or wrongly,
it cannot again be relitigated. State v. Black (1990), 245 Mont.
39, 44, 798 P.2d 530, 533 (citing State v. Zimmerman (1977), 175
Mont. 179, 185, 573 P.2d 174, 177). The principle of the law of
the case promotes judicial economy and serves the need for finality
of judgments; it also stands for the proposition that there must be
an end to litigation at some point. Black, 798 P.2d at 533 (citing
Statev. Perry (1988), 232 Mont. 455, 463-64, 758 P.2d 268, 273-
74) .
The doctrine of the law of the case has most often been
applied in Supreme Court decisions. See, for example, Haines
Pipeline Construction v. Montana Power Co. (1994), 265 Mont. 282,
876 P.2d 632; In re Marriage of Becker (1992), 255 Mont. 357, 842
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P.2d 332; Zimmerman, 573 P.2d 174. But we have also held that the
law of the case is equally applicable to prior rulings of a trial
court in the same case. State v. Carden (1976), 170 Mont. 437,
439, 555 P.2d 738, 739 (citations omitted). Such is the situation
in the case at bar. The CSED was presented with an appealable
order which it chose not to appeal. In the absence of an appeal,
that order became the law of this case.
The CSED, however, argues that the law of the case doctrine
should not apply because the 1995 order of the District Court was
open to interpretation. It claims that it believed the order only
mandated that it reevaluate the fairness of the method used, not
that it employ a different method entirely. Since the order could
be interpreted two ways, the CSED argues that the order was
ambiguous and, therefore, cannot constitute the law of the case.
We have reviewed the order in question and can discover no
ambiguity. The District Court stated:
[w]hile it is true that CSED subtracts from his gross
income the amount [Severns] pays in child support for his
other child, in setting the child support obligation for
each child, CSED acts as if he has only one child. This
method of calculation is not reflective of [Severns']
individual situation. In determining his support
obligation, the agency cannot legally ignore the fact
that he has two, not one child to support by calculating
each of his two obligations as if he only had one.
Therefore. the Court remands the case to the agency for
a recalculation of [Severns'] child support obligation,
taking into consideration the fact, as required by § 40-
4-208, MCA, and § 40-6-216(5), MCA, that he is obliged to
support not one, but two children.
(Emphasis added.) This order clearly does not contemplate a
recalculation using the same methodology the District Court
concluded was, in this case, erroneous. Rather, it mandates a
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recalculation using another, more equitable formula. The order in
question set out the law as determined by the District Court.
Since the CSED did not appeal that judicial determination, the 1995
order of the District Court was and is the law of this case.
It is not the function of the CSED to determine whether the
pronouncements of the District Court are correct or not; that is
the function of this Court. If the CSED is presented with a
decision with which it disagrees, it may choose to follow it or it
may choose to appeal it. It may not, however, choose to ignore it.
Affirmed.
~/ Justice
We concur,?/
~ /4'·~7:~
Chief Justice
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Justices
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