State v. Spielmann Christensen ( 1973 )


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  •        I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA
    F           F
    STATE O MONTANA,
    F
    P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,                 No. 12479
    J O H N MICHAEL SPIELMANN,
    Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
    ............................................
    STATE O MONTANA,
    F
    P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,                 No. 12480
    LOUIS T N CHRISTENSEN,
    OY
    Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
    Appeal from:        D i s t r i c t Court of t h e E i g h t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
    Honorable W . W . L e s s l e y , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
    Counsel of R.ecord:
    For A p p e l l a n t s :
    Smith, Smith and Sewell, Helena, Montana
    Robert J . Sewell argued, Helena, Montana
    Anderson and Dasinger, Bozeman, Montana
    For Respondents:
    Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y General, Helena,
    Montana
    3 . C . Weingartner, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a r g u e d ,
    Helena, Montana
    Thomas A . Olson, County A t t o r n e y , Bozeman, Montana
    Donald E. White, S p e c i a l Deputy County A t t o r n e y , argued,
    Bozeman, Montana
    Submitted:          October 2, 1973
    Decided : ~         V 9 lZn
    g
    M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
    This a p p e a l i s brought by defendants John Michael Spielmann
    and Louis Tony C h r i s t e n s e n , from t h e i r j o i n t t r i a l i n t h e d i s -
    t r i c t c o u r t of G a l l a t i n County.       Spielmann was c o n v i c t e d of one
    count of robbery and Christensen of two c o u n t s of robbery and
    of f i r s t degree b u r g l a r y .
    On November 9, 1972, Spielmann, C h r i s t e n s e n and Douglas
    Green, aged 15, were a r r e s t e d t o g e t h e r .            Green plead g u i l t y t o
    charges a g a i n s t him and was committed t o t h e Pine H i l l s J u v e n i l e
    facility.         Green t e s t i f i e d a s a p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s a t t h e t r i a l
    of Spielmann and C h r i s t e n s e n .
    From t h e t r i a l r e c o r d t h e s e f a c t s appear:       Sometime between
    10:00 p.m.        t h e n i g h t of October 31, 1972, and 2:39 a.m. t h e
    morning of November 1, 1972, Christensen and Green b u r g l a r i z e d
    t h e medical o f f i c e of D r . Edward L. King i n Ifanhatten, Montana,
    t a k i n g v a r i o u s t y p e s of d r u g s , some s y r i n g e s and o t h e r medical
    equipment.
    O November 2, 1972, Christensen and Green, a t gun p o i n t ,
    n
    robbed t h e Medical A r t s Pharmacy i n Bozeman, Montana, t a k i n g a l l
    t h e codeine, morphine and demerol.                      The pharmacist i n c h a r g e ,
    D. G. Dunham, was a b l e t o g e n e r a l l y d e s c r i b e t h e two persons
    and t h e i r c l o t h i n g .   He s t a t e d t h a t b o t h had nylon s t o c k i n g s over
    t h e i r faces.
    On November 8 , 1972, Spielmann, Christensen and Green a g a i n
    b u r g l a r i z e d D r . King's o f f i c e sometime between 5:45 p.m.                  and 8:00
    p.m.,     t h i s time t a k i n g a b l a c k medical bag and v a r i o u s drugs.
    On November 9 , 1972, a t about 9:45 a.m.,                        Spielmann and Green,
    a t gun p o i n t , a g a i n robbed t h e Medical Arts Pharmacy wearing nylon
    s t o c k i n g s over t h e i r f a c e s .   M r . Dunham was on d u t y and recognized
    Green from t h e previous robbery.                    Some r e d l i n , dexedrine and
    demerol were taken i n t h e robbery.                    While t h e robbery was i n
    p r o g r e s s a customer, Mrs. Aileen Zacher, e n t e r e d t h e pharmacy and
    ..
    observed the two men who ran from the pharmacy to a waiting car
    driven by Christensen.   At this time a Mrs. AnnaClousing, with
    her mother and son, were driving south on Willson Avenue and
    observed what they described as a black-over-white 1964 or 1965
    Buick leaving the scene of the crime.
