State v. Rogers ( 1979 )


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  •                                       No. 14577
    I N THE S P
    U=      COURT O THE STATE O M3NTAN.A
    F           F
    1979
    THE STATE: O IXlNDNA, ACTING BY AND
    F
    THROUGH THE D P R C N O HIGHmYS
    EA T E T F
    O THE STATE O IalvBNA,
    F            F
    P l a i n t i f f and Appellant,
    Defendant and Respondent.
    Appeal from:  D i s t r i c t Court of the Fourth Judicial ~ i s t r i c t ,
    Honorable Jack L. Green, J d g e presiding, and
    Honorable E Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding.
    .
    Counsel of Record:
    For Appellant:
    M. G n ELatchy, Highway Legal Dept., H e l e n a , Montana
    ee
    For Respondent:
    W n e , Karlberg and Haddon, Missoula, P4xkana
    Kcch and Menna, Hamilton, Wntana
    Subnitted on briefs:    May 31, 1979
    -   ~-
    'J i- '
    . - -                                          Decided :              ?   1B
    9
    -I :
    .-     2 4R
    9
    Filed:
    Mr.   J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
    t h e Court.
    T h i s i s an a p p e a l i n a n eminent domain p r o c e e d i n g by
    t h e S t a t e of Montana from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s g r a n t i n g o f
    r e s p o n d e n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r f i n a l judgment and o r d e r f i x i n g
    c o s t s a s prayed f o r by r e s p o n d e n t .
    A p p e l l a n t f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t i n R a v a l l i County on March
    23, 1978, s e e k i n g condemnation o f r e s p o n d e n t ' s p r o p e r t y f o r
    p u r p o s e s o f c o n s t r u c t i n g a p u b l i c highway.      On A p r i l 3,
    r e s p o n d e n t f i l e d a n answer c l a i m i n g $66,000 a s j u s t compen-
    s a t i o n f o r t h e t a k i n g o f h e r p r o p e r t y and f o r t h e d e p r e c i a -
    t i o n t h a t would a c c r u e t o t h e p r o p e r t y n o t t a k e n .      The
    D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h e n nominated and a p p o i n t e d t h r e e l a n d v a l u e
    commissioners t o a s c e r t a i n t h e amount of compensation t o be
    paid.
    A f t e r a h e a r i n g on May 1 2 , t h e commissioners f i l e d a
    r e p o r t w i t h t h e c l e r k o f c o u r t on J u n e 6 a s s e s s i n g r e s p o n -
    d e n t ' s j u s t compensation a s $40,000, $9,100 o f which w a s f o r
    t h e p r o p e r t y t a k e n and $30,900 of which was f o r t h e p r o p e r t y
    n o t taken.       A copy o f t h e r e p o r t and n o t i c e of i t s e n t r y
    w e r e m a i l e d t o t h e p a r t i e s by t h e c l e r k on J u n e 6.
    On August 3 , 58 d a y s a f t e r t h e commissioners' assess-
    ment was f i l e d , a p p e l l a n t f i l e d a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l con-
    t e s t i n g t h e assessment.         Respondent s u b s e q u e n t l y p e t i t i o n e d
    t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r judgment f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t a p p e l -
    l a n t had f a i l e d t o f i l e a n o t i c e of a p p e a l w i t h i n 30 d a y s
    a f t e r t h e s e r v i c e of t h e n o t i c e of f i l i n g of t h e commis-
    s i o n e r s ' r e p o r t and a copy o f t h a t r e p o r t .       I n response,
    a p p e l l a n t f i l e d a motion r e q u e s t i n g a n o r d e r v a c a t i n g t h e
    commissioners' r e p o r t of J u n e 6 .              The D i s t r i c t C o u r t , how-
    e v e r , d e n i e d a p p e l l a n t ' s motion and g r a n t e d judgment i n
    f a v o r o f r e s p o n d e n t on August 18.            I n a s e p a r a t e proceeding
    t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d a n o r d e r on September 1 8 a l l o w i n g
    n e c e s s a r y c o s t s o f t h e l i t i g a t i o n a s prayed f o r by r e s p o n -
    dent.        Following t h e s e r u l i n g s , a p p e l l a n t ' s motions t o amend
    t h e c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s , c o n c l u s i o n s and o r d e r o f August 31,
    and t h e c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on September 1 8 w i t h r e s p e c t t o c o s t s
    w e r e denied.        An a p p e a l was f i l e d w i t h t h i s C o u r t on October
    31.
