Victor Fed'n of Teachers Local 3494 v. Victor Sch. Dist. No. 7 , 391 Mont. 139 ( 2018 )

04/03/2018
DA 17-0557
Case Number: DA 17-0557
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2018 MT 72VICTOR FEDERATION OF TEACHERS LOCAL
3494, MEA-MFT, and JULIANA ARECHAGA,
Applicants and Appellants,
v.
VICTOR SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7, RAVALLI
COUNTY, MONTANA, and its trustees PAUL
ROSEN, MARCI SMITH, MARY ALLRED,
ROY PERRY, and STEVE WILSON,
Respondents and Appellees.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DV 17-275
Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Karl J. Englund, Karl J. Englund, P.C., Missoula, Montana
Jonathan McDonald, McDonald Law Office, PLLC, Helena, Montana
For Appellees:
Kris Goss, Debra A. Silk, Tony C. Koenig, Montana School Boards
Association, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 31, 2018
Decided: April 3, 2018
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Juliana Arechaga was a non-tenured teacher for Victor School District No. 7 (School
District) when, on May 23, 2017, the School District’s Board of Trustees (Board) voted to
not renew her employment contract for the 2017-2018 school year. Arechaga was present
at that meeting but did not receive written notice of the School District’s decision
until June 7. Arechaga applied for a writ of mandamus in the Twenty-First Judicial District
Court, arguing that because she did not receive the written notice by June 1, the School
District was statutorily obligated to renew her contract for the ensuing school year. The
District Court denied her application. We reverse and remand for issuance of the writ.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Arechaga worked as a social studies teacher for the School District from 2014 to
2017. As a non-tenured teacher, Arechaga was subject to the School District’s annual
decision to renew or not renew her contract. The School District had renewed her
employment contract for both the 2015-2016 and 2016-2017 school years.
¶3 When the School District hired Arechaga in 2014, she lived on Foothills Drive in
Missoula. In March 2016, Arechaga moved. She did not notify the School District of her
new address. The School District rarely communicated with Arechaga by mail, and it had
no policy—in its faculty handbook or otherwise—obligating teachers to inform it of any
change to their mailing addresses. The School District typically communicated with
Arechaga in person, by telephone, or by e-mail.
¶4 Arechaga went on maternity leave on March 31, 2017, through the end of the school
year. On May 16, while Arechaga was present at the school to sign up for health insurance,
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the School District hand-delivered her written notice that the Board was going to discuss
her contract at a meeting on May 23. At the meeting—with Arechaga present—the Board
voted to not renew Arechaga’s contract for the 2017-2018 school year.
¶5 The next day, the School District drafted a letter to Arechaga notifying her that her
employment contract for the ensuing school year had not been renewed. The School
District sent this letter via certified U.S. mail to the address it had on file—Arechaga’s
outdated Foothills Drive address. Arechaga never received the letter; it was returned to the
School District as “unclaimed” on June 18. Arechaga did not receive written notice of the
School District’s decision until June 7, when the School District Clerk hand-delivered her
a copy while she was present at the school.
¶6 Arechaga and the Victor Federation of Teachers Local 3494 (Federation)—the
collective bargaining unit representing her—filed an application for a writ of mandamus in
the District Court. Arechaga and the Federation asserted that because Arechaga had not
received the School District’s written notice by June 1, the School District was statutorily
obligated to renew her contract for the 2017-2018 school year.
¶7 The court held a show cause hearing at which Arechaga testified. Arechaga asserted
that she did not “in any way attempt to avoid receiving the written notice” and that, given
the School District’s history of communicating with her in person, by telephone, and by e-
mail, it “didn’t even occur” to her to notify the School District of her updated mailing
address.
¶8 After the hearing, the District Court denied the application. The court agreed with
Arechaga that under § 20-4-206(1), MCA—which obligates a school district to “provide”
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written notice by June 1 of its decision to not renew a teaching contract for the ensuing
school year—written notice becomes effective only upon receipt by the teacher. But the
court noted that “constructive receipt and notice are chargeable to one who willfully avoids
or frustrates written notice.” The court found as a matter of fact that Arechaga “did not
take active steps, per se, to avoid notice.” It concluded nonetheless that “her neglect and
lack of diligence in maintaining a current address on file with the school district were the
sole cause of her failure to receive timely notice of the non-renewal of her contract.” The
court held that this excused the School District’s “mandatory duty to provide her with
written notice by June 1, 2017.” The court concluded that the School District was not
obligated to renew Arechaga’s employment contract for the 2017-2018 school year.
