Caterpillar Tractor v. Dept. of Re ( 1981 )

No. 80-307
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981
CATERPILLAR TRACTOR COMPANY,
Inc., a Corporation,
Petitioner and Respondent,
THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF THE
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lewis and Clark.
Honorable Gordon Bennett, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Terry B. Cosgrove, Special Assistant Attorney General,
argued, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Hughes, Bennett, Kellner & Sullivan, Helena, Montana
George T. Bennett argued, , Montana
Submitted: June 17, 1981
Decided : AUG 6 - 1981
Filed: A U G 6 - 19m
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment of the
District Court of the First Judicial District, County of
Lewis and Clark, determining that the two-year statute of
limitations in section 27-2-211, MCA, applied to the
assessment of corporate license tax for corporations which
failed to file a return.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., respondent, appealed
to the State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) from a determination
made by the Montana Department of Revenue, appellant, in
December 1978, that respondent had been doing business in
Montana for tax purposes for the years 1959 through 1971.
Respondent alleged that appellant did not have statutory
authority to assess any delinquent tax for a portion of the
years under audit because such action would be barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.
While the matter was pending before STAB, the parties
jointly petitioned the District Court for an interlocutory
adjudication of the applicable statute of limitations. The
District Court accepted jurisdiction for the purpose of
determining that single legal issue. The court, in an
original memorandum and supplemental memorandum amending
opinion, held that the two-year statute of limitations
contained in section 27-2-211, MCA, applies and controls the
assessment of any corporation license tax. The result of
that finding prohibits the assessment of any additional tax
by appellant. From this judgment the Department of Revenue
appeals.
Respondent, an Illinois corporation, had business
activities in Montana for the years 1959 through 1971.
Appellant alleges the business a c t i v i t i e s consisted of
s e l l i n g equipment through independent d e a l e r s o p e r a t i n g i n
Montana. R e s p o n d e n t c o n t e n d s i t was n o t engaged i n b u s i n e s s
f o r t h e y e a r s i n q u e s t i o n w i t h i n t h e meaning o f t h e Montana
C o r p o r a t i o n L i c e n s e Tax A c t a n d , t h e r e f o r e , was n o t s u b j e c t
t o the tax. I n December 1 9 7 8 , a p p e l l a n t n o t i f i e d r e s p o n d e n t
t h a t it had d e t e r m i n e d t h a t i t was d o i n g b u s i n e s s f o r t a x
p u r p o s e s i n Montana f o r t h e y e a r s i n q u e s t i o n and demanded
that respondent file corporation license tax returns
together with tax and i n t e r e s t due for the corporation's
c a l e n d a r y e a r s December 3 1 , 1 9 5 9 , t h r o u g h December 3 1 , 1 9 7 1 .
Respondent appealed t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o STAB and
later to the District Court by the interlocutory
adjudication. The D i s t r i c t Court held that appellant is
l i m i t e d t o a p e r i o d of two y e a r s t o a s s e s s o r c o l l e c t a n y
t a x a g a i n s t a t a x p a y e r who h a s f a i l e d t o f i l e a r e t u r n and
is limited to a period of five years to collect a tax
d e f i c i e n c y a s s e s s m e n t f r o m a n y c o r p o r a t i o n which h a s f i l e d a
return.
The following chronology of statutory enactments,
amendments, repeals and revivals, and Supreme Court
d e c i s i o n s is necessary t o determine t h i s case. Not a l l o f
t h e s e s t a t u t e s a r e c o d i f i e d i n t h e Montana Code A n n o t a t e d ;
therefore, use of Revised Codes of Montana citations is
necessary.
T h e Montana C o r p o r a t i o n L i c e n s e Tax A c t ( t h e A c t ) w a s
adopted in 1917. Section 5, Chapter 79, Laws of 1917,
codified as section 2300, R.C.M. 1921, was the sole
p r o v i s i o n which a l l o w e d t h e s t a t e t o a s s e s s a d d i t i o n a l t a x .
I t provided:
" I n c a s e s of r e f u s a l o r n e g l e c t t o make s u c h
r e t u r n , and i n c a s e s o f e r r o n e o u s , f a l s e , o r
fraudulent returns, the s t a t e treasurer
s h a l l , upon t h e d i s c o v e r y t h e r e o f a t any t i m e
within t h r e e years a f t e r s a i d return is due,
make a r e t u r n upon i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a i n e d a s
p r o v i d e d f o r i n t h i s a c t , and t h e a s s e s s m e n t
made by him s h a l l be p a i d by s u c h c o r p o r a t i o n
i m m e d i a t e l y upon n o t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e amount
of such a s s e s s m e n t . . ."
That portion of the Act was amended five times
b e t w e e n 1917 and 1963:
I n 1923 t h e c o r p o r a t i o n t a x s t a t u t e was amended in
Section 2, Chapter 146, Laws of 1923, to substitute the
S t a t e Board o f E q u a l i z a t i o n i n a l l i n s t a n c e s where r e f e r e n c e
had been made t o t h e s t a t e t r e a s u r e r .
I n 1 9 3 3 a s e p a r a t e and d i f f e r e n t s t a t u t e was e n a c t e d
which g r a n t e d t o t h e Board o f E q u a l i z a t i o n t h e a u t h o r i t y a t
any t i m e to a s s e r t deficiency assessment of tax where no
r e t u r n was f i l e d :
" I n t h e c a s e of a f a l s e o r f r a u d u l e n t r e t u r n
w i t h i n t e n t t o evade t a x or of a f a i l u r e t o
f i l e a r e t u r n t h e t a x may b e a s s e s s e d , o r a
proceeding i n Court f o r t h e c o l l e c t i o n of
s u c h t a x may be begun w i t h o u t a s s e s s m e n t a t
any t i m e . " S e c t i o n 9 , C h a p t e r 1 6 6 , Laws o f
1933, c o d i f i e d a s s e c t i o n 2303.5, R.C.M.
1935.
I n 1945 t h e p e r i o d f o r a s s e s s i n g t h e a d d i t i o n a l t a x
was changed from t h r e e t o f i v e y e a r s a l o n g w i t h some o t h e r
u n r e l a t e d amendments, C h a p t e r 2 0 9 , Laws o f 1 9 4 5 , c o d i f i e d a s
s e c t i o n 84-1505, R.C.M. 1947:
" A s s e s s m e n t o f Tax--Payment-Lien of Tax. A l l
a s s e s s m e n t s s h a l l be made by t h e s t a t e b o a r d
o f e q u a l i z a t i o n , and t h e s e i e r a l c o r p o r a t i o n s
s h a l l be n o t i f i e d o f t h e amounts f o r which
t h e y a r e r e s p e c t i v e l y l i a b l e , on o r b e f o r e
t h e f i r s t day of J u n e of each s u c c e s s i v e
year. Payment o f t h e t a x a s s e s s e d s h a l l be
made by c o r p o r a t i o n s r e p o r t i n g on a c a l e n d a r
y e a r b a s i s , on o r b e f o r e t h e f i f t e e n t h d a y o f
June following t h e assessment of t h e tax.
P a y m e n t o f s a i d t a x s h a l l b e made by
c o r p o r a t i o n s o p e r a t i n g on a f i s c a l y e a r b a s i s
on or before the fifteenth day of the sixth
month following the close of said
corporation's fiscal year. In cases of
refusal or neglect to make such return, and
in cases of erroneous, false, or fraudulent
returns, the state board of equalization
shall, upon the discovery thereof at any time
within five (5) years after said return is
due, make a return upon information obtained
as provided for in this act, and the
assessment made by the state board of
equalization shall be paid by such
corporation immediately upon notification of
the amount of such assessment . . ."
In 1960 this Court, in State v. King Colony Ranch
(1960), 137 Mont. 145, 350 P.2d 841, held that the 1945
statute, section 84-1505, superseded the 1933 enactment,
section 84-1513, in determining which time limitation the
state board would use in assessing taxes. This Court did
not expressly mention that the 1933 statute was "repealed by
implication" or any other legal rationale on that point.
Not addressing the particulars of repeal, the Court said the
1945 enactment was later and, therefore, the later statute
applied.
At the next legislative session, the 37th Legisla.tive
Assembly in Chapter 102, Laws of 1961, reenacted section
84-1505, R.C.M. 1947, which placed a five-year limitation
upon the Board's authority to assess deficiencies in all
instances and repealed all acts or parts of acts in conflict
therewith:
"(1) Assessment of tax--payment--lien of tax.
