Goodover v. Oblander , 2017 MT 130N ( 2017 )

05/30/2017
DA 16-0726
Case Number: DA 16-0726
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2017 MT 130N
PAT M. GOODOVER, II,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
STEPHANIE OBLANDER; SMITH OBLANDER PC,
SMITH OBLANDER & MORA PC,
Defendants and Appellees.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. ADV-16-279
Honorable Gregory G. Pinski, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Pat M. Goodover, II (Self-Represented), Great Falls, Montana
For Appellees:
Steven J. Fitzpatrick, Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry & Hoven, P.C.,
Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 3, 2017
Decided: May 30 2017
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Michael E Wheat delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Beginning in 2012, Smith Oblander represented Robert Hopkins in a law suit against
Pat Goodover and Goodover’s Great Falls property management/real estate business. The
suit arose from a home foreclosure proceeding against Hopkins. Hopkins alleged that after
he was evicted from his home, Goodover converted and allowed others to convert Hopkins’
personal property that remained in the home. The Hopkins’ suit was litigated for
approximately three years before the parties settled in December 2015.
¶3 In March 2016, Goodover initiated this action against Smith Oblander alleging
multiple acts of misconduct in the Hopkins’ litigation, including actual and constructive
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, actual malice, abuse of process, and malicious
prosecution. Smith Oblander moved to dismiss under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and
Goodover objected. On July 11, 2016, after receiving materials outside of the record from
both parties, the Eighth Judicial District Court converted the motion to dismiss to a motion
for summary judgment under M. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Goodover promptly filed a
M. R. Civ. P. 56(f) motion seeking additional time to respond to the court’s Rule 12(d)
order and attaching his affidavit and several discovery requests. Smith Oblander opposed
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Goodover’s motion arguing, in part, that Goodover failed to establish how the discovery
could preclude summary judgment or was material to the motion for summary judgment.
¶4 While Goodover’s Rule 56 motion was pending, Smith Oblander moved to file the
Hopkins’ settlement agreement under seal with the District Court. Goodover objected but
the court granted Smith Oblander’s motion and the agreement was filed with the court.
After reviewing the legal elements of Goodover’s various claims, the District Court granted
summary judgment in favor of Smith Oblander and denied Goodover’s Rule 56 motion.
Goodover appeals.
¶5 We review a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo using the
same standards applied by the district court under M. R. Civ. P. 56. Swanson v. Consumer
Direct, 2017 MT 57, ¶ 12, 387 Mont. 37, 391 P.3d 79. We review a district court’s rulings
regarding discovery and the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. City of
Missoula v. Mt. Water Co., 2016 MT 183, ¶ 18, 384 Mont. 193, 378 P.3d 1113 (citations
omitted).
¶6 Goodover argues on appeal that the District Court erred in granting summary
judgment and in allowing the Hopkins’ settlement agreement to be filed with the court. He
further claims that the District Court erred in deciding “the facts and circumstances of the
case” and the merits of his claims of actual fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and actual
malice.
¶7 The District Court’s detailed order in this case set forth the necessary elements of
Goodover’s claims for actual and constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. It identified those elements in each claim that
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had not been satisfied and explained why each claim failed. It also noted that actual malice
is not a claim but rather is a standard for punitive damages. The court held that because
Goodover’s substantive claims failed, he was not entitled to damages. The court’s factual
findings are supported by the record and its interpretation and application of relevant rules
and cases is correct. We therefore affirm the District Court’s rulings as to these claims.
¶8 Relying on Miller v. Goetz, 2014 MT 150, ¶ 15, 375 Mont. 281, 327 P.3d 483, the
District Court noted its authority to deny a Rule 56 motion “where the moving party fails
to establish how the proposed discovery could preclude summary judgment.” The court
reviewed Goodover’s five discovery requests and stated that the requests were primarily
“objectionable requests seeking legal conclusions, punitive damage information, and
[Goodover’s] subjective beliefs about the underlying claims.” The District Court
concluded that the discovery requests were “unlikely to yield the favorable information”
Goodover anticipated and that they had “no bearing on the [c]ourt’s summary judgment
analysis.” The record supports the District Court’s conclusion to deny Goodover’s Rule
56 motion.
¶9 Goodover also asserts on appeal that the District Court was “clearly influenced” by
the terms of the settlement agreement in determining that Goodover had not prevailed in
the Hopkins’ case and therefore his malicious prosecution claim could not stand. He argues
that M. R. Evid. 408 (Rule 408) precludes the admission of compromises and offers to
compromise. Rule 408 states:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2)
accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in
compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as
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to either validity or amount is not admissible to prove liability for or
invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements
made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does
not require exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because
it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does
not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such
as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue
delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
¶10 The plain language of the Rule excludes a settlement agreement from being offered
to prove liability or the validity of a claim but allows a settlement agreement to be offered
for “another purpose.” In this case, the settlement agreement was not offered to prove that
Goodover was liable in the Hopkins’ case; rather, it was offered to establish, under Vehrs
v. Piquette, 210 Mont. 386, 684 P.2d 476 (1984), that Goodover was not the prevailing
party in the Hopkins’ matter. In Vehrs, we clearly stated that “A proceeding that terminates
indecisively because of a settlement . . . agreement does not meet the requirements of a
cause of action for malicious prosecution.” Vehrs, 210 Mont. at 392, 684 P.2d at 479.
Moreover, as argued by Smith Oblander on appeal, the terms of the settlement agreement
supported the conclusions that Smith Oblander had probable cause for bringing the
Hopkins’ case and that it had no improper ulterior motive, i.e., elements of a claim for
malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The District Court correctly interpreted the
applicable rule of evidence and case law and did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
settlement agreement under seal.
¶11 As conceded by Goodover, his M. R. Civ. P. 11(b) claim is not appealable.
¶12 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
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Court, the District Court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, its interpretation and
application of the law were correct, and its ruling was not an abuse of discretion.
¶13 Affirmed.
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
We Concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
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