Arechaga appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 A district court’s decision to issue or deny a writ of mandamus presents a conclusion
of law that we review for correctness. City of Deer Lodge ex rel. City of Deer Lodge
Ordinances 130 & 136 v. Chilcott, 2012 MT 165, ¶ 12, 365 Mont. 497, 285 P.3d 418.
DISCUSSION
¶10 Section 20-4-206(1), MCA, provides:
The trustees shall provide written notice by June 1 to each nontenure teacher
employed by the district regarding whether the nontenure teacher has been
reelected for the ensuing school fiscal year. A teacher who does not receive
written notice of reelection or termination is automatically reelected for the
ensuing school fiscal year.
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“Subject to the June 1 notice requirements in this section,” the statute permits a school
district to refuse to renew a non-tenure teacher’s employment “with or without cause.”
Section 20-4-206(3), MCA.
¶11 Arechaga argues that because she did not receive written notice of the non-renewal
of her contract by June 1, 2017, she was “automatically” rehired for the 2017-2018 school
year by operation of law. She contends that the District Court misapplied the law in
determining that Arechaga’s failure to update her mailing address with the School District
excused the School District’s obligation to ensure that she received timely written notice
of its decision. Arechaga contends that a writ of mandamus is appropriate in this case
because the School District had a clear legal duty to renew her contract and because she
has no other speedy and adequate legal remedy available to her.
¶12 The School District argues that it complied with the requirements of § 20-4-206(1),
MCA, by mailing written notice on May 24, 2017, to the address that it had on file for
Arechaga. It emphasizes that Arechaga had actual notice of the School District’s decision
prior to June 1 because she attended the May 23 meeting at which the Board voted to not
renew her contract. The School District argues that Arechaga’s failure to update her
address—rather than anything the School District did—frustrated delivery of the written
notice. The School District contends that Arechaga has not satisfied the requirements for
a writ of mandamus because the action she seeks to compel—the renewal of her teaching
contract—is not a “ministerial act,” and because the appropriate remedy for her was a
declaratory judgment action, rather than a writ of mandamus.
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¶13 A writ of mandamus compels “the performance of an act that the law specially
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.” Citizens for a Better Flathead
v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2016 MT 325, ¶ 58, 385 Mont. 505, 386 P.3d 567 (citing
§ 27-26-102, MCA). A writ of mandamus is available when “(1) the party who applies for
it is entitled to the performance of a clear legal duty by the party against whom the writ is
sought; and (2) there is no speedy and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of
law.” Citizens for a Better Flathead, ¶ 58 (citation and internal quotations omitted). The
“clear legal duty must involve a ministerial act, not a discretionary act.” Citizens for a
Better Flathead, ¶ 59 (citation and internal quotations omitted). An act is ministerial when
“the law prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with such precision and certainty
as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment.” Citizens for a Better
Flathead, ¶ 59 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
A. Legal Duty
¶14 In construing the terms of a statute, we are bound by its plain language. If the
statute’s language is “clear and unambiguous,” we “will not interpret the statute further.”
Mont. Sports Shooting Ass’n v. State, 2008 MT 190, ¶ 11, 344 Mont. 1, 185 P.3d 1003.
Our role “is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained
therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted.” Section
1-2-101, MCA.
¶15 Section 20-4-206(1), MCA, requires a school district to “provide written notice by
June 1” of its decision to not renew a contract for the ensuing school year. The District
Court determined that, under the plain language of the statute, written notice is not
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“provided” by June 1 unless it is received—and not merely mailed—by that date. We have
held that, under the common law,
Where a statute or rule merely states that written notice must be given,
without stating how it is to be given, it is not enough that the notice is mailed.
It must also be received. In other words, the effective date of the notice is
the day it is received, rather than the day it is mailed.
Grenfell v. Anderson, 1999 MT 272, ¶ 34, 296 Mont. 474, 989 P.2d 818 (quoting
58 Am. Jur. 2d Notice § 35 (1989)). The statute expressly adopts this common-law rule by
requiring the teacher’s receipt of the notice. Section 20-4-206(1), MCA. Arechaga was
not provided written notice of the School District’s decision by June 1.
¶16 The School District emphasizes that Arechaga had actual notice of the non-renewal
of her contract, thus fulfilling the intent of § 20-4-206(1), MCA, which it asserts is to ensure
that teachers receive timely notice of their employment status for the ensuing school year.
The School District cites § 1-1-217, MCA, which provides, “Each person who has actual
notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry as to a particular
fact has constructive notice of the fact itself.”
¶17 Without doubt, Arechaga’s presence at the May 23, 2017 board meeting gave her
actual and constructive notice of the School District’s decision to not renew her contract.
But when “a statute requires a written notice, an actual oral notice is insufficient.” 58 Am.
Jur. 2d Notice § 10 (2012) (citing In re Marriage of Lugo, 170 Cal. App. 3d 427 (1985)).
Section 20-4-206, MCA, is specific; it plainly requires that the School District provide a
teacher with “written notice” of its decision by June 1. If the teacher does not receive that
written notice within the time the statute allows, she is “automatically reelected,” and the
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School District may not “nonrenew” her employment without cause. Section 20-4-206(1),
(3), MCA. The statute contains no exception for a teacher who receives actual notice of
non-renewal of her employment contract.
¶18 Section 1-1-217, MCA, articulates a general principle of constructive notice. But
§ 20-4-206, MCA, is specific, and it controls here. See § 1-2-102, MCA. We would be
elevating the general over the specific and “insert[ing] what has been omitted” from the
controlling statute if we agreed that the School District satisfied the written notice
requirement because Arechaga had actual notice of its decision. See § 1-2-101, -102,
MCA. We decline to create judicially an exception to the statute’s clear mandate that a
School District provide a teacher with “written notice” of non-renewal of her contract by
June 1. See § 20-4-206(1), MCA. The School District’s failure to provide Arechaga with
timely written notice nullified its attempted non-renewal under the explicit language of
§ 20-4-206(1), MCA.
¶19 The District Court held—and the School District argues on appeal—that the School
District’s statutory obligation to “provide written notice by June 1” was excused by
Arechaga’s failure to inform the School District of her updated mailing address. As the
District Court noted, it is a general rule that “[c]onstructive receipt and notice are
chargeable to one who willfully avoids actual notice by refusing to accept a notice.”
58 Am. Jur. 2d Notice § 28 (2012) (citing Crenshaw v. Ga. Underwriting Ass’n, 414 S.E.2d
915 (1992); Walkenhorst-Newman v. Montgomery Elevator, 37 S.W.3d 283 (Mo. Ct. App.
2000)). This follows the principle that “a person may not profit from his own wrongful
act.” Grenfell, ¶ 38. Recognizing this principle, we have held that the failure to claim a
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certified letter does not constitute “actual refusal to accept” the written notice. Grenfell,
¶¶ 38, 45. Certified letters “that are returned ‘unclaimed’ are not evidence of a refusal to
accept delivery” and do not impute “constructive knowledge” of the notice on the intended
recipient. Grenfell, ¶ 39 (citing Long v. Crum, 267 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Iowa 1978)).
¶20 The record does not show that Arechaga willfully avoided or actually refused to
accept service of the written notice. The District Court in fact found to the contrary. As
noted, the School District did not require teachers to keep it apprised of changes to their
mailing addresses. Arechaga testified that the vast majority of her communications with
the School District occurred in person, by telephone, or by e-mail, and that it “didn’t even
occur” to her to send the School District her new mailing address. She testified that she
was unaware prior to June 1, 2017, that the School District had attempted to notify her in
writing of its decision; that she did not know the law required the School District to give
her written notice by June 1; that had the School District told her it had a letter for her, she
would have come to the school to pick it up; and that had the School District asked her to
confirm her mailing address, she would have provided her updated address. The School
District did not refute any of this testimony at the hearing and does not contest it on appeal.
¶21 The District Court acknowledged that Arechaga “did not take active steps, per se,
to avoid notice” and that she “testified she did not attempt in any way to avoid receiving
written notice of her termination.” Because Arechaga did not purposefully avoid service
of written notice or actually refuse to accept the notice, “constructive receipt and notice”
are not chargeable to her. See Grenfell, ¶ 38; 58 Am. Jur. 2d Notice § 28 (2012).
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¶22 The statute provides that a “teacher who does not receive written notice of reelection
or termination is automatically reelected for the ensuing fiscal year.” Section 20-4-206(1),
MCA (emphasis added). Although Arechaga received written notice of the School
District’s decision on June 7, 2017, she did not receive it by the time of the “June 1 notice
requirements.” See §§ 20-4-206(1), (3), MCA. Under the plain language of the statute,
Arechaga was “automatically reelected for the ensuing school fiscal year.” See
§ 20-4-206(1), MCA. It is hard to imagine more “precision and certainty” than the
“automatic” reelection of a teacher who does not “receive” written notice by a prescribed
date. See Citizens for a Better Flathead, ¶ 59; § 20-4-206(1), MCA. The statute’s use of
the term “automatically” leaves “nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment.” See
Citizens for a Better Flathead, ¶ 59. The School District had a “clear legal duty” to take
the ministerial act of reelecting Arechaga as a teacher for the 2017-2018 school year. See
Citizens for a Better Flathead, ¶ 59.
