Krone v. McCann ( 1982 )

No. 81-50
I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE OF M N A A
O T N
1981
M A X I N E M. KRONE ,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
REX T . McCANN a n d D R T Y G. McCANN,
O OH
i n d i v i d u a l l y a n d as o f f i c e r s o f , a n d
d/b/a SUPERIOR H M S REALTORS, I N C . ,
O E
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: ~ i s t r i c t ourt of t h e Fourteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
C
I n a n d f o r t h e County o f M u s s e l s h e l l , The H o n o r a b l e
N a t A l l e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For Appellant:
B o s c h e r t & Z o s c h e r t , B i l l i n g s , Montana
For Respondents :
Keefer, Roybal, and Hanson, B i l l i n g s , Montana
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s ? August 6 , 1981
~ecided: \Ah! 5.. 1374
Filed: -
8brti K j 4 *1782
v-
Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .
T h i s is an a c t i o n i n n e g l i g e n c e w i t h t h e p l a i n t i f f ,
Maxine K r o n e , s e e k i n g r e c o v e r y o f damages f o r a n i n j u r y s h e
r e c e i v e d w h i l e s h e was a b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e on t h e p r o p e r t y o f
the defendants. D e f e n d a n t s moved for summary judgment on
all issues; plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the
i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y only. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e Four-
teenth Judicial District, Musselshell County, granted the
d e f e n d a n t s ' motion. The p l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s .
On J u n e 1 3 , 1 9 7 6 , a p p e l l a n t wrenched h e r knee w h i l e
she was walking on rural property owned by respondents.
R e s p o n d e n t Rex McCann, a s a r e a l t o r f o r S u p e r i o r Homes, was
showing t h e p r o p e r t y t o a p p e l l a n t f o r h e r p o s s i b l e p u r c h a s e .
At the time of the injury, McCann was l o o k i n g f o r a well
located on the property, and the a p p e l l a n t was following
him.
I n her deposition the a p p e l l a n t gave t h e following
a c c o u n t of how h e r i n j u r y o c c u r r e d :
"Q. Would you e x p l a i n t o m e what happened
t h a t d a y t h a t r e s u l t e d i n some i n j u r y t o you?
A. Mr. McCann was showing u s t h e p l a c e . Is
t h a t what you mean?
"Q. Um-hum, and what h a p p e n e d ? A . W --
e
He was d r i v i n g u s a r o u n d i n h i s v e h i c l e . And
we s t o p p e d on t h e r o a d , g o t o u t and l o o k e d a t
one w e l l t h a t we c o u l d s e e . Or what you want
t o c a l l it. And t h e n he was t o show u s
a n o t h e r w e l l t h a t was r i g h t -- r i g h t a r o u n d
there.
"Q. Go a h e a d . What h a p p e n e d ? A. Well, I
was f o l l o w i n g him, and . . .
hurt m leg.
y
"U. W e l l , how d i d you come t o h u r t y o u r l e g ?
A. L i k e I s a i d , I was f o l l o w i n g him, ' c a u s e
he c o u l d n ' t f i n d t h i s one w e l l . And . . .
I
_--_-___--___---__------------------- s o m e - - I r e a l l y _
stumbled o r f e l l over
h a t -- some d e b r i
c o u l d n ' t t e l l y o u w..................... s o r
w h a t e v e r i t was.
"Q. When you say i t was 'debris,' d o you
mean t o s a y t h a t -- Can you d e s c r i b e what i t
was i n t e r m s o f -- Was i t m e t a l ? Was i t
wood? Was i t d i r t ? What was i t ? A. I
r e a l l y d o n ' t know. I t was . . . something
t h a t was -- T h e r e had been a n o l d c o r r a l a t
o n e t i m e t h a t had b e e n . . . oh, I suppose
w h a t I would c a l l t h e 'home c o r r a l p l a c e '
where t h e y b r a n d e d t h e c a t t l e o r w h a t e v e r ,
a n d t h e r e was a l o t o f t h a t l a y i n g a r o u n d .
"Q. I t was i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f a n o l d c o r r a l ,
i s t h a t r i g h t ? A. Yes. Well, I mean t h e r e
was a l o t o f l o g s and s t u f f l a y i n g a r o u n d .
I'Q . Now w a s t h e r e a p a t h ? Were you
f o l l o w i n g s o m e t h i n g , o r were you-- A. I was
f o l l o w i n g Mr. McCann.
"Q. Okay. Now, was h e i m m e d i a t e l y i n f r o n t
o f you? Was h e 5 0 f e e t i n f r o n t o f you? How
much d i s t a n c e s e p a r a t e d you f r o m Mr. McCann?
A. I d o n ' t remember e x a c t l y , a b o u t 1 5 f e e t .
"Q. Was y o u r s o n w i t h you? A. M s o n was
y
with me, yes.
"Q. Was h e a t y o u r s i d e , o r was h e b e h i n d
you o r i n f r o n t o f you? A. He was w a l k i n g
b e s i d e me, I t h i n k .
"Q. Now, d i d you f a l l t o t h e g r o u n d ? A.
No, I d i d n ' t go c l e a r t o t h e g r o u n d .
"Q. So what y o u ' r e s a y i n g i s -- k i n d o f l i k e
you t w i s t y o u r a n k l e , you t w i s t e d y o u r k n e e ?
Would t h a t be a f a i r s t a t e m e n t ? A. Yes.
Well i t happened a w f u l f a s t - l i k e . And s o I
j u s t -- And t h a t ' s b e e n a few y e a r s a g o , and
I j u s t . . . Whatever h a p p e n e d , i t h u r t l i k e
-- t e r r i b l e a t t h e t i m e .
"Q. What t i m e o f t h e d a y was t h i s ? A . It
was a b o u t 2:00 o'clock i n the afternoon.
Approximately. NOW, I c o u l d n ' t p u t i t r i g h t
on t h e -- p i n p o i n t i t r i g h t a t t h e m i n u t e .
"Q. Any problem w i t h v i s i b i l i t y i n t h a t
a r e a ? A. No. Hum-um* ( * n e g a t i v e r e s p o n s e ) .
"Q. Were you w e a r i n g your glasses at the
time? A. Yes. Um-hum.
"Q. Was t h i s a n a r e a t h a t was o v e r g r o w n w i t h
bushes or shrubs o r . .
.? A. T h e r e was
t a l l g r a s s and weeds.
"Q. And was i t d e e p g r a s s , o r was i t . . ..
3
A. I d o n ' t remember, b u t I t h i n k a b o u t knee
h i g h o r more.
"Q. T h e r e w a s n ' t a n y t h i n g t h a t p r e v e n t e d you
f r o m s e e i n g t h e g r o u n d a s you w a l k e d o v e r i t ,
was t h e r e ? A. Yes, b u t I j u s t w a l k e d a n d
was f o l l o w i n g Mr. McCann and w e w e r e l o o k i n g
for this w e l l . And he s h o u l d h a v e been
where t h e w e l l was r i g h t away. And i f we'd
h a v e gone r i g h t from t h e c a r up t o where i t
w a s , t h e w e l l was a t , i t w o u l d n ' t h a v e
happened. And t h e r e -- i f h e had had a l l
t h a t s t u f f c l e a n e d o f f , c l e a r e d o f f , l i k e we
d i d a f t e r w a r d s , it w o u l d n ' t have happened.
"Q. So what y o u ' r e s a y i n g i s t h a t t h e r e was
s o m e t h i n g t h a t was on t h e g r o u n d t h a t was
what y o u t r i p p e d o n , b u t you d o n ' t remember
--
what it was? A . Well, I w o u l d n ' t know what
-r r a l p o l e , o r mound o f d i r t .
i t w a s e x a c t l y , b u t a p p a r e n t l y i t was a n o l d
co
"Q. And you d o n ' t know i f i t was a n a t u r a l
a c c u m u l a t i o n o f d i r t o r r o c k o r i f i t was a n
u n n a t u r a l a c c u m u l a t i o n , i s t h a t r i g h t ? A. A
n a t u r a l -- N a t u r a l o r u n n a t u r a l . Could h a v e
been b o t h .
"Q. It wasn't something t h a t you f e l l in?
A. No.
"Q. I t ' s s o m e t h i n g t h a t you t r i p p e d o v e r , i s
that right? A. I j u s t cannot r e a l l y say
what it was, because it happened, l i k e I
s a i d , s o f a s t t h a t -- t h a t -- And when i t
h a p p e n e d , i t was v e r y p a i n f u l . L e t ' s p u t it
t h a t way. " (Emphasis added. )
After twisting her knee, appellant went back to
McCann's c a r and r e t u r n e d t o B i l l i n g s . S h e d i d n o t go t o a
doctor a t t h a t time. About a y e a r l a t e r , s h e went t o s e e a
doctor for a c h e c k u p and t o a s k a b o u t h e r knee. S h e was
r e f e r r e d t o a n o t h e r d o c t o r who l a t e r o p e r a t e d on h e r knee.
She was i n t h e h o s p i t a l f o r f i v e d a y s and was i n a c a s t f o r
about s i x weeks. She stated in her deposition that the
s u r g e r y d i d n o t s t o p t h e p a i n s h e s t i l l h a s from h e r knee.
The p a r t i e s a g r e e t h a t t h e o n l y i s s u e on r e v i e w i s
whether the District Court e r r e d by granting respondents'
m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t .
Under Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., a summary judgment is
proper only if the record discloses no genuine issue of
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Reaves v. Reinbold (1980), Mont . - I
615 P.2d 896, 37 St.Rep. 1500; Rumph v. Dale Edwards, Inc.
(19791, - Mont . -, 600 P.2d 163, 36 St.Rep. 1022. The
party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing
the complete absence of any genuine issue as to all facts
which are deemed material in light of those substantive
principles which entitle him to a judgment as a matter of
law. Big Man v. State (1981), - Mont . -, 626 P.2d 235,
38 St-Rep. 362; Harland v. Anderson (1976), 169 Mont. 447,
548 P.2d 613. Once the movant has established that no
material issues of fact exist, the burden shifts to the
opposing party to raise an issue of fact. As we stated in
Rumph:
"While the initial burden of proof must at-
tach to the moving party, that burden shifts
where the record discloses no genuine issue
of material fact. Under these circumstances,
the party opposing the motion must come for-
ward with substantial evidence raising the
issue. [Citations omitted. 1 Once the burden
has shifted, the party opposing the motion is
held to a standard of proof which is as sub-
stantial as that initially imposed upon the
moving party. [Citation ommitted.] " 600
P.2d at 167.
It is also well established in Montana that
" [a]ctionable negligence arises only from a breach of legal
duty." Rennick v. Hoover (1980), Mont. , 606 P.2d
1079, 1081, 37 N.Y. St. Rep. 308, 310, quoting Jonosky v.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. (1920), 57 Mont. 63, 72, 187 P.
1014, 1015, and Cassady v. City of Billings (1959), 135
Mont. 390, 393, 340 P.2d 509, 510.
As we stated recently in Rennick:
". . . i n o r d e r f o r t h e r e t o be a genuine
i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t i n a n e q l - i q e n c e c a s e
t h e r e m u s t b e a d u t y imposed upon t - f e n - h e d- e
d- n t a n d a l l e g a t i o n s w h i c h , i f p r o v e n , would
--a
s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g of a- a c h o f t - d u t y . "
b r- e he
606 P.2d a t 1 0 8 1 .
The p a r t i e s a g r e e t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t was a b u s i n e s s
invitee when she wrenched her knee while walking on the
respondents' property. It is well settled in this state
that a property owner's duty toward an invitee is t o use
o r d i n a r y c a r e t o keep t h e premises r e a s o n a b l y s a f e and t o
warn t h e i n v i t e e of any h i d d e n o r l u r k i n g d a n g e r s . C a s s a d y ,
supra, 340 P.2d a t 510, quoting Milasevich v. Fox W e s t e r n
Montana T h e a t r e C o r p . ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 1.18 Mont. 265, 1 6 5 P.2d 1.95,
197.
W h i l e t h e p r o p e r t y owner h a s t h e a b o v e - s t a t e d duty,
i t h a s been r e c o g n i z e d many t i m e s by t h i s Court t h a t t h e
p r o p e r t y owner i s n o t a n i n s u r e r a g a i n s t a l l a c c i d e n t s and
injuries to invitees. S c o t t v. Robson (1979), Mont.
, 597 P.2d 1150, 1155, 36 St.Rep. 1273, 1279-1280,
c i t i n g Dunham v . S o u t h s i d e N a t i o n a l Bank o f M i s s o u l a ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,
1 6 9 Mont. 466, 548 P.2d 1 3 8 3 , and C a s s a d y , supra, 340 P.2d
a t 510-511. I n R e n n i c k , we n o t e d :
"'The t r u e ground of l i a b i l i t y is h i s [ t h e
p r o p e r t y owner ' s ] s u p e r i o r knowledge o v e r
t h a t of business i n v i t e e s of t h e dangerous
c o n d i t i o n and h i s f a i l u r e t o g i v e w a r n i n g o f
the risk, however, --- i s n o t a n i n s u r e r
he
a g a i n s t -- l l a c c i d e n t s w h i c h may b e f a l l them
a
upon h i s p r e m i s e s . ' . . . McIntosh v . Linder-
Kind Lumber Co. ( 1 9 6 4 1 , 144 Mont. 1, 6 , 393
P.2d 7 8 2 , 7 8 5 . " 606 ~ . . 2 da t l ( J 8 1 . ( . ~ r n ~ h a s i s
added. )
I n ~ l a 6 e yv . Associated Subdivisions, Inc. (1963),
97 R.I. 34, 1 9 5 A.2d 234, 3 A.L.R. 3d 970, a real estate
a g e n c y was h e l d l i a b l e f o r injuries t o the plaintiff when
she fell in a rodent hole while looking at a partially
c l e a r e d l o t o f f e r e d f o r s a i e ~y t h e dgency. i l h i s l o t was i n
t h e C i t y o f C r a n s t o n , Rhode I s l a n d , a n d was b e i n g d e v e l o p e d
t o r home s i t e s .
Blahey is readily distinguishable from the case
before us. I n Blak-ney, t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r i e s o c c u r r e d on
a city lot. She was n o t aware t h a t r o d e n t h o l e s were i n t h e
lot. Here, t n e a p p e l l a n t was w a l k i n g t h r o u g h a n o p e n f i e l d
In r u r a l country. She stumbled over something s h e charac-
terized as "debris," a "mound o f dirt," or an "old c o r r a l
pole." while s h e was unsure of e x a c t l y what she tripped
over, she could see t h a t t h e r e were " l o g s and s t u f f lying
arouna." Since she knew of the general c o n d i t i o n of the
g r o u n d , no d u t y r e s t s o n t h e d e f e n d a n t t o w a r n h e r o f i t .
More importantly, the fact is undisputed that the
a p p e l l a n t cannot d e s c r i b e what caused h e r i n j u r y . She d o e s
n o t know i f i t was m e r e l y a mound o f d i r t o r a n o l d c o r r a l
pole.
I n a n a c t i o n f o r n e g l i g e n c e , a p l a i n t i f f must produce
evldence from which it can be reasonably inferred that
n e g l i g e n t conduct on t h e p a r t of t h e defendant o r its a g e n t s
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
F l a n s b e r g v . M o n t a n a Power Company ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 4 Cfiont. 53, 460
P.2d 263, approved i n S c o t t v. Robson, supra, 597 P.2d at
1155. H e r e , t h e a p p e l - l a n t s i m p l y d o e s n o t know e x a c t l y w h a t
caused her injury. A s noted above, the respondents cannot
be the insurers of the a p p e l - l a n t and held liable for her
i n j u r y m e r e l y b e c a u s e a n a c c i d e n t happened on t h e i r l a n d .
Upon r e s p o n d e n t s ' showing t h a t no m a t e r i a l i s s u e s o f
genuine f a c t were s t i l l i n d i s p u t e , t h e burden s h i f t e d t o
t n e a p p e l l a n t t o come f o r w a r d by a f f i d a v i t a n d s u b s t a n t i a l
e v i d e n c e and r a i s e a n i s s u e ot n a t e r l a l t a c t . H p p e l . l ~ n th a s
f a i l e d t o meet t h i s burden. She h a s p r e s e n t e d no s u b s t a n t i a l
evidence indicating that respondents had breached a duty
owed t o her or that respondents' a c t i o n s were a p r o x i m a t e
cause of her i n j u r y .
The summary judgment i s a f f i r m e d .
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4 Justice
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Chief J u s t i c e
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