Great Falls Tribune Co. Inc. v. C ( 1989 )


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  •                                    No. 89-86
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    1989
    GREAT FALLS TRIBUNE COMPANY, INC.,                                                                             .,
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    Petitioner and Respondent,                        _-
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    CASCADE COUNTY SHERIFF, BARRY MICHELOTTI,                                                                        c)
    and CITY OF GREAT FALLS, a Municipal corp.,                                                                         -+--J
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    Respondents and Appellants.                                                                          \--'
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    APPEAL FROM:     ~istrictCourt of the Eighth ~udicial~istrict,
    In and for the County of Cascade,
    The Honorable Thomas ~ c ~ i t t r i c k ,
    Judge presiding.
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    David V. ~ l i k o ,City Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
    For Respondent:
    Peter Michael Meloy, Helena, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs:     May 18, 1989
    Decided:     July 6, 1989
    Filed:
    Clerk
    Mr. Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the
    Court.
    The City of Great Falls appeals from an order of the
    District Court for the Eighth ~udicial ~istrict, Cascade
    County, that the City must publicly disclose the names of
    three law enforcement officers disciplined as the result of a
    November 30, 1988, incident. We affirm.
    The issue is whether the privacy rights of the individ-
    ual police officers exceed the merits of public disclosure of
    the names of the officers in the Great Falls Tribune.
    On November 30, 1988, certain police officers and
    deputies from the Cascade County Sheriff's Office engaged in
    a high-speed automobile chase through the City of Great Falls
    in an attempt to apprehend a suspect. The suspect left his
    car and continued his flight on foot.       A deputy sheriff
    attempting to stop the suspect ran his squad car up on a city
    sidewalk and struck the suspect.
    When the suspect was taken to jail, a jailer noticed
    that the suspect had suffered injuries to his head and face.
    The jailer brought the injuries to the attention of the
    sheriff and an investigation followed.
    As a result of the investigation, a sheriff Is deputy
    was suspended for a period of time, one police officer was
    fired, and two other police officers were given the option to
    resign or be terminated. They resigned. A reporter from the
    Great Falls Tribune (~ribune)had been given access to an
    "initial offense report" which contained the names of a
    number of officers involved in the incident without specify-
    ing how they were involved. He attempted to obtain the names
    of the officers disciplined. The reporter asked the Cascade
    County Sheriff, the Great Falls city police chief, and the
    Great Falls City Manager for the names of the officers disci-
    plined, but all three refused to disclose the names on the
    grounds of the officers' right to privacy.
    The Tribune filed a petition in District Court seeking
    an order directing the defendants to release the names of the
    law enforcement officers who had been disciplined. The City
    of Great Falls (City) moved to dismiss and filed an answer
    asserting the individual officers' right to privacy under
    Article 11, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution.       The
    court held a hearing at which two witnesses for the Tribune
    testified.   The City did not call witnesses but filed an
    affidavit by the Police Chief which was entered by
    stipulation as part of the record.
    On January 17, 1989, the District Court issued its
    opinion and order directing the City to disclose the identity
    of the officers who were disciplined. The court noted that
    the Cascade County Sheriff had disclosed the name of the
    deputy sheriff to the Tribune and had been dismissed from the
    lawsuit.
    In analyzing the issue before it, the District Court
    conducted a balancing of two rights guaranteed under the
    Montana Constitution. The right to know is set forth at Art.
    11, Section 9, Mont.Const.:
    Section 9.   Right to know.    No person
    shall be deprived of the right to exam-
    ine documents or to observe the deliber-
    ations of all public bodies or agencies
    of state government and its subdivi-
    sions, except in cases in which the
    demand of individual privacy clearly
    exceeds the merits of public disclosure.
    The right of privacy is set forth at Art. 11, Section 10,
    Mont.Const.:
    Section 10.    Right of privacy.     The
    right of individual privacy is essential
    to the well-being of a free society and
    shall not be infringed without the
    showing of a compelling state interest.
    The court determined that "the demands of individual privacy
    as shown on this record do not clearly exceed the merits of
    public disclosure."    It ordered the City to provide the
    Tribune with the names of the officers disciplined as a
    result of the November 30th incident, along with information
    on which officers were terminated and resigned.
    Before conducting our analysis, we will review recent
    cases in which this Court has been asked to balance the right
    of privacy against the right to know.
    This Court has used a two-part test in determining
    whether a person has a constitutionally-protected privacy
    interest.   Montana Human Rights Div. v. City of Billings
    (1982), 
    199 Mont. 434
    , 442, 
    649 P.2d 1283
    , 1287. First, we
    determine whether the person has a subjective or actual
    expectation of privacy. Next, we evaluate whether society is
    willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.       In
    Human Rights, the issue was whether the Human Rights Division
    had the authority to subpoena employment records of employees
    other than the employee who was accusing the employer of
    discrimination. The Court concluded that the other employees
    had a high expectation of privacy worthy of protection under
    Art. 11, section 10, Mont.Const., since their files presum-
    ably contained sensitive information.     his Court next bal-
    anced the right of privacy of the other employees against the
    State's interest in prohibiting employment discrimination,
    using as its standard whether there was a compelling state
    interest which overrode the right to individual privacy.
    Human ~ i g h t s ,649 P.2d at 1288. his Court concluded that
    the State had a compelling interest. The Court ordered that
    the information sought by the Human Rights Division must be
    released, but that a protective order must also issue to
    prevent release of names of the other employees outside of
    the investigating agency.
    In Missoulian v. Board of Regents of Higher Educ.
    (1984), 
    207 Mont. 513
    , 
    675 P.2d 962
    , this Court was asked to
    balance the public right to know about the performance of a
    university president against the president's expectation of
    privacy in job performance evaluations.     After determining
    that the university president had a constitutionally-
    protected privacy interest, the Court used as its standard
    the Art. 11, Section 9, Mont.Const., test of whether the
    demand of individual privacy clearly exceeded the merits of
    public disclosure. 
    Missoulian, 675 P.2d at 970
    . The Court
    ruled that closed job performance evaluations were justified
    because the individual privacy interest of the university
    president clearly exceeded the public's right to know.
    
    Missoulian, 675 P.2d at 973
    .
    In Belth v. Bennett (Mont. 1987), 
    740 P.2d 638
    , 44
    St.Rep. 1133, the balance was between insurance companies'
    privacy interests in national regulatory reports on them and
    the public's right to disclosure of the reports. The Court
    first determined that the insurance companies had a
    constitutionally-protected privacy interest. The Court then
    stated the balancing test as whether the demand of individual
    privacy clearly exceeded the merits of public disclosure.
    
    Belth, 740 P.2d at 641
    . Because the Court found that there
    were ways other than reviewing the reports to obtain similar
    information about insurance companies' performance and finan-
    cial status, and because the reports had been represented to
    the insurance companies as confidential during data gather-
    ing, the Court affirmed the ~istrictCourt in denying release
    of the requested information.
    In Engrav v. Cragun (Mont. 1989), 
    769 P.2d 1224
    , 46
    St.Rep. 344, we weighed the public right to know about county
    law enforcement operations, as represented by appellant's
    desire to do a school research project, against the privacy
    interest of persons named in daily logs of telephone calls,
    case files of criminal investigations, pre-employment inves-
    tigation reports, and a list of persons arrested. We deter-
    mined that the individuals whose names would be disclosed by
    release of the information had an actual expectation of
    privacy which society recognized and that this privacy inter-
    est outweighed the appellant's right to do a study for his
    school research project. We stated that no compelling state
    interest justified invading the privacy of the individuals
    affected. 
    Engrav, 769 P.2d at 1229
    .
    In the present case, the ~istrictCourt declared that
    "it is not good public policy to recognize an expectation of
    privacy in protecting the identity of a law enforcement
    officer whose conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to merit
    discipline." We agree. The law enforcement officers in the
    present case may have had a subjective or actual expectation
    of privacy relating to the disciplinary proceedings against
    them. However, law enforcement officers occupy positions of
    great public trust. Whatever privacy interest the officers
    have in the release of their names as having been disci-
    plined, it is not one which society recognizes as a strong
    right.
    On the other hand, the public has a right to know when
    law enforcement officers act in such a manner as to be sub-
    ject to disciplinary action. The public health, safety, and
    welfare are closely tied to an honest police force.       The
    conduct of our law enforcement officers is a sensitive matter
    so that if they engage in conduct resulting in discipline for
    misconduct in the line of duty, the public should know. We
    conclude that the public's right to know in this situation
    represents a compelling state interest.
    When we balance the limited privacy interest of the law
    enforcement officers against the public's right to know which
    officers have been disciplined for unlawful acts, we conclude
    that the ~istrictCourt was correct. The privacy interest of
    the officers does not clearly exceed the public's right to
    know. We note that we are not ruling that the entirety of
    any personnel files must be revealed.     The ~istrict Court
    ordered only the release of the names of the officer who was
    terminated and those who resigned.
    Affirmed.
    We concur: