Heggen v. Mtn. West Farm Bur. Mut. ( 1986 )


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  •                                             NO.    85-71
    I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O F MONTANA
    F
    1986
    NEAL HEGGEN,
    P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
    MOUNTAIN WEST F R
    A M RUREAU M T A
    UU L
    INSURANCE COMPANY,
    D e f e n d a n t and R e s p o n d e n t .
    APPEAL FROM:    District Court of t h e S i x t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
    I n a n d f o r t h e County o f F a l l o n ,
    The H o n o r a b l e A. B. M a r t i n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
    COUNSEL O RECOPJ):
    F
    For Appellant:
    H u n t l e y & E a k i n ; Gene H u n t l e y a r g u e d , B a k e r , Monta-na
    For Respondent:
    C r o w l e y , Haughey, Banson, T o o l e & D i e t r i c h ; H e r b e r t
    I. P i e r c e a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana
    L . R. C a z z e n s , B i l l i n g s , Montana
    Submitted:         ~ o v e m b e r1 4 , 1 9 8 5
    Decided:       march 4 ,
    &
    18 1986
    &" 18 ;$&
    Filed:   ---
    a
    e4%               Clerk
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    Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    Neal Heggen appeals a judgment of the Fallon County
    District Court which granted Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual
    Insurance Co. (Mountain West) a summary judgment.             The Dis-
    trict Court ruled that George Eichhornls steer-roping con-
    tests were a business pursuit, and as such, were excluded
    from coverage under a policy of insurance relating to farm
    operations.      We affirm.
    While Mr. Heggen raises three issues on appeal, we find
    the following issue dispositive:
    Did the District Court err in ruling that the jackpot
    steer-roping contests held by Mr. Eichhorn were a "business
    pursuit" excluded      from insurance coverage, rather than a
    spare     time   recreational     activity   within     the   insurance
    coverage?
    George Eichhorn, a Baker, Montana resident, had worked
    for the State of Montana as a brand inspector since 1962.            In
    July 1973, he purchased a policy of insurance for his small
    ranch from Mountain West.         The policy provided coverage for
    accidental bodily injury to persons on the premises with the
    permission of the insured.       However, it specifically excluded
    from coverage all       "business pursuits."          The policy   also
    provided that written notice of an accident was to be given
    by the insured to Mountain West as soon as practicable, but
    in no event to exceed 60 days.
    In 1975, Mr. Eichhorn constructed a roping arena on his
    land.     He began holding jackpot steer-roping contests.           He
    held three or four steer-roping contests in each of the years
    1975, 1976 and 1977.          Nonprofessional cowboys and ranchers
    participated in the contests and paid a $48 to $50 fee to
    rope a certain number of cattle.             Mr.   Eichhorn reserved
    approximately $300 to $400 from each contest, and the balance
    of the fees were distributed to the winning ropers as prizes.
    After Mr. Heimbuch, the local agent for Mountain West,
    had    observed that Mr. Eichhorn was constructing a roping
    arena in 1975, he advised Mr. Eichhorn that the roping arena
    and roping contests were not covered under the Mountain West
    insurance policy.       Mr. Eichhorn testified that the agent made
    it plain to him that he should have another policy to cover
    the ropers.     He did not take any steps to get such a policy,
    because of the cost.
    On July 23, 1977, Neal Heggen was permanently injured
    when    his   horse    tripped    and   fell on   him   during one of
    Mr. Eichhorn's contests.         Mr. Eichhorn was present on the day
    of the accident and was aware that Mr. Heggen's injuries were
    serious.      Mr. Eichhorn did not immediately notify Mountain
    West of the accident, based in part on his belief that Mr.
    Heggen would not sue him.           Mr. Heggen's attorney contacted
    Mr. Eichhorn in the spring of 1980, and in July 1980, filed a
    complaint against him.           Mr. Eichhorn notified Mountain West
    and delivered a copy of the complaint to Mountain West.             In
    turn, Mountain West advised Mr. Eichhorn they were not going
    to defend him in the action, because the jackpot steer-roping
    was a "business pursuit" and excluded from coverage, and
    because Eichhorn failed to timely notify Mountain West pursu-
    ant to the policy provisions.           Mr. Eichhorn allowed a default
    judgment to be taken against him in the action brought by
    Mr. Heggen.     On October 1, 1980, Mr. Heggen signed a covenant
    not to execute on the judgment against Mr. Eichhorn, in
    exchange      for an   assignment to Mr. Heggen of all of Mr.
