State v. Musgrove ( 1982 )

No. 82-32
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
THURMAN J. MUSGROVE,
Defendant,
INTERNATIONAL FIDELITY INSURANCE
COMPANY, BONDING COMPANY,
Petitioner and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Mineral
Honorable Douglas Harkin, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
C. J. Tornabene argued, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Sarah Powers argued, Assistant Attorney General,
Helena, Montana
M. Shaun Donovan, County Attorney, Superior, Montana
submitted : FTovembei- 26, 1982
Decided: December 29, 1982
Filed: DEC & 8 % !
I %!
M r . J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
Defendant appeals a Mineral County judgment finding him
g u i l t y , f o r a second t i m e , of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide. The
j u d g m e n t i n t h i s c a s e a r i s e s from a r e t r i a l t h i s C o u r t o r d e r e d i n
State v. Musgrove (1978), 178 Mont. 162, 582 P.2d 1246.
This time, defendant presents four issues to this Court.
F i r s t , d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by d i s c u s s i n g
i s s u e s of the case with prospective jurors, i n t h e a b s e n c e of
defendant and his counsel, without recording the discussion.
Second, defendant argues the trial court erred by allowing
r e f e r e n c e s to d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i o r t r i a l . Third, defendant contends
t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by a d m i t t i n g e v i d e n c e of a crime d e f e n d a n t
was n o t c h a r g e d w i t h . F o u r t h , d e f e n d a n t claims t h e t r i a l c o u r t
violated his rights to due process by giving the jury the
following instruction: "The law a l s o p r e s u m e s that a person
i n t e n d s t h e o r d i n a r y c o n s e q u e n c e s of a n y v o l u n t a r y a c t c o m m i t t e d
b y him." W e need o n l y a n a l y z e t h e f o u r t h i s s u e , and b e c a u s e w e
f i n d e r r o r , w e m u s t r e v e r s e and remand f o r a new t r i a l . I n view
of our reversal i n t h i s case, comment w i l l a l s o be d i r e c t e d to
i s s u e s t w o and t h r e e .
The instruction complained of was jury instruction number
s e v e n ; i n f u l l it s t a t e s :
" I n e v e r y crime or p u b l i c o f f e n s e t h e S t a t e
m u s t e s t a b l i s h e a c h e l e m e n t d e s c r i b e d by t h e
s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g t h e o f f e n s e and t h e S t a t e
must f u r t h e r e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e Defendant
a c t e d while having t h e mental state required
by the s t a t u t e defining the offense.
"In t h i s action the s t a t u t e requires t h a t the
Defendant performed t h e acts knowingly o r pur-
posely. A p e r s o n acts knowingly w i t h r e s p e c t
t o c o n d u c t or t o a c i r c u m s t a n c e d e s c r i b e d b y a
s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g a n o f f e n s e when he i s a w a r e
of h i s conduct or t h a t t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e
exists. When k n o w l e d g e of t h e e x i s t e n c e of a
p a r t i c u l a r f a c t is a n e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e ,
s u c h k n o w l e d g e i s e s t a b l i s h e d i f a p e r s o n is
aware of a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y of i t s e x i s t e n c e .
"A p e r s o n a c t s p u r p o s e l y w i t h respect t o a
r e s u l t or t o c o n d u c t d e s c r i b e d b y a s t a t u t e
d e f i n i n g a n o f f e n s e i f it is h i s c o n s c i o u s
o b j e c t t o e n g a g e i n t h a t c o n d u c t or to c a u s e
that result. When a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e is a n
element of an offense the element is
e s t a b l i s h e d , a1 t h o u g h s u c h p u r p o s e i s con-
d i t i o n a l u n l e s s t h e c o n d i t i o n n e g a t e s t h e harm
o r e v i l s o u g h t t o be p r e v e n t e d b y t h e l a w
defining the offense .
"Any r e q u i r e d m e n t a l s t a t e need n o t be p r o v e d
b y d i r e c t e v i d e n c e b u t may be i n f e r r e d from
a c t s , c o n d u c t and c i r c u m s t a n c e s a p p e a r i n g i n
t h e evidence. The law
- - - - a l s o -r e s u m e s t h a t a
p
p e r s o n i n t e n d s t h e o r d i n a r y consequences of
- -
- - a r y - -c o m m i t t e d by - T h i s p r K
a n y v o l u n- c t
t a him.
s u m p t i o n , h o w e v e r , is termed a d i s p u t a b l e p r e -
s u m p t i o n and may be c o n t r o v e r t e d b y o t h e r
e v i d e n c e . " (Emphasis added. )
The underlined portion, which may be referred to as the
"Sandstrom i n s t r u c t i o n ," is t h e f o c u s of appellant's argument.
Appellant contends the giving of that portion of instruction
number s e v e n is c l e a r l y r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i n v i e w of t h e United
S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t ' s holding i n Sandstrom v. Montana (1979),
494
4-552- U.S. 5 1 0 , 99 S . C t . 2450, 6 1 L. Ed. 2d 39. I n t h a t case, t h e
United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t s t r u c k down a s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l an
instruction almost identical to the language emphasized above
" [blecause David Sandstrom's jury may have interpreted the
judge I s i n s t r u c t i o n as c o n s t i t u t i n g e i t h e r a b u r d e n s h i f t i n g p r e -
sumption . . . or a conclusive presumption . . ." 4 2 2 U.S. at
524.
On remand t o t h i s C o u r t , t h e q u e s t i o n was " w h e t h e r t h e erro-
neous instruction constituted harmless error as against the
defendant." S t a t e v. Sandstrom (1979) -.- Mont .
6 0 3 P.2d 244, 245, 36 St.Rep. 2099, 2100. W e found r e v e r s i b l e
error. W e reversed because " [ t ]h e e r r o n e o u s i n s t r u c t i o n [ w e n t ]
t o a v i t a l e l e m e n t of t h e proof of t h e crime, n a m e l y t h e i n t e n t
of t h e defendant Sandstrom i n committing t h e homicide. If the
j u r y f o l l o w e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , it c o u l d h a v e presumed t h e i n t e n t
w i t h o u t p r o o f beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . " Mont. at I
6 0 3 P.2d a t 2 4 5 , 36 S t . R e p . a t 2101. I n t h e c a s e now b e f o r e u s ,
the question is the same, was the giving of the instruction
h a r m l e s s error? W e must answer i n t h e n e g a t i v e .
I n t h i s c a s e , as i n S a n d s t r o m , t h e i n s t r u c t i o n o b v i o u s l y p e r -
m i t t e d t h e j u r y to presume i n t e n t w i t h o u t proof beyond a r e a s o n -
able doubt. The d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t e n t was a h o t l y c o n t e s t e d i s s u e
of fact i n t h e case and i n t e n t is a n i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t o f the
crime t h e S t a t e c h a r g e d . B e c a u s e of the instruction, the jury
c o u l d d i s r e g a r d t h e d e f e n d a n t s t e s t i m o n y t h a t he i n t e n d e d o n l y
t o f i r e a w a r n i n g s h o t ; t h e n w i t h t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of i n t e n t , t h e
j u r y c o u l d h a v e c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t used d e a d l y f o r c e to
intentionally kill the victim. Therefore, because of the
Sandstrom instruction, the State could obtain a convict ion
without having to introduce any evidence of the defendant's
intent.
Respondent argues that the issue here was not intent but
justification i n t h e use of f o r c e by the defendant, and since
i n t e n t was n o t a n i s s u e , t h e g i v i n g o f t h e S a n d s t r o m i n s t r u c t i o n
was harmless error. Respondent c i t e s S t a t e v. Sunday ( 1 9 8 0 ),
---- Mon t . , 609 P.2d 1188, 37 St.Rep. 561, t o support its
argument. In Sunday the jury was given the Sandstrom
instruction; " t h e l a w presumes t h a t a person intends the ordi-
n a r y consequences of h i s v o l u n t a r y a c t s . " W e found t h e g i v i n g o f
the i n s t r u c t i o n to b e , a t most, harmless e r r o r . Such w a s o u r
holding because by Sunday's own a d m i s s i o n , h i s o b j e c t was "to
s h o o t t h e McLeans or t o c a u s e t h a t r e s u l t . " C o n s e q u e n t l y , it was
never an i s s u e w h e t h e r S u n d a y p u r p o s e l y or k n o w i n g l y s h o t the
victims. I n o t h e r words, overwhelming e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e d the
p r e s u m p t i o n of t h e Sandstrom i n s t r u c t i o n . Sunday's j u r y d i d n o t
h a v e t o p r e s u m e t h a t h e i n t e n d e d t h e o r d i n a r y c o n s e q u e n c e s of h i s
v o l u n t a r y a c t s ; t h a t h e s h o t a t t h e McLeans i n t e n d i n g to k i l l or
seriously injure. Sunday a d m i t t e d that. The o n l y issue was
w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e s h o o t i n g w a s done i n s e l f d e f e n s e .
