State v. Jungers ( 1990 )


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  •                             No.    90-302
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    1990
    THE STATE OF MONTANA,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    RICHARD DUKE JUNGERS,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    73 l
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    APPEAL FROM:   District Court of the First Judicial ~istrsik, P
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    In and for the County of Lewis and Clark, E &
    The Honorable Thomas Honzel, Judge presidigzu 0 -  7C.
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Randi Hood, Public Defender, Helena, Montana
    For Respondent:
    Marc Racicot, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
    Jennifer Anders, Asst. Atty. General, Helena,
    Montana
    Mike McGrath, County Attorney, Helena, Montana
    Leo J. Gallagher, Deputy County Atty., Helena,
    Montana
    submitted on Briefs:        November 1, 1990
    Decided:   December 11, 1990
    Filed:                                   0
    Justice R. C. McDonough delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    Richard Duke Jungers appeals from a jury verdict finding him
    guilty of felony theft.   The District Court of the First Judicial
    District, Lewis and Clark County sentenced Jungers to ten years for
    the felony theft and an additional twenty years with twelve years
    suspended as a persistent felony offender. Jungers was designated
    dangerous for purposes of parole.   We affirm.
    The issues presented for review are:
    1.    Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Jungers'
    conviction for felony theft;
    2.    Whether Jungers was afforded effective assistance of
    counsel.
    In the weeks preceding Thanksgiving of 1989, Richard Duke
    Jungers stayed at an apartment rented by Debbie and Ron Newbreast,
    which was located in Helena, Montana.    His stay at the apartment
    was intermittent because at times he stayed with his girlfriend,
    or was out of town.   However, when he did stay at the apartment he
    slept on a couch which was in the front room.          The Newbreasts
    occupied the bedroom, which apparently was the only other room in
    the apartment.
    During this same period of time a number of burglaries
    occurred in the Helena area.   On Thanksgiving day Virginia Pruett
    observed a man running across her neighbor's back yard carrying a
    long object wrapped in a rug or blanket. The man ran to a blue and
    white jeep which was waiting in an alley.        The   man threw the
    wrapped object into the back, climbed into the passenger side of
    the vehicle which then drove off.    The man Ms. Pruett saw running
    across the yard had dark tousled hair and was not Richard Jungers.
    She could not identify the driver of the vehicle.
    Gwen Smith, the owner of the house was out of town for the
    Thanksgiving holiday.   Upon returning home, she found out that her
    house had been ransacked. She prepared a list of missing personal
    property which included several pieces of jewelry.    She estimated
    the total value of her missing property at $4,300.00.
    Shortly after the reported burglary, police found a Jeep
    Cherokee matching Ms. Pruett's description parked in an apartment
    complex across the street from the Helena Police Department. The
    police took a photograph of the vehicle and showed it to Ms.
    Pruett, who stated that it was similar to the vehicle she had seen
    in the alley Thanksgiving day.      Upon further investigation, the
    police discovered that the vehicle belonged to Richard Jungers, who
    as stated earlier, had been staying with        Debbie and Ronald
    Newbreast at their home in the apartment complex.
    On December 1, 1989, Helena police, pursuant to a search
    warrant entered and searched the Newbreast residence.    An arrest
    warrant was also issued for Richard Jungers and while the officer
    searched the home, Jungers was arrested.      Recovered during the
    search were several items taken from area homes and offices during
    recent burglaries. These items included a .22 rifle which belonged
    to Henry Smith and a bronze statue and a notary seal taken from the
    Morrison-Meloy Law Office during a burglary which occurred shortly
    after the Thanksgiving holiday.   Also found were several articles
    of jewelry taken from the Gwen Smith residence.
    Jungers was charged with four counts of burglary in violation
    of 9 45-6-204, MCA, and felony theft (common scheme) as defined in
    9 9 45-6-301 and 45-2-lOl(7).    After Jungers entered his plea of not
    guilty, the State moved to dismiss the four counts of burglary.
    The District Court granted this motion and ordered trial to proceed
    on the charges of felony theft.
    Following trial, a jury found Jungers guilty of felony theft
    as defined by   §   45-6-301(1)(c), MCA.   The District Court sentenced
    Jungers as heretofore stated.      This appeal followed.
    Jungers argues that there is insufficient evidence to support
    his conviction for felony theft.           As stated earlier, he was
    convicted of felony theft because the jury found he received stolen
    property.   This offense is defined in 9 45-6-301(3), MCA, which
    states in pertinent part:
    (3) A person commits the offense of theft when he
    purposely or knowingly obtains control over stolen
    property knowing the property to have been stolen by
    another and:
    (a) has the purpose of depriving the owner of the
    property ;
    (b) purposely or knowingly uses, conceals, or
    abandons the property in such manner as to deprive the
    owner of the property; or
    (c) uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing
    such use, concealment, or abandonment probably will
    deprive the owner of the property.
    Section    45-6-301(6),    MCA,   provides   that   the   line   of
    demarcation between felony and misdemeanor theft as to the value
    of the property stolen is $300.00.          Taking these two sections
    together, it is apparent that in order to support Jungers'
    conviction the evidence must support the conclusion that:
    1.  Jungers had control over
    2.  stolen property
    3. whose value exceeded $300.00,
    4.   with the intent to deprive its owner of such
    property.
    During trial, four items seized during the search of the
    Newbreast home were entered into evidence.        The value of these
    items, as estimated and testified to by their owners was:
    .22 rifle                $225.00
    items of jewelry         $5-$10.00
    notary seal              $27.00
    X
    bronze statu e           $50.00
    The total value of this property approximated $307-$312.00.     This
    evidence as a whole is sufficient to meet the value requirement of
    felony theft.
    However, Jungers strongly argues that the evidence does not
    support the conclusion that he purposely or knowingly had control
    over the stolen property. The .22 rifle, in particular, was found
    in a closet in the Newbreasts' bedroom.    According to testimony of
    Debbie and Ronald Newbreast the rifle was sold to them by another
    friend, Freddy Gaither.        Jungers maintains that there is no
    evidence he had access to the closet or the rifle and therefore his
    control over it cannot be established.        Since the State cannot
    prove he had control of the rifle, his conviction for felony theft
    is unsupported because the only items proven to be in his control
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    were worth          at the most, $87.00, which is less than the
    required for a felony conviction.
    We disagree with Jungersl argument.      We begin by noting that
    the testimony of Ronald Newbreast is far from convincing.      It is
    riddled with inconsistencies and suspect explanations.         Following
    his arrest Newbreast told police that the .22 rifle was brought
    into the apartment by Richard Jungers.       By the time he was called
    to testify, however, Newbreast changed his story to incriminate
    Freddy Gaither, who apparently had fallen from Newbreastts favor
    because he suspected him of Ifratting them out."               Newbreast
    attempted to account for this inconsistency through various
    explanations including his insistence that he was high at the time
    of the police interview or, in the alternative, that he lied to get
    out of jail.
    We further note that testimony established, contrary to
    Jungerst argument, that Jungers had full access to the Newbreast
    apartment.     Testimony established that Jungers and the Newbreasts
    were very generous towards one another and shared all of their
    belongings.     This generosity towards Jungers apparently included
    permission to enter the Newbreasts1 room and access to their
    personal belongings.
    Given this testimony, we hold that the evidence meets the
    requirement of control.     The standard of review employed by this
    Court   when   reviewing   jury   verdicts   in   criminal   matters   is
    necessarily very limited.    This standard dictates that:
    [A] conviction may not be overturned when the evidence
    presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the
    prosecution, would permit a rationale [sic] trier of fact
    to find the essential elements necessary to establish the
    offense. State v. Holman (1990), 
    241 Mont. 238
    , 241, 
    786 P.2d 667
    , 669.
    The above evidence would permit a jury to find such essential
    elements.
    Next Jungers argues that he was denied his constitutional
    right to effective assistance of counsel. In making this argument
    Jungers maintains that through his failure to rebut the value of
    the stolen property seized by police, his attorney failed to
    adequately represent him.     As stated earlier, only four items
    seized at trial were appraised by their owners. The value of these
    items totaled between $307-$312.00.       Jungers argues that his
    counsel should have attacked the values placed on these items in
    an effort to establish a total value less than $300.00, which would
    have led to a conviction for the lesser crime of misdemeanor theft.
    In asserting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
    Jungers must establish two elements. First he must prove that his
    lawyer's performance fell below the range of competence reasonably
    demanded of attorneys by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution. Second, he must demonstrate that the deficiency was
    so prejudicial that he was denied a fair trial.       State v. Senn
    After careful review of the record, it is apparent that
    Jungersl counsel performed adequately and competently.         It is
    obvious that he decided, as a matter of tactic, to confront
    Jungers'   guilt head   on   in an   effort to   establish   complete
    innocence. Perhaps he utilized this tactic in an effort to prevent
    Jungers, who was on parole, from being sent back to prison. At any
    rate, we refuse here to second guess counsells tactical decisions.
    Accordingly, we hold that Richard Duke Jungers was not denied his
    constitutional right to effective assistance of counse. The jury's
    verdict is affirmed.
    ,
    Justice2
    2    &5~ /
    hief Justice
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 90-302

Judges: McDonough, Turnage, Barz, Hunt, Weber

Filed Date: 12/11/1990

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/11/2024