    On a p p e a l w e c o n s i d e r t h e f o l l o w i n g two i s s u e s :
    1.     Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t
    a p p e l l a n t f a i l e d t o a p p e a l from t h e l a n d v a l u e comrnissioners'
    r e p o r t w i t h i n t h e t i m e p r o v i d e d by l a w , and hence, t h e c o u r t
    lacked j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear the appeal?
    2.     Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n f i n d i n g , a s n e c e s s a r y
    and r e a s o n a b l e e x p e n s e s , a t t o r n e y f e e s which w e r e based upon
    a c o n t i n g e n c y f e e c o n t r a c t and a p p r a i s e r f e e s where t h e
    a p p r a i s e r d i d n o t t e s t i f y a t t h e l a n d commissioners' h e a r i n g ?
    With r e s p e c t t o t h e f i r s t i s s u e , t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o c e -
    d u r e f o r a p p e a l i n g a commissioners' a s s e s s m e n t i n an e m i n e n t
    domain p r o c e e d i n g i s s t a t e d i n s e c t i o n 70-30-304,            W A , and
    provides i n pertinent part:
    "Appeal t o D i s t r i c t C o u r t from Assessment of
    ~ o m m i s s i o n e r s . (1) An a p p e a l from any a s s e s s -
    ment made by t h e commissioners must be t a k e n
    and p r o s e c u t e d i n t h e c o u r t where t h e r e p o r t of
    s a i d commissioners i s f i l e d by any p a r t y i n t e r -
    ested.       Such a p p e a l must be t a k e n w i t h i n t h e
    p e r i o d of t h i r t y ( 3 0 ) d a y s a f t e r t h e s e r v i c e
    upon a p p e l l a n t of t h e n o t i c e o f t h e f i l i n g o f
    t h e award      . . ."
    Here, t h e commissioners' r e p o r t was m a i l e d t o t h e
    p a r t i e s by t h e c l e r k o f c o u r t on J u n e 6 .         While t h e t h i r t y -
    day a p p e a l p e r i o d would have n o r m a l l y e x p i r e d on J u l y 6 ,
    a p p e l l a n t c o u l d have c l a i m e d e x t e n s i o n s u n t i l J u l y 1 0 .   In
    computing t h e t i m e p e r i o d f o r p u r p o s e s of a p p e a l , t h e
    Montana Rules of Civil Procedure provide for a three-day
    extension when a party receives service by mail and has the
    right to do some act, such as file an appeal, and an exten-
    sion when the last day of the period falls on a Sunday.
    Rules 6 (e) and 6 (a), M.R.Civ.P.
    Appellant, however, filed a notice of appeal on August
    3, 58 days after the commissioners' assessment was filed.
    Appellant nevertheless maintains that the notice of appeal
    was timely because the time for appeal did not begin to run
    when the manner of service departed from the method of
    service prescribed by the statute.      When the statute calls
    for service as "in the manner of a summons," appellant
    contends that service by mail will not suffice and that a
    departure from the prescribed method is a jurisdictional
    defect which cannot be waived.      Appellant argues for a
    strict construction of section 70-30-303, MCA, which pro-
    vides :
    "Report of Commissioners. The report of commis-
    sioners shall be made on such forms as are pro-
    vided for their use by authority of the court.
    Such report must be filed .     ..
    with the clerk
    of court and the Clerk must forthwith notify the
    parties that such report has been filed, with
    notice, together with a true copy of said report,
    must be served upon all the parties interested,
    in the same manner as a summons      .
    . ."
    Respondent, in turn, places emphasis upon appellant's
    receiving actual notice of the comrnissioners~report.        We
    are referred to the findings of fact of the District Court
    where it was found that appellant received a copy of the
    commissioners' report and notice of its entry on June 8.
