State v. Buffalo ( 1993 )


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  •                             No.    92-57
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    1993
    STATE OF MONTANA,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    JOHN BUFFALO,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM:    District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
    In and for the County of Yellowstone,
    The Honorable William J. Speare, Judge presiding.
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    L. Sanford Selvey, 11, Yellowstone County Public
    Defender, Billings, Montana
    For Respondent:
    Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, John
    P ~ u ~ s o ~ , Attorney General, Helena, Montana
    Ass't
    Dennis J. Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney,
    Billings, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: September 16, 1993
    Decided: October 14, 1993
    Filed:
    Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    John Buffalo appeals from an order of the Thirteenth Judicial
    District Court, Yellowstone County, designating him a dangerous
    offender.    We affirm.
    The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court
    adequately articulated its reasons for designating Buffalo a
    dangerous offender under 1 46-18-404, MCA.
    On October 31, 1991, an information was filed against John
    Buffalo     (Buffalo)    alleging     one   count    of   attempted    sexual
    intercourse without consent and one count of attempted kidnapping,
    According to the affidavit filed in support of the information and
    the evidence introduced at trial, at approximately 9:35 a.m, on
    October 27, 1991, Buffalo attacked G.M. from behind and hit her in
    the face with his closed fist.         He then carried her between a row
    of parked cars, where he threw her to the ground and attempted to
    tear her clothes off. A Yellowstone County deputy sheriff observed
    the incident by chance and interceded; Buffalo fled the scene.
    Buffalo then encountered C.T., who was leaving her car to
    attend a church service.        Buffalo ordered C.T. into the car and
    then shoved her inside. C.T. began to scream and kick at Buffalo.
    Deputies    in   the    area   saw    the   altercation,      responded,   and
    apprehended Buffalo after a short chase.               Neither victim knew
    Buffalo prior to the attacks.
    Following a two-day trial, a jury found Buffalo guilty of
    attempted    sexual     intercourse    without      consent   and   attempted
    kidnapping.      A presentence report and psychological examination
    2
    were obtained for sentencing purposes.         On September 3, 1992, the
    ~istrictCourt sentenced Buffalo to twenty years imprisonment for
    attempted   sexual   intercourse without         consent   and     ten   years
    imprisonment for attempted kidnapping.             The court ordered the
    sentences to run concurrently and designated Buffalo a dangerous
    offender. Buffalo appeals only the dangerous offender designation
    contained in his sentence.
    Did the District Court adequately articulate its reasons for
    designating Buffalo a dangerous offender under S 46-18-404, MCA?
    Under Montana's sentencing provisions, the designation of an
    offender as either nondangerous or dangerous is an important factor
    in determining parole eligibility. See 5 46-23-201(2), MCA; State
    v. Belmarez (1991), 
    248 Mont. 378
    , 379, 
    812 P.2d 341
    , 342.               As a
    general   rule, a    district   court     must   designate     an    offender
    nondangerous if he has no other felony convictions in the preceding
    five years and it determines that the offender does not represent
    a substantial danger to other persons or society.            Section 46-18-
    404(1) and (2), MCA.    Under   §   46-18-404(3), MCA, " [ ; I f    the court
    determines that an offender is a dangerous offender, it shall make
    that determination a part of the sentence imposed and shall state
    the determination in the judgment.        . . ."     Moreover, we require
    sentencing courts to articulate the reasons underlying decisions to
    designate an offender as "dangerous;" more than a mere recital of
    the statutory language is required.           State v. Morrison (Mont.
    1993), 
    848 P.2d 514
    , 517, 50 St-Rep. 270, 272.          
    Belmarez, 812 P.2d at 342
    .
    In this case, the District Court articulated the following
    3
    reasons for its sentence and dangerous offender designation:
    1.    The Court has considered the contents of the
    presentence report, as well as the recommendations of
    counsel.
    2. The Court has considered that a jury, after hearing
    the evidence, found the defendant guilty on both Counts,
    each of these serious crimes. Although the jury had
    trouble with Count 11, the Attempted Kidnapping. [sic]
    3 . The Court considered the very nature of these crimes
    abhorrent in that the defendant had no prior acquaintance
    with the victims, the time of the offenses being early
    Sunday morning and the place being relatively deserted at
    that hour. The Court knows that both of these totally
    innocent victims were terrified and justly so.
    4.   The Court considered defendant's age and prior
    criminal record which includes a Felony conviction in
    1987 and a Misdemeanor sexual assault.
    5 . The Court has considered the psychological evaluation
    and which it agrees [sic] that it and the other records
    show a need for alcohol treatment.         The Court is
    concerned about the defendant's apparent proclivity for
    violent sexual activity.
    6.   While the Court does not believe that the prior
    felony conviction in June of 1987 necessarily mandates a
    designation of dangerous, certainly the entire criminal
    nature and the vicious and serious nature of these
    offenses as committed justify such designation.
    Relying on Morrison and Belmarez, Buffalo argues that the
    reasons given by the District Court are mere variations of the
    statutory language of 5 46-18-404, MCA, and, therefore, the court
    did not sufficiently set forth its reasons for designating him a
    dangerous offender.   Belmarez and Morrison lend no support to
    Buffalo's argument
    In Morrison, the district court stated only that it had
    considered the contents of the presentence report and the nature
    and seriousness of the offense.    Because the record supported a
    dangerous offender designation, we remanded the case for entry of
    findings to support that conclusion. 
    Morrison, 848 P.2d at 517-18
    .
    In Belmarez, although the district court stated that it had
    considered the presentence report and           the plea    bargain and
    concluded that the defendant was a danger to society, it also
    stated that the defendant was sincerely remorseful and that he had
    no prior criminal record. We determined that the court's findings
    did not support its determination that the defendant was a danger
    to society; indeed, we stated that the findings just as easily
    could have supported a nondangerous designation.           
    Belmarez, 812 P.2d at 343
    .
    Here, the District Court did not merely recite the statutory
    language, but      made   numerous   specific   findings applying   the
    statutory factors to the facts of this case.        The court detailed
    the serious and vicious nature of the crimes and the effect on the
    innocent victims, set forth Buffalo's      prior criminal history and
    explained both the need       for alcohol treatment and Buffalo's
    apparent proclivity for violent sexual activity.           The District
    Court's findings are clearly distinguishable from those in Morrison
    and Belmarez.
    In light of the circumstances of this case, we conclude that
    the District Court acted within its discretion and adequately
    articulated    its reasons for designating Buffalo a          dangerous
    offender for purposes of parole eligibility.
    Af firmed .
    Pursuant to Section I Paragraph 3 (c),Montana Supreme Court
    1988 Internal Operating Rules, this decision shall not be cited as
    precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public document
    with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its result
    to Montana Law Week, State Reporter and West Publishing Company.
    We concur:
    October 14, 1993
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following
    named:
    L. Sanford Selvey, I1
    Yellowstone County Public Defender
    2720 3rd Avenue North, Suite 200
    Billings, MT 59101
    Hon. JOSEPH P. MAZUREK, Attorney General
    John Paulson, Assistant
    215 N. Sanders, Justice Building
    Helena, MT 59620
    Dennis James Paxinos
    Yellowstone County Attorney
    P. 0 . Box 35025
    Billings, MT 5910'7
    ED SMITH
    ,
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 92-579

Filed Date: 10/14/1993

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016