    After police were notified of the robbery, roadblocks were
    set up around Bozeman.   Instructions were given to look for a
    Buick with a black top and white body, about a 1964 or 1965 model,
    and two occupants, one of whom wore a pencil-line mustache,
    appeared to be in his forties and wore a khaki coat.    The other
    occupant was described as a younger, taller man with rather long
    hair, wearing a khaki colored coat with a fur collar.
    Two Montana highway patrolmen, John Flynn and Kerry Keyser,
    participated in the search setting a roadblock on U.S. Highway
    191 at its intersection with Cottonwood Road. At approximately
    11:OO a.m. they were notified to discontinue the roadblock.
    While proceeding back toward Bozeman on U.S. 191, they noticed
    a black-over-white 1967 Buick traveling the opposite direction.
    The patrolmen turned and came up behind the Buick, which stopped
    before the patrol car lights or siren were turned on.   The driver
    of the Buick, Christensen, who was in his forties and had a black
    pencil-line mustache, got out as the two patrolmen were walking
    up on either side.   Both patrolmen looked into the Buick and
    observed Green sitting in the front seat on the passenger side and
    Spielmann sitting in the back seat. They also observed a khaki jacket
    with a fur collar on the left side of the rear seat.    Patrolman
    Keyser asked Christensen to come back to the patrol car with him.
    Flynn remained at the other car talking to the other two men.
    Patrolman Keyser contacted Bozeman law enforcement officers
    concerning the stopped vehicle and remained seated in the patrol
    car with Christensen, questioning Christensen about the absence
    of license plates on his car.   Christensen was also asked if
    there was a gun in the Buick and he replied there was a gun on
    the front seat under some books.   Patrolman Flynn walked back to
    the patrol car from the Buick and asked Christensen if he could
    look i n t o t h e trunk.         Christensen s a i d yes, and y e l l e d t o Green
    t o push t h e button t h a t opened t h e trunk.                   Green pushed t h e r e -
    l e a s e b u t t o n opening t h e trunk and i n i t Flynn saw another khaki
    type j a c k e t .   I t appears Flynn closed t h e trunk once, and then
    again asked Christensen i f he could look i n the trunk.                                 Green
    again opened t h e trunk a t c h r i s t e n s e n ' s r e q u e s t , and t h i s time
    Flynn took a black medical bag from t h e trunk.
    O f f i c e r s from t h e Bozeman c i t y p o l i c e and from t h e G a l l a t i n
    County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e a r r i v e d on t h e scene i n response t o t h e
    r a d i o n o t i f i c a t i o n from Keyser.      Spielmann, Christensen and Green
    were placed under a r r e s t and advised of t h e i r r i g h t s .
    O November 10, 1972, M r . Harold Cain telephoned t h e G a l l a t i n
    n
    County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e and informed them t h a t a bag containing
    drugs had been found a t h i s wrecking yard t h e previous day by
    a customer, M r . David Keith.                 Gerald Mell, a pharmicist who had
    been employed a t t h e Medical A r t s Pharmacy, t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l
    concerning t h e s e drugs and i d e n t i f i e d them a s having come from
    t h e Medical A r t s Pharmacy based upon inventory markings on t h e
    c o n t a i n e r s and t h e f a c t t h e types of drugs corresponded with t h e
    types missing a f t e r t h e robbery.               Green t e s t i f i e d t h a t Spielmann,
    a t Christensen's r e q u e s t , had tossed t h e bag of drugs out of t h e
    c a r window before t h e t h r e e were apprehended.
    Spielmann and Christensen r e t a i n e d s e p a r a t e counsel.                    Both
    f i l e d i d e n t i c a l p r e t r i a l motions t o suppress t h e evidence seized
    i n t h e November 9 searches              of t h e Buick automobile, and a j o i n t
    hearing was had.           Defendants were t r i e d together without o b j e c t i o n
    by defendants o r t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e counsel.
    O appeal defendants b r i n g t h r e e i s s u e s of e r r o r :
    n
    (1) Whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n denying defendants'
    motions t o suppress evidence obtained i n t h e November 9 searches
    of t h e Buick automobile?