    Respondent also argues that this Court has implicitly held
    that the manner of service prescribed under the eminent
    domain statutes is a procedural defect which may be waived.
    State of Montana v. Helehan (1977), 
    171 Mont. 473
    , 
    559 P.2d 817
    .      I n Helehan s e r v i c e o f t h e commissioners' r e p o r t was
    made by m a i l and s u c h s e r v i c e d i d n o t p r e v e n t t h e c o u r t from
    assuming j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e a p p e a l .
    I n t h i s c a s e , however, w e r e f r a i n from a p p r o v i n g o f
    methods of s e r v i c e which d e p a r t from p r e s c r i b e d s t a t u t o r y
    procedures.          Nor d o w e a d o p t r e s p o n d e n t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of
    Helehan.        W e simply h o l d t h a t where a p a r t y r e c e i v e s a c t u a l
    n o t i c e of t h e commissioners' r e p o r t i n a n e m i n e n t domain
    p r o c e e d i n g and f a i l s t o f i l e a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l w i t h i n t h e
    t i m e p r o v i d e d by law, t h e c o u r t i s w i t h o u t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o
    hear t h e appeal.
    S i n c e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t a p p e l l a n t r e c e i v e d
    a c t u a l n o t i c e and a d m i t t e d s e r v i c e on J u n e 8 and t h a t f i n d -
    i n g h a s n o t been shown t o be c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s , i t s h a l l n o t
    be set a s i d e .      Rule 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P.;            F a r m e r ' s S t a t e Bank
    v . Mobile Homes U n l i m i t e d ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,               Mon t   .        ,   
    593 P.2d 734
    , 36 St.Rep.           792, 796.         Accordingly, w e hold t h a t appel-
    l a n t ' s n o t i c e of a p p e a l w a s n o t t i m e l y f i l e d and t h a t t h e
    D i s t r i c t Court lacked j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear t h e appeal.
    A p p e l l a n t c h a l l e n g e s t h e a p p r a i s e r ' s f e e upon two
    grounds--the         n e c e s s i t y o f t h e expense, and t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
    a p p r a i s e r d i d n o t t e s t i f y a t t h e commission h e a r i n g .        Appel-
    l a n t contends t h a t n o t c a l l i n g t h e a p p r a i s e r t o t e s t i f y a t
    t h e commission h e a r i n g d e p r i v e d i t o f t h e r i g h t of c r o s s -
    examination of t h e a p p r a i s e r .
    A t t h e c o s t h e a r i n g r e s p o n d e n t produced proof o f pay-
    ment of t h e a p p r a i s e r by a $1,400 c a s h i e r ' s check.                   he
    c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t i t c o n s i d e r e d t h e employment of a n ap-
    p r a i s e r a n e c e s s a r y a c t i o n by t h e landowner t o p r e p a r e h e r
    case, and t h a t t h e s t a t e s h o u l d r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t t h a t t h e
    landowners would l o o k t o e x p e r t s i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e t h e i r
    damages by v i r t u e of t h e t a k i n g .
    ÿ he   only testimony before t h e D i s t r i c t Court a s t o t h e
    r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f t h e a p p r a i s e r ' s c h a r g e s was produced by
    respondent.           T h a t t e s t i m o n y showed t h a t a c h a r g e o f $175 p e r
    day f o r e i g h t d a y s was r e a s o n a b l e and u s u a l f o r t h e s e r v i c e s
    of a professional appraiser.                       The e x p e n s e was n e c e s s a r i l y
    i n c u r r e d by r e s p o n d e n t and under s e c t i o n 70-30-306,                MCA, w a s
    p r o p e r l y awarded h e r e .
    With r e s p e c t t o t h e a t t o r n e y f e e s , t h e e v i d e n c e shows
    t h a t t h e f i n a l o f f e r t o r e s p o n d e n t from a p p e l l a n t was $7,800.
    Respondent e n t e r e d i n t o a c o n t i n g e n t f e e a r r a n g e m e n t w i t h
    h e r l a w y e r s i n May 1977 f i x i n g t h e a t t o r n e y s ' compensation
    a t 30 p e r c e n t of any r e c o v e r y i n e x c e s s o f $7,800.                 The
    r e t a i n e r c o n t r a c t p r o v i d e d t h a t any amount awarded r e s p o n -
    d e n t by t h e c o u r t a s a t t o r n e y f e e s would be a c r e d i t a g a i n s t
    the contingent fee.                 Testimony a t t h e c o s t h e a r i n g produced
    by r e s p o n d e n t showed t h a t a 30 p e r c e n t c o n t i n g e n t f e e con-
    t r a c t i n eminent domain c a s e s , on t h e c a s e s e s t a b l i s h e d
    h e r e , was r e a s o n a b l e , and p e r h a p s lower t h a n t h e u s u a l one-
    t h i r d c o n t i n g e n t f e e c h a r g e d by some l a w y e r s .       I t was ad-
    m i t t e d t h a t c o u n s e l f o r r e s p o n d e n t were e x p e r i e n c e d p r a c t i -
    t i o n e r s i n eminent domain cases.                   I t w a s a l s o shown t h a t $50
    p e r hour was t h e p r e v a i l i n g r a t e f o r l a w y e r s ' s e r v i c e s i n
    t h e a r e a a t t h a t t i m e and t h a t i n t h i s c a s e t h e a t t o r n e y s
    had logged a t o t a l o f 80 h o u r s of work, e x c l u d i n g t h e work
    f o r t h e c o s t hearing.
    Respondent c l a i m e d s h e was e n t i t l e d t o t h e amount of
    f e e s c a l c u l a t e d under t h e c o n t i n g e n t f e e c o n t r a c t b e c a u s e
    s h e was o b l i g a t e d t o pay t h e same i n any e v e n t and b e c a u s e
    t h e c o n t i n g e n t f e e was n e c e s s a r y and r e a s o n a b l e under t h e
    circumstances.             A p p e l l a n t o b j e c t e d , c l a i m i n g t h a t any f e e i n
    e x c e s s o f t h e h o u r l y r a t e was c o n t r a t o s e c t i o n 70-30-306,
    MCA   .
    S e c t i o n 70-30-306,         MCA, became e f f e c t i v e J u l y 1, 1977.
    The c o n t i n g e n t f e e was a g r e e d upon i n May 1977, b e f o r e t h e
    e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e s t a t u t e .     The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e c i d e d
    t h a t s i n c e t h e s t a t u t e , which l i m i t s a t t o r n e y f e e s t o be
    r e c o v e r e d by condemnees t o customary h o u r l y r a t e s f o r a t t o r -
    n e y s i n t h e c o u n t y i n v o l v e d , became e f f e c t i v e a f t e r t h e
    c o n t i n g e n t f e e c o n t r a c t was a g r e e d t o , i t would award t h e
    c o n t i n g e n t f e e under t h e s t a t u t e which p r e c e d e d s e c t i o n 70-
    30-306,      MCA.      A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t awarded $9,600
    i n attorney fees.
    Because t h e r e t a i n e r c o n t r a c t was a g r e e d t o b e f o r e
    s e c t i o n 70-30-306       came i n t o e f f e c t , t h i s c a s e i s c o n t r o l l e d
    by S t a t e v. Olsen ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 
    166 Mont. 139
    , 
    531 P.2d 1330
    .                                 In
    Olsen t h i s C o u r t approved a c o n t i n g e n t f e e c o n t r a c t of 25
    p e r c e n t where proof o f t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of t h e p e r c e n t a g e
    was made a t t h e h e a r i n g , a s n e c e s s a r y t o make t h e landowner
    whole under A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 29, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u -
    tion.      Here a p p e l l a n t o f f e r e d no e v i d e n c e a s t o e i t h e r a
    r e a s o n a b l e h o u r l y r a t e o r t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of 30 p e r c e n t
    c o n t i n g e n t f e e c o n t r a c t . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t a c t e d a c c o r d i n g
    t o t h e e v i d e n c e b e f o r e i t and t h e p r e v a i l i n g law.           Therefore,
    i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a t t o r n e y f e e s i n t h i s c a s e w i l l n o t be
    disturbed.
    Affirmed.
    W e concur:
    I
    /j Justices
    /
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14577

Filed Date: 10/3/1979

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016