All assessments shall be made by the state
board of equalization, and the several
corporations shall be notified of the amounts
for which they are respectively liable, on or
before the first day of June of each
successive year. Payment of the tax
assessed shall be made by corporations
reporting on a calendar year basis, on or
before the fifteenth day of June following
the assessment of the tax. Payment of said
tax shall be made by corporations operating
on a fiscal year basis on or before the
f i f t e e n t h day o f t h e s i x t h month f o l l o w i n g
t h e c l o s e of s a i d c o r p o r a t i o n s ' s f i s c a l y e a r .
I n c a s e s o f r e f u s a l o r n e g l e c t t o make s u c h
r e t u r n , and i n c a s e s o f e r r o n e o u s , f a l s e , o r
fraudulent returns, t h e s t a t e board of
equalization shall, upon t h e d i s c o v e r y
t h e r e o f a t any t i m e w i t h i n f i v e ( 5 ) y e a r s
a f t e r s a i d r e t u r n i s d u e , make a r e t u r n upon
information obtained a s provided f o r i n t h i s
a c t , and t h e a s s e s s m e n t made by t h e s t a t e
b o a r d of e q u a l i z a t i o n s h a l l be p a i d by s u c h
c o r p o r a t i o n i m m e d i a t e l y upon n o t i f i c a t i o n o f
t h e amount o f s u c h a s s e s s m e n t . . ."
In 1963 the 38th Legislative Assembly, by Chapter
186, Laws of 1963, substantially revised the Corporation
L i c e n s e Tax Act and made t h e c o r p o r a t i o n l i c e n s e t a x s e l f -
assessing. The t a x p a y e r was r e q u i r e d t o a s s e s s t h e t a x in
t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e , w h e r e a s p r e v i o u s l y t h e s t a t e b o a r d had
d e t e r m i n e d t h e t a x i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e b a s e d upon r e t u r n s .
Among the changes made by the 1963 Legislature was the
r e v i s i o n of s e c t i o n 84-1505, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , p r o v i d i n g t h a t no
longer did the Department have the authority to make
deficiency assessments. In addition, Section 2, Chapter
186, Laws of 1963, codified as section 84-1508.2, R.C.M.
1 9 4 7 , provided t h a t a l l d e f i c i e n c y assessments f o r corpora-
t i o n l i c e n s e t a x p u r p o s e s were r e q u i r e d t o be made w i t h i n
five years from t h e d a t e the r e t u r n was filed "except as
otherwise provided in s e c t i o n 84-1513," R.C.M. 1947. The
p a r t i a l t e x t provided:
" ( 1 ) Except a s otherwise provided i n s e c t i o n
84-1513, no d e f i c i e n c y s h a l l be a s s e s s e d o r
c o l l e c t e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e y e a r f o r which
a r e t u r n is f i l e d u n l e s s t h e n o t i c e of
a d d i t i o n a l t a x p r o p o s e d t o be a s s e s s e d i s
m a i l e d w i t h i n f i v e ( 5 ) y e a r s from t h e d a t e
t h e r e t u r n was f i l e d . "
The i s s u e p r e s e n t e d h e r e i s w h e t h e r t h e 1 9 6 3 L e g i s l a -
ture, in adopting Chapter 186, Laws o f 1963, intended to
place a comprehensive five-year s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s on
t h e Department's i n i t i a t i o n of d e f i c i e n c y a c t i o n s o r whether
i t i n t e n d e d t o impose a f i v e - y e a r l i m i t o n l y on t h o s e c a s e s
w h e r e a r e t u r n had b e e n f i l e d and t o p l a c e no l i m i t on c a s e s
where t h e r e had been no f i l i n g a t a l l .
Appellant argues that the amendment to section
84-1505 adopted as part of the Laws of 1945 did not
impliedly repeal section 84-1513; and, therefore, section
84-1513 was in full force and effect when the 1963
L e g i s l a t u r e adopted that s e c t i o n by reference. Appellant
a r g u e s t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l 1 9 1 7 A c t was amended by t h e 1 9 3 3
A c t a n d , t h e r e f o r e , t h e 1 9 4 5 amendment t o t h e o r i g i n a l 1 9 1 7
Act d i d n o t r e p e a l t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e 1933 A c t or r e s t o r e t h e
repealed and superseded p r o v i s i o n s of the 1917 A c t . Any
a t t e m p t t o r e s t o r e t h e 1 9 1 7 A c t by t h e 1 9 4 5 A c t was e r r o r .