    (2)    Whether p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r r e s u l t e d from t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n
    of t h e cases f o r t r i a l ?
    (3)    Whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n denying motions t o
    d i s m i s s on t h e b a s i s of i n s u f f i c i e n t independent evidence t o
    c o r r o b o r a t e t h e testimony of t h e accomplice?
    I s s u e 1.        C e r t a i n f a c t s appear undisputed.        The November 9
    s e a r c h e s of t h e automobile by t h e patrolmen were n o t pursuant
    7'
    t o a warrant l n c i d e n t t o a r r e s t and exceeded t h e scope of t h e
    11
    p l a i n view d o c t r i n e " a s t o most of t h e evidence s e i z e d .             The
    consent t o s e a r c h was given p r i o r t o t h e defendants being placed
    under a r r e s t and informed of t h e i r r i g h t s .
    However, t h e f a c t t h a t s e a r c h was conducted on an automobile
    t r a v e l i n g on a p u b l i c highway, pursuant t9 d e s c r i p t i v e informa-
    t i o n known t o t h e law enforcement o f f i c e r s conducting t h e s e a r c h ,
    11
    brings i n t o issue the             probable cause exception" developed i n
    C a r r o l l v. United S t a t e s , 
    267 U.S. 132
    , 
    45 S.Ct. 280
    , 69 L ed 543;
    Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 
    391 U.S. 216
    , 
    88 S.Ct. 1472
    , 20
    L ed 2d 538; Chambers v. Maroney, 
    399 U.S. 42
    , 48, 
    90 S.Ct. 1975
    ,
    26 L ed 2d 419, 426, 428; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
    403 U.S. 443
    ,
    
    91 S.Ct. 2022
    , 29 L ed 2d 564; and v a r i o u s o t h e r United S t a t e s
    Supreme Court c a s e s which d i f f e r e n t i a t e between automobiles and
    nonmovable premises.               The r a t i o n a l e upon which t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a -
    t i o n i s p r e d i c a t e d i s s t a t e d i n Chambers:
    11
    I n terms o f t h e circumstances j u s t i f y i n g a
    w a r r a n t l e s s s e a r c h , t h e Court has long d i s t i n g u i s h e d
    between an automobile and a home o r o f f i c e , I n
    C a r r o l l v. United S t a t e s , 
    267 US 132
    , 
    69 L Ed 543
    ,
    45 S C t 280, 
    39 ALR 790
     (1925), t h e i s s u e was t h e
    a d m i s s i b i l i t y i n evidence of contraband l i q u o r s e i z e d
    i n a w a r r a n t l e s s s e a r c h of a c a r on t h e highway.
    A f t e r surveying t h e law from t h e time of t h e adoption
    of t h e Fourth Amendment onward, t h e Court h e l d t h a t
    automobiles and o t h e r conveyances may be searched
    w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t i n circumstances t h a t would n o t
    j u s t i f y t h e s e a r c h w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t of a house o r
    an o f f i c e , provided t h a t t h e r e i s probable cause
    t o believe t h a t the c a r contains a r t i c l e s t h a t the
    o f f i c e r s a r e e n t i t l e d t o s e i z e . The Court expressed
    i t s holding a s f o l l o w s :
    11 1
    W have made a somewhat extended r e f e r e n c e
    e
    t o t h e s e s t a t u t e s t o show t h a t t h e guaranty of
    freedom from unreasonable s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s
    by t h e Fourth Amendment has been c o n s t h e d , p r a c t i - .
    c a l l y s i n c e t h e beginning of t h e Government, a s
    r e c o g n i z i n g a n e c e s s a r y d i f f e r e n c e between a s e a r c h
    of a s t o r e , dwelling house o r o t h e r s t r u c t u r e i n
    r e s p e c t of which a proper o f f i c i a l w a r r a n t r e a d i l y
    may be o b t a i n e d , and a s e a r c h of a s h i p , motor b o a t ,
    wagon o r automobile, f o r contraband goods, where
    i t i s n o t p r a c t i c a b l e t o s e c u r e a w a r r a n t because
    t h e v e h i c l e can be q u i c k l y moved o u t of t h e l o c a l i t y
    o r j u r i s d i c t i o n i n which t h e warrant must be sought.
    " ' ~ a v i n gt h u s e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t contraband
    goods concealed and i l l e g a l l y t r a n s p o r t e d i n an
    automobile o r o t h e r v e h i c l e may be searched f o r with-
    o u t a w a r r a n t , we come now t o c o n s i d e r under what
    circumstances such s e a r c h may be made. Jc Jc                          [Tlhose
    lawfully within the country, e n t i t l e d t o use the
    p u b l i c highways, have a r i g h t t o f r e e passage with-
    o u t i n t e r r u p t i o n o r s e a r c h u n l e s s t h e r e i s known
    t o a competent o f f i c i a l a u t h o r i z e d t o s e a r c h , probable
    cause f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t t h e i r v e h i c l e s a r e c a r r y i n g
    contraband o r i l l e g a l merchandise.                        *
    Jc
    he he measure of l e g a l i t y of such a s e i z u r e
    i s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e s e i z i n g o f f i c e r s h a l l have
    r e a s o n a b l e o r probable cause f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t
    t h e automobile which he s t o p s and s e i z e s has con-
    traband l i q u o r t h e r e i n which i s b e i n g i l l e g a l l y
    transported.'            **      *
    "The Court a l s o noted t h a t t h e s e a r c h of an
    a u t o on probable c a u s e proceeds on a t h e o r y wholly
    d i f f e r e n t from t h a t j u s t i f y i n g t h e s e a r c h i n c i d e n t
    t o an a r r e s t :
    he r i g h t t o s e a r c h and t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e
    s e i z u r e a r e n o t dependent on t h e r i g h t t o a r r e s t ,
    They a r e dependent on t h e r e a s o n a b l e cause t h e
    s e i z i n g o f f i c e r has f o r b e l i e f t h a t t h e c o n t e n t s
    of t h e automobile offend a g a i n s t t h e law.'
    II  Arguably, because of t h e p r e f e r e n c e f o r a
    m a g i s t r a t e ' s judgment, only t h e immobilization of
    t h e c a r should be permitted u n t i l a s e a r c h w a r r a n t
    i s o b t a i n e d ; a r g u a b l y , only t h e I l e s s e r ' i n t r u s i o n
    i s permissible u n t i l the magistrate authorizes the
    'greater.'             But which i s t h e ' g r e a t e r ' and which t h e
    I lesser'         intrusion i s i t s e l f a debatable question
    and t h e answer may depend on a v a r i e t y of circum-
    s t a n c e s . For c o n s t i t u t i o n a l purposes, we s e e no
    d i f f e r e n c e between on t h e one hand s e i z i n g and
    holding a c a r b e f o r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e probable c a u s e
    i s s u e t o a m a g i s t r a t e and on t h e o t h e r hand c a r r y i n g
    o u t an immediate s e a r c h without a w a r r a n t . Given
    probable cause t o s e a r c h , e i t h e r c o u r s e i s r e a s o n a b l e
    under t h e Fourth Amendment I I            .
