Hash v. Mont. Power Co. ( 1974 )


Menu:
  •                                        No. 12537
    I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O M N A A
    OR    F           F OTN
    1974
    A. G. HASH, d/b / a H S CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
    AH
    P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
    -vs   -
    MONTANA P W R COMPANY,
    O E
    Defendant and Respondent.
    Appeal from:       D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
    Honorable W. W. L e s s l e y , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
    Counsel of Record:
    For A p p e l l a n t :
    David W. DePuy, L i v i n g s t o n , Montana
    Bennett and B e n n e t t , Bozeman, Montana
    Lyman H . B e n n e t t , Jr. appeared and Lyman H . B e n n e t t , 1 1
    1
    argued, Bozeman , Montana
    For Respondent :
    Berg, Angel, Andriolo and Morgan, Bozeman, Montana
    Richard J. Andriolo appeared and Gregory 0. Morgan
    argued, Bozeman, Montana
    Submitted:            A p r i l 24, 1974
    Decided :
    qflk 2 4   1974
    Mr.   Chief J u s t i c e James T . H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
    t h e Court.
    Hash C o n s t r u c t i o n Company b r o u g h t a c t i o n i n t h e d i s t r i c t
    c o u r t o f P a r k County t o r e c o v e r damages i n t h e amount o f $46,793.83
    f o r a f i r e o r i g i n a t i n g i n t h e e l e c t r i c a l m e t e r box on i t s prop-
    e r t y e a s t of L i v i n g s t o n , Montana on August 29, 1970, and t o
    which d e f e n d a n t Montana Power Company p r o v i d e d t h e e l e c t r i c i t y .
    A t t h e c l o s e o f a l l t h e e v i d e n c e , p l a i n t i f f moved f o r a d i r e c t e d
    v e r d i c t on t h e b a s i s of r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r , which motion was t a k e n
    under a d v i s e m e n t .       The c a s e t h e n was s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y ; a
    v e r d i c t i n f a v o r o f d e f e n d a n t Montana Power Company was r e t u r n e d ;
    and judgment was e n t e r e d a c c o r d i n g l y .             P l a i n t i f f t h e r e u p o n moved
    f o r judgment n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v e r d i c t , a g a i n on t h e b a s i s o f
    r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r , o r , i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , f o r a new t r i a l .          The
    motion was d e n i e d .
    P l a i n t i f f s u b s e q u e n t l y p e r f e c t e d t h i s a p p e a l and r a i s e s
    three issues:              (1) Whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g
    t o g r a n t a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t i n f a v o r of p l a i n t i f f on t h e b a s i s
    o f res i p s a l o q u i t u r .       ( 2 ) Whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n
    f a i l i n g t o g r a n t a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t f o r p l a i n t i f f on grounds of
    a l l e g a t i o n s of n e g l i g e n c e .   ( 3 ) Whether t h e e v i d e n c e was s u f f i c i e n t
    t o s u p p o r t a j u r y v e r d i c t i n f a v o r of d e f e n d a n t .
    The f a c t s a r e :
    An e a r l i e r f i r e o c c u r r e d i n t h e meter box l o c a t e d on
    p l a i n t i f f ' s p r o p e r t y i n F e b r u a r y 1970.      Walford L i n d q u i s t , an
    employee of Montana Power Company, came t o p l a i n t i f f ' s p r o p e r t y
    t o d i s c o n n e c t t h e power and remove t h e damaged m e t e r .                       A f t e r re-
    moving t h e m e t e r , he d i s c o v e r e d t h e remains of a dead mouse i n
    t h e m e t e r box and t h o u g h t it t o be t h e p o s s i b l e c a u s e of t h e f i r e .
    F u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n by L i n d q u i s t r e v e a l e d an a c c e s s from w i t h i n
    p l a i n t i f f ' s b u i l d i n g t o t h e m e t e r box which would a l l o w f o r e i g n
    o b j e c t s t o e n t e r t h r o u g h t h e r e a r of t h e m e t e r box.
    Plaintiff hired Cissel Electric to perform the work of
    replacing the damaged meter box.   Lindquist showed Cissel Elec-
    tric the dead mouse he had found in it.   After Cissel Electric
    had completed its work, Lindquist returned to plaintiff's prop-
    erty,connected the service drop, and installed a new meter.
    The second fire, which occurred some six months after
    the new box and meter had been installed, was investigated by Dr.
    J. L. Knox, an electrical engineer at Montana State University,
    and his report was admitted into evidence on behalf of plaintiff.
    In essence, Dr. Knox testified that, in his opinion, the fire
    was caused by a power surge coming over and through the power
    line owned by defendant, and when the power surge reached plain-
    tiff's property, it resulted in a short circuit and a fire.     He
    hypothesized that the collision of descending and returning ex-
    cessive waves of electricity during the power surge was responsible
    for melting the service wire which came from defendant's utility
    pole into the weatherhead on plaintiff's building.
    An investigation of the fire was also conducted by Glen
    Wheeler, an electrical engineer employed by defendant; Robert Leo,
    an electrical engineer at Montana State University; and John Yost,
    an electrician employed by Montana Power Company.    Wheeler and
    Yost testified for defendant and they disagreed with the surge
    theory proposed by Dr. KnoX.   In their opinion, this fire was
    the result of foreign materials accumulating in the meter box
    which resulted in arcing and subsequently fire. Leo in partic-
    of
    ular testified that because/lightning arresters and transformers
    in the line, a power surge of the magnitude testified to by Dr.
    Knox would have dissipated by the time it reached plaintiff's
    property.   Neither Wheeler nor Leo was able to find any evidence
    to support Dr. Knox's surge theory.   There were no unusual fluc-
    tuations on defendant's voltage chart which monitors the power
    system at Livingston, nor records indicating that other customers
    on the line serving plaintiff's property also complained of
    trouble on the day of the fire.     Yost testified that, in his
    opinion, the break in the service wire was due to stress and
    not melting.
    This Court many times has said that certain elements are
    necessary in res ipsa loquitur cases:     (1) the defendant having
    exclusive control of the offending instrumentation possesses the
    knowledge of the cause of the accident, and the plaintiff does
    not; (2) the injured person must be without fault; (3) that the
    injury would not ordinarily occur if the defendant, the one hav-
    ing control, had used ordinary care; and (4) the thing that causes
    the injury must be in the exclusive control of the defendant at
    the time of the injury.     Bostwick v. Butte Motor Co., 
    145 Mont. 570
    , 589, 590, 403 P.2d 6i4.    We hold the doctrine of res ipsa
    loquitur is not appropriate in the instant case and consequently
    the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for
    a directed verdict.
    Superior position of defendant.    Plaintiff's contention
    that defendant is in a better position to explain the fire of
    August 29, 1970, is not persuasive.     The weatherhead meter box
    and related wiring had all been installed by the electrician at
    the request of plaintiff.    Plaintiff complained that after the
    meter was installed it did not have any opportunity to inspect
    the box, yet Hash, plaintiff's owner, testified unequivocally
    that he did not at any time after the box was installed make an
    effort to inspect it.   The box was on plaintiff's building, sup-
    plying power to its machinery and lighting, but nevertheless it
    is argued that defendant is in a better position than plaintiff
    to explain the cause of the accident.    The meter box was separated
    by a thin wall from the inside of the building.    Through that
    wall, on an earlier occasion, a mouse entered, apparently
    causing electrical damage.     It cannot be denied that plaintiff
    is in exclusive control of the wiring, circuit breakers and
    other electrical devices within the building.    Therefore, it is
    senseless to argue that it is not in control of the weatherhead
    and meter box installed by an independent electrician at its
    request.
    To hold that defendant must supply an explanation for
    every fire that occurs on private property to which it supplies
    electricity, when it can be shown that the fire developed through
    arcing in the meter box would have virtually the force and effect
    of making defendant strictly liable for injuries which occur
    without proof of negligence on its part.
    Even if it might be determined that a power company is
    in the same relative position to the general public as that of a
    common carrier and, therefore, as a matter of public policyfit
    should be required to explain accidents which occur through its
    equipment, this case does not fall within that principle.    The
    fire occurred on plaintiff's property within equipment owned by
    it.   There is no reason to believe that defendant is in a better
    position to explain how the accident happened than is plaintiff.
    Faultless plaintiff.    The evidence reveals that plaintiff
    was not entirely free from responsibility for the fire.    On cross-
    -
    examination Dr. Knox, plaintiff's expert witness, testified:
    "A. It is my understanding that the weatherhead,
    the conduit, the cable leading to it and the
    meter base are all installed by the electrician
    hired by the consumer.
    "Q. That would be the owner's electrician in-
    stalls what you have marked here as the weather-
    head, the wires that come out of the weatherhead
    and the wires that extend down that weatherhead
    into the meter base, together with all of the
    other wiring from the meter base into the build-
    ing? A. That is my understanding of the current
    practice."
    Dr. Knox's expert opinion was that the most likely cause
    of the arcing within the meter box was a power surge, yet upon
    further cross-examination he testified:
    "Q. Dr. Knox, have you had much experience work-
    ing with 480 volt circuits? A. I have had a
    reasonable amount of experience. My work with
    Firestone Tire and Rubber Company involved quite
    a lot of 480, or 440 it was in those days.
    "Q. Now Dr. Knox, could moisture accumulating
    in the meter box cause a short within the meter
    base here? What I am referring to is not the
    meter but the meter base, which is Plaintiff's
    Exhibit 2? A. An accumulation of moisture coupled
    with contaminants that might get into the moisture
    could cause a bridging across insulation and
    eventually causing a breakdown, yes.
    "Q. So a short within this box could have occurred
    from moisture accumulation within the box? A.
    Moisture plus other contaminants. Pure water is
    not a conductor.
    "Q. So that also is another explanation for the
    short which occurred in this box on August 29,
    1970, as well as your power surge explanation?
    A. That would be a possibility.
    "Q. Now what about a loose connection within
    the box, Dr. Knox? A. Yes, any connection between
    ground and one of the hot conductors could cause
    an arcing to be established.
    "Q. What about foreign matter in there, dirt,
    dust, straw, this type of thing; a mouse. A.
    Foreign matter of sufficient conductivity in
    the right places could cause it."
    The insurance report prepared by Dr. Knox indicated that
    incident to an earlier fire, a short in the meter box had been
    caused by a mouse.   There is ample evidence that the meter box
    and related parts were vulnerable to foreign objects entering.
    The jury could reasonably conclude that moisture, a loose con-
    nection, a mouse, or any kind of foreign matter could have caused
    arcing which resulted in the later fire.
    Evidence the injury would not ordinarily occur without
    negligence.   There is a dearth of evidence in the record tending
    to establish that the fire was an accident which ordinarily would
    not have happened without negligence on the part of defendant.
    Plaintiff attempts to satisfy the third element of -
    res
    i p s a l o q u i t u r s o l e l y on t h e b a s i s o f D r . Knox's h y p o t h e s i z e d power
    surge.       Y e t t h e r e i s no c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e t h a t a power s u r g e i n
    and o f i t s e l f i s a r e s u l t o f n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t o f d e f e n d -
    ant.      Moreover, t h e j u r y a p p a r e n t l y doubted whether i n f a c t
    t h e r e was a power s u r g e .           None was n o t i c e d by o t h e r u t i l i t y c u s -
    tomers o r b r o u g h t t o d e f e n d a n t ' s a t t e n t i o n on t h e day of t h e f i r e .
    There were no d e f e c t s found i n t h e s e r v i c e l i n e s , m e t e r o r t r a n s -
    mission f a c i l i t i e s .      August 29, 1970 was a c l e a r d a y i n t h e
    L i v i n g s t o n a r e a , w i t h no s t o r m s o r o t h e r t u r b u l e n c e .
    The j u r y r e j e c t e d t h e power s u r g e theory, a s it had a
    p e r f e c t r i g h t t o d o , s i n c e i t was c o n t r a d i c t e d and n o t s u p p o r t e d
    by o t h e r e v i d e n c e .    There was no s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e upon which
    t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t c o u l d c o n c l u d e t h a t r e a s o n a b l e men might f i n d
    d e f e n d a n t r e s p o n s i b l e t h r o u g h i t s n e g l i g e n c e f o r a power s u r g e .
    S i n c e we have concluded t h i s i s n o t a r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r
    c a s e , t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e p r o c e d u r a l impact of t h a t d o c t r i n e i n
    Montana need n o t be c o n s i d e r e d .
    The f i n a l i s s u e i s t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e t o
    support t h e verdict.               A defendant i s n o t required t o r e b u t a l l
    o f t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s e v i d e n c e b u t i n s t e a d need o n l y p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e
    from which r e a s o n a b l e men c o u l d c o n c l u d e h i s freedom from neg-
    ligence.          I n o u r view, t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f e v i d e n c e s e t o u t above
    s a t i s f i e s t h i s t e s t i n t h a t i t e s t a b l i s h e s t h e r e was ample
    evidence t o support t h e jury v e r d i c t f o r defendant.
    The j u r y was g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n s i d e r a l l of t h e
    e v i d e n c e and was under i n s t r u c t i o n s which were f a v o r a b l e t o p l a i n -
    tiff.      The j u r y d e t e r m i n e d d e f e n d a n t was n o t l i a b l e .       W agree.
    e
    Whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o g r a n t
    p l a i n t i f f ' s motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t on t h e grounds of
    a l l e g a t i o n s of n e g l i g e n c e c a n be d i s p o s e d of simply:           There i s no
    i n d i c a t i o n t h i s i s s u e was e v e r r a i s e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t .     It
    is fundamental that objections urged for the first time on
    appeal will not be considered by this Court.
    The judgment is af£irmed.
    chief Justice
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12537

Filed Date: 7/24/1974

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016