    Eichhorn's policy rights against Mountain West.            Mr. Heggen
    then filed suit against Mountain West, alleging that the
    insurance company wrongfully refused to defend Mr. Eichhorn
    in the suit brought by Mr. Heggen and wrongfully refused to
    pay Mr. Heggen any damages for personal injuries.
    Mountain West moved for summary judgment.         The District
    Court entered summary judgment for Mountain West, holding
    that " [t]he totality of the circumstances strongly indicate
    that Eichhorn was engaged in a business pursuit excluded by
    the policy."     Mr. Heggen argues that summary judgment was not
    appropriate because there is a genuine issue of fact as to
    whether the jackpot steer-roping contests were a busirress
    pursuit.
    Eichhorn's insurance policy provides that " [t]his
    policy does not apply      ...   to any business pursuits of an
    Insured     . . ."   The policy defines "busi.n.ess" as follows:
    "Business" means trade,       profession   or
    occupation, other than:
    (a) farming
    (b) the operation of roadside stands
    maintained on the farm premises princi-
    pally for the sale of the produce raised
    thereon, or
    (c) newspaper    delivery,   babysitting,
    caddying, lawn care, and similar activi-
    ties ordinarily performed by minors, when
    the activity is not the principal occupa-
    tion of the Named Insured, and is not a
    full-time occupation of any insured.
    Montana has not specifically adopted criteria for deter-
    mining what is a "business pursuit" for purposes of insurance
    policy excl.usionary clauses.     Other jurisdictions, in their
    definitions of "business pursuit," have addressed the idea. of
    profit or profit motive, and most have required some 1-eve1 of
    continuity or regularity of the activity.         See Annot., 
    48 A.L.R. 3d 1096
    (1973).
    The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has elaborated upon the
    profit or profit motive element of a business pursuit as
    follows:
    In a business pursuit the profit motive,
    or purpose of a profit, is important.
    Whether there is or is not actual profit
    is immaterial. Does a pursuit have to be
    successful from a profit standpoint
    before it is a business pursuit?     If a
    business suffers a loss, was it not a
    business?     The answers are obvious.
    Profit motive, not actual profit, makes a
    pursuit a business pursuit.
    Wiley v. Travelers Insurance Company (1974 Okla.) , 534 P.2d
    1.293, 1295.    That court found that a man who bred, raised,
    and sold St. Bernard puppies part-time at his residence, in
    addition to holding another full-time job, was engaged in a
    business pursuit because of the presence of a profit motive.
    There was testimony that he intended to retire and raise St.
    Bernard puppies.           
    Wiley, 534 P.2d at 1295
    .       The part-time
    aspect of the dog operation did not prevent it from involving
    a profit motive, and it was not necessary that the activity
    result in actual net profits to possess a profit motive.                We
    agree with the reasoning of the Oklahoma court and hold that
    the presence of a profit motive is one characteristic of a
    "business pursuit."
    The exclusionary provision in the insurance policy in
    the Wiley case defined business, as does the present policy,
    as "a trade, profession, or occupation."               Yet, the part-time
    nature of Mr. Wiley's dog operation did not prevent it from
    being a "business pursuit."          The Oklahoma Court distinguished
    Mr. Wiley's business of raising, breeding, and selling St.
    Bernard puppies from simply holding a family pet litter sale.
    It    pointed   out    the     continuing     nature    of   Mr.   Wiley's
    venture--he had extensively renovated a barn to serve as a
    kennel and had done extensive fencing in his back yard.
    
    FJiley, 534 P.2d at 1295
    .       In contrast, some jurisdictions
    require an activity to be the sole or primary occupation of
    the    insured,       in     order    to     be   a     "continually    or
    regularly-conducted activity."           See Brown v. Peninsular Fire
    Ins. Co.        (Ga. 1984), 
    320 S.E.2d 208
    , 209.       We reject that
    view.         The more expansive interpretation of regularity or
    continuity in a. "business pursuit" is consistent with the
    provision in Mr. Eichhorn's insurance policy that "business
    -
    pursuits of an insured"         (emphasis added) are not covered.
    We, as have others, hold that an activity which is continu-
    ally or regularly conducted may be a business pursuit even
    though it is not the primary occupation of the insured.               See
    citations at Krings v.         Safeco Ins. Co. of America            (Kan.
    1981), 628 P.2d 1.071, 1075.