    The d e t e r m i n a t i o n made by t h e t r i a l c o u r t b e f o r e e n t e r i n g
    i t s o r d e r denying d e f e n d a n t s ' motions t o suppress and t h e d e t e r -
    mination t h i s Court must make i s :                   Did t h e patrolmen conducting
    t h e s e a r c h o f t h e automobile have probable cause t o b e l i e v e i t
    was c a r r y i n g contraband o r s t o l e n p r o p e r t y from t h e robbery of
    t h e Medical A r t s Pharmacy a s h o r t time p r i o r t o t h e search'
    A g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n of probable c a u s e i s s t a t e d i n United
    S t a t e s v. Thompson, 
    420 F.2d 536
    , 539 (3rd C i r , ) :
    II
    One need n o t have evidence which would j u s t i f y
    a c o n v i c t i o n ; probable cause e x i s t s i f t h e f a c t s and
    circumstances known t o t h e o f f i c e r would warrant a
    prudent man i n b e l i e v i n g t h a t t h e o f f e n s e has been o r
    i s being committed. On t h e o t h e r hand, probable cause
    means more than a b a r e s u s p i c i o n , t h e l i n e between
    mere s u s p i c i o n and probable cause 'must be drawn by
    an a c t of judgment formed i n t h e l i g h t of t h e p a r t i -
    c u l a r s i t u a t i o n and w i t h account taken of a l l t h e
    circumstances. 1 I 1
    The b a s i s of t h e probable cause e x i s t i n g i n Chambers was
    a d e s c r i p t i o n of a c a r and occupants f u r n i s h e d by t h e v i c t i m
    of a s e r v i c e s t a t i o n robbery and two teenage o b s e r v e r s .                     Officers
    were seeking a b l u e compact s t a t i o n wagon c a r r y i n g f o u r men,
    one of whom was wearing a green sweater and one of whom was
    wearing a t r e n c h c o a t .        I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , o f f i c e r s had i n -
    formation which was a s p a r t i c u l a r and r e l i a b l e ; which matched
    t h e d e f e n d a n t s , t h e i r c l o t h i n g , and t h e i r automobile a s c l o s e l y
    -
    a s t h a t i n Chambers.
    Accordingly, t h e t r i a l c o u r t was c o r r e c t i n denying d e f e n d a n t s '
    motions t o suppress evidence obtained i n t h e i n i t i a l s e a r c h e s .
    I s s u e 2.    Whether p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r r e s u l t e d from c o n s o l i -
    d a t i o n of t h e c a s e s f o r t r i a l ?    Both Spielmann and C h r i s t e n s e n r e -
    t a i n e d and were r e p r e s e n t e d by s e p a r a t e paid counsel.               Neither
    defendants nor t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e counsel o b j e c t e d t o c o n s o l i d a t i o n
    p r i o r t o o r during t r i a l .        Neither of defendants1 t r i a l c o u n s e l
    p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h i s appeal.
    The c a s e precedent c i t e d by defendants i n support of t h i s
    i s s u e i n v o l v e s i n s t a n c e s o f f a i l u r e of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o
    a p p o i n t s e p a r a t e counsel o r d e n i a l of a r e q u e s t t o allow s e p a r a t e
    trials.       I n l i g h t of t h e undisputed f a c t s t h a t b o t h Spielmann
    and C h r i s t e n s e n were r e p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l by competent c o u n s e l
    of t h e i r own c h o i c e and t h a t a t no t i m e p r i o r t o appeal was t h i s
    o b j e c t i o n r a i s e d , we f i n d t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t e r r i n con-
    ducting a j o i n t t r i a l .
    I t o f t e n happens t h a t a j o i n t t r i a l w i t h two p a r t i c i p a t i n g
    a t t o r n e y s can b e an advantageous t a c t i c o r s t r a t e g y .              Hindsight
    has g r e a t advantage over f o r e s i g h t , i n t h a t i t i s always 20-20.
    A f t e r e l e c t i n g a p a r t i c u l a r c o u r s e of s t r a t e g y , a defendant
    cannot a s s i g n a s e r r o r on a p p e a l t h e f a c t t h a t h i s d e f e n s e was
    u n s u c c e s s f u l , p r e d i c a t e d on t h e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t a n o t h e r a l t e r n a -
    t i v e would have been s u c c e s s f u l .               S t a t e v. Meidinger,                    Mont    .
    ,   
    502 P.2d 58
    , 
    29 St.Rep. 861
    ; Henry v. M i s s i s s i p p i , 
    379 U.S. 443
    , 
    85 S.Ct. 564
    , 13 L ed 2d 408.
    I s s u e 3.          Whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n denying motions
    t o d i s m i s s on t h e b a s i s of i n s u f f i c i e n t independent evidence t o
    c o r r o b o r a t e t h e testimony of t h e accomplice?                       This i s s u e i s pre-
    d i c a t e d on s e c t i o n 94-7220, R.C.M.               1947, which provides:
    II
    A c o n v i c t i o n cannot b e had on t h e testimony of
    an accomplice, u n l e s s he i s c o r r o b o r a t e d by o t h e r
    evidence, which i n i t s e l f , and without t h e a i d of
    t h e testimony of t h e accomplice, tends t o connect
    t h e defendant w i t h t h e commission o f t h e o f f e n s e ;
    and t h e c o r r o b o r a t i o n i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t , i f i t merely
    shows t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e , o r t h e circum-
    stances thereof. "
    Whether t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t independent c o r r o b o r a t i o n of an
    accomplice's testimony tending t o connect a defendant w i t h t h e
    commission of t h e o f f e n s e charged i s a determination of law which
    must b e made by t h e t r i a l c o u r t .               S t a t e v. Moran, 
    142 Mont. 423
    , 
    384 P.2d 777
    ; S t a t e            Y.   Dess, 
    154 Mont. 231
    , 237, 
    462 P.2d 186
    .
    Here, we f i n d s u f f i c i e n t c o r r o b o r a t i n g evidence i n t h e record
    from s t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s t o warrant submission of t h i s c a s e t o t h e
    jury:           M r . D.G.     Dunham; Mrs. Anna Clousing and h e r son David;
    Mrs. Aileen Zacher, who saw t h e defendants and t h e i r c a r d u r i n g
    t h e commission of a robbery; D r . Edward King; M r . Gerald Mell;
    M r . Harold Cain; Patrolmen Flynn and Kyser; and                                     M r . David Keith.
    The requirement and a p p l i c a t i o n of s e c t i o n 94-7220, R.C.M.
    1947, was explained i n Dess:
    "* +< * Appellant s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e evidence, inde-
    pendent of t h e testimony of an accomplice, must
    prove him g u i l t y beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt. This
    i s n o t t h e law i n Montana, however. Though t h e r e must
    be some independent evidence connecting t h e defendant
    t o t h e crime, i t need n o t be s u f f i c i e n t a l o n e t o s u s t a i n
    a c o n v i c t i o n . The j u r y can c o n s i d e r t h e testimony of
    t h e accomplice and g i v e t h e testimony whatever weight
    they d e s i r e . I n S t a t e v. Donges, 
    126 Mont. 341
    , 
    251 P.2d 254
     (1952), t h e Court s t a t e d a t page 347, 251 P.2d a t
    page 257:
    11 I
    The evidence which c o r r o b o r a t e d Bungard
    could be f u r n i s h e d by t h e defendants. I t could be
    c i r c u m s t a n t i a l . I t need n o t extend t o every f a c t
    t o which Bungard t e s t i f i e d and need n o t b e s u f f i -
    c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a c o n v i c t i o n o r e s t a b l i s h a prima
    f a c i e c a s e of g u i l t ; i t being s u f f i c i e n t i f i t
    tends t o connect defendants w i t h t h e commission of
    t h e crime. Whether i t tends t o do so i s a q u e s t i o n
    of law, w h i l e i t s w e i g h t - - i t s e f f i c a c y t o f o r t i f y
    t h e testimony of Bungard and r e n d e r h i s s t o r y t r u s t -
    worthy--is a m a t t e r f o r t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e
    jury.        S t a t e v. Cobb, 
    76 Mont. 89
    , 
    245 P. 265
    . I I I
    From o u r examination of t h e r e c o r d , we f i n d no p r e j u d i c i a l
    error.       The j u r y was p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d ; t h e r e was amply sub-
    s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence p r o p e r l y b e f o r e i t upon which t o b a s e
    i t s v e r d i c t of g u i l t y .
    The judgment of c o n v i c t i o n i s a f firmed,:
    ,'
    f
    Justice
    d
    ,"   /'      Chief J u s t i c e
    Justices U
    -;r3-d--dr-L--'-i           ----   *--->-I.---d-
    Hon. Edward T . D u s s a u l t , D i s t r i c t
    Judge, s i t t i n g f o r J u s t i c e John
    Conway Harrison.