Appellant f u r t h e r argues t h a t t h i s Court e r r e d i n its
decision in State v. King Colony Ranch, supra, and the
o p i n i o n s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d . The 1 9 3 3 A c t i m p l i e d l y r e p e a l e d
t h e 1917 A c t , and t h e a t t e m p t t o amend t h e o r i g i n a l ( 1 9 1 7 )
A c t by t h e 1945 amendment was c o n t r a r y t o t h e law b e c a u s e o f
t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e 1933 A c t .
A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t s e c t i o n 84-1513 was a d o p t e d by
reference by the enactment in 1963 o f section 84-1508.2.
A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t s e c t i o n 84-1513 ( a r e p e a l e d a c t ) may
be reenacted by reference. Appellant argues that Great
Western S u g a r Co. v. Mitchell ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 119 Mont. 328, 174
P.2d 817, allows the legislature to a d o p t by reference a
repealed act if there is a showing of clear legislative
intent. The l e g i s l a t u r e did not specifically express the
intent to revive because, appellant points out, of the
confusion of the Kinq C o l o n y Ranch case. According to
appellant, the " i n t e n t " was "obvious"--to have one s t a t u t e
f o r c o r p o r a t i o n s which f i l e and o n e f o r c o r p o r a t i o n s which
do n o t f i l e .
Prior to 1963, under the provisions of the former
s e c t i o n 84-1505, t h e D e p a r t m e n t had t o a c t w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s
from t h e d a t e t h e r e t u r n was d u e t o c o l l e c t a d e f i c i e n c y .
The 1 9 6 3 amendment made a s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e p r o v i d i n g f o r
f i v e y e a r s from t h e d a t e t h e r e t u r n was f i l e d t o c o l l e c t a
deficiency. Appellant contends from 1963 forward, the
statute of limitations will not begin to run until a
taxpayer a c t u a l l y f i l e s a t a x r e t u r n . The p e r i o d b e g i n s t o
run o n l y when the taxpayer takes the affirmative act of
filing the return.
T h e r e was o n l y one s t a t u t e dealing with deficiency
a s s e s s m e n t s i n 1 9 6 3 , s e c t i o n 84-1508.2, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , and i t
applies to corporations. The s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s f o r f i v e
years from the time the return is filed for all
corporations, and u n t i l the return is a c t u a l l y filed, the
period does not begin t o run.
Respondent a r g u e s t h a t t h i s C o u r t , i n S t a t e v. King
Colony Ranch, supra, held that by later enacting section
84-1505 i n 1 9 4 5 , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e had l i m i t e d t h e D e p a r t m e n t
of Revenue in all instances including the nonfiling
situation to a five-year period for assessment. Section
84-1505 c o n t r o l l e d , and s e c t i o n 84-1513 was n o t a n e f f e c t i v e
and v i a b l e p r o v i s i o n upon which t h e D e p a r t m e n t c o u l d r e l y .
T h i s , r e s p o n d e n t c o n t e n d s , i s c l e a r l y a h o l d i n g o f r e p e a l by
implication. The holding in Kinq C o l o n y Ranch could be
based only upon a finding and holding that the later
e n a c t m e n t was so inconsistent as to impliedly repeal the
first.
Respondent also argues that the District Court
correctly held that section 84-1513 was not revived or
r e e n a c t e d by r e f e r e n c e . A p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i t i o n is t h a t mere
r e f e r e n c e r e e n a c t e d t h e r e p e a l e d s e c t i o n 84-1513. However,
respondent argues there is a distinct difference between
"incorporation by reference" and "revival by reference."
What the Montana legislature did in 1 9 6 3 was to assume
(incorrectly) that section 84-1513 was s t i l l a v a l i d and
existing provision and could thus be incorporated by
reference. This is far different from the legislature
e x p r e s s i n g an i n t e n t t o r e e n a c t a p r o v i s i o n , by r e f e r e n c e ,
which it knew had b e e n r e p e a l e d .
T h e r e were i n t h e 1 9 6 3 A c t no e x p r e s s w o r d s and no
language of r e v i v a l or reenactment. I t seems c l e a r t h a t t h e
1963 l e g i s l a t o r s were o b l i v i o u s t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s C o ur t
had concluded that the 1933 Act had been repealed or
superseded by the 1945 Act and believed they could
incorporate t h a t A c t by r e f e r e n c e . T h e r e was no v i s i b l e
a t t e m p t and, i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , no i n t e n t i o n t o r e v i v e t h e
1933 A c t because t h e q u e s t i o n a p p a r e n t l y never a r o s e .
Finally, r e s p o n d e n t c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was
c o r r e c t i n h o l d i n g t h a t s e c t i o n 84-1508.2 h a s no a p p l i c a t i o n
w h e r e a r e t u r n is f i l e d . T h u s , t h i s c a s e i s c o n t r o l l e d by
t h e g e n e r a l s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s , s e c t i o n 27-2-211, MCA.