T h i s c a s e i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from Sunday. Here, t h e defen-
dant testified that he only intended to f i r e a warning shot.
However, the Sandstrom i n s t r u c t i o n allowed the jury to p r e s u m e
t h a t b e c a u s e Musgrove p u l l e d t h e t r i g g e r , he i n t e n d e d t o k i l l t h e
victim.
The respondent also argues that the instruction was per-
m i s s i v e i n n a t u r e r a t h e r t h a n mandatory; consequently, the prin-
c i p l e s o f S a n d s t r o m were n o t v i o l a t e d . W e have r e c o g n i z e d this
distinction i n S t a t e v. Bad Horse ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - - - - Mont. I
605 P.2d 1113, 37 St.Rep. 45, and State v. Coleman (1979),
Mon t . -- , 6 0 5 P.2d 1 0 5 1 , 36 S t . R e p . 2237. However, in
t h i s case, af ter a r e a d i n g of a l l of t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , espe-
c i a l l y t h e f u l l t e x t of i n s t r u c t i o n no. 7 , we c a n n o t be c e r t a i n
beyond a reasonable doubt that members of the jury did not
misconstrue the instruction. A s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t
s t a t e d i n S a n d s t r o m v . Montana:
"We d o n o t r e j e c t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t some
j u r o r s may h a v e i n t e r p r e t e d t h e c h a l l e n g e d
i n s t r u c t i o n as p e r m i s s i v e , o r , i f m a n d a t o r y ,
a s r e q u i r i n g o n l y t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t come f o r -
ward with 'some1 e v i d e n c e in rebuttal.
However, t h e f a c t t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e j u r o r
c o u l d h a v e g i v e n t h e p r e s u m p t i o n c o n c l u s i v e or
p e r s u a s i o n - s h i f t i n g e f f e c t means t h a t we can-
not discount the possibility
a t 519.
. . ." 442 U.S.
Accordingly, we must r e v e r s e .
The m a t t e r of r e f e r e n c e s to p r e v i o u s t r i a l s s h o u l d n o t o c c u r
if the trial court f o l l o w s o u r recommendation t h a t a change of
venue t a k e p l a c e . However, i n r e g a r d to t h i s i s s u e , o u r s t a t u t e ,
s e c t i o n 46-16-701, MCA, provides: " a Inew t r i a l is a reexamina-
t i o n of t h e i s s u e i n t h e same c o u r t b e f o r e a n o t h e r j u r y a f t e r a
v e r d i c t or a f i n d i n g h a s b e e n r e n d e r e d . The g r a n t i n g o f a new
trial places the p a r t i e s i n the same p o s i t i o n as i f t h e r e had
b e e n no t r i a l ."
Appellant contends that this statute compels an automatic
reversal if a n y o n e ( o t h e r t h a n d e f e n d a n t o r h i s w i t n e s s e s ) men-
tions that there has been another trial. W decline
e to so
s t r i c t l y construe t h i s statute. W e c a n e n v i s i o n many s i t u a t i o n s
where i t may be necessary to mention the fact t h e r e h a s been
another trial. W d i r e c t t h e t r i a l c o u r t and c o u n s e l
e for the
S t a t e and d e f e n s e t o c a r e f u l l y g u a r d t h e r e c o r d to see t h a t n o n e
of the parties i n v o l v e d l o s e o r g a i n a n y r i g h t s b e c a u s e of the
r e s u l t of t h e p r e v i o u s t r i a l . The f a i r t r i a l i s s u e m u s t p r e d o m i -
n a t e i n t h e new t r i a l .
Concerning i s s u e t h r e e , the f a c t t h a t the appellant did not
h a v e a gun p e r m i t , w e n o t e t h a t t h i s i s s u e was c r e a t e d b y t h e
opening argument of appellant's counsel and suggest that on
r e t r i a l t h e c o u r t a d m o n i s h c o u n s e l n o t to r e p e a t t h i s a r g u m e n t .
I f c o u n s e l , o n r e t r i a l , a r g u e s a p p e l l a n t s r i g h t to c a r r y a l o a d e d
p i s t o l , t h e n t h e S t a t e may c o u n t e r as it d i d i n t h i s t r i a l .
F i n a l l y , we d i r e c t t h e District C o u r t g r a n t a change of venue
f o r r e t r i a l i n t h i s case. I n Montana, t h e r u l e p e r t a i n i n g to a
c h a n g e o f v e n u e is:
". . . a n accused i s e n t i t l e d to a change of
v e n u e when i t a p p e a r s t h e r e a r e r e a s o n a b l e
grounds to b e l i e v e t h a t t h e p r e j u d i c e a l l e g e d
a c t u a l l y e x i s t s and t h a t by r e a s o n o f t h e p r e -
j u d i c e t h e r e is a r e a s o n a b l e a p p r e h e n s i o n t h a t
t h e a c c u s e d c a n n o t r e c e i v e a f a i r and impar-
tial trial."
S t a t e v. Austad (1982), --- - -.-- Mont . , 6 4 1 P.2d 1373,
1 3 8 1 , 39 S t . R e p . 3 5 6 , 3 6 4 ; S t a t e v. L i n k ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont. --- I
6 4 0 P.2d 3 6 6 , 38 S t . R e p . 982. I n l o o k i n g a t t h e r e c o r d , and t h e
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f M i n e r a l C o u n t y , w e t h i n k t h e r e are a number of
r e a s o n s t o s u p p o r t a change of venue i n t h i s c a s e . First, i t is
obvious t h a t Mineral County is a v e r y small c o u n t y c o n t a i n i n g
o n l y a b o u t 993 r e s i d e n t s . This alone substantially increases the
p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t p u b l i c i t y c o n c e r n i n g t h e case c o u l d be p e r v a s i v e
i n t h e c o u n t y and a f f e c t t h e o p i n i o n s o f p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s . As a
stronger reason, however, we n o t e t h a t t h e r e have a l r e a d y been
t w o t r i a l s i n t h i s county. Each o f t h e s e t r i a l s were h o t l y con-
tested and attended by many residents of the county.
C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e r e s u l t s and c o n t e n t o f t h e
p r i o r t r i a l s h a v e b e e n w i d e l y d i s s e m i n a t e d is much h i g h e r t h a n i f
n o p r e v i o u s t r i a l s had o c c u r r e d . Therefore, the criteria f o r a
change of venue articulated in -ink
L- and Austad are to be
fulfilled.
Reversed.
Xe c o n c u r :
" h i&J u s! c e
C i e f f &t i
f .?%i-Jq
Ilk. Justice Daniel J. Shea, specially concurring:
I join the majority in ruling that defendant is entitled to a
new trial &cause the unconstitutional Sandstrom instruction was
qiven.
Although the first issue--discussion of the case by the
District Court with prospective jurors in the absence of defendant
and his counsel--need not be decided, for future guidance, this
Court should have provided a detailed analysis of what happened and
why the procedure should be condemned. And the same is true of the
second issue--defendant's contention that he was prejudiced by
references to his first trial. This Court should have set forth
some quidelines in an effort to eliminate potential prejudice
arising from mentioning that a defendant is being tried for a second
or even.third time. On the third issue, I agree with the Court that
defendant opened the door by defense counsel's statement i the
n
opening statement and therefore no preiudice occurred because the
State went into the concealed weapon issue during its case i chief.
n
H"