B. Speedy and Adequate Remedy
¶23 “[O]nce a petitioner for a writ of mandate establishes a clear legal duty, the writ
must be granted if no speedy and adequate remedy exists.” Belgrade Educ. Ass’n v.
Belgrade Sch. Dist. No. 44, 2004 MT 318, ¶ 20, 324 Mont. 50, 102 P.3d 517. “To constitute
an adequate remedy, the alternative must be one that itself enforces the performance of the
particular duty” that the applicant for a writ of mandamus seeks. Jefferson Cnty. v. Dep’t
of Envtl. Quality, 2011 MT 265, ¶ 30, 362 Mont. 311, 264 P.3d 715.
¶24 Arechaga contends that she has no speedy and adequate remedy at law other than a
writ of mandamus. She points out that her collective bargaining agreement (CBA) does
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not provide a remedy for disputes over the non-renewal of employment contracts for
non-tenured teachers. She argues that Montana statutes do not provide for direct appeal of
a school district’s failure to comply with statutory requirements for non-renewal of a
teaching contract. The School District counters that the ordinary legal remedy for
Arechaga was a declaratory judgment action.
¶25 Arechaga’s CBA provides a procedure for filing grievances, defined as disputes “as
to the interpretation or application of terms and conditions contained in this agreement.”
The CBA contains no terms or conditions relating to the annual renewal or non-renewal of
non-tenure teacher contracts. It thus does not provide any avenue for the relief that
Arechaga seeks.
¶26 The statutes governing school districts’ employment of teachers do not explicitly
provide for judicial review of the non-renewal of annual contracts for non-tenured teachers.
See §§ 20-4-201 to -208, MCA. Under § 20-4-206(3), MCA, a school district may,
“[s]ubject to the June 1 notice requirements,” decline to renew a non-tenured teacher’s
contract “with or without cause.” We have held that non-tenured teachers have no “legally
recognized property right in a new contract” and that “[n]owhere in . . . the statutes . . . is
[the teacher] given a right to appeal her non-renewal.” Roos v. Kircher Pub. Sch. Bd. of
Trs., 2004 MT 48, ¶ 11, 320 Mont. 128, 86 P.3d 39 (citing Irving v. Sch. Dist. No. 1-1A,
248 Mont. 460, 813 P.2d 417 (1991)). It thus appears that Arechaga has no adequate
remedy under her CBA or the relevant statutes to compel the School District to renew her
employment contract.
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¶27 The School District’s contention that Arechaga’s appropriate remedy was a
declaratory judgment action is not persuasive. A declaratory judgment action “simply
pronounces the duty to be performed;” mandamus, in contrast, “commands performance.”
Gallatin Cnty. v. D & R Music & Vending, 201 Mont. 409, 413, 654 P.2d 998, 1000 (1982),
superseded by statute on other grounds. A declaratory judgment action is not an “adequate
remedy,” because it does not “enforce[ ] the performance of the particular duty” that
Arechaga seeks in her application for a writ of mandamus. See Jefferson Cnty., ¶ 30; see
also Gallatin Cnty., 201 Mont. at 413, 654 P.2d at 1000 (stating that, when a party seeks
to compel a public body to take an action, a writ of mandamus is “a more adequate remedy
than a declaratory judgment”).
¶28 Arechaga has demonstrated that she is entitled to the School District’s performance
of a “clear legal duty” to renew her contract for the 2017-2018 school year and that there
is no other “speedy and adequate remedy” available to her apart from a writ of mandamus.
See Citizens for a Better Flathead, ¶ 58.
CONCLUSION
¶29 For the reasons discussed, we conclude that the District Court erred when it held
that Arechaga did not satisfy the requirements for mandamus. Finally, we are not
convinced by the School District’s argument that, if we reverse, “the method of delivering
notice to school employees will be altered throughout Montana as school districts will be
required to personally deliver every notice to avoid intentional or neglectful frustration of
delivery.” Nothing in this Opinion forecloses a school district from adopting specific
policy language that obligates its employees to keep it apprised of their current addresses
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and designates the employee’s listed address as the agreed location for service of written
notices. Such a policy in its faculty handbook would give the School District stronger
footing from which to argue willful avoidance or refusal to accept written notice.
Fundamentally, we are not at liberty to ignore an explicit statutory directive in order to
carry out the School District’s intended action.
¶30 The District Court’s denial of Arechaga’s application is reversed. The case is
remanded for issuance of the requested writ of mandamus.
/S/ BETH BAKER
We Concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
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