    Mr.    Eichhorn's testimony, in a deposition which was
    before the District Court when it considered the motion for
    summary judgment, establishes a profit motive.                  From his
    testimony, it is clear that he received something in the
    vicinity of $1,200 to $1,500 each year from the fees paid on
    the steer-roping contests.            He listed those amounts on his
    income tax returns.        He listed a s expenses on his income tax
    .
    returns the steers which he purchased for the steer-roping
    and the hay which he fed the steers and the eight or ten
    horses which were used in the steer-roping.               It is true that
    he testified that his income tax return showed no profit, but
    that appeared to be because he lost money on buying and
    selling the steers.        We hold that Mr. Eichhorn's testimony on
    the income and expenses, and his treatment of them on his
    income tax returns, established a profit motive.
    Mr.        Eichhorn   testified    that   he   held   three or   four
    steer-roping contests in each of the years 1975, 1976 and
    1977.     Mr. Eichhorn also testified by deposition at length as
    to the roping arena which he built in 1975.               It was a perma-
    nent arena, with catch pen, return alley, timer's box, chutes
    and bleachers.       He described the fence around the outside of
    the arena as having posts which consist of railroad ties and
    woven wire on the posts with a plank around the top of the
    woven wire and a bumper pole in the middle, the fence being
    five feet high.       The planks were 2" x 8".      There were two
    sets of bleachers with three plank rows for each set.          The
    total   capacity    of    the bleachers was    approximately forty
    persons.   Mr. Eichhorn's testimony clearly establishes that
    these steer-roping contests were held on a regular basis in a
    permanently designed roping arena constructed expressly for
    that purpose.       We hold that the evidence established that
    there was a regular and continuous level of activity which
    amounted to a business pursuit.
    A summary judgment is proper if the record discloses no
    genuine issue of material fact.        Downs v. Smyck (1982), 
    200 Mont. 334
    , 344, 
    651 P.2d 1238
    , 1243.          There is no issue of
    material fact which has been shown.        There is no contradic-
    tion in the facts.       The question to be decided is whether the
    testimony on behalf of the plaintiff, uncontradicted in any
    aspect, is sufficient to establish that Mr.          Eichhorn was
    engaged in a business pursuit.        We hold that Mr. Eichhorn's
    own testimony establishes that there was a profit motive and
    that he conducted the steer-roping contests on a regular and
    continuing basis.        We affirm the District Court in its con-
    clusion that Mr. Eichhorn was engaged in a business pursuit.
    We therefore do not consider the other issues raised.
    Af firmed   .
    Justices
    Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., dissenting:
    The majority holds that as a matter of law jackpot
    steer-roping contests are a business pursuit.                   I cannot
    agree.    A business pursuit is characterized by continuity and
    the existence of a profit motive.
    In the case at bar, the steer-roping contests were not
    hel-d on a regular basis.         Three to four were held in the
    summer of 1976, for example, but only one in the summer of
    1980.      Throughout this period, Eichhorn continued in his
    occupation    as   a   State Brand      Inspector.      While    Eichhorn
    participated. in the contests held at his ranch, he did not
    participate in all the contests held in the area.              There is a
    genuine issue of fact whether this level of activity is
    "continuous" enough to amount to a business pursuit.
    A     business    pursuit    is    also   characterized     by    the
    existence of a profit motive.             As the majority correctly
    points out, it is the motive to realize a profit and not the
    actual realization of a profit that is the critical factor.
    All the money Eichhorn collected from the participants in the
    contests     was   awarded   to   the    contest     winners    with   the
    exception of a small amount retained by Eichhorn to cover the
    cost of feeding the stock.        Bleachers were sometimes erected
    to accommodate spectators, but spectators were never charged
    admission.     While Eichhorn listed the fees he collected and
    the expenses he incurred from the contests on his income tax
    returns, the majority's reliance on this fact is misplaced.
    Income tax returns are a device to determine the amount of
    tax owed to the governmert, and nothing more.             They are not
    used to demonstrate financial worth or a profit motive.                Had
    Eichhorn failed to report these items on his income tax
    return, he would have been in violation of the law.                The fact
    that he did report these items as required by law does not
    evince a profit motive.
    Since this is an appeal from a summary judgment, all
    reasonable inferences that can be dra.wn must be drawn in
    favor of the losing party, Eichhorn.                  That being the case,
    there is a genuine question whether Eichhorn was engaged in a
    business pursuit, characterized by continuity and a profit
    motive.         This question should have been decided by the jury,
    and   not       by   the   trial   court upon    a    motion   for summary
    j udqment   .
    Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy and Mr. Justice Fra.nk R .
    hlorrison, Jr. join in the dissent of Mr. Justice William E.
    Hunt, Sr.
    L/
    .//     Justices
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 85-071

Filed Date: 3/17/1986

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014