A p p e l l a n t ' s a r g u m e n t t h a t p r i o r t o 1 9 6 3 i t had f i v e
y e a r s i n which t o a s s e s s i n t h i s c a s e t h e n o n f i l i n g r e t u r n
and t h a t t h e 1 9 6 3 amendment removed that l i m i t a t i o n would
bring i n t o play the general s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s .
S e c t i o n 25-1-102, MCA ( f o r m e r l y s e c t i o n 93-2401,
R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 ) , p r o v i d e s t h a t c i v i l a c t i o n s m u s t be commenced
within the periods prescribed in the s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n s
a f t e r t h e c a u s e of a c t i o n s h a l l h a v e a c c r u e d e x c e p t where i n
special cases a different limitation is prescribed by
statute. T h i s same s e c t i o n d e s c r i b e s t h e t e r m " a c t i o n " as
including "a special proceeding of a c i v i l nature." The
action of appellant in asserting liability against a
taxpayer by way of deficiency assessment constitutes "a
s p e c i a l p ro c e e d i n g of a c i v i l n a t u r e . "
S e c t i o n 27-2-211(c), MCA, p r o v i d e s a two-year statute
of limitations for "a liability created by statute other
than a penalty or f o r f e i t u r e . "
S e c t i o n 27-2-103, MCA ( f o r m e r l y s e c t i o n 93-2615,
R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 ) , p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n s a r e
a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e S t a t e o f Montana. Respondent contends t h e
Montana corporation license tax is a l i a b i l i t y imposed by
s t a t u t e and, i n t h e absence of a s p e c i a l g r a n t of a u t h o r i t y
p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 25-1-102, MCA, t o t h e S t a t e o f Montana
g r a n t i n g a longer period of l i m i t a t i o n , the generic statute
of l i m i t a t i o n s , which i s two y e a r s , would a p p l y .
Two c a s e s o f t h i s C o u r t c o n t r o l o u r d e c i s i o n i n t h i s
case: S t a t e v . King Colony Ranch ( 1 9 6 0 ) , 1 3 7 Mont. 1 4 5 , 350
P.2d 841, and G r e a t W e s t e r n S u g a r Co. v. Mitchell (1946),
1 1 9 Mont. 328, 174 P . 2 d 817. I n G r e a t W e s t e r n S u q a r Co.
t h i s C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d a c o r p o r a t i o n l i c e n s e f e e , p a i d under
p r o t e s t by t h e s u g a r company. The company f i l e d i t s p a p e r s
of incorporation with t h e S e c r e t a r y of State in 1916 and
paid a fee for f i l i n g thereof a s p r e s c r i b e d by S e c t i o n 1,
Chapter 37, Laws o f 1915. The f e e u n d e r t h e 1915 A c t was
b a s e d on t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e f o r e i g n c o r p o r a t i o n ' s c a p i t a l
stock represented by its property and business in this
state. In 1923 the legislature enacted Chapter 132.
Section 4 of that Act doubled the fee and repealed all
conflicting acts. This Act was reenacted by a statute
p a s s e d by t h e 1 9 2 5 L e g i s l a t u r e t o p r o v i d e t h a t t h e f e e was
t o be c a l c u l a t e d on t h e " a u t h o r i z e d c a p i t a l s t o c k " i n s t e a d
o f on t h e " i s s u e d c a p i t a l s t o c k . " T h i s C o u r t found t h a t t h e
Act, in basing the fee upon authorized capital stock, a
l a r g e p o r t i o n o f which r e m a i n e d u n i s s u e d , o f f e n d e d b o t h t h e
commerce and due process clauses of the United States
C o n s t i t u t i o n and was i n v a l i d .
The C o u r t f u r t h e r f o u n d t h a t where t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n
e n a c t i n g a new s t a t u t e t o t a k e t h e p l a c e o f t h e f o r m e r o n e ,
related t o a given s u b j e c t , intended t o continue t h e policy
t h e r e t o f o r e pursued, where the new A c t would supplant the
f o r m e r one o n l y i n c a s e t h e new A c t s h o u l d become o p e r a t i v e ,
and where such new A c t is declared unconstitutional, the
repealing clause therein contained f a l l s with it. The new
Act must be deemed as though never enacted, and the one
sought to be repealed remains in full force and effect,
c i t i n g Chicago, M . , S t . P. & P. R. Co. v . Harmon ( 1 9 3 1 ) , 89
Mont. 1, 295 P . 762, 764.
G r e a t W e s t e r n S u g a r Co. went on to hold that the
l e g i s l a t u r e c o u l d a d o p t a s t a t u t e by r e f e r e n c e . Gustafson
v. Hammond Irrigation D i s t . ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 87 Mont. 217, 287 P.
640. Considering whether the legislature could adopt a
repealed act, a q u e s t i o n w h i c h was n o t b e f o r e t h e C o u r t , it
s a i d : " I f we assume t h a t t h i s may be d o n e ( s e e 59 C . J . 618),
before it may be accomplished there must be a clear
l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o do s o . ( 5 0 Am.Jur. 574 n . 12) There
i s no l a n g u a g e i n C h a p t e r 1 6 9 [Laws o f 19311 t h a t i n d i c a t e s
any s u c h l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . " G r e a t Western Sugar Co., 174
P.2d a t 8 2 1 .
Appellant i n c o r r e c t l y r e l i e s on G r e a t W e s t e r n S u g a r
- for
Co. the proposition that a repealed statute may be
r e v i v e d by r e f e r e n c e . That case, a s noted above, did not
d e c i d e t h a t i s s u e , a s i t was n o t b e f o r e t h e C o u r t . I t held
that, if it could be done, there had to be a clear
l e q i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o do s o . While appellant argues that
there was a clear legislative intent to revive section
84-1513, R.C.M., 1947, we hold that because of no such
e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e A c t s e c t i o n 84-1513 was n o t r e v i v e d .
The next case for consideration is S t a t e v. King
C o l o n y Ranch, supra, decided i n 1960, which b r o u g h t about
the legislative enactment of Chapter 186, Laws of 1963.
That case called for this Court to interpret what the
l e g i s l a t u r e had d o n e i n 1 9 3 3 and 1 9 4 5 . This Court held with
r e s p e c t t o a l l t a x p a y e r s t h a t t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f Revenue had
five years from t h e d u e d a t e o f the return, i n which to
a s s e r t a d e f i c i e n c y judgment.
This was the state of the law when the 1963
l e g i s l a t u r e e n a c t e d C h a p t e r 1 8 6 , Laws o f 1 9 6 3 , s e e m i n g l y i n
t o t a l i g n o r a n c e o f t h e s t a t e o f t h e l a w i t had c r e a t e d by
i t s 1 9 3 3 and 1 9 4 5 e n a c t m e n t s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t comments
i n i t s memorandum:
" T h e r e w e r e i n t h e 1 9 6 3 A c t no e x p r e s s w o r d s
and no l a n g u a g e o f r e v i v a l o r r e e n a c t m e n t .
I t seems p e r f e c t l y c l e a r t h a t t h e 1963
l e g i s l a t o r s were o b l i v i o u s t o t h e f a c t o u r
Supreme C o u r t had c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e 1 9 3 3 A c t
had been r e p e a l e d o r s u p e r s e d e d by t h e 1 9 4 5
A c t and b e l i e v e d t h e y c o u l d i n c o r p o r a t e t h a t
A c t by r e f e r e n c e . T h e r e was no v i s i b l e
a t t e m p t a n d , i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , no i n t e n t i o n
t o r e v i v e t h e 1933 A c t because t h e q u e s t i o n
apparently never arose."
I n view o f t h e f a c t t h e r e is no e x p r e s s i n t e n t t h a t
the l e g i s l a t u r e intended t o reverse or reenact t h e s t a t u t e
i n t h e 1 9 6 3 A c t , w e h o l d t h e e x c e p t i o n t h e r e i n s e t f o r t h is
unenforceable. State v. King Colony Ranch, supra. We
f u r t h e r h o l d t h a t s e c t i o n 27-2-211, MCA, t h e g e n e r a l s t a t u t e
of l i m i t a t i o n s on a l i a b i l i t y c r e a t e d by s t a t u t e , is t h e
c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e i n t h i s case a n d t h a t a p p e l l a n t c a n n o t
enforce t h e t a x s t a t u t e anytime t h e r e a f t e r .
The judgment is a f f i r m e d .
Justice
We concur: