Rasmussen v. Bennett ( 1983 )

No. 83-208
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1983
M Y RASMUSSEN and PAULINE RASMUSSEN,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
LARRY C. BENNETT, CLIFFORD HARDEN,
DANIEL P. JAIIIES, DONALD WHITING,
and NELSON DAVES,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Toole,
The Honorable John M. PlcCZ-mvel, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
James C. Bartlett argued; Hash, Jellison, O'Brien
and Bartlett, Kalispell, Montana
For Respondents:
P.
Jbhn 'jg: Paul argued; Alexander & Baucus, Great Falls,
Montana
Submitted: November 3, 1983
Decided: November 23, 1983
Filed: !\dov 2 3 I9983
Clerk
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
This is an appeal from an order granting summary
judgment in a libel and slander action filed in the District
Court of the Ninth Judicial District, State of Montana, in
and for the County of Toole.
The appellant opens the introduction of his brief with
the statement "the facts of this case are a mess." With
that statement we are in total accord. Late in this year of
1983, this Court is called upon to consider disputed facts
that began in March, 1968. In addition, in a summary
judgment decision, we are faced with a situation where the
District Court that granted the summary judgment, did not
have available to it the depositions of the four defendants,
a fact unknown to either counsel until the record on appeal
was prepared. In view of the complicated issues raised by
this appeal, and the length of the hibernation period that
this case lay at rest unattended by the caretakers of our
judicial system, we find it necessary to remand the cause to
the trial court with the four depositions for
reconsideration.
The four issues raised for our consideration are:
(1) whether the defendants are liable under state law
for libel and slander;
(2) whether the defendants can properly claim a
privilege or qualified privilege on religious grounds;
(3) whether the defense of truth, based on religious
grounds is applicable;
(4) whether the District Court erred in granting
summary j u d g m e n t for defendants, in that there remain
material questions of f a c t t h a t o u g h t t o b e l i t i g a t e d and
t r i e d o n t h e m e r i t s ; and whether t h e D i s t r i c t J u d g e e r r e d i n
g r a n t i n g summary j u d g m e n t when i t d i d n o t h a v e a v a i l a b l e t o
it t h e f o u r d e p o s i t i o n s f o r review.
As previously noted i t is t h i s f i n a l i s s u e we f i n d
controlling, necessitating a return to the trial court.
W h i l e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i s p u t e d on s e v e r a l f a c t s i n t h e
case, it found t h e y were n o t r e l e v a n t b e c a u s e o f a letter
from the Watchtower Bible and Tract S o c i e t y of New York
Inc., d a t e d A u g u s t 3 , 1 9 8 2 , which c o n t r o l l e d t h e l i t i g a t i o n .
Had t h e c o u r t had b e f o r e i t t h e d e p o s i t i o n s , i t i s p o s s i b l e
that it could have ascertained that t h e r e was sufficient
e v i d e n c e t o go t o a j u r y .
R u l e 5 6 ( c ) M.R.Civ.P., p r o v i d e s t h a t summary j u d g m e n t
is p r o p e r i f : " * * * t h e p l e a d i n g s , d e p o s i t i o n s , answers t o
interrogatories, and a d m i s s i o n s on f i l e show t h a t t h e r e i s
no g e n u i n e i s s u e a s t o a n y m a t e r i a l f a c t a n d t h a t t h e moving
p a r t y is e n t i t l e d t o a judgment a s a m a t t e r o f law." In
H a r l a n v. A n d e r s o n ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 Mont. 4 4 7 , 4 5 0 , 548 P.2d 6 1 3 ,
6 1 5 , t h i s C o u r t commented o n t h e a b o v e r u l e :
" T h i s C o u r t h a s o n many o c c a s i o n s
commented upon t h e n a t u r e o f t h e b u r d e n
o f p r o o f imposed on t h e moving p a r t y
under Rule 56. The Court has
c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t t h e p a r t y moving
f o r summary judgment h a s t h e b u r d e n o f
showing t h e complete a b s e n c e of any
g e n u i n e i s s u e a s t o a l l f a c t s which a r e
deemed m a t e r i a l i n l i g h t of those
s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h e n t i t l e d him
t o a j u d g m e n t a s a m a t t e r o f law. We
have a l s o held t h e r u l e o p e r a t e s t o hold
t h e movant t o a ' s t r i c t s t a n d a r d ' a n d
that:
" ' * * * To s a t i s f y h i s b u r d e n t h e m o v a n t
m u s t make a s h o w i n g t h a t i s q u i t e c l e a r
w h a t t h e t r u t h i s , and t h a t e x c l u d e s a n y
r e a l d o u b t a s t o t h e e x i s t e n c e of any
genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t . * * * '
Kober & K y r i s s v. S t e w a r t & B i l l i n g s
D e a c o n e s s H o s p i t a l , 1 4 8 Mont. 1 1 7 , 1 2 2 ,
417 P.2d 476, 478."
Where a s h e r e , t h e c o u r t d i d n o t have t h e d e p o s i t i o n s
before i t , and q u i t e p o s s i b l y d i d n o t h a v e a l l t h e f a c t s
b e f o r e i t , summary j u d g m e n t was i m p r o p e r l y g r a n t e d .
Summary judgment is set aside and the cause is
returned t o the D i s t r i c t Court f o r f u r t h e r consideration.
W e concur:
s-,-Qos*4
Chief J u s t i c e
~ r d ~ u s t i c oeh n C.
J Sheehy, s p e c i a l l y c o n c u r r i n g :
I t h a s b e e n a l o n g t i m e c o m i n g b u t t h e C o u r t h a s now
a t l e a s t p a r t i a l l y r e v e r s e d M u s t a n g B e v e r a g e Co., I n c . v .
J o s e p h S c h l i t z B r e w i n g Company ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 2 Mont. 2 4 3 , 5 1 1
P.2d 1. n